António da Silva Rêgo*

PREVIOUS PAGE: Planisphere--detail. DIOGO RIBEIRO 1525. This chart registers for the first time in a Portuguese map the word CHINA, previously called India Superior (Upper India) or Cataio (Cathay).


Portuguese and Chinese traders first met during Diogo Lopes de Sequeira's voyage to Malacca in 1509, immediately establishing an amicable understanding reinforced by the common interest in doing profitable business. After 1511, the date of the occupation of Malacca by Afonso de Albuquerque, Portuguese and Chinese traders, ignoring to a certain extent the strictness of Chinese Law concerning contacts with foreigners, arranged to occasionally meet in a variety of spots along the vast Chinese shoreline.

In 1552, they met a number of times in the small island of Sangchuan, rendered by Portuguese to Sanchoão and even to S. João (St. John), and which was to become famous because St. Francis Xavier, expecting to clandestinely enter the great Chinese Empire, died there. In 1554, Leonel de Sousa managed to sign, in Guangzhou, a Trade Agreement with the Chinese, the relationship between both peoples becaming firmer.

It also happened that as a daring pirate called Zhang Silao threatned navigation along the coast of the province of Guangdong, both Portuguese and Chinese traders agreed to join forces and fight this common enemy, eventually defeating him.

As a consequence of this joint effort, the Chinese became more friendly and less suspicious of the Portuguese and so, since 1555, the Portuguese were allowed to gain a foothold in Macao. These were the general lines of the origins the Portuguese Settlement of Macao, which was initially a mere trading Colony established on the confines of the vast Chinese Empire, but known and approved by the Chinese Authorities.

And if there was any fighting led by Portuguese, it was against a common enemy of local Authorities and never against these.

Being a trading Colony, Macao depended from the very start on the vessels of the Portuguese, on the success of their marketing voyages and on the initiative of its inhabitants. At the beginning, Japan, Goa and Malacca were the main ports of Macao's economic support. But year after year, the small Colony developed its trading contacts with other major Eastern commercial regions and trading cities. In Manila, Cochin-China, Java, Timor, Siam, Madras, Surrate, Bombay, Ceylon, etc. the tradesmen from Macao exchanged Chinese products such as silk, manufactures,tea, chinaware, and so on for just about everything that might have interested their Chinese counterparts, but mostly silver bullion.

The Macao Government developed according to the necessities of local circumstances and, if, on one side, there was the Chinese reality, on the other side, there were overpowering patriotic and sentimental feelings for Portugal. One of the first things to be undertaken was the election of a leader. Considering that Macao was the main base of the Portuguese sea trade with Japan, from which it greatly depended, it was not surprising that the comandante (Captain) of the Japanese annual voyage occupied, from the beginning, the most important position in the Settlement.

In addition to the naval capitão-mor (Captain-Major), there was also a capitão de terra (Land Captain) elected by the inhabitants. The first Captain-Major seems to have been Diogo Pereira, a close friend of St. Francis Xavier, who remained in charge until 1587. Besides these two head entities, can be traced the presence of some other legislating Authorities in Macao, such as juíz (Judge), an ouvidor (Magistrate) and conselheiros (Counsellors).

In May 1582, Fr. Alonso Sanchez arrived in Macao, from the Philippines, sent by the Governor of that Spanish Colony, Don Pedro de Peñalosa, bringing news of the union between the Portuguese and the Castilian Crowns, which had occured in 1580. His diplomatic mission was successful and Macao officially recognized by King Felipe II [of Spain as King Filipe I of Portugal] with one condition, which was to represent the interests of both Portuguese and Spanish before the Chinese, in order not to provoke the mistrust related to the changing of circumstances.

In 1585, a 'Magna' meeting of the Macao inhabitants, decided to surname the Settlement as the City of the Holy Name of God, thus further emphasising the democratic character of the territory. New Authorities necessary to the expansion of local Administration were elected: a new Judge, vereadores (Council Members), a City Procurator and a City Council escrivão (Scrivener). The Viceroy of the Portuguese State of India, Dom Duarte de Meneses, agreed to this, and King Filipe I of Portugal gave to the 'new' City the Privileges of Evora, already given to the city of Cochin, in India. 1

In 1607, a Carta Régia (Royal Letter), henceforth authorized the Viceroy of the Portuguese State of India to name the Captain-Major of Macao as the City's Governor. However, only in 1623 the first Captain-Major acting as Governor was sent to Macao. His name was Dom Francisco de Mascarenhas, and occupied his post on the 17th of July 1623. His task was quite clear. In modern words, the Captain-Major was to act as Military Commander of the Colony, 2 the Civil Administration remaining under the turtelage of the City Council.

From the early seventeenth century onwards Macao suffered the consequences of the union of the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns, which was to last for sixty years, from 1580 to 1640. However, the City managed to maintain its prosperity until 1639, the year when it lost the trade with Japan. The first period of Macanese history can be said to end here.

Without the trade with Japan and, later, without the voyages to Manila, who remained a Spanish possession, faithful to the interests of the Motherland, the Macanese were forced to expand their economic network and to send their ships to more distant localities on longer voyages. 3


The main aim of this study is to investigate the Macanese 'dream'. At the beginning of the eighteenth century this ideal was to establish free and direct trade between Macao and the Brazilian ports. In those days, all trade voyages had to strictly comply with the doctrine of the pacto colonial (Colonial Alliance), which could not be ignored. All Colonies are directly subservient from their hierarchycal Metropolis, which, in their turn back, are vassals to the interests of the Motherland. Macao depended first from Goa and ultimately from Lisbon; the interests of these two centres prevailing those of the small Colony.

But what was Macao's real trade aspiration? Simply this: authorization for its ships to trade Eastern merchandise directly in the Brazilian ports, rather than being forced to pay Duties while in transit in Lisbon; a 'dream' only fulfilled in 1810, after the forced exile of the Portuguese Royal Family to Brazil.

In order to better understand this situation it is first essential to understand and evaluate the extremely delicate situation of Macao as an inevitable vassal of China. It is furthermore necessary to examine, although briefly, some general aspects of the evolution of Macao during the eighteenth century and, in particular, essence of the Macao-Brazil 'dream'. Finally, one must chronologically analyse the unfolding of events and circumstances underlying the problems of this study, which started at the beginning of the eighteenth century and ended in 1810.



It would be foolish to base the Portuguese presence in Macao by any act of conquest. It is obvious that the Establishment of the Portuguese in Macao could not contest, by any means, any demonstration of Chinese Official opposition.

Right from the beginning, the Macanese knew perfectly well their situation, not only directly to the neighbouring Chinese Authorities but also towards the higher and more distant dignataries in Guangzhou. The remoteness of Beijing, the supreme command of the Chinese Empire, invalidating any attempt of direct or immediate appeal, the Portuguese were forced to respect the Chinese hierarchy with which they could have tangible contact.

At the beginning it seemed that the Macanese had tried the practice of some agriculture in Xiangshan (Anção) Island [at the extremity of which Macao is situated], but this initiative did not succeed. If it was convenient to the Portuguese, it did not please the Chinese. It was convenient to the Chinese to maintain the insignificant commercial Establishment under their direct and total dependency. Concerning the food and other supplies that Macao needed, they would continue to come from China. The Macanese would have the sea to contribute to the common welfare of both Portuguese and Chinese.

It is not surprising, therefore, that soon the Portuguese experienced the inevitable inconveniences of such an intimate familiarity with their neighbours and protectors. With their experience, obtained in India and in other Asiatic places, they had learned that money should be used with certain generosity. It was not a question of 'corruption', as we consider it, but a matter of a 'donation' or 'gift', destined to encourage someone to carry out any purpose.

Considering that Macao depended entirely on China for its livelihood, it is easy to understand the gradual imposition of some vassalage that, once accepted, would influence the City life in the future. Two examples of vassalage stand out in this context: the payment of a rent for the occupied piece of land, and, later, the establishment of the Chinese Penal Code.


According to old Macanese tradition, there would be a "chapa de ouro" (lit.: "golden chop"), engraved by the Emperor of China himself, to sanction the donation of Macao to the Portuguese in order to allow them to trade with his vassals. But the "chapa de ouro" has since disappeared.

The Macanese went every year to Guangzhou during its commercial fair. They paid the local Duties and offered a certain amount of silver to the Authorities. These Authorities accepted willingly this peita (gift). In 1571 or 1572, the Macanese translator (interpreter) Pedro Gonçalves used, unintentionally or perhaps willfully, the wordforo (rent) when he gave the present or payment to the Aitao, the Chinese "principal governor" (lit.: "Governor-General"). He accepted it, saying that it would be preserved for the Royal Treasury.

In fact, it seems natural that, at the beginning, there was not any imposition to pay rent for the land. The presence of Portuguese tradesmen interested the Chinese, without any doubt. It was convenient for them to get the precious foreign merchandise without using much effort. They even desired that the Portuguese felt comfortable in the small territory. On the other hand, they did not want the Portuguese to 'abuse' (if this word could be employed in this context) their hospitality, in other words, they did not want them to become economically superior.

The following manuscript from the Biblioteca da Ajuda ([BA] Library of the Royal Palace of Ajuda), in Lisbon, relates the event:

"E se algum quizer saber a antiguidade e solemnidade deste foro, passou asim: desde o tempo que foi entregue este porto e península aos Portuguezes, logo além dos direitos ou ancoragens, pagarão certa quantia de prata com título de foro; mas por alguns annos não se punham no thezouro de el-rei; porque como os Portuguezes o antegavão ao Aitão por ser principal governador, e protector desta terra, ella consumia e gastava, e por isso se chamava a peita do Aitão, e durou isto por espaço de alguns dez ou doze annos; athe que no anno de 71 ou 72, hindo os Portuguezes á feira, e sahindo os Mandarins, como costumavão, á porta grande vestidos de vermelho para receber os direitos que levavão os Portuguezes, depois em sinal de respeito conforme a sua uzança de os Mandarins lhes darem hum boyão de vinho e alguns bolos, como era costume, disse hum Pedro Gonçalves que servia de Girubaça, e era mestiço, fallando com o Aitao: como também aqui trazemos os quinhentos taeis que opaga a Cidade de foro; o Aitao, como se disse aquillo diante dos outros Mandarins, vendo que corria perigo seo estado, acodio logo que esses entregasse ao Leencei, que são para o thezouro del-rei por serem do foro que a cidade paga: e desde este tempo cá ja 10 annos se paga e enthezoura pera el-rei, e como não he de direitos, nem de campos, nem vargeas, se não do sitio, e ella tem senhorio delle, como os Chinas que pagão foro do sitio e terras que possuem, e se alguem duvidar desta historia pergunte a verdade della a Antonio Garcez que se achou presente e está vivo."

("Since the time when this port and this peninsula were delivered to the Portuguese they had to pay not only the Duties of anchorage but also a certain amount of silver as a title of rent; but during some years this payment would not be put in the Royal Treasury, because as it was delivered to the Aitao, the Governor General and protector of this land, who would spend it and that is why it was called the peita [ground rent to the Aitao]. This lasted for ten or twelve years; until the year 1571 or 1572, when the Portuguese went to the fair. When the Mandarins went, dressed in red, to receive the Duties that the Portuguese took with them, they gave the Portuguese wine and cakes. A certain Pedro Gonçalves, who served as Girubaça (jirubassa) and was a mestizo, said to the Aitao: --"We also bring here the five-hundred taéis [a Chinese silver monetary unit] to pay the ground rent of the City". As it was said before the Mandarins, the Aitao saw that his state ran a risk and asked the Portuguese: to give the payment to the Leencei because it should belong to the Royal Treasury: and from this moment on, for already ten years, the payment should be given to the King, as Chinese also do, for the land they occupy."). 4

From that time, the rent of five-hundred taéis would be paid almost continuously. That was the ground rent. Later, it would increase to one-thousand taéis. It must be remembered that a tael is a weight and not a coin. We can also consider it as a special coin that changes from place to place. It weighed, more or less, three-hundred-and-seventy-five grams.

It is known that this ground rent was not demanded by the Chinese Authorities in 1650,1652,1685,1686 and 1687. 5

There is no doubt that the payment of this ground rent was important, not only for the independence of the Colony but also for the local budget. This problem was taken into account in the Council many times.


The imposition and execution of the Chinese Penal Law in Macao, in case of any violent death of a Chinese person, was always felt by the inhabitants, but seldom could they escape from it. When any Chinese was murdered, either by one compatriot or by any Macanese or foreigner, the guilty party would be taken to the Chinese Justice in order to be punished, or he could even be punished in Macao. In these cases, the Mandarins came to Macao in order to be informed of the facts in loco and to be present at the execution of the murderer, if the execution took place in town. Their interpretation was always the same: the murderer had to die, and they did not accept, in general, any other penalty. A short reading of the Third Series of "Arquivos de Macau" (published from 1964 to 1979) shows significant examples of this humiliating interference over Portuguese Sovereignty in Macao.


The histories of Macao and the existing documents almost always refer to the care that the Macanese had concerning the desire of maintaining their Privilégios (Privileges). The Chinese Mandarins were always promising them those 'privileges', mainly when they were attacked by pirates. However, those promises were never fulfilled. The continuous Macanese reference to the Privileges shows clearly the subordination of the Colony to the wilfulness of their neighbours. It was not a matter of achieving the recognition of Rights but of Privileges.

A remarkable testimony of that dependence can be found in a letter that Dom Alexandre da Silva Pedrosa Guimarães (1772-1789), Bishop and Governor of the Colony wrote to the Câmara (Council) [former Leal Senado (Loyal Senate)]. On the 5th of August 1777 the Council wrote the Bishop a letter, asking his opinion "about the assistance to the foreigners in this City".6

The matter was of extreme importance because the Viceroys of India insisted in the banishment of foreigners, saying that the presence of them was prejudicial. The Bishop-Governor answered three days later, on the 8th of August 1777.

There were three reasons for excluding foreigners from Macao, according to the thesis defended by Goa, in the person of the Viceroy Dom José Pedro da Câmara (1774-1779):

1. The foreigners ruined the City commerce, because their presence contributed to the lack of goods and provisions.

2. The local inhabitants did not gain any profit by the residence of these foreign people in the City.

3. Their habits spoiled the native people.

The Bishop-Governor accepted those arguments as valid, arguments that could apply to foreign people in general, except the corpos das Companhias (the Foreign Companies' staff), i. e., the crew of the ships that frequented the port of Guangzhou.

And, in a scholastic way, he divided the arguments into eight categories:

1. The City of Macao had been forced, more than ten years ago, by the Chinese Emperor's orders, to receive those foreigners. Therefore, there was no reason to change the adopted attitude.

2. "He o segundo estarmos numa terra precaria coinsentidos hà duzentos e vinte dous annos, vivendo em boa Armenia, e corn subjeição nos delictos a justiça do Imperador, havendo algum reo de morte feito em china [...]." ("The second argument was the fact that they had had permission, for the following two-thousand-and-twenty-two years, to stay in a small land, living in perfect harmony, but being submitted to the Emperor's Justice [...].").

3. "He o terceiro não podermos rezistir com forças a qualquer ordem, que se houver de não cumprir, porque os chinas existentes nesta Cidade, são perto de vinte e dous mil, e todos christãos de Macao assim velhos, como mossos, e crianças de peito, pretos e brancos de hum, e de outro sexo não chegarão a seis mil, e muito fracos: e o Imperador em hum instante meterá nesta cidade de improvise tantos Chinas, que lançando cada um sȯ sapato neste rio farà intupir a barra, como elle referio a respeito dosmoradores de Macao, quando perante elle os quizerão malquistar. [...]" ("The third argument was the fact that they could not resist the Chinese, because they amounted to about twenty-two-million and the Christians of Macao were, including children, less than six-thousand, and they were all weak. The Emperor could also, in one minute, bring many Chinese to Macao. This mean to that the City depended completely on the Chinese will. [...]").

4. The other Nations that traded with China from Guangzhou took advantages, maintaining their agents or their overload in China, while the ships were sailing, so that they could prepare conveniently the cargo that was destined for the next shipping. Because these agents could not allowed to live in Guangzhou they used to come to Macao.

5. The Chinese, tradesmen from Guangzhou, received a lot of money from the Europeans with whom they traded.

Therefore, they were in the presence of the European agents in Macao.

6. The Chinese and their Emperor also desired to keep the European trade and, for that reason, "[...] mais quererão a existência dos Estrangeiros do que livrar os moradores de Macao de quaesquer opressoens, que nȯs lhe reprezentarmos, respondendo a tudo que temos Leis, e justiças, para nos conservarmos [...]." ("[...] they preferred the presence of foreigners in Macao and were prepared to compromise with them in order to have business running smoothly [...].").

7. The Chinese knew very well that the Macanese could not substitute the other European tradesmen, who used to come to Guangzhou. It was not worthwhile to offend them.

8. Finally, it was not convenient to forget that the overload (Agents) of the Companies made more than forty-thousand taéis. Therefore, its absence would be felt in Macao.

Still speaking about the same subject, the bishop-governor reminded them that the Emperor of China "[...] he Senhor directo de Macao, que lhe paga hum foro, e nòs apenas temos o dominiuo util: A terra não se obteve por que digo por conquista, e assim a nossa rezidencia não hé firme, ad nutum sim [...]" ("[...] is the direct Lord of Macao, to whom Macao pays a rent, and we only have a useful power. The land was not conquered and because of that our residence is not firm [...]")... And continuing his melancholic thoughts: "Onde há forças o direito se perde, e foi a razão por que perdemos Portugal. Nós não temos forças, nem direito; logo hè melhor sofrer, e recorrer, a quem possa dar as providencias [...]." ("Where there is no strength the rights disappear, and that is why we lost Portugal. We do not have strength nor rights, so it is better to suffer and to ask protection of those who can help us [...]."7

Chinese abacus [Suanpan].


Macao was really troubled during the eighteenth century. After the Dutch attack in June 1622, fought-off with heavy losses to the invader, everything indicated a new time of prosperity. However, the Dutch competitiveness in Japan gave a new shape to those hopes. The general persecution, proclaimed in 1614, was only towards the Christans. Year by year, the Dutch trade in Japan was increasing. In 1639, however, Japan decided to reject Portuguese trade. The death of the Macanese Ambassadors sent to Japan in 1640 showed the true extent of the crisis. In fact the trade between Macao and Japan was finished. 8

On the 10th of September 1640, before the National Revolution of that year, the Macanese decided to send a ship to Lisbon to alert the Motherland to the difficulty of the situation. The communication between Malacca and Macao was also seriously threatened and the Dutch were already the unquestionable 'Lords of the Straits of Singapore'.

From this situation it can be concluded that: "[...] não poder conservar-se esta Cidade, sem ter viagens, e Portos aonde levar as fazendas que se comprarão aos Chinas, e como não se comprando as ditas fazendas de Cantão, logo hè força que os mercadores naturaes as levão a vender ao inimigo da Europa, com o qual ficara o dito rebelde entroduzido neste comercio da China e Japão [...]." ("[...] this City could not go on without trips and harbours where they could take the merchandise used to be brought to China, and if the merchandise was not bought in Guangzhou, the native tradesmen had to take it to the enemy from Europe, [i. e., the Dutch], who were already established in the trade of China and Japan [...]."). 9 It would be the ruin of Macao.

There was a fierce wind blowing over Macao. In 1641 Malacca was occupied by the Dutch, and because of that, the communication between Macao and Goa became difficult. After the Revolution in 1640, Manila's port, which had been friendly before, became the enemy. In 1688, the Chinese tightened the economic activity of Macao, and established in Macao the Hopu (Chinese Customs). The Embassy sent to China, led by Manuel Saldanha (1667-1670) exerted a strong influence on the communication between China and Portugal. The Mandarins of Guangzhou saw, with surprise, that Beijing received the Portuguese Ambassador very well, as a representative of a friendly Country, and not as a tributary, as they generally used to consider the foreign Nations.

We enter now into a brief analysis of the eighteenth century, from the following aspects:

1. Religious,

2. Diplomatic,

3. Political and Administrative,

4. Economic, and

5. Final problems.


Macao was, since the beginning, the main missionary base, destined to establish Catholicism in China. During the sixteenth century Catholicism was introduced among the Chinese people and even among the Chinese upper classes. This fact is due to the missionaries who were willing to practice a 'policy of Accommodation'. The Portuguese Jesuits were real models in the effort of introducing elements of Chinese culture into Catholicism. The French Jesuits followed the example of the Portuguese. By the end of the century, new and less well-prepared missionaries arrived at Macao and, at the same time, they faced a very big problem, which was to have tragic consequences. This was the problem of the Chinese Rites. What would seem to be very simple and unimportant for a European mind, would be of extreme importance to the Chinese literati. There were three main points:

1. Which cult did the Chinese pay to Confucius?

2. How could the cult paid to the ancestors be classified? and,

3. How could the name of God be defined or spelt in Chinese?

The Holy See considered it convenient to send a Legate to study the problem in loco, hoping to find a solution to the doubts of the different missionaries. The chosen man was Mgr. Charles Thomas Maillard de Tournon, partisan of Rigourism, defended in general by non-Portuguese missionaries. He condemned the Chinese Rites and as it did not please the Chinese he was threatened with expulsion from China. The presence of the Holy See Legate was not also well accepted in Macao, where the problem of the Rites had been better accepted. Mgr. de Tournon involved himself in a scandalous controversy [the Rites Controversy] with the Bp. Dom João do Casal and with the Macanese Civil Authorities. Pope Clemente XI agreed with the condemnation of the Chinese Rites in November 1704 [Bull Cum Deus Optimus, on the 20th of November 1704]. Elected Cardinal in 1707, Mgr. de Tournon died in Macao on the 18th of July 1710.

The consequence of this problem was the expulsion of the missionaries from China. However, Pope Clemente XI (elect. 1700-† 1721) became more hard-hearted when he published the Bull Ex Illa Die, on the 19th of March 1715. The problem of the Rites remained the same and the missionaries also remained divided: the ones who belonged to the Portuguese Patronage were in favour of the 'policy of Accommodation' but the ones of the Propaganda Fide [The Jesuits] remained faithful to their principles. Reconsidering the past, Pope Clement XI himself sent, in 1720, a new Legate to China, Card. Carlo Ambrogio Mezzabarba. More diplomatic than Card. de Tournon, he tried his best to be introduced to the Chinese Authorities. However, the Kangxi Emperor (r. 1661- † 1722) did not pay him much attention. Because of that, Card. Mezzabarba left Beijing the following year, in 1721.

In November of that same year, he published in Macao some instructions related to the problem in question: that missionaries should take the instructions of the Holy See. In order to lighten the conscience of the Chinese Christians, who acted according to their tradition, Mezzabarba explicited in eight concessões (Compliances) or faculdades (Licences) the correct way to comply with Catholic principles. When he left Macao, he took with him the mortal remains of Card. de Tournon.

However, this attempt did not succeed. Some years later, in July 1742, Benedetto XIV (elect. 1740- † 1758), by the Bull Ex Quo Singulari, brought the problem back again to the state, as it had been left by Card. de Tournon. And so would the problem of Rites Controversy remain until 1939, when Rome, reviewing the process, published a liberating instruction concerning this delicate matter. 10

It is easy to imagine the effect that the development of these events produced in Macao. Those were years of anxiety and disappointment.

Kangxi's successor, the Yongzheng Emperor (r.1723-†1735), noticing that many missionaries were still in China published a new Edict to banish them in 1723. The Portuguese and French Jesuits were an exception because of their scientific knowledge and so they remained in Beijing. The Qianlong Emperor (r.1736-†1795) continued with the persecution of Christianity. Worst of all, Clemente XIV, (elec.1769-†1774), pressed by several potentates, extinguished the Society of Jesus in 1773. In Portugal, this Society had been extinguished since 1759, and the same Order was accomplished in Macao, in 1762.

It was necessary, therefore, to start from the beginning. The Portuguese Lazarists received the difficult mission of replacing the Jesuits in China. It is fair to confess that they did this work very enthusiastically. But, doubtlessly, the Chinese sympathy towards Christianity had already gone. 11


The Embassy of Manuel Saldanha has already been mentioned. Some years later, and because of the increasing anti-Christian persecution, the Macanese Senate decided that a new Embassy should be sent in order to lighten the Imperial antipathy, not only against the Christians but also against foreigners in general. King Dom João V approved of the idea.

The Embassy was led by Dom Alexandre Metelo de Sousa Menezes. António de Magalhães S. J. played the role that Adam Schall S. J. had performed in the Embassy of Manuel Saldanha. In May 1726, Sousa Menezes was solemnly received in audience and there are no records of the Embassy facing any specific problems. However, the persecution against Christianity in China went on and in 1736, the Chinese imposed the presence of one of their Mandarins invested with full powers, in Macao. The Leal Senado (Loyal Senate) promptly reacted to this resolution and negotiations ensued. Finally it was decided that the resolution of the presence of a resident Mandarin in Macao was to be postponed to 1797.

In 1749, Chinese control became even tighter, and the Chinese Penal Code was enforced in the City. There was nothing the powerless Portuguese Authorities could do about it, If until then Justice had been shared between the Chinese and the Portuguese, the former dealing only with cases which directly involved Chinese concerns. Now the Mandarins claimed total Authority over Macao. However, the Chinese Penal Code was not imposed in Macao in the name of the Emperor but in the name of the Viceroy [Governor-general] of the of the Province of Guangdong [Guangsu and Guangxi]. [sic]

Under these circumstances the Portuguese decided to organize a new Embassy to Beijing. The Ambassador Francisco de Assis Pacheco de Sampaio arrived at Macao on the 23rd of January 1752. After careful preparation, in which the Beijing Court confirmed that Portugal was not a tributary Country of China, the Embassy left for Beijing. Once again it was a Jesuit, Fr. Agostino Hallerstein, who was in charge of all the work behind the scenes, in order to make that Embassy successful. The audience with the Emperor took place in May 1752.

It may seem, at first sight, that the effects of this diplomatic effort were negative. But the Macanese, who were completely aware of Chinese phsycology, did not feel the same way. The Viceroy of Guangdong [sic] could not prevent such Embassies from going go to Beijing, where the interests of the Macao were certainly defended. Macao was not complaining against Beijing or against the main Authorities, but against the Mandarins in the neighbourhood and against the Chinese Authorities in Guangdong. Although the diplomatic pretext of the Portuguese Embassies to visit Beijing was to greet the Emperors, their true purpose was quite another one. The ultimate end of these Embassies was to remind the Emperors that Macao was nothing but a small Settlement inhabited by friendly and harmless foreigners, frequent victims of undue oppression by corrupt Chinese Authorities. 12


As we have seen before, the Political and Administrative Government of Macao was in the hands of the Senate; the Military Government being in the hands of the Captain-Major. However, as time went by, the Captain-Majors increasingly claimed more responsibility and power in local Government. The Senate, without control of any material strength, fought back to maintain its legal Rights and Privileges.

According to the Efemérides da História de Macau, by Luís Gonzaga Gomes13 the eighteenth century started badly. In 1700 the Governor and Captain-Major Diogo de Melo Sampaio (1700-1720) simply annulled the Senate elections. 14 In 1710, there was a great scandal, provoked by the Captain-Major Diogo de Pinho Teixeira, whose government had started in 1706 and ended that same year. 15 His successor was Francisco de Melo e Castro, to whom Dom Rodrigo da Costa gave the advice not to interfere in the decisions of the Senate. 16

In spite of all these convulsions the short-lived government of António de Albuquerque Coelho (1718-1719) pleased the Macanese in general. Althought of a lesser scale than the 1710 Pinto Teixeira scandal, another major incident of this period occured in 1709 when the Ouvidor (Magistrate) ordered the inprisonment of the Senate's Procurator, setting a precedent hitherto unknown in the history of Macao. 17

Throughout the century numerous conflicts occurred among the Members of the Senate, the Captain-Majors and the Magistrates. The first, being the representative of the people and elected by them, defended permanent interests. The second being elected by Goa, frequently experienced difficulties in understanding the particular circumstances of local life and 'pressures'.

However, it cannot be concluded that the Senate did not make any mistakes. Macao being a tiny place, was natural that gossip, intrigue and lust for power were rife among local society. An example of irregularities transpires from a contestation letter dated 18th of May 1721, from the Viceroy of the Portuguese State of India, Dom Francisco José de Sampaio e Castro (1720-1723), expressing surprise by a decision of the Senate forbiding the sailing of the inhabitants' chalupas (shallops), giving authorization only for bigger ships. The Viceroy protested against this decision claiming it to be "[...] não só injusta, mas prejudicial ao comum desta cidade [...] porque o commercio he permittido igoalmente a grandes e piquenos [...]." ("[...] not only unfair but also prejudicial for the good of the city [...] because trading is equally permitted to big and small [i. e.: rich and poor men] alike [...]."). 18

Anyway, the complaints against the behaviour of the Senate caused an echo not only in Goa but also in Lisbon. The complaint was against the institution itself and not limited to the people who, in certain circumstances, occupied the place of Members of the Senate.

The main indictment was the subservience of the Senate to the Mandarins, indeed an easy accusation from those who did not have the heavy burden of the Senate's responsibilities.

By 1783, a number of accusations against the Macao Senate finally reached Lisbon. The government of King Dom José (r.1750-†1777), and of his almost omnipotent and valued Marquês de Pombal, had finished. Martinho de Melo e Castro, who was Navy and Overseas Minister, considered carefully the problem of Macao. He read all the documents that he could get and he talked to the people aware of the situation. In the Apontamentos, e notícias para a instrução, que se deve formar em Goa, ao bispo de Pekin, sobre os negôcios relativos ao domínio de Macao (Notes and instructions sent to Goa, to the Bishop of Beijing, about the deals related to the Domain of Macao) we read:

"O Dominio que a Coroa de Portugal tem sobre o importante Estabelecimento de Macáo, não lheprovem de alguma Graça, ou Cessão, que os Imperadores da China fizessem dele a esta Coroa; mas provem do Direito da Conquista, que as Armas Portuguezas fizeram daquela Colónia." ("The domain that the Portuguese Crown has over the important Establishment of Macao is not a present given by the Emperors of China, on the contrary, it was a Right obtained by the Portuguese Military when they conquered Macao."). 19

The words above are the first words of the Apontamentos [...].

According to this mentality it is not surprising that this conscientious Minister attacked the Macao Senate directly. In another document, entitled Instrução para Dom Federico Guilherme de Souza, governador e capitão geral da India (Instructions to DomFederico Guilherme de Souza, governor and general captain of India), he gave his opinion on the Macanese Senate:

"O Senado da Camera daquele importante dominio, composto na mayor parte de Degradados, que ali se refugiaram, ou de outros similhantes a eles, todos ignorantissimos em materias de Governo, e sem outras vistas mais, que as de procurarem a sua fortuna por meyo da Navegação e do Commercio, só cuidam em fazer menos cruel a tirania dos Mandarins, com humiliaçoens serviz, com dadivas, que constantemente lhes oferecem talvez extorquidas da Real Fazenda; e submetendo-se a quanto eles querem, sem lhes importar couza alguma, que diga respeito ao decoro da Nação Portugueza, nemao inconstestaval Direito de Soberania, que a Coroa de Portugal tem naquelle Dominio [...]." ("The Senate of that important domain is composed mainly of politically ignorant refugees, whose aim is only to make their fortunes. They humiliate themselves before the Mandarins giving them presents, donations, perhaps stolen from the Royal Treasury, in order to minimize the Mandarins' cruelty so that they can sail and trade without any problems.

They do not care about the Portuguese Nation, nor about the Right of Sovereignty that the Portuguese Crown has over that Dominion [...]."). 20

This is one of the most violent and authorized accusations against the Leal Senado of Macao. "Leal" ("Loyal") declared by King Dom João VI years later, in 1810. It was, without any doubt, a violent and authorized testimony that could only be explained by Martinho de Melo e Castro's ignorance about the facts.

The Macao Senate was guilty of everything bad that happened in the Colony. According to the opinion of Martinho e Castro it was necessary to reduce the jurisdiction of the Senate to a merely local Administration, reserving to the Captain-Major not only the Military policy but also the affairs with the Chinese and the Financial Administration.

According to Martinho de Melo e Castro another abuse was the lack of a proper Magistrate. The one in charge was a layman. Therefore, the Senate was responsible for the loss of all "the privileges, exemptions and liberties", conceded by the Chinese Emperors. 21

Concerning the Financial Administration, the same Minister had completely offensive ideas against the Senate, arguing that the present situation of the Public Treasury was due to pure negligence of the Senate. One important step to follow would be the establishment of a Customs House in Macao that should adhere to all the specific and technical rules observed in other Colonies.

In brief, there were six providências (Measures) to be taken concerning the matters of Macao:

1. The Governor should be carefully chosen. When he did not perform his duties he could be replaced. After three years, he could be re-elected for another three years in case of good Administration.

2. More Authority should be given to the Governor and in order to be respected he should have a bigger Military force.

3. The Governor should be the one who would deal with the Chinese and not the Senate.

4. Establishment of the Royal Customs House in Macao.

5. Nomination of the Portuguese Bishops to China.

6. Macao Council should render account of the Royal Treasury / Finances income. 22

Martinho de Melo e Castro argued that the Mandarins, who were the oppressors of Macao behaving against Imperial Orders, would be put in their place every time it was noticed that they indulged in irregular procedures. Thus, he ignored the real situation in Macao.

According to these arguments he secretly and efficiently ordered to reduce the Senate's Authority and consequently to increase the authority of the Captain-Major. On board the war ship that would take the Bishop of Beijing to Macao, there would also be a company of sipoys, a detachment of artillery, two Judges, and two Officials of the Treasury who were in charge of carrying out a scrupulous examination of the Senate's accounts. At the same time they would look for the letters concerning Chinese Privileges.

The Governor and other Officers would proceed with the installment of the Customs House although they would face some resistance from the Senate. Those who opposed such measures would be arrested and sent to Goa, on board the same ship, with the respective processes. 23 The only excuse for this strictness was the ignorance of reality or lack of information.


As mentioned previously, Macao depended on maritime trade. Its tradesmen used to buy Chinese products and then they took them to different harbours, where the goods were sold.

Until 1639, the main voyage was to Japan. But the problem was that of Dutch competition. Therefore, Macao lost what had been almost a monopoly trade and so a period of great prosperity came to an end for the time being. 24

In spite of all these problems, the Macanese reacted as best they could. The City life depended on economic interests. The Records of Macao Council were always concerning the same subjects: Communication with the Chinese; Orders from the neighbouring Mandarins; difficulties regarding voyages to Manila, Siam, Madras, Cochin-China, Java, Bombay, Surat and Goa.

The tradesmen, usually the owners of boats, were not completely free to sail around. There was the so called pauta de viagens (schedule of the voyage), proposed by Macao and submitted to Goa for approval many years before. This schedule could be changed if something serious happened. If there was any ship that was not able to make the voyage, a substitute would be proposed to Goa.

One of the most profitable voyages, after the loss of the trade with Japan, was the one to Timor, because of sandalwood. However, this voyage depended on the security of conditions found in the Islands of Solor and Timor. It must be remembered that only in 1665 a Representative of the Central Power was appointed, with the Portuguese Establishment in Lifau, Portuguese Capital until 1769, the date on which it was changed to Dili. It can also be said that, during the eighteenth century, the situation of Indonesia always offered some instability, which did not favoured the normal trade with Macao. 25

The voyages to India could not be carried out without an Authorization from Goa. Macao therefore sent only the number of ships previously fixed and no more than that. To Cochin-China and other destinations there were the same limits. The Macanese obeyed to the principle prescribed to India and to Macao.

The eighteenth century was marked by continuous decay. The missionaries, banishment from China and the affluence awarded Guangzhou by foreign ships deeply affected Macanese prosperity.

In 1726 Dr. João Marques Bacalhau e Pedro Vicente Velho were named, in Lisbon, Procurators of Macao. From the letters between these two men and the Senate, of 1736-1737 we know that Batavia's port was closed by the Dutch and also that Surat could not be visited by Macanese ships. 26 In Lisbon, in 1741, the Companhia Real das Sedas (Royal Company of Silk), in order to develop its commerce, had the idea of creating a branch in Macao, or rather an allied Company. It was to last for sixteen years and was led by Directors and Administrators. The Company accepted shareholders. The Company of Lisbon could send to China, every year, as many ships as the Company wished, these ships having the same prerrogatives to the ones from the Portuguese State of India. However, the Company was not allowed to trade with Brazil. One of the most important concessões (Grants) was: "[...] the Company can carry in its vessels all the silver necessary to the negotiations, although it can not be in coins of this Kingdom".27

During the reign of King Dom José I the situation was the same. In 1753 the Companhia do Comércio Oriental (Company of Eastern Commerce) was established. Two years after, in Lisbon, the Company of Grão Pará and Maranhão was established and in 1759 the Company of Pernambuco and Paraíba. 28 This meant that Macao had just suffered the competition from other enterprises. It must be remembered that the ship from the Company of Eastern Commerce was allowed to trade with India.

The Macanese saw the ports of Malabar, Goa and Surat almost lost. The nau (ship) from India was much bigger and could transport the load of two small ships. On the 5th of November 1755, the Leal Senado recalled that in 1726, at the time of Alexandre Metelo de Sousa e Menezes Embassy, there were in Macao more than twenty vessels, but in contrast, in 1755, "[...]there are only seven ships and shallops, and three of them will disappear during this monsoon." [And it was added that...] the Royal Treasury did not spend anything with Macao; its inhabitants, who lived only from trade, paid the maintenance of the Bishop, Legislative Court, prison, Governor and so on. The decay was such that there were only six inhabitants who could live abundantly." On the streets there were lots of women begging and there were no munitions in the fortresses. The convents did not receive any rents. The Army was insufficient. The Bp. Dom Frei Hilário de Santa Rosa decided to go to Lisbon in order to show to the Court what was really happening. The Senate proposed the exemption of several expenses, the suppression of some posts, including the one of the surgeon. 29 On the other hand, it was necessary to take into account a Royal Ruling, from June 1755, that opened the commerce of Mozambique to all the inhabitants of Portuguese Asia, including Macao. 30


In this brief summary it is, of course, necessary to mention the intensification of piracy along the Chinese coast until the end of the century and naturally Macao was directly involved in this situation. These pirates were led by Zheng Yi and they were different from the others because, apart from robbery, they wanted to bring down the Dynasty. These pirates were not only from China but also from Cochin-China and Formosa (Taiwan). After Zheng Yi died he was succeeded by his wife, who showed extraordinary personal qualities. She galvanized around her all the followers of her husband. They created two naval divisions: one was led by Zhang Baozai, showing a red flag, and the other was led by Guo Podai showing a black flag.

They proved to be a big menace. Finally in 1792 the Mandarin from Xiangshan asked the Portuguese for help. The Senate took profit from this situation to make a deal: they would only help if the Mandarin recognized the "old Privileges". Actually, on the 29th of December 1792, the Senate wrote to Goa to communicate that the Chinese Authorities had asked for the arming of two ships, which would fight the pirates. The Governor agreed but the Senate proposed another deal: the Mandarins could charter the ships at their own expenses while the City would provide the arms and the men. 31

The pirates did not attack only the Imperial Navy. Macao had become the object of their natural greediness. Therefore, it was urgent to prepare the City against any event. If, until that moment, the Mandarins had looked at the fortifications of Macao with suspicion, now, on the other hand, it was the ideal occasion to put in Macao all the troops. In fact, they feared that the pirates might drive the Portuguese away and that would have been the end.

On the 31st of December 1805 the Senate, worried, wrote a letter to the Prince Regent in order to stress that, although Goa had sent some help, it was not enough to cover their necessities. They even had to sell some ships that were not prepared to fight. With the sale's profit they had bought a new ship, Ulisses, made of teak, already prepared to receive suitable gunnage. 32

But the threat of the pirates was not the only one. The English intended to occupy Macao, with the argument that the French possibly would try to do the same. However, there were no signs of a French threat. The only real threat was the pirates. On 11th of September, one small British fleet appeared around Macao, led by Admiral Drury. He had not come to defend Macao against the local pirates. Instead, he came to defend Macao against the French, who were far away from Macao. He had superior orders to disembark his men and to occupy strategic places. The Governor, Bernardo Aleixo de Lemos Faria, and the Senate tried to oppose the British from disembarking as best they could.

Long and difficult negotiations went on, in which the Magistrate, Miguel de Arriaga Brum da Silveira, also participated. The British Admiral insisted on the execution of the received orders. On the 21st of September they signed a Convention according to which the British disembarkation was allowed, although it had to submit to several conditions.

Once in Macao, the British sailors become involved with the Chinese population. The neighbouring Mandarins, from Qianshan and Xiangshan, and the Viceroy of Guandong [...] himself were openly against the British presence in Macao. Guangdong also threatened to send an Army against Macao. Facing these unexpected difficulties, the English decided to re-embark. And, always practical,they managed to make Arriaga intercede with the Chinese Authorities on their behalf in order to cancel the Chinese Law, according to which they could not trade in Guangzhou. Eventually, everything was favourably concluded: the English re-embarked on the 18th of December and a few days after, on the 1st of January, 1809, Guangzhou declared again that the English were free to trade in that City.

The English threat was over. But there were still the pirates. In fact, it was a time of great anxiety. But, on the 21st of January 1810 the pirates were thorougly defeated. Months later, on the 26th of May 1810, the Senate wrote to Goa, pleased to inform them that the Portuguese Navy, with only six ships defeated more than two-hundred-and-seventy "[...] embarcaçõens guarnecidas de groça artelharia, fazendo dois Corpos hum de 17 mil homens e outro de 8000 [...]." ("[...] wellarmed ships provided with heavy artillery, composed by two contigents of armed forces, one of seventeen-thousand men and another of eightthousand [...]."). 33

This was the scenario for the development of the Macanese 'dream': free trade and direct contacts with Brazil.

Chinese Musical score [Aria chineza].



As already seen, at the beginning Macanese navigation was limited to Eastern ports. The hard experience gained by the end of the seventeenth century showed that it was necessary to spread their horizons. Therefore the Macanese wished to establish a normal course to Brazilian ports, but with the system of free sailing, without necessity of sailing through Lisbon where they would need to pay Duties.

When the Senate proposed this to King Dom João V (r.1706-†1750), it also proposed to send to Lisbon, as Procurator of the Senate respectful Bp. Dom João do Casal (1690-1735) in order to defend the Senate's cause. In March 1707 the King answered, denying their proposal. Concerning the free sailing to Brazil, he had the same negative attitude, saying that such a voyage would be harmful to the Royal Customs because "[...] it would deprive the Customs of the Treasury Duties coming from China [...]." Furthermore, according to the King's opinion, Brazilian commerce was not profitable. 34

However, this answer did not convince the Senate. It continued sending Representatives to Lisbon from time to time. The Senate also had a Representative in Goa. In 1709 André Lopes de Lavre was in Lisbon and mentioned Gaspar Franco da Silva, the men sent by Macao to present to the King the following: that either Macao would be kept, or it would be said that "que ali foi Macao" ("There it was, Macao") like Mombasa and Ceylon... Lopes de Lavre also mentioned the King's decision of not allowing direct sailing from Brazil to Macao. It means: the navigation Macao-Brazil would go on like it was before. 35 Gaspar Franco da Silva explained, with realism, the situation of Macao. One of the reasons for Macao decay was the payment of Duties, imposed by the Portuguese State of India, when Macanese ships sailed in "their seas, [... even when...] they did not enter Goa." The Macanese desired to be free of that imposition. The King expressed himself about this on the 30th of December 1709:

"Me pareceo dizer-vos, que sobre o poderem navegar as vossas embarcaçoens para os portos do Brazil deste Reyno, e da Azia, vos tenho concedido esta liberdade [...]." ("I am here to say that I give you all the freedom to navigate to Brazilian ports and the Eastern ports [...]."). The King also suggested the creation of a trading Company, composed of Metropolitans and Macanese. He also mentioned the fact that the Macanese were obliged to pay duties to Goa just because they sailed the Indian Ocean.

Concerning the fact that Macao was deprived of the voyage to Manila, and the fact that the voyage to Solor and Timor was also blocked by local problems, he affirmed:

"Hey por bem de ordenar ao V. Rey desse Estado não consinta que obriguem as embarcaçoens desse porto que passão pelos mares de Goa, a que paguem taes direitos, com declaração porem, que isto se entenderá em quanto se não logre a paz com a Coroa de Castela, e se não restituem esses moradores aos interesses antigos, e se passeficão as ditas Ilha, por que tornando tudo ao primeiro ser, e se estabelecer o negocio sem nenhum embaraço, neste cazo pagarão os taes direitos como estava em estilo, de que me pareceo avizar-vos para terdes a rezolução, que Fui Servido tomar nesta materia [...]." ("I order the Viceroy of that State that he should not force the ships sailing in Goan seas to pay such Duties, until the Peace with Spain. After that everything should go back to normal and the ships would have to pay duties as usual."). 36

In another words: the ships were, in fact, obliged to pay Duties to the Portuguese State of India, only because they sailed in seas that were considered "their" property for fiscal purposes, although they did not enter the port of Goa. Those were claims of the actual economic policy!

About this subject, the Royal Grant was only one exception, lasting until the next Peace with Spain, i. e.: in 1715. However, it can be noticed that the Macanese ships were allowed to sail to the ports in Asia and Brazil. These were common trips, that should obey the actual Rules, and were not free sailing.

However, there is a certain difference concerning Macao-Brazil trade. In fact, the Royal Letter of March 1707 tried to divert the Macanese from that commerce, while the Letter of December 1709 openly allowed it. So, Macao would continue under Goa direct administrative and economic dependence.

Concerning the trading Company previously mentioned, it is known that the Macanese Procurator, Gaspar Franco da Silva, participated in the preparation of its creation. He proposed that such a Company should be open to anyone who would like to take part in it. This proposal was submitted to the provedor (Purveyor) and (Deputies) of the Mesa do Espírito Santo da Pedreira (Board of the Holy Ghost of Pedreira), of the businessmen, who agreed to it.

In fact, there were many foreigners that would like to make business with India and Macao, and it was convenient to be aware of that. The new Company, confirmed by Royal Ruling on the 31 st of January 1710, could trade in Brazilian ports, according to the running conditions. It was expected that, in the first monsoon -- in March, 1710 -- the Company's ship would leave for the East.

The seventh condition was quite clear:

"Com condição que os Administradores desta Companhia poderão mandar vender em qualquer porto do Brazil donde forem as ditas Naus vindas de Macao, as fazendas que lhes parecer, manifestandose na Alfandega de V. Magestade ao Provedor & Officiaes della, de que mandarão certidão á Caza daÍndia, para nella se pagarem os direytos a V. Magestadena forma atraz referida de dez por cento, & as mais miudezas, que costumão pagar na dita Caza, & poresta condição somente se obrigão a sua importancia nesta Cidade." ("The Company may sell products in any Brazilian port. However, they have to get in touch with the Royal Customs House, that will send the testimonial to Casa da Índia (House of India) in order to pay the Duties of ten per cent to the King."). 37

It seems that the activity of the Company was very reduced. Actually, in 1715, two Catalans, João and Paulo Martins, required the concession of a new Company to the Eastern ports, from the Comorim Cape to the Molucca and Japan, for a five year period. One of the reasons mentioned was that the trading Company of Macao, granted to the Mesa do Bem Comum do Comércio (Welfare Board of Trade) for ten years, could be considered extinguished.

This proposal was examined in the Mesa do Bem Comum do Comércio, in May 1715. Their opinion was negative, and they were alerted to the fact that the Company of Macao was by no means extinct.

In August 1715, the Casa da Índia, after being consulted, also did not agree with the previous proposal, adding that, after the discovery of gold in Brazil, there were many foreigners who asked for permission to sail to Brazilian ports.

The navigation Macao-Brazil continued to be submitted to the general Legislation. 38


Some years later, in 1719, Fr. António dos Prazeres, Dominican, was in Lisbon as the Senate's Procurator to explain to the King the sad situation of Macao and to ask for suitable means to help it. The main problem was the lack of commerce. The Macanese asked for permission to send ships, with Chinese products, to "all the ports in Africa, America and Portugal", paying, of course, the necessary Duties to the Crown.

When Fr. António dos Prazeres left from Goa, he first went to Brazil, arriving at Bahia in November 1717. After a period in that port, he went to Lisbon, where he arrived by the end of 1718, presenting to the King the Memorial he had taken with him.

There was one matter that could not be forgotten. The old Kangxi Emperor would die soon. In a letter dated the 26th of December 1717, the Senate explained the dangerous possibility of a War among the candidates to the throne. So it was convenient to prepare the City to face any event. He asked for the following help:

Fifty soldiers,

One-hundred rifles, and

Five-hundred barrels of gunpowder.

The Conselho Ultramarino (Overseas Council) examined the subject carefully. They had different opinions and "[...] muitos forão de parecer que se perdia a Cidade de Goa, concedendose a Macao o que pedia." ("[...] many thought that it would be better to lose the City of Goa, giving to Macao everything they asked for."

Concerning the requested military help, the (Overseas Council) agreed to the number of soldiers and rifles, but, reducing to three-hundred the number of barrels of gunpowder. 39

This resolution was on the 25th of January 1719.

Considering that the situation was very dangerous, the King gave orders to create a junta (Commission)composed of three ancient Viceroys of the Portuguese State of India. One of them, Dom Rodrigo da Costa, Viceroy from 1707 to 1712, declared himself for Goa and against Macao. In the 4th of April 1719, he wrote a letter to the Senate, in which he confessed that he was unhappy with "[...] pela lastimoza reprezentação que me fazem do mizeravel estado a que chegouo Povo dessa Cidade, a quem sempre dezejei opulentissimos augmentos não deixando de lhos procurar emtudo o que me tern sido possivel [...]" ("[...] the miserable situation of the people of that City, for whom he desired the best [...]." And, as a good courtier, he said that the King had granted"[...] tudo o que se faz possivel coma sua costumada grandeza [...]." ("everything possible with his usual greatness [...]."). 40 At the end of the letter he made an honourable reference to the envoy, Fr. António dos Prazeres.

After these counsels, the King sent an answer to Macao on the 11th of May 1719. According to this important source, the Macanese demands were as follows:

1. Ability to send ships, with Chinese merchandise, "[...] to every port and place in Africa, America and Portugal", paying the Royal Duties. The King conceded them the authorization to send ships "[...] every year to this Kingdom, to Brazilian ports, as the Company does [...]" for five years, but it was forbidden to carry textile material, gold or silver from the Kingdom or from Brazil to Angola, and also to sell goods in Goa. Furthermore, the Senate should also send to Goa two ships every year, because this City should not lose its Duties, and those two ships should leave from Macao before the two ships that would be destined either to the Kingdom or to Brazil.

2. The sending of a new Embassy to China. The King agreed, and he named for that mission Dom Francisco Alarcão Sotto Mayor, however with one condition:

"[...] que a despeza de tal embaixada a hade fazer essa Cidade [...]." ("[...] that all the expenses pertaining to the Embassy would be on Macao [...].").

3. Concerning port of Malacca, the Senate also demanded if the corte (Court) could try to remove the difficulties set by the Dutch, who charged hard Duties for the anchorage. The King promised to try his best in that respect.

4. The Senate demanded to be exempt from paying the (Ecclesiastical Revenue) to the Bishop of the City. A letter about this subject would be sent to the Viceroy of the Portuguese State of India.

5. Concerning the demanded munitions for Macao fortifications, instructions would be given to the vedor geral (General Inspector) of Fazenda (the Public Finances) in Goa to sell it "[...] pelos preços que correrem nos Meus Armazens [...]." ("[...] by the prices that used to be practiced in my storehouses [...].").

6. The Senate had asked for permission to present a triplicate list of the Macanese fortification Captains, from which the King would choose one. About this the King ordered that "[...] deve praticar o que he de estillo [...]." ("[...] it should be done as normal [...].").

7. The Senate wished"[...] to name a person from Macao to be Governor of the Island of Solor, and Timor [...]." But the King comanded that "[...] que não tem lugar defferir-se a vossa reprezentação [...]." "[...] it was not adequate to defer your Representation [...].). 41

On his side, Fr. António dos Prazeres sent, from Lisbon, two letters to the Senate, one on the 11th of May 1719 and the other on the 15th of March 1720, explaining his activity in the Court. The first one concerned his trip and his activity in order to achieve what the Senate demanded. Already in Lisbon, he received a new letter from Macao about the urgent need of military help. After receiving this letter, he wrote a new Report. Concerning this subject, he was curious about the way the soldiers had been recruited. Edicts had been published to invite volunteers and, at the same time, orders had been given "to arrest some idlers", because there were insufficient volunteers.

Concerning the Embassy to China, he mentioned the fact that the Senate did not have to spend any money because the man chosen, Dom Francisco de Alarcão, took all the expenses on himself.

The forbidden import of silver was not a big obstacle because the Kingdom did not have any silver. It had to be brought from Castile and afterwards it was sent to Macao. There was even a general law that forbade the exit of coins from the Kingdom.

Concerning the Ecclesiastical Revenue of the Bishop of Macao, the King had sent an Order to the Viceroy of the Portuguese State of India and to the Public Finances Council of Goa in order to set the Macao Senate free of that expense.

And concerning the arrested Macanese ships: "Manda passar ordens apertadas para se restituirem os Navios tomados assim em França como em Mogor e juntamente passar officios para abordar com a Companhia de Olanda sobre as ancoragens; o que já no tratado das pazes estava concordado e por culpa dosPadres do Oratorio se não tem assinado." ("He gave strict orders to be given back all the ships taken in France and Mogor and he also ordered that Official Letters about the anchorage problem should be written and sent to the Dutch [East Indies] Company; this was already agreed during the Peace Treaty and it was not signed because of the fathers of the Oratory Congregation.").

The second Royal Letter of the 15th of March 1720, mentioned the same subjects. 42

About the organization of the Embassy to China it should be that there was an alteration in the choice of Ambassador. Dom Alexandre Metelo de Souza e Menezes was chosen to greet the new Emperor after the death of Kangxi.

In short: Fr. António dos Prazeres did not achieve any results. The "Macanese dream" was yet to be fulfilled.


On the 14th of December 1732, there was a meeting of the Senate, to which were invited the Captain-Major António Moniz Barreto, the Prelates of the different religions, the 'homens bons' ('good men')and other important people. They were to discuss the future of the Colony.

The situation was dangerous, the decay was apparent and the deficit was terrible. The taxes on the inhabitants were not even enough to pay the ordinary expenses. Experience showed that the commerce with different ports was decaying year after year. The Timor sandalwood was no longer profitable. The remaining ports, which were attended by Macanese ships, were in the same situation.

According to this situation, it was necessary to take new measures. The basic idea would be to try to fulfill the old 'dream', i. e., to send a Petition to the King Dom João V asking him to allow Macao to send, every year, one ship to Brazil, without being forced to sail through Lisbon to pay the Duties, and to allow it to come back with silver. This was the main wish. They expected a fair answer to this request, also because the city was out of money after the expense of the Embassy to China. 43

However, the answer from Lisbon was not favourable. The King continued to deny the requests. We can imagine how the Macanese felt after their frustrated plan.

In a meeting on the 14th of October 1733 they spoke again about this subject in front of Civil and Ecclesiastical Authorities and other guests. Bp. Dom João do Casal (°1690-†1735) could not be present, due to illness.

In this meeting they decided to insist on the Petition:

"[...] e se fação forças para cometer a Viagemdo Brazil, porque alem de ter varios Portos de grandiozo contrato, são terras nossas, e temos tambem a certeza de que os Moradores daquellas partes anciosamente dezejão de que desta terra haja barcos que para aquelles Portos naveguem, adonde dizem não só que querem entrar com Cabedaes, masque tambem interessarão no Barco que for [...]." ("[...] it is necessary to make all efforts to sail to Brazil because, in spite of all the big ports, that land is also ours, and we are also sure that the inhabitants of Brazil will desire that we sail to their land [...]."). 44

This passage shows that there had already been contacts between Macanese and Brazilians. There was a feeling of tenderness when they said that "são terras nossas" ("that land is also ours "); two faraway lands joined by feelings. The Brazilians could say the same: "Macau é terra nossa." ("Macao is our land.").

The great hope concerning Brazil was the silver: "[...] it will be enough if they bring their product in silver [...]" the ship would certainly take Eastern products and bring silver. That would be enough. There is no mention of the import of any other products.

Concerning the accomplishment of this voyage, there was one important thing:

Where was the only inhabitant able to run this risk? There was also the possiblity of a joint-venture among several inhabitants. What was really necessary was "[...] repetir com nova supplica a sua Magestade, que Deus guarde, livremente de poder hum Barco nosso ir, e vir áquelles Portos, e trazer o seu producto em prata, que são hoje os que se achão mais opulentos como todos sabem [...]." ("[...] to supplicate again to His Majesty to give permission to one of our ships to sail to those ports in order to change our products into silver [...].").

There was still another reason. The King was not aware of the tragic situation of Macao. In a recent Royal Letter, of the 24th of March 1732, sent to the Senate of Macao, certainly based on ancient information, He stated: "[...] e porque essa Cidade se acha augmentada com Cabedaes [...]" ("[...] and because that City is full of goods [...]") and to justify it He ordered the Senate to give the Bishop's assistant, Dom Eugénio Trigueiros, O.S.A, the amount of four-thousand cruzados.

Actually the truth was completely different: the Senate was so poor that it could not fulfil such an order. 45

But, there was more: the Viceroy of the Portuguese State of India, Dom Pedro de Mascarenhas, Count of Sandomil (1732-1741), had forbidden the transport of sandalwood from India to Macao. He had been informed that this fact would harm the commerce of sandal from Timor. The intention was good, but with the abundance of foreign ships, the Macanese would be the only ones to suffer from such a measure. As a consequence of that order, the ship sailing from Macao to Timor was forbidden to enter the port of Batavia. This was a direct voyage and it would be harmful to the City. Therefore, it was important to defend in Lisbon the real interests of Macao.

These were the main subjects discussed in that meeting. The resolution concerning Timor was "[...] que se recorresse a Sua Majestade, pedindo o favor de nos conceder licença, para desta Cidade poder mandar Barcos para os ditos Portos, sem ser necessario passar a Corte de Lisboa a pagar os Direitos Reaes, os quaes poderão ser pagos nosmesmos Portos, em que fizerem escalla, e juntamente a graça de podermos trazer prata do producto das fazendas, visto não haver nelles Genero, de que se possão tirar utilidade [...]." ("[...] it is necessary to ask His Majesty permission to send ships from Macao to the mentioned ports without it being necessary to pass through the Court of Lisbon to pay the Royal Duties, which can be paid in the ports crossed by these ships. We must also ask His Majesty to allow the ships to bring silver, which would be the profit of the textile material sale [...]."). 46

The idea that the King had about Macao --"[...] because that City was full of goods [...]" -- might have produced a strong shock to the Macanese. This might have been the reason for the King's refusal to the Petitions of the City. Also, there was nobody in the Court to plead in favour the local interests.

In the Senate's meeting, on the 27th of October 1733, the vereador (Council Member) João Baptista Monteiro reminded the facts and proposed to send an Envoy to Lisbon "[...] a supplicar aos Reaes péz de Sua Magestade o remedio mais efictáz, que se encaminhe a conservação desta sua Cidade tão esclarecida com o Nome Portuguez, quanto invejada pelas Naçoens Estrangeiras [...]." ("[...] to beg His Majesty for the most efficient solution for that City, which had a Portuguese name and was envied by foreign Nations [...]."). 47

In fact, it was necessary to inform the King about the real situation of China. The Emperor was adverse to Catholicism. There was a time, from 1644 to 1722, during the two first reigns of the Qing Dynasty, in which Catholicism was accepted. However, there was again persecution.

Therefore, it was important to send a ship to Brazil "[...] na forma da licença de El-Rei Nosso Senhor que se acha neste Senado, visto não termos athé agora alcançado a outra, que pretendemos para o effeito das conveniencias, que na proposta passada lhes foi apresentada." ("[...] with the licence given by the King to this Senate, since we did not achieve the other one.").

This proposal was discussed and the advantages were considered: in the first place it was God's service; then the King's service and in the third place, "[...] for the development and maintenance of the City."

However, the Senate had no conditions to afford such expenses. It would also be necessary to hear the interested Chinese tradesmen, the Jesuit priests and other personalities.

Therefore, it was important to convene a 'Magna' meeting. It took place on the 5th November 1733. In fact, a concrete Proposal was put forward by the Senate Member João Baptista Monteiro, as follows:

1. He would have the title of Ambassador, considering that he was a nobleman,

2. He should have someone to substitute him in case he died during the trip,

3. There were to be no restrictions on the luggage he would take with him,

4. He should have three assistants, and

5. the trip would start in Guangzhou, on board an English ship. This important Record ends this way:

"Estas são finalmente as circunstâncias de que careço para ultimamente me determinar, e sendo porVossas Mercês concedidas, agora mesmo corn brevidade possivel me preparo para o meu embarque, porque o tempo vai sendo pouco, e o negocio não permite demoras. Vossas Mercês rezolvão neste particular, e que se faz precizo a concluzão della, que da minha não faltarei a tudo o que por este Senado me for documentado para sua instrucção: e requeiro a Vossas Mercês Senhores Senadores, que desta minha rezolução se faça termos, para que a todo tempo conste, que eu como Leal Vassallo do meu Rei, e Senhor, me animo a fazer este Servi'co, e não faltarei em couza alguma do que aqui rellato, ficando por conta de Vossas Mercês as mais deligencias, que na minha determinação se rellata. --João Baptista Monteiro. -- Não houve efeito -- Moura.

Está conformé-- Jozé Joaquim Barros. Dito Escrivão."

"Finally, these are the conditions I need to make my decision, and if you agree to them, I am prepared to embark, because time is passing quickly and delays will affect business. You will make the decisions and I will execute everything you have decided. I demand you to record my Proposal, because I want it to be known, that I am willing to do this service, and I will endeavour to carry out what is promised to the best of my ability. You will be responsible for the rest that is recorded in my document.

[signed] João Baptista Monteiro. Without effect -- Moura.

In accordance -- Jozé Joaquim Barros. Said Scrivener."48

The abrupt way this Report ends may have different interpretations. It might have been some discussion about the Proposal of the Senate Member Baptista Monteiro. It seems that this proposal was disregarded, because the following Reports mentioned his name as still living in Macao. The 'dream' continued to be unfulfilled.

The character of João Baptista Monteiro, as it can be deduced from the Report, seems to have been that of an ostentatious man. Although his offer was quite generous, it did not have the Senate's agreement. The reasons were not explained. 49Would this cavaleirofidalgo (nobleman) be considered unworthy to be the Juiz dos Órfãos (Judge of the Orphans), although it would be only for a while, and unworthy to be the Ambassador or Envoy to the Court of Dom João V?

The Macanese were not discouraged. In 1735, Dr. João Marques Bacalhao and Pedro Vicente Velho were in Lisbon as Procurators of the Macanese Senate. On the 18th of December 1735, the Senate sent them some items to be proposed to the Court, which were: claims against ouvidores (Magistrates) coming from Goa; the Authorization to Macanese ships to be able to sail to Surat, a voyage that was forbidden on Goa's demand, the ones that most profited of this were the Moors and the English.

Concerning Brazil, it was stated as follows:

"Não tem este Senado achado athé o prezente a rezolução, que pertendia sobre a Viagem do Brazil, pois se nos faz odioza com as condiçoens, com que nos foi concedida, e só nos será facil o faze-la aliviando-se-nos a pensão de irmos ao Reino, pelos atrazos que disso se segue [...]."("The Senate have not found, as yet, the desired solution for the voyage to Brazil, taking into account that what was granted was unsuitable for us, and considering that we do not wish to sail via Lisbon [...]."). 50

This passage is very clear, namely, the condition forcing Macanese ships, destined for Brazil, to go Lisbon where they were to pay Royal Duties, was odious.


Time passed by and the condition of complete subordination to Goa remained the same. In fact, this is a case of colonial dualism: Colonies could be grouped, almost two by two, according to the interests to which such Colonies were submitted.

From this perspective, therefore, Angola depended upon Brazil; Guinea on Cape Verde; Mozambique on Goa; Macao also on Goa; Timor upon Macao.

Macao had already adapted to the hard life imposed by the circumstances. Suddenly, in 1789 the French Revolution! Queen Dona Maria I (°1734†1816) was deeply affected by this event. At the end of 1791, the sad news of the Queen's insanity spread over all the Country. Dom João, Prince of Brazil, assumed the Royal funtions, in the name of the Queen, until the 15th of July 1799, when he agreed to take the title of Regent. Then War broke out. The Country began to be submerged in confusion, badly prepared as it was to participate in European operations. On the 6th of June 1801, the Treaties signed under pressure in Badajoz, with Spain and France, left Portugal even more confused. From this Treaty with Spain the memory of the loss Olivença still remained. The cahos continued with the 'Continental blockage'. On the 27th of October 1807 the Treaty of Fontainebleau divided Portugal between Britain and Spain, and reflected the weakness and mockery of contemporary international Treaties. Then followed the 'French invasions' (1808-1814). The Portuguese Royal Family managed to embark to Brazil on the 29th of November 1807.

The Portuguese overseas Colonies became ruled from Brazil, and Rio de Janeiro was transformed in a Metropolis.

Foreign troops stepped in and violated Portuguese territory. The people rose against it. The British remembered their old allies [the Portuguese] and went to help the Iberian Peninsula. These were years of great depression for Portugal and its people. The feeling of restlessness and discontent was also felt in Brazil and the overseas Colonies.


Meanwhile, after the arrival of the Royal Family in Bahia, on the 22nd of January 1808, it was decided to give another course to the old Portuguese Monarchy. A few days after their arrival, a Royal Letter stated that all Brazilian ports would be forthwith open to all friendly Nations.

In September of that year, Dom Rodrigo Sousa Coutinho, Count of Linhares, was named Royal Plenipotentiary to negotiate a trade Treaty with Great Britain, ruled by George III. The Treaty was carefully studied and it was signed on the 19th of February 1810. A reading of the document suggests that it was probably Britain that profited from it. 51

However, it was in this context that there appeared the Decree, which was to enventually fulfil the Macanese dream fo free and direct commerce with Brazil. This Decree was a simple, logical consequence of the measure taken by the Royal Family upon their arrival in Brazil, when it was declared that all the Brazilian ports would be open for commerce with all friendly Nations.

The Decree, of the 13th of May 1810 stated:

"Tendo em consideração aos Serviços feitos pelos Officiaes do Senado da Camara e maishabitadores da Cidade de Macáo na China, e mostrando a sua fidelidade não só em mandar a estePorto (Rio de Janeiro) hum Navio, com o fim de felicitar-Me por occasião da Minha feliz chegada a este Estado; mas muito principalmente pelos esforços, com que repellirão os Piratas, que ameaçavão invadir aquella Colonia, além de terem prestado soccorros pecuniarios à Capital dos Meus Estados da Índia: e querendo promover a prosperidade daquella Cidade: Hei por bem Determinar que sejão isentos dos Direitosde Entrada nas Alfandegas do Brasil os Generos e Mercadorias da China, que se exportarem direitamente para os Portos deste Estado, e pertencerem aos Meus Vassalos Portuguezes, ou por sua conta forem carregados em Navios Nacionaes; ficando outrossim independentes da navegação para Goa, e sendo porem obrigados a enviar para alli annualmente o Barco das Vias, que faz a correspondencia com a Metropole. 0 Conselho da Fazenda o tenha assim entendido e o faça executar com os despachos necessarios.

Palacio do Rio de Janeiro em 13 de Maio de 1810.

[Com a Rubrica do] Principe Regente."

("Considering the service of the Senate and of the inhabitants of Macao in China, who showed their fidelity not only by sending to this Port (Rio de Janeiro) one ship in order to greet me when I arrived in this State; but mainly because of their efforts in beating the pirates who threatened to invade that Colony, and also because they send monetary help to my States in India: and having decided to promote the prosperity of that City, I am determined that the Chinese products directly exported to the ports of this State, and which belong to my Portuguese vassals or carried in National ships, will be free from payment of Entry Duties in the Brazilian Customs House. From now on, they will be independent from Goa's navigation, although they will be obliged to send to Goa, every year, the "Barco das Vias", that establishes the correspondence with the Metropolis. The Treasury Council may execute this Order.

Palace of Rio de Janeiro, on the 13th of May, 1810.

[rubricated] The Prince Regent"). 52

The Macanese dream was at last fulfilled: free and direct commerce with Brazil. On that day, 1810, the Prince Regent conceded to the City of Macao the title "Leal" ("Loyal"). 53

But... one month later, a Royal Letter was published, on the 2nd of June, somewhat limiting the scope of the above Decree.

"Sou servido, para evitar qualquer intelligencia que se queira dar de uma maior extensão desta Graça, Mandar-vos declarar: que ella se limita simplesmente a respeito dos generos que forem pertencentes aos meus Vassallos que residem nessa Colonia e transportados em seus Navios, construidos nos Estaleiros dos Meus dominios da Azia, não comprehendendo portanto este favor a qualquer Navio, ou propriedade nacional indistinctamente, mas unica e singularmente aos que ficam já indicados: o que assim Me pareceu participar-vos para vossa intelligencia, e para que assim o façais constar a todos os Mestres de Embarcaçoens Portuguezas, que ahi aportarem, a fim de que saibão que lhes não é transcendente a disposição daquella Graça, e que conseguintemente os effeitos que trouxerem, deverão pagar os direitos que se achão estabelecidos nas respectivas Alfandegas." ("In order to limit the range of this Grace, I hereby declare it to be limited to the products belonging to my vassals who live in that Colony and who are carried in their ships, which were built in the shipyards of my Domains in Asia. The favour is granted only to the above mentioned ships. This favour must be known everywhere. The Portuguese ships that do not meet these conditions must pay the established Duties."). 54

This Royal Letter included a Clause stipulating that only Portuguese vessels built in the "[...] Estaleiros dos Meus domínios da Azia [...]" ("[...] Naval Chandleries of my Domains in Asia [...]) could be warrented such Grace. This proviso intended to promote ship-building in the Portuguese State of India, mainly in the shipyards of Daman.

The problem was, though, that the vessels from Macao did not fulfill these conditions.

However, the Decree was, in general, received with satisfaction. For the first voyage the ship Ulisses was chosen. It had been bought and therefore it could not receive the licence granted by the Clause stipulated in the Royal Letter. As there was not enough time to have a ship made in Daman, the Senate sent an Official Letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the 30th of December l810, on board Carolina's ship, bound for Lisbon with silk, tea, etc, to ask Authorization to use Ulisses only once, as an exception. 55 They sent an Ofício (Bill) to the Count of Arcos, Governor and Captain General of Bahia's Captainship, explaining the same reasons. The ship was commanded by Manuel Pereira. This Bill was written on the 16th of March 1811, a a short time before the departure. 56

The Senate also made known the event to the Viceroy of the Portuguese State of India, Dom Bernardo José Maria de Lorena, Count of Sarzedas.By this Bill it was known that anyone could join this voyage. However, as some inconveniences were considered, they decided that the cargo would be only the responsibility of the Senate. The only person who joined them was Manuel Pereira because he had the leadership of this enterprise. The ship Ulisses would sail from Bahia to Calcutta "[...] to employ there the funds received from the Chinese products exported to Brazil."57

With the voyage of Ulisses to Brazil, began a new and more prosperous period in the history of Macao. The Brazilian 'dream' of the Macanese was finally fulfilled -- a 'dream' that started at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

At the same time, other Royal Edicts were granted. One of them was the Authorization, granted on the 18th of May 1810, to create a Caza de Seguro Mercantil (House of Trade Insurance) in Macao "[...] debaixo dos principios adoptados pelas Naçoens Commerciantes, especialmente daquelles, que servirão de baze a organização das Cazas de Seguros de Lisboa, Bahia, e Rio de Janeiro [...]" ("[...] under the principles adopted by the Trade Nations, mainly under those that will be the base of the organization of the Insurance Houses in Lisbon, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro [...]."). 58

This Royal Letter was extremely advantageous to the Senate and to the population of Macao. All the inhabitants were invited to use their savings to buying shares of that company or Caza de Seguro Mercantil.

Another Royal Letter stated that, from the 20th of May 1810, the Portuguese born in Macao were to be raised to the level of Portuguese born in Europe so that they could occupy places in Government and Public Administration. 59

This Royal decision was not only advantageous to the natural wish of people to be equal, but it also, and most importantly, abolished the reasons that had prevented the Macanese from occupying places in Government and Administration.

But, ten days later, on the 30th of May, another Royal Letter referred to the precautions taken on the 4th of April 1783, and applied to Macao by Queen Dona Maria I. There were not many years between 1783 and 1810. It seems that such "measures" were not strictly executed, at least in part. This would be a sign that "[...] talvez a esse Senado não tenhão sido até agora conhecidas em toda a sua extensão [...]." ("[...] perhaps the Senate did not understand the measure completely [...].").

As was mentioned before, such measures had been extremely unfair to the Senate. It is true that some exceptions were admitted, because it was written in this Royal Letter the following: "Ordenando-vos que todos os seus artigos se ponhao logo na mais inteira observancia excepto naquelles pontos em que ora Eu Houver por bem rezolver differentemente [...]." ("I order that all their products must be observed, except if I decide something else [...]."). 60It would have been better not to remember such documents!


It took more than one century to fulfil the old Macanese 'dream': the direct communication with Brazil. This meant the expansion of commercial horizons of the old Macanese Settlement. This, however, was a difficult undertaking where many bureaucratic obstacles hindered progress. The French Revolution shook the basis of the old European order.

It was in Brazil that the exiled Portuguese Royal Family, facing new realities and new demands, after the lessons learned from the experience of other colonizers, decided to adopt a new plan and "general system of commerce", extendible to every Portuguese territory. The long Alvará (Ruling) of the 4th of February 1811, a subject that is out of the limit of this study, although we recommend its reading, is very clear about this matter:

"Resolvi facilitar por meio das amplas concessoens, que por este Alvará liberalizo aos Meus fieis Vassallos o Comercio, e Navegação directa dos Mares da Índia, China, Enseadas, Rios, Ilhas, e Portos assim Nacionaes, como Estrangeiros do Cabo da Boa Esperança como tambem nos Portos de Portugal, Brazil, Ilhas dos Assures digo dos Açores, Madeira, Ilhas do Cabo Verde, Portos da Costa d'Africa Ocidental, e Ilhas adjacentes pertencentes a Minha Real Coroa, abolindo todas as restriçoens que por muitos annos obstruirão os Canaes da prosperidade."

("I decided to liberalize the commerce and direct sailing to the seas of India, China, national rivers, islands and ports, Cape of Good Hope and Ports in Portugal, Brazil, Azores, Madeira, Cape Verde, the West Coast of Africa, abolishing all the restictions that, for many years, blocked up the channels of prosperity."). 61

The Colony of Macao experienced, over the eighteenth century, many different vicissitudes. Differences can be noticed in the behaviour of native Macao people and Portuguese coming from Goa or from the Motherland. These people did not understand the Macanese simple way of living, always under the Mandarins and Chinese pressure. The threat of lack of food, always cunningly used by the Mandarins, was enough to keep the Senate quiet. Foreigners, particularly Portuguese who were not from Macao, found the Members of the Senate guilty of the situation. Martinho de Melo e Castro, influenced by Goa, was really unfair to Macao.

The Senate thought that it was necessary to keep Procurators from Macao in Goa and Lisbon, in order to defend Macao interests. However, it can be noticed that they did not manage to convince their interlocutors that the Portuguese life in Macao was extremely difficult.

In spite of misunderstandings and of the campaign that several Captain-Majors and Magistrates launched against the Senate, the Senate was able to keep its functions. They fought for their existence, certain that they were progressing in the right direction and also aware that Portuguese Sovereignty in Macao, as it was understood by the Macanese, had nothing to do with the mentality that existed in Goa or in Lisbon towards them.

Concerning China, the attitude seems clear. The Portuguese were welcome in Macao. Concerning the English attempt to occupy Macao, China was very convincing: China accepted the Portuguese but not the English, even being prepared to expel them by force.

Was it a selfish attitude? Who could deny it? But it had always been like that, since the foundation of the Colony. At least, concerning the Privilégios (Privileges) it is fair to remember that, in 1783, there were still five Privileges granted to Macao. They were the following:

1. "Que nenhum China pode vir estabelecerse em Macao, nem ter Cazas suas na Cidade sem licença do Procurador do Senado."

2. "0 segundo Privilegio que ainda possuimos he o da lotação dos Navios: Hum Navio Portuguez por exemplo de duzentas Toneladas, paga ao Imperador pela primeira vez 1800 Taeis, que são perto de dous contos de Reis da nossa Moeda; e todas as outras vezes que o mesmo Navio voltar a Macao, paga tão somente a terça parte. Hum Navio de outra qualquer Nação, e das mesmas Toneladas, paga em Cantão 5400 Taes, ou seis contos de reis da nossa Moeda com pouca differença; e todas as vezes que voltar à China, sempre paga o mesmo."

3. "0 terceiro Privilegio he, que se hum Navio Portuguez naufragar, e a Equipagem se salvar em qualquer Porto do Imperio da China, a dita Equipagem deve ser sustentada e conduzida à custa do Imperador até se entregar em Macau." [...]

4. "0 quarto Privilegio he: que todas as Fazendas, e Generos que os Portugueses compram em Cantão, e que conduzem a Macao pagam duas terças partes menos de Direitos que pagam as outras Naçoens: hum Jogo de Meza por exemplo, comprador por hum Portuguez, paga de Direitos em Cantão dous Taes; qualquer outra Nação paga seis Taes; e o mesmo se pratica com o Chá, sedas, e geralmente com tudo o mais."

5. "0 quinto Privilegio he, que as Naus de Guerra Portuguezas, não pagam Direito algum de Lotação ao Imperador: as das outras Naçoens, todas são medidas, e pagam o dito Direito."

1. "The first Privilige is that no Chinese man could be established in Macao, nor could have his own houses, without licence from the Senate's Procurator."

2. "The second Privilege, which we still possess, is the one concerning the ships' tonnage: for example, a Portuguese ship of two hundred tons, pays to the Emperor 1,800 taéis for the first time, which is more or less (two-thousand Escudos, nowadays) in our coin; and every time the same ship comes back it will pay only one third of this. A vessel from any other Nation, and with the same tonnage, pays in Guangzhou four-thousand-five-hundred taéis, which is (six-thousand Escudos) in our coin each and every time it comes back to China, it pays the same."

3. "The third Privilege is, if one Portuguese ship sinks, and if the goods are safe in any port of China's Empire, the mentioned goods shall be kept by the Emperor and sent to Macao at his own expense." [The last time it happened was in 1722, and the Privilege was carefully carried out. This was not applied to foreign ships.]

4. "The fourth Privilege is that all textile cloth and products bought by the Portuguese in Guangzhou and taken to Macao, must pay two thirds less of the Duties than other Nations: for example, a 'dinner sets' bought by a Portuguese, pays Duties in Guangzhou of two taéis; but other Nations must pay six taéis; the same applies to tea, silk and, in general, all others products."

5. "The fifth Privilege is that the Portuguese war ships do not pay any Equipment Duty to the Emperor. The equipment of the other Nations' ships must be weighed and Duties paid accordingly."). 62

A careful reading of these Privileges explains the interest that the Macanese had in enjoying such Privileges and the assiduity of the Chinese in respecting them.

In view of these Privileges, therefore, it cannot be denied that during the centuries the Macanese enjoyed a favoured status. **

Translated from the Portuguese by: Ana Marques


** Revised reprint from: RÊGO, António da Silva, Relações directas entre Macau e o Brasil: um sonho irrealizável?: (1710-1810), in "Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa", Lisboa, Jul.-Dez. [Jul.-Dec.],1976, pp.117-152.

1 TEIXEIRA, Manuel, Macau e a sua diocese, 16 vols., Macau, Tipografia do Orfanato Salesiano & etc, 1940-1979; 1940, vol.1, p.80.

2 GOMES, Luís Gonzaga, Efemérides da história de Macau, Macau, Notícias de Macau, 1954, p.88 -- However, note that Francisco Lopes Carrasco was elected by the edis (Aldermen) "governador de guerra da cidade" ("War Governor of the City") because of the Dutch threat. See: COLOMBAN, Eudore de, Resumo da história de Macau, Refundido e aumentado pelo editor Jacinto José do Nascimento Moura, Macau, Tipografia do Orfanato da Imaculada Conceicão, 1927, p.26.

Also see: Documentos remetidos da India ou Livros das Monções Publicados por Ordem da Classe de Sciencias morais, politicas e bellas-lettras da Academia Real das Sciencias de Lisboa e sob a direcção de Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, 5 vols., Lisboa, Typographia da Academia Real de Sciencias, 1884, vol.5, passim.

3 BOXER, Charles Ralph, The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650, Cambridge, University of California Press, 1951 -- About the Portuguese in Japan.

4 RÊGO, António da Silva, A presença de Portugal em Macau, Lisboa, Agência Geral das Colónias, 1946, p.37 -- According to this document, it seems that the Portuguese considered foro (ground rent) the five-hundred taéis, paid to the Aitao, although he kept it for himself.

5 PIRES, Benjamim Videira, O foro do chão de Macau, in "Boletim do Instituto Luís de Camóes", Macau, 1 (4-5) 1967, pp.319-334 -- Where this problem is studied in depth. Also see: RÊGO, António da Silva, op. cit., pp.36-43.

6 GUIMARÃES, Alexandre da Silva Pedrosa, Do bispo governador sobre a expulsão dos extrangeiros, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3, 16 (4) Out. [Oct.] 1971, pp.204-209.

7 The words of the Bishop-Governor are not surprising since this was the reality imposed on the inhabitants.

8 BOXER, Charles Ralph, ed., Embaixada de Macau ao Japão em 1640: relação contemporânea, Lisboa, Agência Geral das Colónias, 1933 -- The four martyred Ambassadors were Luís Pais Pacheco, Rodrigo Sanches de Paredes, Gonçalo Monteiro de Carvalho and Simão Vaz de Paiva. Besides the four, there were another sixty-one who were executed. In spite of the efforts taken by the Japanese, mainly with the slaves, there was no renunciation.

9 Asento, que se fes, sobre, que fosse hum navio em dereitura daqui a Portugal, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.1, 1 (5) Out. [Oct.] 1929, pp.251-252.

10 There is a wide bibliography about the problem of the Chinese Rites. Macao was deeply involved in this problem.

11 In fact, the era had suffered a great change, not only in China but also in Europe.

12 See: PIMENTEL, Francisco, BRAGA, José Maria BOXER, Charles Ralph, comp. and annot., Breve relação da jornada que fez a Corte de Pekim o senhor Manoel de Saldanha, embaixador extraordinario del Rey de Portugal ao Emperador da China e Tartaria (1667-1670) escrita pelo Padre Francisco Pimentel e documentos contemporâneos, Macau, Imprensa Nacional, 1942.

SANTARÉM, Visconde de, Abreviada relação da embaixada que a serenissima magestade do senhor Dom João V Rei de Portugal mandou ao Imperador da China e Tartaria Yum Chim pelo seu embaixador Alexandre Metello de Sousa Menezes, in his "Memória sobre o estabelecimento dos portuguezes em Macau na China", Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1879.

SAMPAIO, Francisco de Assis Pacheco de, Noticias das couzas succedidas na embaixada que levou á Corte de Pekim Francisco de Assiz Pacheco de Sampayo mandado pelo senhor Rey D. Jozé 1° no anno de 1752, Lisboa, Livraria Pacheco, 1936. -- This is a Report of the Ambassador himself. The Viscount of Santarém also published it in the work mentioned above under the title: Relatório de Francisco de Assis Pacheco de Sampaio a El-Rei D. José I dando conta dos sucessos da embaixada a que fôra mandado á Corte de Pekim no anno de 1752.

13 GOMES, Luís Gozaga, Efemérides da História de Macau, Macau, Notícias de Macau, 1954.

14 Idem., p.6

15 Idem., pp.34, 38, 93, 103, 119, 123, 128 and 153.

16 Idem., p.34.

17 Idem., p.224.

18 CASTRO, Francisco José de Sampaio e, Sobre não ser justo, o assento tornado pelo Leal Senado acerca da prohibição das chalupas desta Cid. e p. aas viagens de Batavia, Timor, e Manilla, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3, 9 (3) Mar. 1968, p.125.

19 CASTRO, Martinho de Melo e, Apontamentos, e notícias para a instrução, que se deve formar em Goa, ao bispo de Pekin, sobre os negócios relativos ao domínio de Macau, MÚRIAS, Manuel, pref., in "Instrução para o bispo de Pequim e outros documentos para a história de Macau", Lisboa, Agência Geral das Colónias, 1943, p. 19.

20 CASTRO, Martinho de Melo e, Instrução para Dom Federico Guilherme de Souza, governador e capitão general da India, in MÚRIAS, Manuel, pref., in "Instrução para o bispo de Pequim e outros documentos para a história de Macau", Lisboa, Agência Geral das Colónias, 1943, p. 11. Also published in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3,11 (5) Maio [May] 1969, pp.269-280.

21 MÚRIAS, Manuel, pref., Instrução para o bispo de Pequim e outros documentos para a história de Macau, Lisboa, Agência Geral das Colónia, 1943, p.2.

22 Idem., pp.5ff.

23 To evaluate the tom (mood) of this Instruction, follows an extract of no 35:

"Para executores das Providencias que ficam assim referidas, deve V. Sa nomear hum dos Ministros dessa Relação, que melhor lhe parecer, e hum, ou dous Officiaes da Fazenda, ou Pessoas de fora mais inteligentes em Contas e Escrituração Mercantil: o dito Ministro, junto com o Governador de Macáo, que V. Sa tambem nomeará, no cazo que o que ali se acha, náo tenha as circunstancias necessarias, para ser incumbido desta diligencia, ambos os referidos Governador e Ministro, logo que chegarem aquele Dominio, sem se demorar, nem se embaraçar com formalidades e cumprimentos de recepção, vizitas e outras Ceremonias inuteis e prejudiciaes, nem por modo algum aceitar Prezente pequeno ou grande do Senado, nem de Pessoa alguma de Macáo, façam convocar ao mesmo Senado, e lendo-lhe a Carta Regia, que será com esta, dirigida a V. Sa, Ordenem ao mesmo Senado, que logo lhes aprezentem os livros de Registo e Contas, com todos os mais Papeis e clarezas relativas as Rendimento, e Capital da Real Fazenda, fazendo examinar tudo, pelos dous Officiaes da Fazenda assima indicados [...]."

Follows a succint translation of the above passage:

("To execute the Orders hereto referred, you should name one Minister and one or two Officials of the Royal Treasury or people skilled in Trade Accounts.

The Minister and Governor of Macao should convoke the Senate without delay and without accepting any present from the Senate or from anybody else. The Senate should give them the Accounts Register to be examined by the above mentioned Officials from the Royal Treasury.").

Reading these lines, we would say that the Senate feared some scandal. This shows that the Macanese ambience was completely ignored. Nothing abnormal was recorded. The Royal Orders were strictly executed. Bernardo Aleixo de Lemos was the first Governor to be endorsed with the new powers. The Senate obeyed. Initially, the Mandarins just observed what was going on but soon their protests were heard. The solution was to appeal to the Senate's goodwill.

See: COLOMBAN, Eudore de, op. cit., pp.91-95.

24 BOXER, Charles Ralph, As viagens de Japão e os seus capitães-mores: 1550-1640: subsídios para a sua história, in "Boletim Eclesiástico da Diocese de Macau", (448-451)Jul.-Out. [Oct.] 1941, pp.85-98,108-145,199-210, respectively.

25 MATOS, Artur Teodoro de, Timor Português: contribuição para a sua história, Lisboa, Universidade de Lisboa-Instituto Histórico Infante Dom Henrique, 1974.

26 Lembrança do Senado da Camara desta Cidade de Macáo p. a o S. r Ant. o Albuquerque Coelho, seu Procd.or bastante, e geral em Goa, e aonde mais cumprir, feita neste anno de 1835 [sic], in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3, 15 (5) Maio 1971, pp.283-286.

Sobre os requerimt. os remettidos pelo Senado a S. Mag. e, pedindo despacho, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3, 15 (5) Maio 1971, p.287.

Sobre os previlegios do Senado, e remeça d'hum caixote, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3,15 (5) Maio 1971, p.287.

Lembrança do Senado da Camara desta Cidade [...] p. a os Snres João Marques Bacalha, e Pero Vic. e Velho [...], in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3,15 (5) Maio 1971, pp.287-289.

Sobre o estado decadente desta cidade pedindo novam. te providencia, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3, 15 (6)Jun. 1971, p.311.

Sobre varios assumptos attinenbtes a esta cidade, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,15 (6) Jun. 1971, p.314.

Informação dada pelo Senado a S. Mag. e acerca de differentes assumptos desta cidade, pedindo providencia, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,15 (6) Jun. 1971, pp.323-326.

27 BGUC: Ms. 677, fol. 22ff., Bases para a erecção duma nova Companhia das Sedas, na cidade do Santo Nome de Deus de Macau [impresso (printed)].

28 Decreto, de 5 de Janeiro de 1759, a permitir á Companhia do Grão Pará e Maranhão mandar sua nau Nossa Senhora da Atalaia a Macau, in Legislação antiga: 1755-1834, in "Boletim do Conselho Ultramarino", Lisboa, (2) 1867, p.20 -- On the 5th of January 1759, a Decree made possible to the Companhia do Grão Pará e Maranhão to send to Macao its ship Nossa Senhora da Atalaia, that same year. See: AHMF: Code.138, Diário[...] (Diary [...])-- For an account of this deal.

Also see: Diário da Navegação de Macau 1759-1761, Lisboa, Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1970 -- For the same AHMF: Code. 138 manuscript published under a new title. The first entry is on the 9th of January 1759 and the last one on the 7th of August 1761, totalling four-hundred-and-eight entries.

29 Sobre os mesmos assumptos do officio acima, p. a alcançar de S. Mag. e providencia, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,16 (2) Ago. [Aug.] 1971, pp.84-85.

30 Sobre o socorro para as embarcaçoens pedidas pelos Chinas, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3, 17 (2) Fev. [Feb.] 1972, pp.93-94.

Sobre o socorro de duas embarcaçoens pedido pelos Chinas, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3, 17 (2) Fev. 1972, pp. 100-102.

31 Idem., pp. 100-102.

32 Carta do Senado a Sua Alteza Real o Principe Regente Nosso Senhor, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,17 (5) Maio 1972, pp.274-276.

33 Sobre a falta das pautas q'havia, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3, 17 (6) Jun. 1972, pp.314ff. -- Concerning the disembarkation of the English in Macao.

Carta do Ill. mo Senado, ao Ill. mo e Ex. mo S. r Conde V. Rey de Goa sobre o rendimento dos piratas chinas [...], in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,18 (1) Jul. 1972, pp.2-3 -- About the victory over pirates.

34 Carta regia sobre poderem os moradores de Macáo mandarem os seos navios Á Goa comboiados por um nao de guerra, e nao a Brazil, e sobre outros assumptos que na mesma carta se refirem, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3, 9 (1) Jan. 1968, pp.8-9. Also published in "O Oriente Portuguez", Macau, 1 (6) 31 Maio 1892, The position upheld by the Lisbon Government -- which was to prevail for more than a century -- is clearly expressed in the Royal Letter dated 15th of March 1707.

Follows an extract:

"Officiaes da Camara da Cidade de Macáo. Eu El-Rey vos Envio muito saudar. Havendo visto a reprezentação que Me fizestes sobre a conveniencia que pode rezultar a esses moradores, e ainda a minha fazenda, o permitir-lhe que possão navegar as suas fazendas para o Estado do Brazil, visto se lhes haver prohibido a navegação e embarque dellas para Goa com a nao de guerra que daquelle porto vai todos os annos a China. Me pareceo dizer-vos que querendo esses moradores mandar a Goa os seus navios o poderão fazer livremente, e para se evitar o damno que poderão receber dos inimigos hirá hua nao de guerra em sua conserva; com declaração que serão obrigados a pagar o comboy della, e sendo cazo que não tenhão Navios seus para andarem nestas viagens, se ordena ao V. Rey que mande ao Cappitão que for na nao de guerra dê todo o lugar na ditta não para esses moradores embarcarem a sua fazenda, pois não será razáo que hindo-se a fazer o negocio a essa Cidade, em que assistem Meus Vassalos, deixem de lograr algumas conveniencias, sequeira toda para os moradores de Goa, e mais particulares e no que respeita a licença que pedis para a navegação livre desse porto para os do Estado do Brazil. Me pareceo dizer-vos que de nenhuma maneira se deve permitir para que sobre o prejuizo que rezultaria a Alfandega de Goa, em se privar dos direitos das fazendas que vez a elle da China; ocorre que do Brazil não podem ter nenhum retorno, e verção [sic] por este caminho a fazer muito pouco negocio [...]."

Follows as succint translation of the above extract:

"Officials of Macao City Council. I, the King, greet you. Considering that the inhabitants of Macao, and the Royal Treasury, have convenience to sail to Brazil and to take their products to that land and once I have forbidden the sailing to Goa on board the war ship that every year sails to China, now I allow you to sail freely to Goa and to protect you from the enemies I will send a war ship. In case you do not have your own ships you can carry your products on board the war ship.

Concerning the licence you asked for in order to sail freely to Brazil, I have to deny it because it would be harmful to Goa."

35 LAVRE, André Lopes de, Carta que André Lopes de Lavre escreveo a este Senado em 24 de Março de 1702 [should be: 1709] de Lisbôa junto corn uma copia, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,13 (5) Maio 1970, pp.288-289 -- For two letters from André Lopes de Lavre, one dated 24th May 1709, and another 24th Februyary 1710.

36 Carta regia desobrigando as embarcações de Macau q. passassem pelos mares de Goa a pagarem direitos a dita Capital enquanto durasse a guerra corn Castella, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3, 9 (1) Jan. 1968, pp.6-7. Also published in "O Oriente Portuguez", Macau, 1(4)17 Maio 1892, p.4.

It must be remembered that Portugal was in conflict with Castile, because of the War of the Spanish Succession. The conflict ended with the Peace of Utrecht (1713) allowing the French Bourbon Crown-Prince Philippe to be recognised as King Felipe V of Spain. The Peace between Portugal and Spain was signed on 6th of February 1715.

37 Condiçoens da Companhia de Macau que sua Magestade concede por tempo dez annos, Lisboa, Officina Real Valentim da Costa Deslandes, 1710.

38 RAU, Virgínia - SILVA, Maria Fernanda Gomes da, Os manuscritos do Arquivo da Casa de Cadaval respeitantes ao Brazil, 2 vols., Coimbra, Universidade de Coimbra, 1958, vol.2, pp.135-136, 148-150, 361-362.

39 Carta regia sobre a faculdade de que pudesse mandar desta cidade dois navios annuaes ao Reino [...], in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3, 9(1) Jan. 1968, pp. 10-11 -- For the decision communicated by the Royal Letter dated 28th of January 1719. Also published in "O Oriente Portuguez", Macau, 1 (10) 5 Jul. 1892, p.4.

40 COSTA, Rodrigo da, Carta ao Senado de 4-4-1719, in "Arquivos de Macau'", ser. 3, 9 (1) Jan. 1968, p.9. Also published in "O Oriente Portuguez", Macau, 1 (9) 21 Jun. 1892.

41 See: Note 39.

42 PRAZERES, António, Carta do R. do P. e Fr. An. to dos Prazeres, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. l (6) Nov. 1929, pp.347-349.

43 Until that moment there had been three Embassies sent by Portugal to China: the first one was led by Tomé Pires (ca1550); the second one by Manuel Saldanha (1667-1670); and the third one by Alexandre Metello de Sousa e Menezes (1726-1727).

44 1733 -- Termo sobre a proposta do vereador deste Senado acerca do mizeravel estado, em q'se acha esta cid. e, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3, 3 (3) Mar. 1965, p. 147.

45 Ibidem., pp. 147-150 -- Dom Eugénio Trigueiros, O. S. A., assistant Bishop in Macao from 1724 to 1735, and afterwards Bishop himself, from 1735 to 1739.

46 Idem., p.149.

47 1733 -- Termo feito sobre a proposta do vereador João Bap. ta Monteiro, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3, 3 (3) Mar. 1965, pp. 151-153.

48 1 733 -- Termo sobre o Conselho feito em 27 de Outubro proximo passado, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3, 3 (3) Mar. 1965, pp. 155-156.

49 1733 -- Termo sobre a suspensão do officio de juiz dos orphaons João Baptista Monteiro, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3, 3 (3) Mar. 1965, pp.135-136.

Perhaps it was taken in account the fact that João Baptista Monteiro was accused of irregularities and exonerated of his post of Juiz dos Orfãos (Judge of the Orphans) by the Doutor Desembargador (Associate Justice) Manuel de Macedo. After this event he hid himself in the Jesuit College. This event, mentioned in the Senate's Report dated 3rd of March 1733, must have produced a great impact in the quiet City.

50 Lembrança do Senado da Camara desta Cidade [...] p.a os Snres João Marques Bacalhao, e Pero Vict.e Velho [...], in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,15 (5) Maio 1971, pp.287-289.

51 CASTRO, José Ferreira Borges de, Collecção de tratados, convenções, contratos e actos publicos celebrados entre a Coroa de Portugal e as mais potencias desde 1640 até ao presente, Lisboa, 1857, vol.4, pp.348-395.

On the same date, the two Powers signed another Treaty of Friendship and Alliance: Idem., pp.396-415. As a curiosity, on that same day, the 19th of February 1810, a Convention was dealt between the two Countries in order to establish a shipping line "between the two Domains:Portugal and Great Britain": Idem., pp.416-423.

52 Sobre a izensão dos direitos d'alfandega de Brazil, in Legislação antiga: 1755-1834, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,11 (5) Maio 1969, p.285. Also published in "Boletim do Conselho Ultramarino", Lisboa, (2) 1867, p.300.

53 Ibidem.

54 Sobre a izensão dos direitos n'alf.a do Brazil, in Legislação antiga : 1755-1834, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,11 (5) Maio 1969, p.281. Also published in "Boletim do Conselho Ultramarino", Lisboa, (2) 1867, pp.302-303.

55 Relação das vias dos off.os que o Leal Senado da Camara da Cidade de Macáo dirige a Secretaria d'Estado dos Negocios Ultramarinos pelo Navio Carolina: nō17, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,18(1) Jul. 1972, p.36.

56 Officio, que o Leal Senado dirige ao e Snr Conde dos Arcos Gov.or e Cap.m General da Capitania de Bahia, a respeito do Navio Ulisses, e suas cargas, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3,18 (1) Jul. 1972, pp.37-38.

57 Rellação dos Officios, que na prezente monção são dirigidos pelo Leal Senado da Camara da Cidade de Macáo ao Ill. mo e Ex. mo Senhor Conde Vice Rey d'Estado, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,18(1) Jul. 1972, p.44.

58 Sobre a izempção dos direitos de entrada nas alfandegas de Brazil, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3, 11 (5) Maio 1969, p.263.

59 Sobre os naturais de Macáo, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,11 (5) Maio 1969, p.266.

60 Sobre as antigas providencias dadas por Gen. de Goa, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser.3, 11 (5) Maio 1969, pp.268-269.

Providencias dadas pela Rainha N. Snr. a p.a o Porto da Cidade de Macao em 4 de Abril de 1783, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3, 11 (5) Maio 1969, pp.269-280.

61 Provisão da R. Junta de Goa em que acomp.a o Tratado do Comercio com a Gram Bretanha, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3,11 (6) Jun. 1969, p.293.

Copia do Tratado do Commercio, in "Arquivos de Macau", Macau, ser. 3, 11 (6) Jun. 1969, pp.293-303 -- The mentioned passage is in p.294. This Alvará (Ruling) represents, in fact, a reversal in the Portuguese trade system.

62 CASTRO, Martinho de Melo e, Apontamentos e noticias para a instrução, que se deve formar em Goa ao Bispo de Pekin, sobre os negócios relativos ao dominio de Macáo, in MÚRIAS, Manuel, pref., "Instrução para o bispo de Pequim e outros documentos para a história de Macau", Lisboa, Agência Geral das Colónias, 1943, pp.31-32.

* MA in Historical Sciences from the University of Louvain. Historian and researcher of the Portuguese Expansion and Christian Church, in the Orient. Professor in Instituto de Ciências Sociais(Institute of Social Sciences), Universidade de Lisboa (University of Lisbon), Lisbon. Director of Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa (Portuguese Overseas Film Archive). President of Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos (Centre of Overseas Historical Studies). Procurator in Câmara Corporativa (Corporative Chamber) -- as Counsellor of the Overseas Episcopate. Member of Conselho Ultramarino. Academician in Academia Portuguesa da História (Portuguese Academy of History), in Academia de Ciências de Lisboa (Academy of Sciences of Lisbon) and in Academia Internacional da Cultura Portuguesa (International Academy of Portuguese Culture).

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