Huang Xiaofeng*

Several centuries before the Portuguese came to shore at Macao, asking to "[...] use a piece of land to dry out their tributes, [...]" Macao served as a port for China's trade with the outside world and also for smuggling, 1 Between 1535 and 1553, the Portuguese stole their way into Haojing'ao• (Haojing Bay), the Shizimen (Cross Gate) (including Shangchuangdao• (Sanchoan or St. John's Island) and Lanbaijiao• (Lampacau)) in search of a base at the mouth of the Zhujiang• (Pearl River) from which to conduct their smuggling activities. From 1557 to 1572 (the last year of the reign of the Longqing Emperor) [r.1567-† 1572], which was the time during which Wang Bo• was promoted to the post of haidaofushi• (Deputy Superintendent of Maritime Affairs) in Guangdong and subsequently removed from office, Macao became a commercial port which was occupied solely by Portuguese. They had 'bribed' Wang Bo to obtain permission to land and settle there. It is evident that 1573, the first year of the Wanli• Emperor's reign Jr. 1573-† 1620], was the year during which the Portuguese 'leased' the territory and established the port 'officially' and 'legally'.2 The first year of the new Emperor's reign was the year in which the minister Zhang Juzheng• began his vigorous and resolute investigation of officialdom, undertaking a thorough inquiry into officials and ministers in the local government of Guangdong. He considered the 'gifts' from the Portuguese in Macao to be 'ground rent' which was to be handed over to the Imperial treasury. From then on, it was acknowledged officially in the Fuyi quanshu• (General Register of Taxes and Services) of Guangdong that the Portuguese had the right to 'lease' Macao in usufruct. Yan Song• was in office in approximately in 1557, a year in which money-driven and avaricious corruption was rife. Ouyang Bijin, • appointed zongdu• (Viceroy) of Liangguang• (Guangxi• and Guangdong) in 1553, was Yan Song's nephew; Chen Gui,• zongbing• (Commander of the Armed Forces) of Liangguang, was related to Yan Song by marriage. 3 Judging from this, the historical basis of the so-called 'bribing' of Wang Bo seems overwhelmingly convincing.

From Jiajing• [r.1522-†1566] reign, years twenty-eight to thirty-four [JJ 28 =1550 - JJ 34 = 1556], the Portuguese returned from Zhejiang• and Fujian• in search of a base for their smuggling activities. At that time, the northern frontier of the Ming Empire was crumbling. There was a large scale invasion in the eighth lunar month of 1550 by Mongol Anda• forces, who laid siege to the capital and withdrew only after they had plundered it. The attack became known as 'Gengxu zhi bian'• ('The 1550 Incident'). The Anda forces attempted invasion several more times between then and 1557, such that there was constant fighting on the frontier. Despite the efforts of Zhu Wan• to control piracy on the south-eastern seaboard, the measures he took in fact stirred up opposition in both government and public circles against the prohibition of maritime trade. The piracy which went on during the Jiajing period was an unfortunate consequence of this ban on maritime trade. The pirate Wang Zhi• wrote that he did nothing but:

"[...] seek to gain from maritime trade, selling goods in Zhejiang and Fujian for the mutual benefit of himself and others, guarding the country's coastline, and on no account plotting misdeeds with bands of robbers."

He pleaded with the Imperial Court to pardon him of the crime of smuggling contraband, saying that he:

"[...] would offer himself as the humble servant of the Court, at ports beyond Dinghai• in Zhejiang such as Changtu,• coordinating the payment of taxes in the same way as on the coast of Liangguang, guaranteeing prompt delivery of tributes and undertaking to safeguard any islands put under his jurisdiction so that the Japanese pirates could not resume their domineering activities, enabling him to keep them at bay without resorting to force. If this proposal is accepted, would it not atone for my mortal crimes?"4

The phrase "[...] coordinating the payment of taxes in the same way as on the coast of Liangguang [...]" in the above passage indicates that policy of the local government in Guangdong was somewhat relaxed with regard to foreign trade.

Qu Dajun mentions:

"Previously, when foreign ships came, they brought profit both for the treasury and for the people. [...] They provided the state and the army with supplies which both came to depend on. There was no person either in officialdom or in the public who did not benefit. It was because of this benefit to the people that permission was granted [for foreign ships to come]."5

He also had the following opinion of the Portuguese:

"When the folangji• [Portuguese] came from the Western seas, they committed minor acts of bullying and aggression which were not without reason. The presence now of their ships in Zhangzhou• and Fujian has given no cause for alarm. On the contrary, they would not dare to cause trouble. Everything is quite in order."6

"The boats bringing tributes came to Zhangzhou and Quanzhou,• a change from previously established practice, and trade in Guangzhou fell into decline."7

Consequently, in Jiajing reign, year eight [JJ 8 =1529], Lin Fu, the xunfuduyushi• (General of the Armed Forces) of Liangguang, who was originally from Putian• in Fujian province, submitted the following petition to the Emperor, requesting that"[...] trade with foreign ships be opened." He attacked the ban in Guangdong on maritime traffic on the grounds that:

"The present ban, imposed for the purpose of avoiding conflict, and for the benefit of all, is causing the army and the state to lose revenue. The constitution established by our ancestors is forgotten and our links with those far away are lost. [...] It is heavy-handed and over-cautious to forbid all trade and the presentation of tributes to the Emperor, like forgoing all food for fear of choking."

Li Fu pointed out that trade with foreign ships had four advantages. Firstly, it would bring considerable profit. Secondly, the trade surplus would augment the income of the army. Thirdly, it would simultaneously satisfy the urgent immediate needs of Guangxi, bringing benefits both to the authorities and to the people. Fourthly, by supporting commercial activity amongst the people, and developing trade, Guangdong would once again enjoy its former reputation of affluence and wealth. Lin Fu's discourse reveals the considerable resolve and bravery it would have taken for a local official from Guangdong to assert that opening the ports for trade would be of benefit both to the country and to the people. He wrote that the great advantages of opening up the seas were such that they would:

"[...] help the country and provide for the army, and could be relied on both by the people and by government. Furthermore, it was certain to be of benefit to the people, rather than the vaunted transition from illicit trading to criminal activity!" The forcefulness of his opinion is evident. Lin Fu represented those in Guangdong who advocated the opening up of sea trade also employed a whole range of clever tactics to enable trading by sea to begin again: they acted as the occasion demanded, and acted effectively.

"It is proposed that the haidaofushi and the beiwodu zhihui• (Commander of the Defence Force) against the Japanese Pirates should send out patrols to inspect the seas and inlets and strategic points such as Nantou• [Lantau] in Dongwan.• Every ship which arrived should, in accordance with the established regulations and after rigorous interrogation to ascertain their validity, be allowed to occupy quarters as in the past."

There was also a provision that:

"[...] if ships arrived of which there was no record in the official register, such as the folangji [Portuguese], they were duly driven out of Chinese waters."8

It can be deduced from this that the "[...] seas and inlets and strategic points such as Nantou in Dongwan, [...]" and other locations at the mouth of the Zhujiang were the principal locations for 'quartering' the trading ships from early on. These were also the places where the Portuguese habitually stopped off to trade. In the Mingshi (Ming History), Lin Fu's Memorial to the Emperor reads:

Panoramic of Colina da Penha (Guia Hill). Bottom left: The old Palacete de Santa Sancha (Santa Sancha Manor House), former Summer Residence of the Governor, before its demolition and reconstruction in 1923-1925. FAN MINGSAN 范明三, former vice-director of the Shanghai Buwuguan 上海博物馆 Shanghai Museum, Shanghai. Photograph taken ca 1913, in Macao.

"Allowing trading now with the folangji will bring four benefits. [... The account goes on to include the phrase:...] Subsequently, folangji ships will continue to come into Xiangshan'ao·(Xiangshan Bay) [i. e., Haojing'ao• (Haojing Bay)] to trade, and then sail up to Fujian to trade there also."9

This passage from the Mingshi rubric Folangji can probably be reliably traced to the same source as the Ming tongjiang• (Records of the Ming [Dynasty]). Dai Jing's Guangdong tongzhi chugao• (Preliminary Draft of the Records of Guangdong)10 came out in Jiajing reign, year fourteen [JJ 14 = 1535], six years after the submission of Lin Fu's Memorial to the Emperor, and there is no reason to doubt its authenticity. In the very same year, it is mentioned in the Mingshi that:

"Captain Huang Qing• was paid a bribe to order the trading ships in Guangdong to move to Haojing Bay in Xiangshan, and to order them to pay a yearly tax of twenty-thousand taels."11

Even if this were not entirely true, it is probably not a complete fabrication. Just three months after Lin Fu's Memorial to the Emperor, the Bingbu• (Ministry of War) discussed and approved it. The Jiajing Emperor Shizong• granted permission:

"The foreign ships which were allowed into Guangdong under the previously established regulations are not to be prevented. However, they are to be driven away and not permitted to stop in Zhangzhou."12

Lin Fu's threat in his Memorial to "[...] drive the folangji out of territorial waters, [...]" appears to have been calculated to put the case for reopening foreign trade in Guangdong, but the "[...] four advantages [...]" appeal mentioned earlier must have made on behalf of the Portuguese who ran the entrepot trade from far away. The shibosi• (Superintendent of Trading Vessels) in Guangzhou chose not to establish a foreign trading post at the existing postal station of Huaiyuan.• He chose instead the "[...] seas and inlets and strategic points such as Nantou in Dongwan [...]" at the mouth of the Zhujiang (he showed an early preference even for the remote location of Dianbai)•13 to be opened up as mooring points for foreign trade. This shows the circumspection and farsightedness of Lin Fu's vision. This change opened up a convenient doorway for the Portuguese: they could now mingle in the 'quartering' stations and carry out direct contact trade on a large scale. In fact, the "[...] four advantages of now allowing the folangji to trade [...]" did indeed come to fruition. It reveals the shrewd cunning and sheer pragmatic audacity of the local government in Guangdong. Lin Fu phrased his mention of the ban on the Portuguese entering territorial waters to trade such that it was no more than a hollow formula; when the time came for its actual implementation, the wording was 'corrected' as it was applied to the real situation. In Shuyu zhouzi lu• (Records of Various Expenses in Various Districts), the original text of Lin Fu's Memorial to the Emperor reads:

"[...] the proposal was approved; the foreign ships returned to Guangzhou. [... This is followed by...] but since the folangji are forbidden from coming and going, their followers were more inclined to go and mix with them on their boats to carry out trade."14

By pursuing a policy of limited opening to trade, with the aim of"[...] prohibition through permission, [...]" Lin Fu proceeded with extreme caution when the policy was put into practice, in order to achieve his stated aims of showing conciliation and benefiting both public and private interests. After Lin Fu's term of office was over, eunuchs took over the responsibilities of the shibosi in Guangzhou. Whenever a ship anchored in a bay, honest functionaries, the assistants of the county magistrate, were sent out to inspect their merchandise and collect the customs duty; the shibosi did not intervene. Only then did the Portuguese coming to the mouth of the Zhujiang discover that they could anchor at Shangchuandao instead of at Haojing'ao, probably because they wanted to keep their distance from the government office at Xiangshan. Until 1552, whenever Francis Xavier• came to China, he anchored at Shangchuandao rather than Haojing'ao, which suggests that in that year, Macao was not yet a place where the Portuguese could set foot whenever they pleased. In 1530, after Guangzhou was once again open to foreign trading ships, there were eight main "[...] seas, inlets and strategic points [...]" where the foreign boats could stop: Guanghai• and Wangdong• in Xinning;• Langbai'ao• (Langbai Bay), Haojing and Shizimen in Xiangshan County; Hutoumen• (Tiger's Head Gate) Tunmen• and Jiqi• in Dongwan county. In the early days, Langbaijiao was the widest trading inlet, being more than one hundred li• wide. 15

"In 1537 there were three Portuguese settlements near Canton• [Guangzhou], one at St. John's• [Shangchuandao] one at a smaller island called Lampacao (Lang-peh-kau),• lying northwest of the Grand Ladrones, and the third just begun on Macao. In 1542 traders had left St. John's for Lampacao, and ten years afterward, at the time of Francis Xavier's death, trade was concentrated at the latter, where five or six hundred Portuguese constantly resided in 1560."16

Fernão Mendes Pinto• recorded that:

"After the massacres in the north, Lampacao• [Langbaijiao] was the only port left at which the Portuguese could trade; but in 1557, by means of the customary pecuniary inducements, permission was give to erect sheds, to dry and store cargo, on the 'desert island' of Amakau• [Macao], the port of the goddess Ama."•17

The entrance to the Pagode da Barra or Ama Miu (Ama Temple). FAN MINGSAN 范明三, former vice-director of the Shanghai Buwuguan 上海物馆 Shanghai Museum, Shanghai. Photograph taken ca 1913, in Macao.

While Rev. Robert Morrison wrote that"[...] temporary shelters [...]"18 had already been constructed by the Portuguese in Jiajing reign, year sixteen [JJ 16 = 1537]. It is evident from these accounts that even if the theory that"[...] Huang Qing took bribes for asking the authorities to move the trading post to Haojing [...]" is based in rumour, it is not without a certain historical basis.

A book by Guo Fei• completed in Wanli reign, year thirty [WL 30 = 1602] is the earliest surviving documentary evidence in Chinese of the establishment of Macao:

"In Jiajing reign, year thirty two [JJ 32 =1553], the foreign ships reached Haojing. Claiming that their sails had been torn in a gale, and that the articles they had brought as tribute for the Emperor were soaked through, they asked for the use of a patch of land on which to dry them out. Wang Bo, the haidaofushi, took a bribe from them and granted them permission. At first, they constructed only a few dozen shelters from clumps of reed; later on, seeking to make a profit by trading, they gradually brought in bricks, tiles and wood to build houses with, and the settlement became more populous. Subsequently, when all the other bays were unusable, Haojing became the major mooring point. "19

Zhang Rulin• and Yin Guangren• mention that the date in which the Portuguese 'intermingled' or 'settled' in Macao is put at "[... Jiajing reign], year thirty two [...]" [JJ 32 = 1553]:

"In [Jiajing reign], year thirty two, foreigners arrived, claiming that forceful gales and waves had struck their ship. They asked for permission to use an area of land at Haojing on which to set out the tributes they had brought, which were soaked through. They were granted permission by Wang Bo, haidaofushi. At first, they only made shelters out of reeds. The merchants sought illicit gains from trading, and gradually brought in bricks, tiles and beams to build houses with, and the folangji were able to settle in. They constructed tall and sumptuous buildings, arranged side-by-side and facing each other like the teeth of a comb. After a period of time they took up permanent residence. The settlement of the foreigners in Macao began from the time of Wang Bo."20

A work by Zheng Shungong• describes two occasions in 1554 and 1555 when Portuguese came to trade in Guangzhou:

"In Jiayin• year [1554], folangji ships came and anchored off Guangdong. Zhou Luan,• known as Kegang,• advised the foreigners to pass themselves off as subjects of a different country, give false reports of having sighted pirates and pay the customs duty according to the regulations. The haidaofushi, Wang Bo, intentionally granted them permission to enter and trade. They attracted the attention of the other tradetrs by going out to sea in small junks, which they then loaded with foreign merchandise for sale in Guangdong. They even tried to go into the city to trade there.

In Yimao• year [1555], the folangji foreigners lured some Japanese into the waters off Guangdong. Zhou Luan had the Japanese disguise themselves as folangji, and in this way succeeded in trading in the Maima• market in Guangdong, where they remained for some time before leaving again. This was how the folangji attracted Japanese merchants to trade in Guangdong every year. Gangsters and criminals established roots on the islands settled by the foreigners, under the pretence of being merchants. They perpetrated acts of piracy from there, coming and going by sea, mainly in the south-east."21

A book by Yan Ruyan,• contains the following passage:

"At the beginning of the reign of the Hongwu• Emperor [r.1368-†1398], foreigners were forbid-den from entering the towns in the places where they gathered to trade and anchored their ships. [...] It was not until the reign of the Zhengde Emperor [r. 1506-† 1521] that the foreigners began illicitly to build houses in order to be able to trade more easily in the inlets. A single house could fetch a price of up to several hundred taels. In Jiajing reign, year 35 [JJ 35 = 1556], Wang Bo set out the 'Kegang'• ('Regulations for Visitors'), and the 'Keji'• ('Disciplinary Code for Visitors') for the inhabitants of Guangdong, Huizhou •and Quanzhou."•22

It is apparent that Wang Bo's acceptance of bribes and his calculated granting of permission to trade freely was in the interests of merchants in Guangdong, Guangxi, Huizhou and Quanzhou. Wang Bo, originally from Fuliang• in Jiangxi• province, began his career in officialdom by passing the highest Imperial exams. In Jiajing reign, year thirty two [JJ 32 = 1553] he was appointed anchasi fushi xunhai fushi• (Superintendant of the Coast); in Jiajing reign, year thirty six [JJ 36 = 1557] he was promoted to anchasi anchashi• (Provincial Superintend). His promotion shows that his achievements and behaviour in Guangdong must have impressed his superiors. Ruan Yuan's Yang Jisheng zhuan• (Biography of Ding Yizhong) reads:

"From time to time the folangji violated the ban, and stole into the southern bay at Macao; this was actually at the instigation of Wang Bo, the haidaofushi. Ding Yizhong raised the objection that "This is bound to cause trouble for Guangdong's future. Should this matter not be reconsidered?" Wang Bo did not follow this advice, however."23

Ding Yizhong was also a native of Jiangxi, from Nanchang, • and also began his career by passing the Imperial examinations. He was appointed a anchasi in Jiajing reign, year thirty two [JJ 32 = 1553]. However, when the two were compared, it became apparent that Wang Bo was more decisive and resolute in his handling of affairs than Ding Yizhong. Xia Xie• wrote in Jiajing reign, year thirty six [JJ 36 = 1557] that:

"On the 13th day of the seventh month, in autumn, the Governor of Fujian presented a tribute of sixteen taels of ambergris; the xunfu of Guangdong's tribute was more than nineteen taels. [...] Formerly, the Imperial Court dispatched Wang Jian• and other functionaries to procure longxiangxiang• [ambergris] from Fujian and Guangdong, but after a lengthy period of time, it had not been obtained. Subsequently, Wang Jian proposed that consideration should be given to the levying of a tax on ships which entered the bay. Any ship which arrived carrying ambergris should be allowed to trade it. In this way, ambergris could be bought at a modest price and would be more easily obtained, without the need for officials to be specially sent to look for it. The Ministry approved Wang's proposal and requested the return of all the officials who had been dispatched, and bestowed the responsibility for acquiring the substance on haibo• [Customs Officer] and the xunfu. The proposal was carried out."24

The eunuch functionaries had originally had the task of procuring the unobtainable ambergris until 1557, when the xunfu took on the task and, using their official powers, they procured it most successfully.

St. Paul's Church facade, built betwewen 1601 and 1640, seen from the bottom of the staircase leading to it. FAN MINGSAN 范明三, former vice-director of the Shanghai Buwuguan 上海博物馆 Shanghai Museum, Shanghai. Photograph taken ca 1913, in Macao.

"During the early years of the reign of the Jiajing Emperor Shizong, supplies diminished in the Imperial kitchens. After Zhengde reign, year nine [ZD 9 = 1514], grand construction projects were afoot, including the attendant religious ceremonies, requiring wood, incense, pearls, jade and precious stones. The functionaries made haste and exerted all possible efforts to obtain these. More than thirty thousand catties of wax was used. Similarly, by offering exemption from various tax duties, they obtained more than one hundred thousand catties of chenxiang• (eaglewood), jiangxiang• (acronychia pedunculata), naiqizhuxiang• (marine lacquer) and other aromatic substances. [...] By inviting the foreign trading ships into the bay, the emissaries soon found what they had been searching for so long."25

Between the seventh and tenth lunar months of Jiajing year reign, thirty three [JJ 33 = 1554], Wang Bo, haidaofushi, received orders from Bao Xiangxian,• a sea captain and shilang• (Undersecretary) in the Bingbu (Ministry of War) of Lianggguang, and instructions from commanders Wang Pei• and Hei Mengyang• to levy troops to combat a band of more than a thousand "[...] foreign bandits and Japanese pirates [...]" who were attacking the coast. Wang Bo's successive accomplishments were to capture He Yaba• in Sanzhouyang,• Fang Wu,• the foreigner Zhaguoluo• and more than a hundred others in the waters of Zhelin• off Chaozhou,• thwarting the pirate leader Xu Bixi.• 26 If this quashing of the pirates in 1554 had not taken place, it would have been impossible in 1557 to attract foreign ships into port to obtain ambergris. And so it was in 1554 that:

"[...] the Portuguese concluded a secret treaty with the local authorities in Guangdong. The principal person concerned on the Portuguese side was Leonel de Souza,• who led a fleet of ships on an expedition to Japan. In 1554, [Leonel] de Souza wrote in a letter to a friend: "The Chinese have never differentiated between the Portuguese and other Europeans, and refer to them indiscriminately as folangji. From now on the Portuguese are recognised separately and merit their attention." He also wrote: "After signing the peace agreement in 1554, the Chinese no longer referred to the Portuguese as fangui•[foreign devils], but simply as foreigners."27

According to Henri Bérnard-Maître, Leonel de Souza's policy with regard to the Chinese was determined by Francis Xavier in the following manner:

"The day after the death of Francis Xavier, there was a sudden flash of hope in China. In a number of places in Guangdong there were influential merchants who deeply regretted the prospect of ending the ban on foreign trade. At the same time, the authorities were urgently seeking to raise funds to combat piracy off the coast of Liangguang. They were displeased by the Imperial Court's decision to cut off their source of customs revenue. It was at this moment that Leonel de Souza cleverly seized the opportunity to intervene. On the pretext of draft arrangements which had been made by Francis Xavier when he returned from Japan, peace was formally established."28

This agreement was not easily abandoned, especially in light of the significant contributions of the Society of Jesus after the establishment of Macao. 29 Zhang Tianze• writes that the Portuguese entered Macao in 1553 solely because they had "[...] the permission of the haidaofushi Wang Bo [...]" (quoted from Aomen Jilue (Monograph of Macao)). He finds this reason "[...] not entirely convincing [...]".30

If the Portuguese thought that their presence in Macao was possible simply because a few mandarins granted temporary permission, then they would not have bothered to construct buildings of such a permanent nature to live in. The rapid influx of large numbers of Portuguese to Macao and the rapid development of Macao as a port all both give the impression that the new residents felt secure, and such security derived simply from favourable treatment.

The third motivation for settling in Macao is that expounded by the Jesuit missionary Álvaro Semedo in his book published in Rome in 1643. Being a natural researcher, during the twenty two years he spent in China, Álvaro Semedo collected a large quantity of valuable information relating to China, for the most part quite accurate. In our opinion, his writing is the first reliable work on China by a European after Marco Polo. His account of the background to the Portuguese settlement in Macao does not derive from his own research. Undoubtedly it represents the prevalent view of the Portuguese who were living in Macao at the time. It reads as follows:

"The island is located fifty four miles away [from Shangchuandao or St. John's], and therefore within the territorial boundaries of this kingdom. It is known as Gau Xan• [Ao Shan], and the Portuguese call it Macao. It is a small island of dense coral reefs, extremely easily defended, and perfectly suited to use as a pirate hideout. In fact, this was exactly the situation at the time. In those days, hordes of pirates flocked there and threatened all the surrounding islands. The Chinese had discussed how they might eliminate this scourge. Either because they lacked the courage, or because they were unwilling to put themselves at risk, they decided to employ a third party to fight on their behalf. So once they discovered that the Portuguese were valiant and skilled in fighting, they conferred the burden of risk onto the Portuguese. They promised that if the Portuguese were able to banish the pirates, they would give them the island to live on.

The Portuguese were delighted with the offer and accepted the condition eagerly. In spite of their small numbers, many times fewer than the pirates but were more skilled in techniques of warfare. They prepared their forces for battle and made a sudden attack on the pirates. They inflicted heavy losses on their adversaries, but suffered not a single casualty themselves. They began building their houses immediately afterwards, each of them choosing a location which he found satisfactory."31

Partial view of the facade of St. Paul's Church. FAN MINGSAN 范明三, former vice-director of the Shanghai Buwuguan 上海博物馆 Shanghai Museum, Shanghai. Photograph taken ca 1913, in Macao.

In our view, Álvaro Semedo's account of the establishment of Macao is the most convincing: the Portuguese right to settle in Macao was given as a gesture of thanks for a job well done. In 1554, the shibosi moved from Macao to Langbaijiao, a move which has not been satisfactorily explained to this day. An eminently plausible reason is that the threats and harassment of the pirates were growing steadily worse. However, after the authorities had relinquished Macao, the pirates would certainly have plundered it and used it as a hideout until they were driven out. It is quite natural that Chinese historians and chroniclers have not made much of the contribution the Portuguese made to the project of banishing the pirates. At that time, piracy was rampant in southern China, and hostile clashes between the pirates and the government forces were frequent. In the records which have survived, there is scant mention of actual clashes, although much was written about the horror and tragedy they caused. The reason for this is as follows: clearly, the fact of the expulsion of the pirates from Macao may have been thought to be of much greater significance and consequence than any of the government's other victories. It was only years later, after the Chinese had forgotten the courageous and outstanding contribution of the Portuguese in those events, that people became fully aware of the wider implications of the Portuguese involvement.

The local government in Guangdong used the Portuguese to suppress the pirates not only as a matter of expedience. More importantly, it was a way to remove an obstacle which stood in the way of resolving the economic crisis by seeking foreign trade. At that time, the absolute priority was to rid the South China of the menace of piracy, in order to proceed with the urgent task of attracting foreign trade to the mouth of the Zhujiang. Therefore, the decision to enlist the help of the Portuguese to expel the pirates was certainly the best option, under the circumstances. With the benefit of historical hindsight, there are at least two instances, beyond a shadow of doubt, where the Portuguese's assisted the Ming government in banishing the pirates and putting down rebel forces. The first was in Jiajing reign, year forty [JJ 40 = 15 61], when the pirate Zhang Lian• came from Guangdong and made trouble along the coast, at one point reaching the city of Guangzhou:

"[...] during the reign of the Jiajing Emperor, the Guangdongnese pirate Zhang Xilao• [Zhang Lian] attacked Macao and surrounded Guangzhou. The officers of the garrison invited the Western guests [i. e., the Portuguese] to help them out of their predicament. The pirates were driven out as far as Macao and wiped out completely."32

The other incident was the Zheling bingbian• (Zhelin Rebellion) of Jiajing reign, year forty three [JJ 43 =1564]:

"Several hundred of the garrison troops in Chaozhou rebelled, [...] they pillaged and burnt the neighbourhood and drove out the residents. Subsequent attempts to punish them failed, and the situation worsened. There was panic in Guangzhou."33

The Ming dynasty general Yu Dayou invited the Portuguese to assist the Chinese in putting down the rebellion. However, Yu Dayou, Pang Shangpeng• and Lu Tinglong• and other officals who wanted to keep the ban on maritime traffic petitioned the Emperor with proposals to drive the Portuguese out of Macao. The Imperial Court in fact took the opposite measure of opening up foreign trade, the policy advocated by Zhang Minggang, •zongdu •of Liangguang;

"Although the Japanese pirates had left, the folangji in Macao remained. Some were of the opinion that it would be expedient to expel them with a large military force, and to eliminate the foreign menace once and for all. The opposite body of opinion held that the occupation of Haojing [Macao] was unacceptable because it was part of mainland territory, and that the threat to the interior could be eradicated if the foreigners moved to outer waters beyond Langbaijiao and traded directly from their ships. It was argued that, as a part of Xiangshan county, Haojing was protected by a military garrison along the coast. Furthermore, the foreigners were dependent on us for all their daily needs. It was sufficient that, if their intentions changed, their source of supplies could be cut off, condemning them to perish without any need for bloodshed or fighting. Even if sizeable forces were deployed there, it would still be difficult to penetrate. If they moved out to Langbaijiao and the seas beyond, vast and unbounded, then the location of their ships would be uncertain. How would it be then be possible to question foreign ships when they arrived? If they are providing wrongdoers with material assistance, how can we put a stop to it? We would be powerless to prevent them from dealing with the Japanese pirates. How could we implement the Imperial ban properly? By preventing Chinese wrongdoers from slipping out and Japanese pirates from finding their way in, we will avoid provoking trouble without compromising our defences, and at the same time prevent further problems. If those who are not Chinese do not pose a threat are not stopped from coming and not prevented from going, there will be no cause for them to proliferate. It would always be possible later on for a decision to ban them to be made by a higher authority."34

The text of the Memorial to the Emperor of Zhang Minggang appears in a slightly different version in the Mingshi (Ming History):

"If the foreigners remain in Haojing [Macao], it will be easy for us to observe and question them. If they relocate to the outer waters at Langbaijiao, in the vast open seas, it would be difficult to investigate and question them if their intentions changed. It is better for the foreign merchants to remain on the mainland."35

The young scholar Zhu Yafei,• of the History Department at Shandong Daxue• (Shandong University), has produced an acutely insightful analysis of the Macao problem. His pragmatic approach enables him to assess the facts of Macao's history from a broad historical standpoint. He believes that the Imperial Court agreed to Zhang Minggang's suggestion, and that this was the final impetus which caused the Portuguese finally to settle in Macao:

"It is not difficult to deduce that by harnessing the force of the Portuguese to deal with the trouble of the Japanese and the pirates, the Ming government was effectively using the Portuguese as a means of controlling the Portuguese themselves. Their aim was to prevent them from forming alliances with the Japanese and the pirates, while at the same time using them to tackle the Japanese and the pirates. Just as Yu Dayou• said: "Use government troops to control the foreign merchants; use the foreign troops to control the Chinese rebel troops." The Portuguese ability to gain a foothold in Macao was due, to a large extent, to the Ming government's policy. Using the Portuguese to eliminate the pirates was a way of increasing their control over the Portuguese themselves, which undoubtedly had advantages for the Ming government and for local officials alike. The Portuguese, by assisting the Ming forces to suppress the pirates, were guaranteeing the security of their own trading routes and gaining the trust of the Ming government. This was another step towards establishing their own base. In Jiajing reign, years forty two and forty three, [JJ 42 = 1563, JJ 43 = 1564], the Portuguese on two occasions sent troops to help the Imperial forces to tackle pirates and the rebel Chinese troops; this was certainly a way of paying the Ming government for the lease of Macao. This was not an isolated incident, and it was certainly not the case that the Ming government did not have the military power to expel the Portuguese. For all the above reasons, it can be assumed that the Portuguese occupied Macao with the tacit approval of both the Ming government and of high-ranking local officials. The reasoning that Wang Bo, the haidaofushi, granted them permission solely on the strength of a bribe simply does not hold water. It is virtually impossible to entertain that Wang Bo would have risked his career and his own and his family's lives by secretly giving away national territory to foreigners. If this was what actually happened, the Ming government would hardly have given their approval; they would taken measures similar to those adopted during the Zhengde period, and driven the Portuguese out."36

Zhang Minggang's tactic in controlling Macao reflected the Ming Court's policy of restraint towards the foreign merchants. It represented also the victory of the more flexible policy of the Ming Court and the officials of the local government in Guangdong, who advocated the lifting of trade restrictions, over the rival policy of those who wanted the restrictions to remain in place. Between 1535, when the Portuguese began their furtive occupation of Haojing'ao, 1557, the last years of the Jiajing Emperor's reign, when they established their settlement in Macao, the Portuguese also took the initiative to find a way to placate the local government in Guangdong (by making of a 'gift' of five hundred taels and further contributions made yearly of twenty thousand taels) in order to keep their monopoly on the import and export trade conducted through Macao. During the first year of the Longqing Emperor's reign [1567], the Ming Court approved the proposal made in memorials submitted by Tu Zemin,• the new xunfu of Fujian, to lift the restriction on maritime traffic, and officially opened the port of Yuegang in Zhangzhou county, Fujian province. Yuegang was the only port from which Chinese merchants could trade with the outside world, while Macao was the only port through which the Portuguese, with special permission, could conduct their import and export business. The opening of these two ports in Fujian and Guangdong enabled the law prohibiting trade to be upheld while at the same time enabling some trade to take place along the south-eastern seaboard. This culminated in renewed debate of the Imperial Court's policy on foreign trade which had been in place for the previous four decades, and prompted the introduction of limited reforms which was largely sufficient to meet the urgently needed markets for the agricultural and manufactured products of the provinces of the south east.

In the first year of the Wanli Emperor's reign [WL 1 = 1573], Prime Minister Zhang Juzheng• proposed, as part of his programme of reforms, assessment of the achievements of government officials, as well as strict legislation, revision and scrutiny of every level of government, promotion of honest government, such that no official dared put a foot wrong. In 1568, Zhang Juzheng severely criticised Zhang Yuanzhou, dufu• (Vice-Governor) of Liangguang, in a letter: "The course of events in Guangdong has now taken an unexpected turn." He was referring to the attacks on Guangzhou and Lianzhou• by the pirate Zeng Yiben• in the first year of the Longqing Emperor's reign [LQ 1 = 1567]. "The military commanders are incompetent and the morale of the army is low, [...] such that on catching a glimpse of the pirates, they immediately flee to the north at full sail, without so much as a clash of swords."

There were still many pirates in Guangdong until Wanli year six [WL 6 = 1578]. Zhang Juzheng considered that this "[...] was not due to the rebellious nature of the people, but rather to the poor morality of the government and the malign greed of its officials."37 Zhang Juzheng wrote the following year that: "Bad practices have lingered on from the times of the Jiajing and Longqing Emperors: the income of the governors and magistrates is unchecked, they spend too much time engaging in social intercourse, and their spending is wanton. These practices are widespread in every province, but are particularly serious in Guangdong. Since taking up office, have I not rejected a total of more than ten thousand taels which Your Excellencies in Liangguang have had the kindness to offer me? If I had accepted them in the usual manner, I too could be a rich man."38

Previously, during the eighth lunar month of Longqing year five [LQ 5 = 1571], Yin Zhengmao was sent to take up the post of zongdu of Liangguang and received the following instructions from Zhang Juzheng: "Liangguang certainly is a territory in disorder. It is not enough to threaten the use of military force. This would neither give the wrongdoers anything to fear nor earn the respect of honest citizens."39 Also: "If the provisions for the soldiers were increased, it would certainly be possible to pacify the region within one or two years."40

The official administration of Guangdong was first target of Zhang Juzheng's programme of reform and reorganisation. This naturally involved tackling the problem of Macao. Wang Bo left office in Longqing year five [LQ 5 = 1571]. The following year, the Portuguese in Macao presented their annual 'gift' of five hundred taels at the usual time and in the usual manner to the successor in the post of haidaofushi. This happened to coincide exactly with the change of Emperor. The Longqing Emperor Muzong• died in the fifth month of the sixth year of his reign (Renshen)•[r.1567-†1572] and the Wanli Emperor Yijun• acceded to the throne the following month [r.1573-†1620]. Zhang Jingpan,• the zhixian• (County Magistrate) of Xiangshan, wrote that: "It is confirmed that the Europeans have resided in Macao from the time of the Jiajing Emperor's reign, as recorded in the county records.They paid an annual rent of five hundred taels of silver. It was established procedure for the district authorities to send notification to the Portuguese functionaries around the time of the winter solstice during the eleventh lunar month. Messengers were sent to Macao to collect the money. The amount paid was entered in the records of land and population. The money went to the local exchequer, and was included in the yearly accounts submitted to the high court. All payments up to Daoguang• [r. 1821-†1850] reign, year twenty-eight [DG 28 = 1849] are recorded clearly and completely."41 The payment was made at the time of the winter solstice. The timing of the winter solstice can be calculated as having taken place not during Longqing reign, year six [LG 6 =1572], but just after the change of Emperor, in Wanli reign, year one (Guisi)• [WL 1 = usually calculated as 1573]. This is why the Aomen jilüe (Monograph of Macao) also records that:

"The monthly payment of five hundred taels of silver for the lease of Macao was collected from Xiangshan county. It is recorded in the Mingshi• (Ming History) that twenty thousand taels were levied annually from Haojing. It is not known when the annual payments of five hundred taels were begun, though this is the amount entered in the Fuyi quanshu• (General Register of Taxes and Services) of the Daoguang Emperor, which was based on the Register of the previous Wanli Emperor."42

The account given in Montalto de Jesus' book Historic Macao is more or less the same:

"Roughly in 1554, and with the permission of the Deputy Superintendent of Maritime Affairs [haidaofushi] Wang Bo, the Portuguese settled in Macao. Initially, they did not pay rent to the Chinese government; they simply paid a yearly bribe of five-hundred taels to the hai-tao.• [haidaofushi]. This continued until 1573, when other officials learnt of the bribe, after which it was categorised as land rent. It was paid into the imperial treasury until 1849."43

Therefore, on the cusp between the two Imperial reigns, the Portuguese, unaware of the reforming instincts of the Ming government since the accession of the new Emperor, sent their 'gift' in the normal manner to the new holder of the post of haidaofushi. However, an interlude of somewhat theatrical scenes ensued in the subsequent unfolding of Sino-Portuguese relations ensued. Non-Chinese sources contain the following wonderfully detailed description:

"In 1572 or thereabout, as the Portuguese went to a fair, the mandarins, attired in red, issued from a gate to receive the dues usually brought, presenting the Portuguese with cakes and a jar of wine as was their wont; after which the interpreter, Pedro Gonçalves, a mestizo, whilst talking with the hai-tao [haidaofushi] remarked that the Portuguese also brought the five hundred taels payable as the colony's rent. As this was said in the presence of other mandarins, the hai-tao, finding himself compromised, hastily replied that the money should be remitted to the te-quei• [tiegui] as it was for the Imperial Treasury. Since then it was received as such."44

The writer of this account is of the opinion that the "[...] official establishment of Macao, [...]" or, strictly speaking, only a specifically defined area of two square li in the south-western part of the peninsula of Macao, should be counted from the first year of the Ming dynasty Wanli Emperor [1573]. From this year onwards, the Portuguese payments to the central Chinese government for the lease of Macao were 'official', and Macao became a trading port leased by the Portuguese, but remained under the jurisdiction of the shibosi at Guangzhou and the prefecture of Xiangshan county, and was duly recorded as an official legal clause in the Fuyi quanshu (General Register of Taxes and Services) of Guangzhou. This record may also be considered retroactive recognition and confirmation of the Portuguese presence in Macao. Between then and Wanli reign, year six [WL 6 = 1578], the authorities in Guangdong became increasingly open, allowing the foreign merchants at Macao to trade directly with the port at Guangzhou. The Portuguese were also permitted from 1578 onwards to take part in the biannual trade fair known in Chinese as the 'Dingqi shi'• "('Fixed Term Market') held on an island in the in the Zhejiang Harbour at Guangzhou. 45

"After a period of prosperous trade along the coast of China, the Portuguese had been allowed to settle at Macao; and there they lived under the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities. The Portuguese jurisdiction over Portuguese subjects was not generally interfered with; but in all other respects the Chinese control, territorial, judicial, and fiscal, was absolute, and remained so for three centuries, until1849."46

Portuguese historians of the time wrote that: "In 1557, China conceded to our peaceful occupation of Macao."47 A very grand turn of phrase, "[...] peaceful occupation [...]" indeed! In reality, an occupation arrived at through bribery can hardly be considered honourable in any respect. Now that we have been able to examine anew the actual historical facts of the establishment of Macao, we may take as our point of departure the contemporary state of international relations and the mutual 'requirements' of the Chinese and the Portuguese before carefully drawing, bit by bit, clear details into the muddled picture of history which prevails. Only then is it possible for us to understand fully the connotations of the phrase "[...] the friendship between the Chinese and Portuguese peoples, [...]" which has undergone tortuous contortions through the course of history. So it was that in 1557, after the death of the King of Portugal, Dom João III [°1502-r.1521-+11557], his sucessor, his threeyear-old grandson Dom Sebastião [°1554-r. 1568-†1578] was too young to control the complex affairs of the vast Portuguese Empire. From then until 1570, the Portuguese Crown abandoned its monopoly on trade in the Far East. The expansion into the Far East had already caused the Portuguese to fall into decline, and subsequently in 1580 the Portuguese lost their independence.

"Their ancestors in Aljubarrota had fought heroically for their freedom; just two centuries later they were on the point of being broken and brought to their knees by the enemy they had previously defeated."48

Portuguese involvement in the smuggling trade with Japanese pirates on the south-eastern coast of China had been foiled and the Portuguese had been forced to return to the mouth of the Zhujiang in search of a means of trading peacefully. At this time, the Portuguese had already entered an era in which they would be forced to battle for the survival of their nation. The establishment of Macao, and the opening up of the market for agricultural and manufactured products in late Ming society, revitalised business for the Portuguese navigator merchants. From then on, the Portuguese appeared to function "[...] as a bridge between the Asian world, provider of commercial goods, and the capitalist European world, consumer of those goods."49

The fundamental reason for the establishment of Macao was that the Ming government was forced to comply with the newly emerging relations of production which had been brought about by the traditional system of organisation in the country at that time. This was especially the case in the coastal areas, where the government was obliged to implement policies involving a degree of openness by the sheer force of the momentum of the developing capitalist-driven commerce. Monetary reform of the fiscal system was set out in a nationwide 'yitiao bianfa'• ('single whip' law'), in force from Jiajing reign, year one [JJ 1 = 1522] until Wanli reign, year twenty [WL 20 = 1592]. The purpose of this policy was to avoid the crisis of battling with Asian style despotism and the traditional means of production which would result from a change in the system of land ownership. The policy was also a consequence of the encroaching commercial and monetary economy, or, put another way, it forcefully induced a keen desire for the exchange of goods and money both within the country and abroad. 50 Therefore, the historical background behind the establishment of Macao seems to be all the more complex for having set off a chain reaction between the Far East and the West, ultimately involving almost the whole world. It not only rang alarm bells heralding the end of the history of the traditional 'Asian method of production' in China; it also hastened, either directly or indirectly, a whirlwind process of material and spiritual transformation of European society from commercial capitalism to industrial capitalism. A further effect of this, over several centuries, was the Enlightenment 'movement' in the East and the West. Mutual influence and interaction thus engendered gradually built up enormous momentum. The meeting of the Eastern and Western worlds through the maritime links established during the sixteenth century raised the curtain on the prelude of modern civilization. The rise of Macao can be said to have provided the first solid, irrevocable point of contact between East and West.

Translated from the Chinese by: Justin Watkins

HO SANG WONG 黄豪生. Historical Heritage IV. Photograph 1998.

* Consulting Editor of the Chinese edition of "Wenhua zazhi"• ("Review of Culture"). Founding member of the Aomen wenhua yanjiuhui• (Macao Cultural Research Association). From 1994 to 1997 he undertook research for a doctoral degree at Jinan daxue• (Jinan University), in Guangzhou, working on Zhong-wai guanxi shi fangxiang• (Directions in the historiography of Sino-International relations). The present paper is a chapter of his doctoral dissertation.


1QU Dajun 屈大均 Guangdong xinyu «广东新语» (New Words of Guangdong), fasc.15: Huoyu «货语» (Trading Commodities):

"The barbarians who came to Guangdong were form lands with unfamiliar names: Nian,· Luolan,· Duntian,· Liqi,· Mendu,· Youda,· Luoyue,· Foshi,· Heling,· Geluo,· Gegeluo,· Polu,· Shizi,· Moyi,· and Folangji,· all of whom came to present tributes and to trade. [...] When people came from any of these countries, it was usual for them to three ships to sail to Guangdong, from where emissaries departed for Beijing to present the tributes. Meanwhile, the ships traded their goods and returned home. They returned the following year to meet their emissaries, then traded goods and departed for home once again. Whether they presented three tributes in three years or just once every five years, the ships made three journeys for each tribute, with Macao as the stopping-off port each time."

See: YIN Guangren 印光任 - ZHANG Rulin 张汝霖, ZHAO Chunchen's 赵春震annot. ed., Aomen jilüe «澳门記略» (Monograph of Macao), Aomen 澳门 Macau, Aomen Wenhua Sishu 澳门文化司署 Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1922, part.l, chap.2: Guanshou pian «官守篇»(Governance) - "Since the Tang and Song dynasties, the presentation of tributes by foreigners had come under the jurisdiction of the shibosi (Superintendent of Trading Vessels); no official in Macao was entrusted specifically with this responsibility. At the end of the reign of the Zhengde· Emperor, all contact with the folangji was forbidden, as a means of penalising them for their harassment and threatening behaviour."

This shows that there was no official responsible specifically for Macao, but not that there was no trading post there. The ban on contact with the Portuguese came into force only at the end of the Zhengde Emperor's reign.

2YIN Guangren 印光任 - ZHANG Rulin 张汝霖, op. cit., part.1, p.106 - "The annual rent paid for Macao was five hundred taels, which was levied from Xiangshan county. According to Mingshi «明史» (Ming History), the yearly ground rent for Haojing was twenty thousand taels; the source of a payment of five hundred taels recorded in the Fuyi quanshu «赋役全书» (General Register of Taxes and Services) is not clear. The Register of the new Qing dynasty [1644-1912] was based on the Register of the previous Ming dynasty [1368-1644]. The payment of ground rent for Macao must therefore have started at some time in the middle of the Wanli period."

3YIN Shouheng 尹守衡, Huangming shiqie «皇明史窃» (History of the Imperial Ming Dynasty), fast.92: Yang Jisheng zhuan «杨继盛传» (Biography of Yan Song), apud, ZHANG Xianqing 张显清; Yan Song zhuan «严嵩传» (Biography of Yan Song), Huangshan shushe chubanshe "黄山书社出版 Huangshan Publishers, 1992, p.240.

4Wobian shilüe «倭变事略» (Encounters with Japanese pirates), pp.113-114.

5QU Dajun 屈大均 op. cit.; apud, HUANG Zuo 黄佐 Guangdong tongzhi «广东新语»(Guangdong Records).

6DAI Jing 戴埙, Guangdong tongzhi chugao «广东通志初稿» (Preliminary Draft of the Guangdong Records), [a Ming dynasty block-printed edition in the Beijing tushuguan• (Beijing Library)] - for a slightly different account of the original text of Lin Fu's Memorial to the throne. An excerpt from this reads: "Recently the Portuguese came from the Western seas. They committed minor acts of bullying and aggression which were not without reason. The presence now of Portuguese ships in Zhangzhou and Fujian has given rise to no reports of plundering or looting. On the contrary, they would no dare to cause trouble. Everything is quite in order."

7HUANG Zuo "黄佐 op. cit.

8 Idem.

Also see: GU Yanwu 顾炎武, Tianxia junguo libing shu «天下群国利病书» (Benefits and Faults of Prefectorial China), vol.33 [original edition], rubric: Jiaozhi xi'nan yi tiao «交址西南夷条» (About the foreigners from the Southwest).

9Mingshi «明史» (Ming History), rubric: Folangji «佛郎机» (Chronicles of the Folangji).

10HUANG Wenkuan 黄文宽 Aomen shi gouchen «黄文宽» (Treatise on the History of Macao), Aomen 澳门 (Macao), Aomen Xingguang chubanshe 星光出版社 Macao Starlight Publishers, 1987, p.65.

11Mingshi «明史» (Ming History), rubric: Folangji «佛郎机» (Chronicles of the Folangji).

12Ming Shenzong shilu «明世宗实录»(A Factual Record of the Ming Emperor Shenzong), fasc.106.

13Ming Xizong shilu «明熹宗实录» (A Factual Record of the Ming Emperor Xizong), There is the following comment in the sixth lunar month of Tianqi reign, year one (Xinyou) [TQ 6:1 = 1621]: "All the countries who present tributes for the Emperor enter the country through Guangzhou, and traded with the local inhabitants. A body was established to encourage and promote trade with foreign vessels, and to levy tax on the goods traded. During the Zhengde period [r.1506-†1521], they moved away and anchored instead at Dian County in Gaozhou. Until Jiajing reign, year fourteen [JJ 14= 15 3 5], commander Huang Qiong took bribes and was asked to petition the Emperor to permit the foreigners to settle in Haojing Bay."

This evidence seems to indicate that "Dianbai"• and "Haojing'ao" ("Haojing Bay") - as well as "Langbaijiao" ("Langbai Bay"), located between the two - were the designated mooring points where the trade promotion authorities collected a tax on traded goods. The movement of these trading points was determined by the changing patterns of harassment at the hands of the "Japanese peril" in the mouth of the Zhujiang (Pearl River).

14YAN Congjian 严从简, ed., Shuyu zhouzi lu «殊域周咨录» (Record of Various Expenses in Various Districts), vol.9, pp. 10-11.

15Qu Dajun 屈大均 op. cit.

16WILLIAMS, S. Wells, The Middle Kingdom. A Survey of the Geography, Government, Education, Social Life, Arts, and History of the Chinese Empire and its Inhabitants, 2 vols., New York, John Wiley, 1848, vol.2, p.433.

17MORSE, Hosea Ballou, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, 3 vols., London, Longman, Green & Co., 1910-1918, vol.1, p.42.

18MORRISON, Rev. Robert, View of China for philological purposes: containing a sketch of Chinese chronology, geography, government, religion and customs, designed for the use of persons who study the Chinese language, London, Black - Parbury and Allen, 1817.

19GUO Fei 郭棐, Guangdong tongzhi «广东通志» (Guangdong Records).

20YIN Guangren 印光任 - ZHANG Rulin 张汝霖 op. cit.

21ZHENG Shungong 郑舜功, Riben yajan «日本一鉴» (Japan Examined).

22YAN Ruyan 严如熤, Yanfang jiyao «洋防辑要» (Abstracts on Coastal Defense), fasc.15: Guangdong haifang «广东海防» (Coastal Defence of Guangdong).

23RUAN Yuan 阮元, Ding Yizhong zhuan «丁以忠传» (Biography of Ding Yizhong), in Zuo 载, "Guangdong tongzhi" "广东通志" ("Guangdong Records").

24XIA Xie 夏燮, Ming tongjian «明通鉴» (Records of the Ming [Dynasty]), fasc.61.

25Guangdong kaogu jiyao «广东考古辑要» (Archaeological Abstracts of Guangdong), rubric: Haifang «海防» (Coastal defence), in «明通鉴» "Minghui dian" ("Ming Dynasty Institutions"); apud LIANG Jiabin 梁嘉彬 Mingshigao folangji zhuankaozheng «明史稿佛郎机传考证» (Textual research on the "Chronicles of the Folangji" in the "Ming History"), in BAO Zunpeng包遵彭, ed., "Mingshilu cong" «明史论丛» ("Anthology of Studies of the "Ming [Dynasty]""), Taiwan 台湾, Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju 台湾学生书局 Taiwan Student Press, 1968, p.39.

26Mingshilu «明实录» (A Factual Record of the Ming [Dynasty]), passim - Seventh lunar month of Jiajing reign, year three (Yihai) [JJ 7:3 = 1525]; also eigth [JJ 8:3] and tenth [JJ 10:3] months.

27JESUS, Carlos Augusto Montalto de, Historic Macao: International Traits in China: Old and New, Hong Kong, Kelly and Walsh, 1902 [2nd edition: Macao, Salesian Printing Press - Tipografia Mercantil, 1926]

28BÉRNARD-MAÜTRE, Henri, S. J., Aux Portes de la Chine: les Missionaires du Seizième Siècle, 1514-1588, Tientsin, Procuré de la Mission de Sienshein, 1933.

29As a consequence of the first Jesuit expedition from Lisbon to India and the Far East of 1541, led by Francis Xavier, fourteen groups of Jesuit missionaries were sent to work in the Far East between 1545 and 1555.

See: SILVA, Beatriz Basto da, Cronologia da História de Macau, Séculos XVI-XVIII, 4 vols., Macau, Direcção dos Serviços de Educação e Juventude 1992-1998, 1992, vo1.l, pp.8-12.

30ZHANG Tianze 周景濂 Zhong-Pu zaoqi tongshang shi «中葡外交史» (History of Early Sino-Portuguese Trade).

31SEMEDO, Álvaro, Relatione Della Grande Monarchia Della Cina Del P. Alvaro Semedo Portvghese Della Compagnia Di Giesv. Com Privilegio., Romæ, Sunptibus Hermainii Scheus, 1643 - Extract translated from this edition. Also see: SEMEDO, Álvaro, The History of That Great and Renowned Monarchy of China. Wherein all the particular Provinces are accurately described: as also the Dispositions, Manners, Learning Lawes, Militia, Government, and Religion of the People. Together with the Traffick of Commodities of that Countrey. Lately written in Italian by F. Alvarez Semedo, a Portughese, after he had resided twenty two years at the Court; and other Famous Cities in that Kingdom. Now put into English by a person of quality, and illustrated with several Mapps and Figures, to satisfie the curious, and advance the Trade of Great Brittain. To which was added the History of the late Invasion, and Conquest of that flouri∫ing Kingdom by the Tartars. With an exact Account of the affairs of China, in these present Times, London, Printed by E. Tyler for Iohn Crook, and to be sold at his Shop at the Sign of the Ship in S. Pauls Churchyard, 1655.

32Bude yibian «不得巳辨» (Rebuttal).

33"Dongyang xuebao 东洋学报 Journal of Oriental Studies", vol.8, nol; apud, ZHU Yafei 朱亚非, Mingdai Zhong-wai guanxi shi yanjiu «明氏中外关系史研究» (A historical study of Sino-International relations during the Ming dynasty), Jinan chubanshe 济南出版社 Jinan Publishers, 1993, p.258.

34Ming Shenzong shilu «明·神宗实录»(A Factual Record of the Ming Emperor Shenzong), fasc.527 Twelveth lunar month of Wanli reign, year forty six (Jiwei)•[WL 12:42 = 1614] [or forty two (Yimao)].

35Mingshi «明史» (Ming History), rubric: Folangji «佛郎机» (Chronicles of the Folangji) - Jiajing reign, year forty two [JJ 42 = 1563].

36ZHU Yafei 朱亚非, Mingdai Zhong-wai guanxi shi yanjiu «明代中外关系史研究» (A historical study of Sino-International relations during the Ming dynasty), Jinan chubanshe 济南出版社 Jinan Publishers,1993, p.259.

37ZHANG Juzheng 张居正 ZHANG Shunhui 张舜徽, ed., Zhang Juzheng ji «张居正集» (Collected Works of Zhang Juzheng), Hubei Renmin chubanshe 河北人民出版社, Hubei People's Press, 1990, vol.2 - Da Liangguang Liu Ningzhai lun yan qu yu<<答两广刘凝齌论严取与» (Response to Liu Ningzhai's proposal on the strategy for combatting the pirates).

38ZHANG Juzheng 张居正 ZHANG Shunhui 张舜徽 ed., op. cit. -Da Liangguang Liu Ningzhai tiao jinglüe haikou sishi «答两广刘凝齌论严取与» (Response to Liu Ningzhai on observing strictness in the acceptance of gifts).

39ZHANG Juzheng 张居正 ZHANG Shunhui 张舜徽 ed., op. cit. - Da Pan Zongxian Liweng «答潘总宪笠翁» (Response to Military Chief Pan Liweng).

40ZHANG Jingpan 张璟盘, Chaofu Putaoya ren jiu jiao Aomen dizu yuanwei bing «查覆葡萄牙久缴澳门地租原委禀» (Report investigating the details of the long-term lease of Macao by the Portuguese).

41LI Shijin 厉式金, Minguo Xiangshan xianzhi «民国香山悬志» (County Records of Xiangshan during the Republican Period), fasc.6: Haifang «海防» (Coastal de fence).

42YIN Guangren 印光任 - ZHANG Rulin 张汝霖, op. cit.

43JESUS, Carlos Augusto Montalto de, op. cit.; apud, ZHOU Jinglian 周景廉, Zhong-Pu waijiao shi «中葡外交史» (A History of Sino-Portuguese Relations).


45HUANG Qichen 黄启臣, Aomen lishi (zi yuangu -1840 nian) «澳门历史(自远古-1840年» History of Macao (Ancient Times - 1840), Aomen Macau, Aomen lishi xuehui 澳门历史学会 Macao Historical Association, 1995, pp.59-60.

46MORSE, Hosea Bellou, Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China 1635-1834, 3 vols., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1926, vol.1, pp.8-9.

47SARAIVA, José Hermano de, LI Junbao 李均报 - WANG Quanli 王全礼 trans, into Chinese, Putaoya jianshi «葡萄牙简史» (Breve História de Portugal), Aomen 澳门 Macau, Aomen Wenhua Sishu 澳门文化司署 Instituto Cultural de Macau - Huashan wenyi chubanshe "花山文艺出版社 Huashan Literary Press, 1994, p.155.

48NOEL, Charles E., Putaoya shi «葡萄牙史» (History of Portugal), Translated into Chinese collectively at Nanjing Shifan Xueyuan 南京师范学院 Nanjing Teacher Training College, Xianggang 香港 Hong Kong, Shangwu yinshuguan 商务印书馆 Commercial Press, 1979, p. 178.

49SARAIVA, José Hermano de, op. cit., p169.

50See LI Xun 李洵, Xiaxue ji «下学集» (Anthology of Common Studies), Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan Chinese «中国社会科学院» Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; XIAO Shafu 萧萐父- XU Sumin 许苏明, Ming Qing qimeng xueshu liubian «明清启蒙学术流变» (Evolution of Enlightened Study of the Ming and Qing Dynasties), Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe 辽宁教育出版社 Liaoning Educational Press, 1995; GE Rongjin 葛荣晋, ed., Zhongguo shixue shi «中国实学思想史», (History of Chinese Scholarship, Beijing 北京, Shoudu Shifan Daxue chubanshe 首都师范大学出版社 Capital Normal University Press, 1995; YANG Guozhen 杨国祯 - CHEN Zhiping 陈支平 FU Yiling 傅依凌, ed., Mingshi xinbian «明史新编» (New Edition of the Ming History), Xianggang 香港 Hong Kong, Zhongguo tushukan xingshe 中国图书刊行社 China Books, 1994.

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