THE“MACAO ISSUE”AT THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE (1921-1922) FOR THE HISTORY OF PORTUGUESE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY1

The Historiography on Sino-Portuguese relations has long been subordinated to a strictly Macanese Historiography. This is because it often focuses more proficiently on the origin, development and decline of the Colony. However, this has overshadowed the real terms of a relationship that evolved over four centuries between Portugal and China, one that is centred on the existence of a Portuguese settlement in Chinese Territory. Studies such as this one2 are becoming scarce, and there is a definite need for an overview of the evolution of one of the oldest and most persistent Issues in the History of International Law and International relations between East and West. This brief Study covers but a small fraction of this much vaster area and is intended only to highlight the value of an examination of unknown facts and circumstances, in order to clarify Portugal's foreign policy over the last one hundred years and provide a better understanding of it.

Until Portugal and China concluded the Preliminary Lisbon Protocol (on the 26th of March 1887) and the subsequent Friendship and Commerce Treaty (signed in Beijing, on the 1st of December 1887, and ratified on the 28th of April 1888), the 'Macao Issue' consisted essentially of the problem of ascertaining Portugal's Right to be in Macao and getting China to recognize that Right. After the Treaty of Beijing was signed, and until the first half of the present century, the focus of the problem shifted to the delimitation of the Territory, an Issue that was left unresolved by Article 2 of the Treaty. 3 Almost all moments of heightened controversy in Luso-Chinese relations have been related to this unfinished business. Such was the case with the negotiations leading up to the informal Accord signed (1890) by Consul Cinatti and Viceroy Li Hongzhang 李鸿章 that concerned the use of the waters of the Porto Interior (Inner Harbour); the polemic that followed the apprehension of the ship Tatsu Maru, in 1908; the inter-governmental talks held in Hong Kong, in 1909; and the many disputes that ensued from the construction of the Porto Exterior (Outer Harbour), culminating in a dramatic crisis that was temporarily resolved through a Regional Agreement signed, in September 1920, by the Government of Macao and the Military Government of Guangdong but was rekindled, in September 1921, and continued even after the Washington Conference had ended, under circumstances that are beyond the scope of this Study.

The so-called 'limits of the 'Macao Issue' became the cause célèbre of Portuguese Foreign Policy in the Far East, catalysed by Historical prestige and the firm belief that solving the problem would set off a chain reaction that would bring the Territory the economic well-being it had known in previous eras and liberate it from the stigma of being dependent on revenue from gambling and the opium trade. This would be realized through projects such as the building of the new harbour and the proposed rail link between Macao and Guangzhou.

To provide an exact definition of the problem of Territorial 'limits' or to expound ad nauseam on the complex terms of the arguments put forward by each of the Parties to protect its interests would be beyond the scope of this Study. It is important to note, however, that in the early 1920s the Portuguese Government found itself at an impasse, with no visible possibility of resolving an Issue it considered vital. Already disenchanted by the Via Dolorosa of the Accord that ended the 1920 Crisis, Portugal doubted that the change in regime that took place in China, in 1912, might in any way alter the monolithic rigidity of the precept the Mandarins of Beijing and Guangzhou always invoked when considering Portugal's claims in the Territory: that Macao was a Chinese Territory occupied by the Portuguese, circumscribed by the Peninsula of the same name and totally devoided of Territorial waters.

Having lost the opportunity to sit at the feast table set up by the Powers in China after the Boxer Rebellion, and having given up hope of obtaining the decisive support of Britain that the latter, constrained by the Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, was no longer willing to risk, the Portuguese Government seized every opportunity that the new post War context seemed to offer with respect to the intervention of the victors in the untangling of the 'Macao Issue'. This Study examines one of the moments in which the hopes and fears intensified to a level that transcended mere bilateral relations: the International Conference on the limitation of Armament and Matters related to the Far East, commonly known as the Washington Conference.

The Washington Conference had its genesis in a situation that stands out among the major International relations Issues of the first half of the twentieth century－even among the many that resulted from the presence of foreigners in Chinese Territory－because of its profound repercussions on the modern History of China: the 'Shandong Issue'.

In 1898 the Imperial Government granted Germany the ninenty-nine-year lease of the naval base of Jiaozhou 胶州, located in the Province of Shandong 山东. 4 During World War I, the Japanese expelled the Germans and took control of the Region. They cleverly succeeded in legitimizing their position through a series of Secret Treaties with Russia, France, Italy and, above all, Britain, who promised to support Japan at the 1919 Peace Conference and to second Japan's claims to Germany's Colonies in the Pacific, North of the Equator. In return, Japan was to support England's claims to the Colonies South of the Equator. A Secret Pact concluded between Beijing and Tokyo, in 1918, sealed Japan's expansionist plans: in return for a loan of twenty million yen to China's warlord Government, Japan won the right to build two railways in Shandong and to station troops at various strategic points in the Province.

At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Chinese Delegation was greatly disillusioned. Entrusted with the task of recovering Shandong and resolving a series of vexatious situations created by the so-called 'unequal' Treaties, the Delegation was not only rebuffed by the Government of Beijing, but also abandoned by the Allied Powers (who had already agreed to support Japan) and confronted with the Secret Pact of 1918, that Japan hastened to exhibit. China's sole supporter, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, was persuaded by the Allied Representatives that priority should be given to establishing the League of Nations with Japan as a Member, thus postponing the resolution of China's claims. However, President Wilson guaranteed that:

"[...] as soon as the proposed League of Nations is established, we will give China all our assistance and aid her to remove all present inequalities as well as restrictions upon her legitimate rights, so that the Republic of China shall truly become a perfect, independent, Sovereign, great State."5

In April 1919, when Japan won the battle over Shandong at the Conference, a Nationalist protest, that came to be known as the May Fourth Movement, was immediately launched in China. The Movement was so vast and convulsive that it has been considered the first genuine mass Movement in the History of Modem China. 6

President Wilson sacrificed China in order to obtain Japan's Membership in the League of Nations, but he was unable to secure his own Country's Membership in the Organization. And he could hardly have guessed that Japan would be one of the first to withdraw from the League, which it did in 1933. As for China, its Delegation－independently of the domestic discord that might divide it and left to its own devices by the Government of Beijing－was not present at the ceremonies held on the 28th of June to mark the signing of the Peace Treaty with Germany, although the Treaty (Articles 128-134) made express mention of Sino-German Issues involving the renunciation of Privileges gained subsequent to the Boxer Protocol (1901), and the retrocession of the Territories of Hankou 汉口 and Tianjin 天津. 7

Despite the efforts made by the United States at the Peace Conference, the Shandong Issue and other problems related to the Pacific had not been resolved, so in 1920 the Americans considered the opportunity of trying again at the major International Conference to be held in Washington, in 1921. The primary objective of the Washington Conference was to bring together the Five Powers that since the First World War had been known as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan), to discuss the reduction and limitation of armament. However, the Conference would also include discussions on the possibility of modifying existing Policies in the Pacific and the Far East, to try to realign the balance of Power as far as possible and avoid the eruption of controversies or International conflicts in the Region that could lead to War. For this reason, the United States also invited China, Belgium, Holland and Portugal8 to participate in the Conference. Although these Four Nations would be excluded from the discussions on arms reduction, their interests in the Pacific and the Far East were significant enough to warrant their joining the other Five Powers, on equal terms, in the discussions related to that Region.

As mentioned above, the main objective of the Conference was to lessen the possibility of an International conflict in the Pacific and the Far East. However, the Powers－Japan among them－strove to meet this objective despite, and in addition to, China's interests (outlined in the famous 'Ten Points'), which became secondary because of the supremacy of realpolitik with respect to the redefinition of relations between the United States, France, Britain and Japan. The Root Resolutions (which were later incorporated into the Treaty signed by the Nine Conference Participants) and a realistic analysis of what was accomplished, over and above China's relative gains, 9 provide proof of this. There was generalized inertia when it came to finding a solution to some of the Issues raised by the Chinese (outstanding among them was a review of the Treaties in which they assented to the Rights and Privileges enjoyed by the Powers). In addition, Japan and Britain, in particular, wanted to maintain their respective spheres of influence, and the United States sought the guaranteed tutelage of China's resources and finances in the years to follow. As the Head of the Portuguese Delegation coldly denounced, the United States had:

"[...] called the Conference for the apparent purpose of rehabilitating China and guaranteeing its Autonomy, but they also wanted to guarantee their own interests in the East and gain greater preponderance over China, in order to liberate it as much as possible from Japan's influence, a Country whose Power in the Pacific was growing from day to day [...]".10

As E. Fung noted, a Treaty was signed at the Washington Conference under the pretext of giving China greater leeway so that it would have the space and means needed to resolve its internal Crisis without external constraints, but the truth is that the Treaty did nothing to change the belief that China should remain "under tutelage", because all Parties to the Agreement were convinced that the Country could not look after its own interests without their assistance, so they reserved the right to monitor the implementation of reforms that were defined according to Western criteria. 11

Although today Historical accounts do not acknowledge Portugal's participation in this touchy episode in post-First World War International relations, as one of the highlights in the evolution of the 'Macao Issue' in the first half of the twentieth century, the matter deserves attention. The attempt to settle the Issue by taking advantage of the new International order that prevailed after the war was not new. In 1919, Egas Moniz, one of Portugal's representatives at the Paris Peace Conference, personally discussed the delimitation of Macao with one of China's Representatives, Lu Zhengxiang 陸征祥, who at the time was Minister of Foreign Affairs. Afonso Costa, Portugal's Representative to the League of Nations, also made an effort to have the Issue debated there, as will be seen later.

Having accepted the invitation of the President of the United States to attend the Washington Conference, Portugal sent a Delegation headed by Ernesto Júlio de Carvalho e Vasconcelos, an eminent figure at the Ministério das Colónias (Department of Colonial Affairs) who was very familiar with the 'Macao Issue' (worthy of note are his contribution during the preparatory Period of the Hong Kong Conferences, in 1908, and, more preponderantly, as a Member of the Commission responsible for reviewing Portugal's policy with respect to China, in 1911). He was supported by the Viscount d' Alte, José de Horta Machado da França, an experienced Diplomat who was Portugal's Minister in Washington, from 1901 to 1932, to whom was assigned the Diplomatic orientation of Portugal's position.

From the outset (and because the 'Macao Issue' was excluded from the Conference), Portugal had little or no forum in which to state its position with respect to the Pacific and the Far East. It can be affirmed that the 'Macao Issue' was the only reason Portugal participated in the Washington Conference. There were two aspects to this Issue. First of all, the Viscount d' Alte, impressed by the level of participation in the campaigns launched by associations of Chinese students in the United States (approximately twenty-thousand participants), admitted that:

"[...] if Portugal had not been represented at the Conference, it would have run a significant risk because its opponents might have thought it a good opportunity to address the 'Macao Issue' in terms that would be unfavourable to Portugal. That is one of the reasons I was so determined to get us invited to the conference."12

Secondly, it is important to consider the interests of the Colonial Administration, which was faced with the Political discord in China. The so-called Warlord Era, which China entered after the death of President Yuan Shikai [• • •], in 1916, led to a Political split that had the most catastrophic effects, not the least of which was the fact that the International community recognized the legitimacy of a Government that, in an atmosphere of permanent upheaval, exercised little more Power in Beijing than it had within the walls of the Imperial City. In addition, Southern China fell into a state of effervescence resulting from the latent conflict between the Regional and personal interests of the Military leaders, and the more extensive ambitions of Sun Yixian 孙逸仙(Sun-Yat-sen), who was interested in using Guangdong as a revolutionary base from which to launch the unification campaign that he was anxious to lead.

To add to the oppressive weight of a financial crisis in Beijing, the Premier resigned at the end of 1921 because of the Issue of the Delegation sent to Washington, which generated further turmoil. In Guangdong, where he established a Military Government, Sun Yixian was proclaimed President. Faced with the impossibility of getting approval to send a separate Delegation to Washington, he refused to recognize any Agreement concluded at the Conference, even though the three leaders of the Chinese Delegation, Shi Zhaoji (Alfred Sze) 施肇基, Gu Weijun (Wellington Koo) 顾维钧 and Wang Zhengting 王正廷, sympathized with the South and represented the Nationalist cause with conviction. Despite this, right until the end of the Conference, the Government of Guangdong, through its Representative in Washington, Ma Soo, strongly criticized the performance of the Beijing Delegation.

Faced with such a prelude and the uncertainty of the outcome in a climate of extreme instability, and having recently experienced the traumatic events caused by the conflict with the Government of Guangdong over the Territory's boundaries, it is easy to understand why the Governor of Macao, aware of Portugal's participation in Washington, and even before the schism between North and South, hastened to suggest to the Department of Colonial Affairs that the pending Issue of the delimitation of the Territory be raised at the Conference. The suggestion was promptly entertained and transmitted, in September 1921, by Ernesto de Vasconcelos (who was at the time responsible for the Department's Direcção Técnica do Fomento (Technical Development Branch) to the Secretary-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs. To Vasconcelos, the request seemed opportune because Southern China wished to be represented at the Conference, which would in a way facilitate Portugal's desideratum; however, he felt it was necessary to find out if the Conference's Agenda would allow for discussions on such Issues. 13

The circumstances did not in any way facilitate the development of a Portuguese strategy in Washington. First of all, as previously mentioned, Sun Yixiang and the Government of Guangdong, which was considered a Regional Government in rebellion against a legitimate Central Government, failed to obtain an invitation to Washington, whereas the Government of Beijing was clearly invited. As for the possibility of dealing with the 'Macao Issue', the Portuguese Delegates took their place at the initial Meeting in Washington with little more information than what was stated in the invitation14 and in the proposed Agenda that had been sent to the participants for their consideration. The first item on the Agenda was "Questions Relating to China". It will be analysed later. For now, suffice it to say that the Agenda of the Conference that was to begin in Washington, in November 1921 was sufficiently clear to generate concern among the Portuguese that their right to be in Macao might be addressed, but it was also manifestly obscure with respect to the possibility of facilitating precise solutions in accordance with Portugal's interests. It is therefore not surprising that in one of his Reports the Viscount d' Alte sent a bitter, frank reminder to the Department of Foreign Affairs that:

"[...] the Government did not instruct the Portuguese Delegates to the Washington Conference as to how they should proceed, except to say that they should remain in strict agreement with the British Delegates [...]"15

Faced with a well-known problem, the Portuguese Government could count on conflicting views from the outset. To the Europeans, the 'Chinese problem' was rooted in China's intrinsic inability to overcome the endemic disruption of Social and Political order to which it had succumbed since the death of Yuan Shi Kai, and to emerge as a unified modern Nation. 16 The Chinese, of course, viewed the matter differently. As they repeatedly affirmed following the post-War Period, the 'Chinese problem' was the direct result of the predominant position the Foreign Powers occupied in China, thanks to the Privileges and special Rights they had obtained since the midnineteenth century. This predominance had led to a loss of independence and economic imbalance, which could only be overcome through the abolition of the principal causes of these problems: the 'unequal Treaties'.17 On the basis of this analysis, China summarily classified and positioned its 'friends' and 'enemies' in its relations with the so-called 'Imperialist' Powers, all of which were Western, with the exception of Japan.

The invectives, the hatred and the mass actions that were typical of the Chinese Nationalist Movement in the 1920s were not directed at the United States, who enjoyed a traditional esteem, reinforced by the fact that－apart from having reasonable investments and the same Privileges as other Nations－it did not possess spheres of influence, Concessions or leased Territories. France was also spared (its investments in the Yunnan 云南 railway and Shanghai commerce, and its role in the loans granted to China did not pose a problem), as were more insignificant Powers like Holland, Italy and even Portugal, a traditional casus belli that was all but restricted to Guangdong and had no weight in terms of a Policy that could be considered 'Imperialistic', such as that practised by Britain, for example. It was against Britain and Japan, in particular, that many Chinese directed their clamour, alleging that the former was the paradigm of a Western Imperialistic oppressor, and hurling anathemas at the latter that were motivated by a complex feeling of Historic rivalry, which was accentuated to the point of paroxysm by the violence surrounding the occupation of Shandong and the imposition of the much-criticized 'Twenty-One Demands', in 1915, when Yuan Shikai was in Power. In this context, at the Washington Conference, Portugal could expect the advantages to be had in a certain obscurity, given the impact and real interests behind even the slightest move made by the major negotiating Powers.

An analysis of the proposed Conference Agenda reveals the extent to which Portugal was removed from the burning Issues in the relations between China and the Powers. The Agenda, which was developed by the U.S. Government before the Conference as a promotional tool, included questions related to the Pacific and the Far East and was accepted by the participating Nations without modification. There were three items on the Agenda. The second and third concerned Siberia and the Mandated Islands respectively, but only the first item, 'Questions Relating to China', is of interest here. It was divided into two Parts: 'Principles to be Applied', and: 'Application', the latter being in turn subdivided into seven sub-categories:

1. Territorial integrity;

2. Administrative integrity;

3. 'Open door'－equality of commercial and industrial opportunity;

4. Concessions, monopolies or preferential Economic Privileges;

5. Development of railways, including plans related to the Chinese Eastern Railway;

6. Preferential railroad rates;

7. Status of existing commitments. 18

Despite everything, among the sub-categories, there were three that admittedly made the Portuguese Delegates apprehensive: those that alluded to the Territorial and Administrative integrity of China, and the one that referred in generic terms to the "Status of existing commitments". With respect to the latter, it was explained in the Agenda that:

"[...] under the heading of 'Status of Existing Commitments' it is expected that opportunity will be afforded to consider and to reach an understanding with respect to unsettled questions involving the nature and scope of commitments under which claims of Rights may hereafter be asserted."19

The Viscount d'Alte accurately gauged the situation. He was particularly apprehensive about two moments in the deliberations: the discussions on the Issue of Territories leased by China to Foreign Powers (a category in which the Chinese continued obstinately to include Macao) and those on the last item on the Agenda, when Portugal's Right to be present in the Territory might be questioned, under the pretext of examining the "status of existing commitments".20

The Portuguese Delegates became increasingly worried because of the position the Chinese quickly assumed at the Conference. The attitude of the Chinese was understandable. Of the Nine Powers involved in the discussions related to the Pacific and the Far East, China was unquestionably－after its frustrating experience at the Peace Conference, in 1919－the one who went to Washington with the greatest expectations and anxiety. From slightly less than a century of violent conflict with Foreign Powers, most of which were Western, the young Republic inherited a series of humiliating Political and Economic restrictions on the normal exercise of the Sovereignty to which, as an emerging major Power, it naturally aspired. Therefore, at the conference table in Washington, as Westel Willoughby, adviser to the Chinese Delegation, pertinently noted, China:

"[...] needed to ask for no Rights other than those universally conceded to attach to Sovereign States. She needed to ask only that certain wrongs done to her in the past should be corrected, and that she be made more fully the mistress in her own household."21

China's position was manifested by a one-hundred Member Delegation that represented the new generation of Diplomats, who were educated in the West and profoundly imbued with a Nationalist and democratic sentiment that made them anxious to see China granted the place they felt it deserved in the International community. The other Powers took note when, right at the first session of the Committee of the Whole on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, held on the 16th of November, the Head of the Delegation, and China's Minister in the United States, Shi Zhaoji (internationally known as Alfred Sze), presented the famous 'China's Ten Points'. In the Document, China basically exhorted the other Powers present in Washington to respect its Political independence and the integrity of its Territory, to refrain from concluding Treaties that could directly affect China without consulting the latter, to respect its right to remain neutral in future Wars, to remove all limitations upon its Political, Jurisdictional and Administrative freedom, and to review all Foreign Special Rights, immunities and Concessions, in China. 22

As Shi Zhaoji stated:

"In formulating these Principles the purpose has been kept steadily in view of obtaining Rules in accordance with which existing and possible future Political and Economic problems in the Far East and the Pacific may be most justly settled and with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of all the Powers concerned. Thus it has been sought to harmonize the particular interests of China with the general interests of all the World."23

China's 'Ten Points' were received with unparalleled sympathy by the Conference participants, which eased China's apprehension with regard to the possibility that the Eight other Powers might try to take advantage of the domestic instability with which the Government of Beijing was struggling. At the close of the talks, the Head of the Portuguese Delegation noted that China's program contained various principles that were perfectly acceptable, 24 but a closer examination of it could not but generate serious concern. In its appeal for the removal or reduction of some of the obligations that, by way of Treaties, it felt restricted its Political and Administrative freedom of action, China began by proposing that (Item 1-a):

"The Powers engage to respect and observe the Territorial integrity and Political and Administrative independence of the Chinese Republic."25

More specifically, it was further affirmed that (Item 5):

"Immediately or as soon as circumstances will permit, existing limitations upon China's Political, Jurisdictional and Administrative freedom of action are to be removed."

And that (Item 6):

"Reasonable, definite terms of duration are to be attached to China's present commitment which are without time limits."26

There was only one possible strategy for the Portuguese Delegation to follow:

"There is still no indication that Macao will be the topic of specific discussions at the Conference. For the moment, there seems to be a tendency to limit the discussions to general principles without applying them specifically to concrete cases."27

In these words to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Viscount d' Alte was reaffirming that the Portuguese Delegation would remain vigilant with respect to the matter. He added that the Delegation would not raise the Issue of Macao, except under entirely favourable circumstances, unless it received instructions to the contrary from the Minister. 28

The Portuguese Diplomat's prudence was understandable, not only in light of the Conference's Agenda, China's 'Ten Points' and the apprehension they caused, but also because of reasons unrelated to the Conference that were rooted in the magnitude of the already traditional anti-Portuguese campaign waged in the United States by the Country's large and powerful Chinese community. The campaign, and its destructive potential at the site of the negotiations, did not go unnoticed by the Viscount.

"An element that is extremely unfavourable to us, [...]"－he wrote. As always, the theme of the campaign was that Macao took a considerable part of its revenues from the opium trade, gambling and prostitution, an argument that in the United States, according to the Viscount, could have an impact that would be difficult to understand among the Portuguese. 29 The campaign led by Lord Northcliffe, owner of "The Times" of London, against what he called the "Monte Carlo of the Orient" had major repercussions in the United States. 30 Even more serious was the action of the:

"[...] associations of Chinese students in the United States, who vigorously [advocated] that China reconquer Macao, never missing a favourable opportunity to insist on this aspect of the 'Macao Issue'."31

The Viscount's decision not to raise the Issue of Macao unless circumstances were entirely favourable was all the more prudent because it was common knowledge that the Government of Guangdong had recently demanded, as a preliminary condition for discussions on an Agreement on the delimitation of Macao, that gambling be immediately abolished in the Territory. 32 Referring to this in one of his Bills, the Viscount wrote:

"[...] to take any step that would allow the Chinese Delegation to assume the role of strict censor of our Administrative processes, trying to get us on the path of morality in front of the Nations assembled here, would be unpardonably frivolous and show an incredible lack of tact [...]".33

He added:

"[...] if there was ever any intention of challenging our Dominion in Macao here at the Conference, it immediately faded because of the certainty that we were in a position to repel such an attempt, right here, with an advantage."34

In his final Report, the Head of the Portuguese Delegation, Ernesto de Vasconcelos, did in effect allude to the specific case of "tendentious rumours" exported to major newspapers in the United States and the subsequent campaign "launched against Macao", which was portrayed by a Washington paper as a "den of vice and debauchery."35 The Delegation agreed that it was not in Portugal's interest to:

"[...] respond in an irritating manner during the Conference, not only because it might give the Issue greater publicity, but also because the matter might by chance be raised at the Conference [...]"36

It was not.

And several days later, the Legation managed to publish a rebuttal in the "Evening Star".37 A cause of great concern was thus overcome, and the deliberations on the items on the Agenda did not pose a threat to Portugal's interests in the Far East, on the contrary.

Leaving aside what was already on the Agenda, China made gains with its famous 'Ten Points'. As Westel Willoughby noted, the preliminary presentation of a Document that was not on the Conference's Agenda constituted, on China's part, a manoeuvre as astute as it was opportune. In fact, from that moment, the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions spontaneously and exclusively assumed the character of an examination of the situation in the Region from China's point of view, since China emerged before any other Nation as the proponent of the subjects discussed. 38 But, even then, when the Powers taking part in the discussions were asked for their opinions, the situation turned in Portugal's favour. The Sub-committee on Program and Procedure, composed of the Heads of the Nine Delegations, decided that matters related to China should be discussed by the Committee of the Whole, so that the relevance of the 'Ten Points' could be considered in light of the Conference's Agenda. In its fourth session, the Committee of the Whole came to the conclusion that:

Point 1.1. of China's proposal was included in adopted resolutions, that

Point 1.2. was a mere declaration of Chinese Policy that should not be discussed at the Conference, and, finally, that

other Points should be addressed as part of the Agenda because they were covered under the abovementioned headings of China's Territorial and Administrative integrity, the 'open door' policy, Concessions and the "status of existing commitment".39

In an attempt to frame the discussion of China's concerns, and on the initiative of one of the leaders of the American Delegation, former Secretary of State, Elihu Root, the Powers agreed on a number of Principles that came to be known as the 'Root Resolutions':

1. To respect the Sovereignty, the independence, and the Territorial and Administrative integrity of China.

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government.

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all Nations throughout the Territory of China.

4. To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in China, in order to seek special Rights or Privileges which would abridge the Rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States. 40

These principles were approved at the plenary session held on the 10th of December 1921, and incorporated into a draft Treaty presented at the 4th of January session. The Head of the Portuguese Delegation observed that the Resolutions did not in any way violate Portugal's Rights in China and that, in the end, "they might even be helpful".41 The potential threat of an unwelcome debate, contained in the First Resolution, was in effect automatically eliminated. This became clear during the discussions on the 'Root Resolutions' when Baron Kato, a Member of the Japanese Delegation, asked a question about the meaning of the text and Elihu Root categorically affirmed that the words "administrative integrity" "did not affect any privileges accorded by valid or effective grants".42 As Root himself clearly stated in the general presentation of the Four Resolutions:

"[...] existing facts should be recognized and the Agreements should be framed as expressions of a common purpose, as evidencing no intention to interfere with valid Treaties and Agreements which, after examination, might be found to create existing Rights, but leaving the possessors of these Rights with full Powers to make changes in them for the benefit of China."43

By and large, the 'Root Resolutions' (later integrated into the final Treaty) had very little to offer China. If the 'open door' and equal opportunity Policies, and the principles of independence and Territorial integrity were reaffirmed by the Powers, it was difficult to consider the resolutions original. Bertrand Russell called them "empty phrases devoid of meaning",44 and the Government of Guangdong denounced them as "platitudes and inane generalities".45 The Fourth Resolution was even tailored as a sort of 'security clause' to allay Japan's fears with respect to its interests in Manchuria, and Elihu Root took it word-for-word from the secret Protocol annexed to the Lansing-Ishii agreement, on the advice of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. 46

Given the general atmosphere in terms of the orientation of the discussions, Ernesto de Vasconcelos had reason to declare in his final Report that, even if the 'Macao Issue' had been on the Agenda, it might not have been addressed at the Conference because it was of a very special nature and did not concern the other Powers. 47 The Viscount d' Alte also alluded to the fact that during the deliberations there was a marked tendency to exclude the discussion of any special Issues pending between two Countries and of interest only to them. More specifically, in terms of the appeals for retrocession of Territories to China, Macao's position was safeguarded by the situation of Hong Kong and the New Territories, which were vigorously defended by the British.

A point to be borne in mind is that in London, in August 1921, before the Conference even began, Minister Lord Curzon requested the advice of the Colonial Office regarding the grounds for a possible move to exclude Hong Kong's New Territories from any retrocession efforts initiated by China at the Conference, perhaps with the support of the United States. 48 The Colonial Office clearly judged it necessary to adopt such an attitude－contrary to the Foreign Office:

"[...] too anxious to please America and China by abandoning the vital interests of the British Empire"49

－and it was supported by Secretary of State Winston Churchill, who was fiercely opposed to the devolution of both Wei Hai 威海 and the New Territories. Apart from circumstantial reasons related to defence, the interests of the Colony's British population and the commercial advantages, it was felt that retrocession:

"[...] would be a shattering blow to British prestige in the Far East, and HMG's representative in Washington should avoid as far as possible any declaration on proposals to restore leased Territories to China."50

Britain was right to plan ahead. In fact, when on the 3rd of December, Wellington Koo openly asked the Powers to anticipate the term of all the Territorial leases, the latter were all quick to weigh their interests and take the necessary measures to maintain the status quo. The Japanese reacted by declaring that－despite the fact that in Versailles they had manifested the desire to proceed with negotiations for the eventual retrocession of Jiaozhou 胶州, in the Province of Shandong－it was not the intention of the Japanese Government to immediately renounce any Rights that had been legitimately and painfully acquired in Port Arthur and Dailian [• •]. France, on the contrary, immediately accepted to evacuate Guangzhou Wan, but the Head of the Portuguese Delegation reminds us of the real meaning of this gesture:

"France played its cards well because it said that, although Guangzhou Wan was today a port with important modern facilities and buildings built by the French Administration, it was prepared to give it to China, if the other Nations followed suit. Mr. Viviani, the first to speak on this subject, put France in a beautiful position in relation to China and forced Mr. Balfour, Head of the British Delegation, to declare that Kowloon was indispensable to Britain."51

Indeed－besides the Officially undesired renunciation of Wei Hai, announced at the moment of collective restitution of the Foreign leases－Balfour was forced to make an inopportune statement regarding the necessary exclusion of the New Territories (Kowloon) from all retrocession efforts. He believed Kowloon should remain under the Administration of the Government of Hong Kong because－since the security of the Colony was of general or World interest－without the leased Territory Hong Kong was perfectly indefensible and would be at the mercy of any enemy possessing modern artillery. 52

As Ernesto de Vasconcelos calmly wrote in his final Report, Macao benefited from the general inconvenience of addressing the Issue at the Conference, and its situation was analogous to that of Hong Kong, though it dated from much earlier, so it had nothing to fear with respect to requests for retrocession of Territories to China, which were propagated in the large Chinese community in the United States. 53

The Ninth of China's 'Ten Points'－"Provision is to be made for the peaceful settlement of International disputes in the Pacific and the Far East"－also caught the attention of the Portuguese Delegates. Ernesto de Vasconcelos considered it a favourable point "to which doctrine could well be applied."54 What he had in mind was the often-mentioned possibility of resorting to International Arbitration to solve the problem of delimiting the Territory. This was not a new solution; it had been vigorously defended by Azevedo Castelo Branco, Portugal's Minister in Beijing, twenty years earlier, by the Royal Commissioner General, Joaquim Machado, and by Chargé d' Affaires Martinho de Brederode at the Hong Kong Conferences. Much more recently, in 1911, it had emerged during the discussions of the Commission appointed to study Issues pending between Portugal and China. The Commission once more acknowledged that Arbitration would be of great value (one of the Members even suggested that the matter be submitted to the United States for consideration). At the time, however, because of Political considerations, direct negotiations with China were favoured over Arbitration. 55 It is therefore not surprising that Ernesto de Vasconcelos (former Member of the 1911 Commission) paid particular attention to the Ninth of China's 'Ten Points', which, in suggesting Arbitration as a final solution to International disputes in the Pacific and the Far East, might:

"[...] be the answer to the problem of Macao's boundaries. At the Conference, however, perhaps at the suggestion of the British Delegates, this Principle was set aside, as was the Tenth, 56 because they were not of the same nature as the Issues that concerned China directly and were not on the Agenda."57

In trying to come to terms with the vagueness of the policy to be adopted by Portugal at the Conference to better safeguard its interests in Macao, the Viscount d' Alte concluded decisively in a Bill to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that, in his opinion, Arbitration was the only possible solution. 58 And it was based precisely on the previous frustrating experience of direct negotiations with China that he stressed to the Minister:

"Even we, negotiators of infinite patience that we are, must already be convinced by many years of experience that it is impossible to reach a satisfactory Agreement. Even if that were not the case, if China were to conclude an Agreement with us, it would undoubtedly demand possession of Lapa Island and shared use of the waters of Macao's Inner Harbour. In previous negotiations we have always repelled such claims by China, so for us to withdraw our opposition on these points now, something that will inevitably happen, would be considered by the public, which is already stirred up by what it reads in anti-Government newspapers, as a colossal Diplomatic defeat. Why take such a serious political risk, at a time when it is especially important to calm people down, when through Arbitration, which no one will attack－because all our major Colonial Issues have been resolved through Arbitration, with full public approval－we could obtain results at least as favourable as those that might come out of problematic direct negotiations? There is another crucial point to be considered, one that must impel us to make every effort to resolve this Issue by the most expedient means, if possible. The China of today, represented at the Washington Conference by three modern Diplomats who were educated at American Universities and have a perfect command of English, is no longer the grotesque and ingenuous China whose Military tactics consisted in trying to instil terror in the enemy through the exhibition of horrendous images. Guangdong can easily put 10,000 men inured to War at Macao's door, whom the City, that is even lacking in water, could resist eight days at the most, according to the Officers stationed there. Now, recent events indicate that such an incident could take place at any moment because the Chinese are well aware of our capacity to resist. It is imperative that we spare our people the National disgrace that the violent taking of Macao by the Chinese would imply. Your Excellency will no doubt appreciate better than I the Political repercussions that such a disaster would have in the Country."59

As for the practical process of implementing the project during the Conference, the Viscount's ideas were no less clear with respect to the strategy to be adopted. To do it Officially by purposely including the Issue in the deliberations was out of the question. The Portuguese Delegation knew full well that all decisions made at the Conference had to be unanimous; if any proposal that emerged from the formal discussions or from informal negotiations met with objections from even one of the Powers involved, it would be irremissibly defeated. As a result, the Delegations were extremely careful when proposing resolutions that, if aborted, would imply the consolidation of the status quo they were trying to alter. 60

Aside from this, it suffices to say, as previously mentioned, that the deliberations had been oriented in such a way as to exclude the examination of any special Issues pending between two Countries and of interest only to them. As a matter of fact:

"Issues of this nature were resolved through direct negotiations between the Nations concerned, and the decisions made were subsequently homologated by the other Powers."61

That was, for example, the course of action taken in relation to one of the most grievous problems underlying the convening of the Conference itself, the 'Shandong Issue', which was finally resolved in China's favour through direct negotiations between China and Japan, under the aegis of the United States and with Britain's support. 62

The Viscount d' Alte therefore needed to obtain the support of the United States. In a Bill to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he explained why:

"Since the United States has an absolutely exceptional position and influence among the Chinese, if we were able to get the Chinese Delegation to accept that the problem of the delimitation of Macao be immediately submitted to the United States for Arbitration, it is possible that the Government of Guangdong would not be opposed when the time came to take joint action to that effect. Its Minister of Foreign Affairs is Wu Tingfang 吴芳, an astute man and a devoted friend of the United States, where he lived for many years and whose sympathy he wants to win for his cause. It would be necessary, of course, to stipulate a fixed, and short, deadline for the signing of the arbitral compromise, leaving it up to the arbitrator to settle any irreconcilable differences that may arise between the negotiators. It would also be essential that the compromise guarantee the supply of water to Macao, the prohibition of the construction of fortifications on Lapa Island that dominate the City and on the heights North of the Porta do Cerco [Border Gate], the Right of Macao's fishermen to fish in the harbour, and other points of secondary importance [...]."63

Since the Viscount d' Alte wanted the Arbitration project to be not only initiated and discussed informally at the Conference, but also concluded (and eventually homologated) there, he was necessarily dependent on the Agreement of China and Britain, as well as the United States. The strategy was repeatedly communicated to Lisbon. He constantly insisted that, given the undisputed influence of the United States in China (emphasized by the position it assumed during the Conference "as the virtual defender of China's revendications"), he believed that:

"[...] it might be possible to get the Chinese Delegates at the Conference to accept Arbitration by the United States on the 'Macao Issue' and, at the same time, to impose the condition that they accept the previously mentioned arbitral compromise within thirty days. The Arbitrator would decide on any points of contention. I was persuaded that if we insinuated that we would negotiate directly with the Government of Guangdong if our wishes were not considered, this, and the pressure applied by the American Delegates, on whose full cooperation I knew I could count, would be sufficient to get the Chinese Plenipotentiaries to agree. It seemed to me that an arbitral decision made under such conditions would have a very good chance of being accepted by the Chinese of Guangdong. At least it was worth a try. And to further ensure the prompt implementation of the resulting Agreement, I would seek an opportune moment to make it known at the Conference, so that it would be recorded in the proceedings. I therefore asked the Government for authorization to put this plan into effect. Considerable time was lost because the instructions requested were long in coming [...]"64

Trying to make up for lost time, in December 1921, the Viscount d' Alte consulted not only U. S. Secretary of State, Hughes, who immediately said he was "willing to co-operate frankly"65 but also Gu Weijun (internationally known as Wellington Koo), one of the more eminent figures of the Chinese Delegation, who "enjoyed considerable prestige even among the Southern Chinese".66 Gu Weijun, remembered in the History of the Republic of China as one of its most eminent Diplomats, was already a Member of the Chinese Delegation at the 1919 Peace Conference, where he had a prominent role in the discussions on the 'Shandong Issue' and in the decision not to sign the Treaty of Versailles. He was subsequently one of the promoters of the League of Nations and China's first Representative on the organization's Council, over which he presided in 1921, during the Fourteenth Session. In 1920, after having represented his Country in Mexico and the United States, Gu Weijun was appointed Minister in England. While there, he was appointed to the Delegation to be sent to the Washington Conference, as Shi Zhaoji's right-hand man. 67

Admiral Ernesto Júlio de Carvalho e Vasconcelos (°1852_†1930), Head of the Delegation of Portugal to the Washington Conference (1921-1922).

Hydrographer engineer, Admiral of the Portuguese Navy, Member of Parliament, General Director of the Serviços Centrals do Ministério das Colónias (Central Administration of the Ministry of Colonies), Professor of the Escola Naval (Naval School), the Escola Colonial (Colonial School), the Academy of Sciences of Lisbon, of the Coimbra Institute, and Honorary Secretary of the Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa (Geographical Society of Lisbon).

The support of Gu Weijun constituted a major trump card because the greatest obstacle to the resolution of the 'Macao Issue' during the Washington Conference was the fact that the Government of Guangdong, under whose Jurisdiction the matter came, was not represented there and had already declared that it would not accept any Agreements the Representatives of the Government of Beijing might conclude. 68 The Chinese Diplomat's reaction was also (to the extent to which it could realistically be) auspicious:

"[...] he stated that, personally, he felt that Arbitration was an excellent means of resolving the difficulties that existed between the two Countries, but that he would ask the Government of Beijing for instructions."69

And in this resided, perhaps, another one of the more serious circumstantial obstacles to the resolution of the 'Macao Issue' during the Conference. The Viscount d' Alte thought that it was quite possible, even very likely, that the Chinese Delegation would hesitate to address (since it was not absolutely necessary) an Issue that specifically came under the Jurisdiction of the Government of Guangdong and in which the Government of Beijing had but an indirect interest. 70

The third move made by the Viscount d' Alte towards consolidating the Arbitration project, one he was almost obligated to make, was to inform the British Delegation. The Head of the Delegation, Lord Balfour, leaned clearly towards the submission of the conflict to the League of Nations, but he ended up promising all possible support during the Conference if Portugal felt it should raise the 'Macao Issue' there. 71 Having been informed of the Viscount's intentions, the Department of Colonial Affairs, in Lisbon, quickly transmitted its approval to the Delegation in Washington:

"[...] the Portuguese Government was ready to accept Arbitration for the delimitation of the Territory and waters of Macao, on the condition that, until a final decision was reached, the status quo (the terms of the Treaty signed in 1887) was to be maintained."72

On the 5th of December 1921, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs was still consulting Portugal's Minister in London, Manuel Teixeira Gomes. Since Portugal had always asked for support from, and agreed with, Britain on the matter, the Department asked the Minister to consult the Foreign Office and Report immediately on the reaction to the suggestion of Arbitration transmitted by the Portuguese Delegation in Washington. 73 Manuel Teixeira Gomes immediately responded, before consulting the British Government, by reminding the Department (and not without some astonishment) that he had been suggesting for some time that the matter be submitted to the League of Nations, and had recently insisted that the Portuguese Government inform him of its decision! 74 According to the Diplomat, who the following year became President of the Republic, that was the only solution:

"The League of Nations has obvious advantages over other means of settling the Issue, and China cannot refuse its intervention because it would be subject to the corresponding penalties if it does not accept the decision. The doubts that have been raised at the Washington Conference concerning the capacity of the Chinese Delegates to represent all of China will also be raised with respect to our case if we resort to Arbitration there, whereas, at the League of Nations the decision will be valid for all intents and purposes, and no one will be able to allege that the Chinese Delegates were incompetent [...]."75

Aware of the communication that was necessarily maintained with the Government of Macao (who was, as previously mentioned, the most insistent that the 'Macao Issue' be taken to Washington), on the 15th of December 1921, the Minister of Foreign Affairs officially informed the Minister of Colonial Affairs of Britain's suggestion that the project of Arbitration by the United States be abandoned in favour of the League of Nations option, because Sun Yixian's Government would probably not respect the decision. The irremissibility of the about-face of the strategy of the Department of Foreign Affairs was thus imposed on the Department of Colonial Affairs, confirming once again the supremacy of the former in the handling of the 'Macao Issue':

"[...] I feel I must make these facts known to Your Excellency, so that you may give the Governor of Macao the instructions you feel best correspond to the interests of the State [...]."76

The idea of submitting the 'Macao Issue' to the League of Nations for Arbitration was apparently not a new one; in fact, an important Document signed in 1919 by the Minister of Colonial Affairs, João Soares, and addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Xavier da Silva, on the eve of the fall of the Department of Domingos Pereira, prophetically described the eventuality of a conflict arising from the need to establish boundaries, one that might be resolved through the intervention of the League of Nations. This Document possibly inspired Ernesto de Vasconcelos.

A short time after, in 1920, the solution was once again mentioned by the Portuguese Representative to the League of Nations, Afonso Costa, in an informal exchange with the President of the League himself, Leon Bourgeois. The following year, coinciding with the opening of the Conference and in the midst of a renewed crisis with Guangdong, the 'Macao Issue' was raised at the League by Lord Curzon and Manuel Teixeira Gomes, who felt it was:

"[...] the best road to take and would have placed [the Portuguese] in extremely high moral standing in the eyes of the World."77

In Washington, the Portuguese Delegates were convinced that the interests of the British in Hong Kong were the main consideration underlying the choice made in 1922. Indeed, it was easy to guess Britain's position when the Viscount d' Alte informed Lord Balfour of the plan for Arbitration in Washington. He understood the hesitation of the British Delegate and the advice the latter gave, to the effect that the case should be submitted to the League of Nations. The viscount knew quite well what it meant:

"In interpreting the attitude of the British Government and its Representatives on this matter, we must not lose sight of this fundamental fact: Macao's interests are absolutely opposed to those of Hong Kong. To suppose that this situation will not have a preponderant influence on the decisions of the British statesmen when considering this Issue would be to really have excessive faith in their neutrality -- faith that is in a way justified by past experience. In a recent conversation with the principal correspondent of "The Times" of London, in Washington about the future development of Macao, he warned me frankly that we needed to proceed with caution because we were going to place ourselves in direct opposition to Hong Kong's interests. 78 Great Britain is very powerful at the League of Nations, but here, it could not exercise any influence over the American Arbitrators. I was therefore not surprised that the British Government leaned towards the League of Nations solution [...]"79

The Viscount d' Alte was therefore understandably disillusioned when he received a telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs informing him of the decision to abandon the idea of Arbitration in Washington:

"[...] it was with extreme reluctance that I gave up hope of preparing a solution to the 'Macao Issue' in Washington, because here we could have counted on the frank support of the Americans, which would be an element of considerable importance if we wish to find a favourable solution."80

The Portuguese Delegate knew full well that inhibitory doubts could be raised with respect to the capacity of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries to represent all of China, yet he noted:

"[...] we must not forget that those Plenipotentiaries were accepted by the Powers participating in the Conference as genuine Representatives of China, and -- what is even more important with respect to resolving the 'Macao Issue' according to the Government's preferred plan -- they are precisely the ones who represent China at the League of Nations, and as I have already mentioned, Mr. Wellington Koo is currently President of the League's Council."

However, after a close examination of the proceedings, the Viscount d' Alte was forced to acknowledge that:

"The Political revolution that occurred in China after the efforts to which I am referring were initiated profoundly upset the situation of those Plenipotentiaries, and, in the final moments, it seems that they themselves realized the uncertainty of their situation. When I recently asked Mr. Wellington Koo if the Chinese Delegation intended to insist on the clause in its program that prescribed Arbitration in all future matters between China and other Nations, 81 he answered dispiritedly that it would no longer insist on anything. He also informed me that he had received an answer from Beijing regarding the 'Macao Issue' and that the Chinese Government felt the matter should be dealt with through direct negotiations. I asked if he was willing to present a definite proposal to that effect within a reasonable period of time, and, since I understood that that was not his intention, I observed that over a period of thirty years we had tried in vain to resolve the 'Issue' through direct negotiations with the Chinese Government and that, in view of what he had just told me, I assumed that my own Government would take the necessary steps to submit the case to the League of Nations without delay. It is possible that the desire to avoid this eventuality might lead the Chinese Government to make a conciliatory proposal in the near future [...]"82

The Portuguese Diplomat was wrong; the Washington Conference ended without any followup in terms of initiatives aimed at resolving the 'Macao Issue'. On the contrary, in Beijing the Governments succeeded one another in a state of perpetual crisis, going from the deposition of President Li Yuanhong 黎元洪to the coup by Feng Yuxiang 冯玉祥, in 1924, and in Macao and Hong Kong the situation worsened to such an extent that it led to the serious convulsions that, from 1921 to 1925, shook the very foundations of the two Colonies.

DOCUMENT83

"Gentlemen,

In October of last year the President of the United States invited the Governments of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan to be represented at a Conference on the limitation of Armament, at which Issues related to the Pacific and the Far East would also be discussed. China also participated in this second part of the Program.

In view of Portugal's interests in the Far East, the Government of the Republic of Portugal was invited to take part in the discussion of subjects that would be addressed at the Conference with respect to the Pacific and the Far East. For this reason, and for the same purpose, Belgium and the Netherlands also received an invitation, which they accepted.

The reasons the Government of the Republic accepted the invitation are obvious. It was represented at the Conference, whose Sessions commenced in Washington last November, by Portugal's Minister in the United States of America, José de Horta Machado da França, and by Captain Ernesto Júlio de Carvalho e Vasconcelos, to whose competence, dedication and patriotism, always manifested in the course of the deliberations of the Conference, it is my grateful duty to pay well-deserved homage.

Apart from Agreements on the limitation of Armament and related matters, in the discussion of which Portugal did not participate, two Treaties were signed at the Conference, on the 6th of February of this year, one on the policy and principles to be followed in matters concerning China and the other on the revision of the Chinese Customs tariff and various related matters.

The four Principles that oriented the deliberations at the Conference, and that were approved by the Powers represented there, who agreed on the 'open door' policy with respect to China, were expressed in the first of the aforementioned Treaties. They do not dispute Portugal's Rights in China and may even be to our advantage, especially the last one.

Apart from the Treaties, the resolutions adopted at the Conference and subscribed to by Portugal provide for the appointment of Commissions responsible for dealing with Issues of vital importance to China. Of those Commissions, on which Portugal is, of course, represented, the most important are the following:

A Commission to study the Administration of Justice in China, in anticipation of the eventual renunciation of the Right to Extraterritoriality by some of the Powers.

A Commission composed of the Diplomatic Representatives of the Powers concerned in Beijing and three Chinese Delegates to study the possibility of withdrawing foreign troops from Chinese Territory, at China's request.

A Commission to resolve matters related to the application of the 'open door' policy.

A Commission to revise the tariff adopted in 1918. As stipulated in the second of the aforementioned contracts, the meeting of this Commission in Shanghai, on which we are represented by Portugal's Consul, will be followed by a special Conference of Diplomatic and Technical Delegates to deal more extensively with the abolition of likin and the reform of the Chinese Customs tariff.

As a result of our Representation at the Conference, Portugal's right to participate in the future deliberations of the Powers with respect to China was recognized.

During the Conference, and independently from it, on the 13th of December 1921, the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Japan concluded a Treaty for the general preservation of peace and the maintenance of their Rights in relation to their Insular Possessions and Insular Dominions in the Region of the Pacific Ocean, having agreed among themselves to respect those Rights. On the 4th of February, the Four Signatory Governments informed the Government of the Republic, through their Diplomatic Representatives, that, in taking care to avoid any interpretation contrary to the spirit of the said Treaty, which did not include Portugal's Pacific Possessions, they were firmly resolved to respect Portugal's Rights in relation to its Insular Possessions in the Pacific Ocean.

Gu Weijun (Wellington Koo).

Chinese diplomat and politician.

Member of the Delegation of China to the Washington Conference (1921-1922).

There seems to be no doubt as to the advantages of ratifying the two Treaties signed in Washington. The aforementioned statement, the importance and scope of which need no further explanation, would justify, if the very essence of the Treaties did not already do so, the appropriateness of proceeding with the ratification as soon as possible.

A White Paper containing the text of the resolutions of the Washington Conference and other Documents related to it has already been prepared. It was, however, impossible to have it printed in time to be distributed with this proposal, a distribution that will take place in due time, but the Government of the Republic did not want to delay the presentation of the following Bill that it hopes will merit the approval of the Portuguese Parliament:

Article 1 -- Are hereby approved for ratification the Treaties signed in Washington on the 6th of February 1922, between Portugal, Belgium, China, the United States of America, France, the British Empire, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands for the adoption of a policy to stabilize the situation in the Far East, safeguard China's Rights and interests, and develop relations between China and the other Powers on the basis of equal opportunity, and for the revision of the Chinese Customs tariff and other related matters.

Article 2 -- Legislation to the contrary is hereby revoked.

Chamber of Deputies, on [...] of July, 1922."

Translated from the Portuguese by: Paula Sousa

CHINESE GLOSSARY

Dailian 大连

Feng Yuxiang 冯玉祥

Guangdong 广东

Guangzhou 广州

Guangzhou Wan 广州湾

Gu Weijun 顾维钧

Hankou 汉口

Jiazhou 胶州

Li Hongzhang 李鸿章

Li Yuanhong 黎元洪

Lu Zhengxiang 陆征祥

Shandong 山东

Shanghai 上海

Shi Zhaoji 施肇基

Sun Yat-sen -- see: Sun Yixian

Sun Yixian [Sun Yat-sen] 孙逸仙

Tianjin 天津

Yuan Shikai 袁世凯

Wang Zhengting 王正廷

Wei Hai 威海

Wu Tingfang 吴芳

Yunnan 云南

NOTES

1 This Essay is part of a more extensive project that has as its theme the "Macao Issue". From its inception, the project has enjoyed the support of the Instituto Cultural de Macao. The author also acknowledges the diligent, and always helpful, collaboration of the Arquivo Histórico do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (Historical Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon) (hereinafter cited as [AHMNE]).

2 With the exception, for example, of CONCEIÇÃO, Lourenço Maria da, Macau entre Dois Tratados com a China, Macau, Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1988; DIAS, Alfredo Gomes, Macau e a I Guerra do Ópio, Macau, Instituto Português do Oriente, 1993; MAGALHÃES, José Calvet de, Macau e a China no Após Guerra, Macau: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1992; or, a less recent work, GUEDES, A. P. Miranda, Macau: As Obras do Porto e a Política Chinesa, Offprint from "Revista Colonial".

See: RAMOS, João de Deus, O Padre António de Magalhães, SJ., e a Embaixada de Kangxi a D. João V (1721-1725), in "História das Relações Diplomáticas entre Portugal e a China", Macau, Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1991; WILLS, John E., Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K'ang-hsi, 1666-1687, Cambridge, Massachussetts/Harvard University Press, 1984 -- For works on an earlier Period in Luso-Chinese relations.

3 "China confirms, in its entirety, Article 2 of the Lisbon Protocol, which relates to the perpetual Occupation and Administration of Macau by Portugal. It is hereby stipulated that Commissioners from the two Countries will go ahead with the respective delimitation, which will be settled by a Special Agreement, but until such limits are established, the status quo will be maintained, without augmentation, reduction or alteration by any of the Parties."

ALMADA, José de, Tratados Aplicáveis ao Ultramar, vol. 5, Lisboa, Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1943, pp.483-505 -- For texts of the Protocol and the Treaty.

4 See: HSU, Immanuel C. Y., The Rise of Modern China, New York, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp.501-505 [3rd edition] -- Which includes a Bibliography.

Also see: AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095 -Assuntos Diversos: Documentos da Conferência de Washington: Relatório de Ernesto de Vasconcelos, Delegado Português à Conferência de Washington, ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 23 de Fevereiro 1922 (Assorted Subjects. Documentation about the Washington Conference: Report submitted by Ernesto de Vasconcelos, Portuguese Delegate at the Washington Conference, to the Foreign Office, 23rd of February 1922), p. 12.

5 TYAU, M. T. Z., History of Unequal Treaties in China Recounted by Writer, in "National Herald", 11th of November

Also see: AHMNE: 2°P A49 M46 PI - Ofício da Legação de Portugal na China ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 12 de Janeiro 1945 (Bill from the Portuguese Legation in China to the Foreign Office, 12th of January 1946).

6 HSU, C. Y., op. cit., p.502.

7 This apparent dead end was circumvented by a Presidential Mandate Issued by China in September 1919 and by the fact that, in signing the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria, China automatically won a seat at the League of Nations.

8 A draft of the Bill of approval for the ratification of the Treaties signed accompanies this Essay. Presented to Parliament by the Government in July 1922, it clarifies the terms of Portugal's participation in Washington.

See: ALMADA, José de, op. cit., vol. 6, Appendices, pp.221-226 -- For the text of the Treaty.

Also see: BUELL, Raymond Leslie, The Washington Conference, New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1922; WILLOUGHBY, Westel, China at the Conference: A Report Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1922; METER, H. Van, Jr., The Washington Conference of 1921-1922: A New Look, in "Pacific Historical Review", (46) 1977, p.603 (Bibliography) -- On the Washington Conference.

9 That is, Japan's Agreement to give up Shandong and to withdraw seventeen of its famous Twenty-One Demands, and, on Britain's part, the conditional promise to surrender the lease of Wei Hai.

10 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., p.12.

Also see: FUNG, E., The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat:

Britain's South China Policy, 1924-1931, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1991, p.19 -- "The United States, though anxious to prevent Japan's embarking on a course of independent action in China, was more interested in demolishing the old structure of Imperialist Diplomacy and secret Agreements than in setting up a new framework of co-operative Diplomacy."

11 FUNG, E., op. cit., p.21.

12 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., Ofício de Alte ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 22 de Janeiro 1922 (Bill from the Viscount d' Alte to the Foreign Office, 22nd of January 1922).

13 AHMNE: File 1095, op. cit.-- Bill from Vasconcelos to the MNE, 6th of September 1921,

14 WILLOUGHBY, W., op. cit., p.8 -- "It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and the Far East, but rather to leave this to be the subject of suggestions to be exchanged before the meeting of the Conference [...]".

15 AHMNE: Caixa[box] 1095, op. cit., Ofício de Alte ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 6 de Setembro 1921 (Bill from the Viscount d' Alte to the Foreign Office, 6th of September 1921).

16 FUNG, E., op. cit., pp.13-14.

17 Ibidem.

18 WILLOUGHBY, W., op. cit., pp.25-26 -- For details of the Agenda.

19 Idem., p.26.

20 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 22 de Janeiro 1922 (22nd of January 1922).

21 WILLOUGHBY, W., op. cit., p.29.

22 Idem., pp.32-36; HSU, I., op. cit., p.532.

23 WILLOUGHBY, W., op. cit., p. 33.

24 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 23 de Fevereiro 1922 (23rd of February 1922), p.4.

25 WILLOUGHBY, W., op. cit., p.34.

26 Ibidem.

27 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., Ofício de Alte ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 24 Novembro de1921 (Bill from the Viscount d' Alte to the Foreign Office, 24th of November 1921).

28 Ibidem.

29 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., Ofício de Alte ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 12 de Fevereiro 1922 (Bill from the Viscount d' Alte to the Foreign Office, 12th of February l922).

30 Ibidem.

31 Ibidem.

32 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 24 November de 1921 (24th of November 1921).

33 Ibidem.

34 Ibidem.

35 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 23 de Fevereiro 1922 (23rd of February 1922), pp.7, 10.

36 Idem., p.7.

37 Idem., pp.7-8.

38 WILLOUGHBY, W., op. cit., p.32.

39 Idem., pp.35-36.

40 Idem., p.43.

41 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 23 de Fevereiro 1922 (23rd of February 1922), pp.5-6.

42 WILLOUGHBY, W., op. cit., p.41.

43 Idem., p.39.

44 RUSSELL, Bertrand, The Problem of China, London, Allen & Unwin, 1922, p. 151.

45 "Weekly Review of the Far East", (19) 24th of December 1921, p.147.

46 FUNG, E., op. cit., p.17.

47 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 23 de Fevereiro 1922 (23rd of February 1922), p. 13.

48WESLEY-SMITH, Peter, Unequal Treaty 1898-1997: China, Great Britain and Hong Kong's New Territories, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 153.

49 Ibidem.

50 WESLEY-SMITH, Peter, op. cit., p. 154.

51 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 23 de Fevereiro 1922 (23rd of February 1922), p.11.

52 WESLEY-SMITH, Peter, op. cit., p. 154.

53 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 23 de Fevereiro 1922 (23rd of February 1922), p.11.

54 Ibidem.

55 Relatório e Actas da Comissão Nomeada para Estudar as Quest' es Actualmente Pendentes entre Portugal e a China, Lisboa, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (reserved edition), 1912, pp.5 and 24.

56 "Provision is to be made for Conferences to be held from time to time for the discussion of International questions relative to the Pacific and the Far East, as a basis for the determination of common policies of the Signatory Powers in relation thereto."

57 Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 23 de Fevereiro 1922 (23rd of February 1922), p.4.

58 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 24 November de 1921 (24th of November 1921).

59 Ibidem.

60 WILLOUGHBY W., op. cit., pp.2-3.

61 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 12 de Fevereiro 1922 (12th of February 1922).

62 HSU, I., op. cit., p.532; AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 23 de Fevereiro 1922 (23rd of February 1922), p.4.

63AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 24 November de 1921 (24th of November 1921).

64 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 22 de Janeiro 1922 (22nd of January 1922).

65 Ibidem.

66 Ibidem.

67 After the Conference ended, Wellington Koo held the Foreign Affairs portfolio in successive Beijing Governments, becoming interim leader of one of them following the resignation of Sun Pao-ch'i, in 1924. From 1957 to 1967, at the end of his career, he served at the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

See: KU Wei-chün, in "Biographical Dictionary of Republican China", vol.2, New York, Columbia University Press, 1968, pp.255-257.

68 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 24 November de 1921(24th of November 1921).

69 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 22 de Janeiro 1922 (22nd of January 1922).

70 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 24 November de 1921 (24th of November 1921).

71 Idem.., p.2.

72 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 9, Limites de Macau (Limits of Macao), Ofício do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Ministério das Colónias, 15 de Dezembro 1921 (Bill from the Foreign Office to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, 15th of December 1921).

73 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 9, op. cit., Telegrama de Teixeira Lopes ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 5 Dezembro 1921 (Telegram from the Foreign Office to Teixeira Gomes, 5th of December 1921) -- See: in (Ofício de Teixeira Gomes ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 22 de Junho 1922 (Bill from Teixeira Gomes to the Foreign Office, 22nd of June 1922).

74 AHMNE: Legação de Londres (Legation of London), M 124 P 66 - Ofício de Teixeira Gomes ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 15 de Novembro 1921 (Bill from Teixeira Gomes to the Foreign Office, 15th of November 1921).

75 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 9, op. cit., Telegrama de Teixeira Lopes ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 6 Dezembro 1921 (Telegram from the Foreign Office to Teixeira Gomes, 6th of December 1921) -- See: in (Ofício de Teixeira Gomes ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 22 de Junho 1922 (Bill from Teixeira Gomes to the Foreign Office, 22nd of June 1922).

76 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 9: op. cit.,15 de Dezembro 1921 (15th of December 1921).

See: AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit.,12 de Fevereiro 1922 (12th of February 1922)-- On this subject, the Viscount d' Alte wrote:

"I am convinced that we could have submitted the Issue of Macao's boundaries to the United States for Arbitration, if the Government had agreed to it. The Government, however, knowing what was in the best interests of the Country, because of the extent of its information and the certainty of its judgement, preferred to have the 'Issue' submitted to the League of Nations [...]"

Also see: AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 23 de Fevereiro 1922 (23rd of February 1922), p.13.

77 74 AHMNE: Legação de Londres (Legation of London), M 124 P 66, op. cit.

78 Curiously enough, six years later, when the Portuguese once again considered submitting the 'Issue' of Macao's boundaries to the League of Nations, Portugal's Minister in Beijing informed the Department of Foreign Affairs that Britain's Minister, Sir Miles Lampson, had assured him "[...] of his utmost willingness to assist us, and added that he took special interest in Macao's fate because of Hong Kong. If any difficulty should arise, he feels we should resolve it without turning to the League of Nations or the International Court of Justice at The Hague, that, the former in particular, if it decided to consider the 'Issue', which is doubtful, would most likely not decide in our favour, in view of the sentimentalist pro-China feeling that is prevalent throughout the World [...]." AHMNE: 3°P A9 M37 A - Ofício do Ministro de Portugal em Pequim ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 28 de Outubro 1928 (Bill from the Minister of Portugal in Beijing to the Foreign Office, 28th of October 1928).

79 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 22 de Janeiro 1922 (22nd of January 1922).

80 Ibidem.

81 The Viscount d' Alte was referring to the ninth of China's Ten Points. Because it suggested Arbitration as a final solution to international disputes in the Pacific and the Far East, Ernesto de Vasconcelos thought this point, might "[...] be the answer to the problem of Macao's boundaries. At the Conference, however, perhaps at the suggestion of the British Delegates, this principle was set aside, as was the tenth, because they were not of the same nature as the Issues that concerned China directly and were not on the Agenda." AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 23 de Fevereiro 1922 (23rd of February 1922), p.4.

82 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095, op. cit., 22 de Janeiro 1922 (22nd of January 1922).

83 AHMNE: Caixa [box] 1095 - Assuntos Diversos: Documentos da Conferência de Washington (Assorted Subjects. Documentation about the Washington Conference) -- [Translation].

* LLB (Bachelor of Law) from the Faculdade de Direito (Faculty of Law) of the Universidade de Lisboa (University of Lisbon), Lisbon. Masters degree in Historical-Juridical Sciences from the Universidade de Lisboa (University of Lisbon), Lisbon. Ph. D in Socio-Political Sciences from the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas (Institute for Social and Political Sciences) of the Universidade Técnica de Lisboa (Technical University of Lisbon), Lisbon. Author of numerous articles and publications on the History of Political Ideas and the Juridical History of Portuguese overseas expansion.