

Leanqua and Anqua — The Founding of the Canton System (1685–1720)

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ABSTRACT: Leanqua and Anqua were prominent merchants in China who were unknowingly two of the founding fathers of what later became known as the Canton System 'yikou tongshang' (一口通商). The Qing government opened China to foreign trade in 1684, but it took several decades of experimenting with different policies before a common set of regulations emerged. The two partners operated in the period from 1685 to 1720, so they experienced at first hand all of the difficulties during these early years of the development. They were involved in both the Chinese junk trade to Southeast Asia and the foreign trade at Canton. They had very extensive connections with suppliers in China's interior and they regularly dealt with prominent merchants throughout Southeast Asia, including Java, Malaysia, and Siam. They also developed close relations with officers of the Dutch, English, and French East India companies.

The commerce in Canton evolved from being a rather corrupt, uncertain, and irregular trade in the late seventeenth century, to a stable, trustworthy, and consistently administered commerce in the 1720s. There were always problems with corruption among government officials and employees, but those connivances were minimised to the point that they did not hinder the growth of the trade. Leanqua and Anqua's story provides detailed examples and insights into how this transformation came about.

KEYWORDS: China trade; Hong merchant; Canton System; Leanqua; Anqua.

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INTRODUCTION

After China opened her doors to foreign commerce in 1684, Indian, European, and other foreign ships began to arrive to try their luck in the trade. By this time, the Portuguese and Spaniards had been carrying on a regular trade with China for more than one hundred years, from their bases in Macao and Manila. Chinese junks had also been sailing to Southeast Asia every year, many of which were from Fujian Province. But now the trade was opened to everyone except the Russians and Japanese, who had separate agreements with China to trade in other ports.

News spread quickly and almost immediately foreign ships began arriving in China. They frequented various ports, including Canton, Amoy (Xiamen), Chusan (Zhoushan), and Ningbo. Of course, they wanted to find the place that would offer them the best terms. Canton quickly emerged as one of the more favourable ports to carry on business, which led to many Fujian merchants moving there.

Leanqua and Anqua were two of the new arrivals from Fujian who established themselves at Canton in the late seventeenth century. They had been involved in the junk trade to Southeast Asia, and had extensive connections with inland suppliers. They had also been trading with the Dutch in Batavia. By the turn of the eighteenth century, the two partners were among the most prominent merchants in Canton.¹

Before I begin their story, I need to clarify some confusion concerning Anqua's identity. In the English East India Company's (EIC) records, there are numerous entries to an Anqua in Canton and another Anqua in Amoy. Sometimes the men appear as though they might be the same person. Several historians, including Morse, Dermigny, Cheong, and Peng, have suggested that this might be the case and have treated the two men as if they were one and the same.²

I have already clarified this matter in another study so I simply state here that these two men were separate people. After I finished researching and writing

the story of Amoy Anqua, it became clear that he could not be the same person as the Anqua in Canton, because they show up in both places at the same time.³ In order not to confuse the two men, I refer to this other man as 'Amoy Anqua'. All other entries below to Anqua refer to Leanqua's partner in Canton.

Anqua and Leanqua were from Quanzhou.⁴ Leanqua signed his name Lianguan (連官) and Anqua (晏官) or Anguan (安官). No signatures have been found showing their family names, but there are some clues in the French records. They wrote several letters to the government in Pondicherry and signed their names in French. Leanqua's transliterated name appears as Ou Lun Kouan or Ou Lien Koüan. Lun Kouan and Lien Koüan would refer to his given name (Leanqua), and Ou refers to his surname. Anqua's full name was recorded as Tçai Ngan Koüan, with Ngan Koüan being his given name (Anqua) and Tçai being his surname.⁵ Ou and Tçai (in French pronunciation) could refer to a couple of different family names, but the transliterations at least help to narrow the possibilities.

Leanqua and Anqua became very famous merchants and were well known throughout China, Asia, and Europe. They interacted with the top merchants in Siam and Malaysia, and they had extensive connections with the officers of the Dutch, French, and English East India companies. They had many dealings with the Dutch at Batavia, the Portuguese in Macao, and they corresponded with the British government in Madras. They were also involved with senior government officials in Canton and Amoy, and their fame and affairs even became known to the emperor in Beijing.

All of these activities inside and outside of China suggest that Leanqua and Anqua should show up somewhere in the Chinese records. I have spent several years searching the gazetteers and other documents looking for the two men, but without success. Perhaps one day their identity will be revealed. Consequently, all

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Fig. 1: A View of the Dutch Fort at Batavia. Anonymous. Courtesy of Bonhams. Source: <https://www.bonhams.com/auctions/26770/lot/591/>

of the information discussed below comes exclusively from the foreign records and archives. This outcome in itself is testimony to their international fame.

Besides trade with foreigners, Leanqua and Anqua also owned their own junks, and traded extensively throughout Southeast Asia. Their junks visited Johore and Batavia, and they had numerous dealings with the king of Siam. The name of their firm was the Fengyuan Hang (豐源行).⁶

It is not until 1698 that the first reference to them begin to appear, and then from 1702 onwards, there are many entries about them. There is some discussion about Anqua's previous dealings with the Dutch in Batavia so I begin with his story.

1. BATAVIA ENVOYS AND AGENTS (1685–1691)

In 1698, the Frenchman Bouvet mentioned that Anqua had previously gone to Batavia on a mission for the governor general in Canton to encourage trade with the Dutch.⁷ In 1702, Anqua also told the French supercargoes in Canton that he had been sent to Batavia by the governor general on a trade mission.⁸

Unfortunately, no one mentioned exactly what year Anqua made the trip.

I searched through the Dutch records from Batavia and discovered that 1689 was the last year prior to 1698 that a trade mission had been sent there from the governor general in Canton.⁹ Thus, that is the most likely year that Anqua would have been sent there. The name 'Anqua', however, does not appear in the Dutch records. But I think there is an explanation.

Chinese merchants always had several given names. Perhaps Anqua was his nickname or trade name and not his official name. When operating in an official capacity such as an envoy he would most likely have used his official birth name. The 'An' in Anqua would have been part of his official name, but probably not the 'qua'.¹⁰ That was an honorary suffix 'guan' (官) that was attached to one of the characters in the given name, which then became his trade name. Consequently, if Anqua used his official name, which is likely, then it is impossible to clearly identify him in the Dutch records. Nevertheless, there are similarities between the Chinese agents mentioned in those

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documents and the information that Anqua gave to the Frenchmen concerning his mission there.

According to the Batavia *dagregisters* (daily diaries), after the China trade was opened to other foreigners in 1684, the governor general in Canton sent an agent to Batavia each year. As historian John E. Wills, Jr. has shown, the Dutch traded on the coast of China every year from 1683 to 1690. This was a special arrangement granted to them by the emperor.¹¹

What has not been made clear, however, is that the governor general sent a trade mission to Batavia with envoys and agents. In 1685, the governor general requested and was granted permission from the Dutch government to send a trading junk to Batavia.¹² In addition to Batavia, a trading junk from Canton was also sent to the Dutch port of Malacca in 1687, 1688, and 1689.¹³

In 1688, two Canton merchants, Lin Qifeng (林奇逢) (spelled Licifoeng, alias Lilauya) and Tsuy Kinki, delivered the governor general's letters to the Dutch government.¹⁴ Canton merchants also sent messages to the Dutch at Batavia via the Portuguese ships at Macao.¹⁵ A couple of ships from Macao, and numerous Chinese junks, visited Batavia every year, which means the Dutch had the means to carry on a regular correspondence with Chinese officials and merchants. They were generally fairly well informed of changes that took place in the Chinese administration in Canton.

Lin was a prominent merchant in Canton and was well known to the Dutch. Anqua would surely have known him as well. Lin had been involved in exchanges with the Chinese government in 1676, and he was a member of the Qing embassy to Batavia in 1679.¹⁶ Lin and Tsuy were sent to Batavia in 1688 to negotiate the trade in the upcoming season.

Translations of the letters from the governor general and the details about the negotiations with these merchant-envoys are preserved in the National Archives in The Hague and the Arsip Nasional in Jakarta.¹⁷ Wills

has done the most extensive study on the relationship at this time between the Qing government and the Dutch. He shows that many of the transactions before 1684 were concerned with the Qing regime recapturing Taiwan from the Zheng clan.¹⁸

Once the Qing administration gained control of Taiwan, the negotiations with the Dutch became more commercial oriented but with some loose connections to the tribute trade.¹⁹ The Dutch were caught in this transitional period between the Ming and Qing administrations, which partially accounts for this rather strange arrangement that emerged between them and the Chinese officials in Canton. The Maritime Trade Commission of the Ming Dynasty was replaced by the Qing Maritime Customs, which operated completely separate from the tribute trade. However, it took a few years for the new structure to take shape and become fully implemented and operational.²⁰

The Dutch often referred to the governor general as the Pouij or Johnsock (with various spellings). These were transliterations of the Chinese words 'buyuan' (部院) and 'zongdu' (總督), respectively. The Dutch made transliterations of the names from both Cantonese and Fujianese pronunciations, depending on the situation at the time, so it can be confusing to determine to which officials they were actually referring.

Eventually, the names Sontuck, Tituck, Sontu, Tsungtu, Tsongtock, Chuntuck, Jontuck, or simply, John Tuck, become universally used by all foreigners trading at Canton to refer to the governor general (transliterations of zongdu). Those names appear frequently in Portuguese, Spanish, French, English, Danish, Dutch, Swedish, and Flemish trade records.²¹ They also referred to him as the 'viceroy'. The Dutch, however, seem to be among the only foreigners who also called him Pouij. This was actually the department or office and not the person, and should not be confused with his palace, which was called the Liangguang Butang (兩廣部堂) (Fig. 2).

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On 10 March 1689, the Dutch made a contract with the ‘Zontok Pouy Vice Roÿ der Provintien Canton en Quansi’ (the governor general of Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces, which in Chinese is Liangguang Zongdu Buyuan 兩廣總督部院). The Chinese agent Onglauya was the person sent to Batavia to work out the particulars.

This man’s activities were very similar to what Anqua had mentioned to the French. The Lin mentioned above could not be Anqua because he died in 1689. There were several men in Onglauya’s entourage, including Tsurie Lauya, Liafung, Tsuikinho, and Touyinkini. All of them were commissioned by governor general Wu Xingzuo (吳興祚) (1685–1689) in Canton.²² Any of them could have been Anqua, but I think Onglauya is the closest match.

In this contract, the Dutch agreed to supply the governor general with 4,000 piculs of Japanese copper. In exchange, the Dutch would receive silk and other products. The fourth page of the contract states that the Dutch ship *Martensdijk* would deliver the copper to the ‘Canton Islands’ (islands near Macao). They would stop at this rendezvous point on the return trip from Japan. These arrangements were made directly with governor general Wu, but Anqua and his fellow agents were the persons who actually carried them out.²³

Much of this activity between the Dutch and the governor general came to an end after Wu left office. The governors’ general were usually changed every three years, but sometimes more frequently, and other times they might stay in office longer, depending on the emperor’s preferences. At the end of 1689, governor general Shi Lin (石琳) took over the position and the missions to Batavia ended. In early 1690, Onglauya wrote to the Dutch explaining that their trade in Canton had now turned for the worse owing to the change in that office.²⁴

The trade between Canton and Batavia continued for another year. The Dutch sent a couple of letters to Shi Lin and he allowed one junk to go

to Batavia in 1690, which was the culmination of the agreements that were made in the previous year. Anqua was probably involved with that trade. In 1691, however, all of these exchanges ended.²⁵ The Canton junks also stopped going to Malacca after 1689.²⁶ Thus, as far as I could tell from the Dutch records, 1689 and 1690 would have been the most likely years for Anqua to have gone to Batavia.

2. THE EARLY YEARS OF THE CHINA TRADE (1685–1701)

As these examples show, in the early years of the Qing Maritime Customs, the governors general were directly involved in the trade. Examples below will also show that the customs superintendents (Hoppos, ‘hubu’ 戶部 or ‘jiandu’ 監督) also benefitted from the commerce. The extent to which they profited from the exchanges is unknown, but they likely earned a substantial side income from trade. The Canton junks that sailed to Batavia from 1685 to 1690 were in fact called the Sontock’s (zongdu, governor general’s) junks.²⁷ The governor in Amoy also sent letters to the Dutch at this time.²⁸ As I have shown in another study, government officials in Amoy and Chusan also received kickbacks from the trade each year.²⁹

Besides exactions from senior officials, local merchants had another threat they had to deal with from time to time. Sometimes a man arrived from another province claiming to have permission from the emperor to trade with foreigners. These persons might be granted the privilege by the emperor, or one of his sons, in exchange for a large payment. These outside licensed men were known as ‘emperor’s’ or ‘king’s’ merchants (皇商).³⁰

From 1685 to the 1720s, senior government officials in Canton such as the governor general, governor, and Hoppo might also grant special permission to a friend or a favourite relative to trade with foreigners.³¹ Fortunately, there were only a few years when these outside men attempted to interfere



Viceroy's Palace Canton

Macao, 1713

Fig. 2: Viceroy's Palace Canton. Anonymous. Courtesy of Bonhams. Source: <https://www.bonhams.com/auctions/20024/lot/337/>

with Leanqua and Anqua's business. Merchants and officials in Canton were much better at handling these outsiders than was the case in other ports like Amoy and Chusan.³²

Before continuing the discussion of the two partners, there is one entry in the Portuguese records from 1689 that deserves some explanation, because it is very likely a reference to Leanqua. The man discussed is called 'Linqua' by the Portuguese.³³ As historian George Bryan Souza has shown, the circumstances surrounding this man are very similar to what we know about Leanqua.³⁴

In November 1689, Linqua and his partner Guia arrived at Macao from Canton. They hired two Portuguese ships owned by the Macao merchant Pero Vaz de Siqueira to carry merchandise from Batavia to Macao. However, because Chinese junks paid much less in duties than Portuguese ships, the two men asked

the Macao Senate to make an exception in their policies and charge the lower duties on these two cargoes. Otherwise, they said they would ship the cargoes on Chinese junks. If that happened, the two Portuguese ships would return to Macao empty, and then the government would receive no duties whatsoever. The Macao Senate agreed to their terms and the goods were shipped on the Portuguese vessels and charged at the lower rate.³⁵

Leanqua and Anqua were closely involved in the trade at Batavia and Macao. When Leanqua died in 1720, foreigners described him as an old man. He was probably at least in his 50s or 60s, at the time, if not 70s or 80s. Thus, if he was at least 55 when he died, he would have been 24 years old in 1689.

In a letter that Leanqua wrote to the French (in French), dated 15 November 1713, he said that he had been 'doing this business' (trading at Batavia

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with his junk *LinYu*) 'for more than ten years'.³⁶ He also mentioned that he had built the vessel 'in the manner of the Europeans' at his own expense, with permission from the Mandarins.³⁷ He mentioned that he supported his wife and children from this trade, which shows that he did indeed have a family.³⁸

From these references, we can assume that Leanqua had probably been trading with Batavia for many years before building his own junk in 1702. He had money to pay for the vessel, and was obviously already well acquainted with the business. While it is impossible to be conclusive, these brief entries support the idea that the Linqua of 1689 may have been Leanqua. At some point, he joined into partnership with Anqua.

3. THE RISE OF LEANQUA AND ANQUA (1702–1710)

In 1702, Leanqua and Anqua traded with both the French and British in Canton.³⁹ Those Europeans had been there in earlier years, as well, but the records are incomplete. From 1699 to 1701 several merchants are mentioned including Sheamea, Hun Shun Quin, Munqua, Tinqu and more than a dozen other names, but there is no mention of trade with Leanqua and Anqua. Perhaps they were focusing more on their junk trade to Southeast Asia at this time, and their trade with Batavia and Macao.

In 1702, the French described Leanqua and Anqua as 'both honest people'. They handled a large volume of trade that year so they were clearly already well established.⁴⁰ The French were anxious to find out more about the production of silk and porcelain in China. They asked the partners if they could help obtain permission to send two persons to the production areas near Suzhou and Nanjing. The partners replied that it should not be a problem, because China was now a very open country with people coming from many nations. They also offered to help sponsor the journey.⁴¹

Leanqua and Anqua arranged a meeting with governor general Shi Lin, so the French officers could ask for permission to make the trip. The Frenchmen argued that their trade would likely increase considerably if they could bring back knowledge of the great diversity and quality of the items that China produced. Shi Lin heard their arguments, read their request twice, and then 'folded it, put it in his pocket, and spoke no more of it'.⁴² That was the end of the discussion.

As we know from history, French missionary François-Xavier d'Entrecolles eventually did make a trip to Jingdezhen in 1712. He produced an extensive report of Chinese porcelain production there.⁴³ What is less known, however, is ten years earlier French officers had attempted to make a trip there, but without success.

In these early decades of the trade there were sometimes two Hoppo in office at the same time, but they were always ranked, first and second.⁴⁴ The French wanted to make an impression and consulted with Anqua as to the proper presents to give to the men. Anqua was given the task of presenting the gifts, but to everyone's surprise, the two Hoppo refused them. They later explained that the French had come a long way to China, and had waited a long time for their goods, so they did not want to burden them further with presents.⁴⁵

In 1702, the partners accepted the British imports in exchange for raw silk, silk manufactures, and other products.⁴⁶ There was a lot of competition that year. Besides Leanqua and Anqua, the British contracted with Chu Tonqua, Lee Hanqua, Lee Kinqua, Caw Sanqua, Quo Henqua, Hue Ketcha, Tim Laiqua and Falai.⁴⁷ The French also traded with a man named Co-kouan.⁴⁸

A competitive environment kept prices up for European imports and down for Chinese exports, which was good for trade. It is important to point this out, because that is not what happened at other ports like Amoy and Chusan. Canton administrators

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were, for the most part, generally good at ensuring no monopolies developed in the trade. They were well aware of the importance of maintaining competition between merchants.⁴⁹

There were several French and English ships trading at Canton in 1703 as well, but few details have survived.⁵⁰ In August 1704, Leanqua met the English supercargoes at Macao after their ships arrived. The Hoppo at Canton heard of their arrival and as was customary in these early years, he went downriver to measure the ships and negotiate the terms of trade. The English were concerned about rumours that had been circulating of disruptions in the trade at Canton and asked Leanqua whether they should go upriver or go to another port. Leanqua answered affirmatively ‘by all means ... go up the river’.⁵¹

After measuring the three English ships at Macao, Leanqua brought up the subject of a junk that had been plundered by the private English captain Hamilton. In 1703, Hamilton conducted considerable trade with Leanqua (spelled Linqua), Anqua and Hemshaw. Hamilton had planned to go to Amoy, but owing to inclement weather and the need for repairs, he put into Macao instead. While at anchor there, he enquired into the possibility of trading at Canton.⁵²

After coming to terms with the Hoppo and the merchants, Hamilton’s imports were sent upriver, and his exports shipped downriver, while the ship was being repaired. At some point in the exchanges, Hamilton learned that the three Chinese merchants had presumably ‘paid to the *Hapoa* [Hoppo] 4,000 *Tayels* for the Monopolisation of my Cargo, and that no Merchant durst have any Commerce with me but they’.⁵³ The Hoppo also demanded the same amount from the French this year.⁵⁴ Hamilton complained about this manipulation of his trade, but to no avail.

In the end, Hamilton received his cargo and returned to his ship at Macao in January 1704. Leanqua and his two associates were well aware that Hamilton was unhappy with the way things had turned out.

Hamilton mentioned in his journal that two of the merchants ‘came to *Maccao*, under Pretence of clearing Accounts fairly’. He ‘invited them on board to dine ... but they would not do me that Honour’. Before the two merchants left again for Canton, Hamilton complained to them again about his trade being manipulated. He also complained that he had not received everything that he had been promised, which amounted to ‘1,800 *Tayels*’. The two men replied ‘that they would give no more, and the Balance they would keep, for fear they should lose on my [Hamilton’s] imported Cargo’.⁵⁵

The next day, Hamilton ‘sent them my Account, wherein I shewed [showed] that they and the *Hapoa* [Hoppo] had cheated me of 12,000 *Tayels*, and that I should not fail to make Reprisals when I met with any Effects of theirs’.⁵⁶ Hamilton sailed his ship *Lucky Hour* towards Southeast Asia with the intention of intercepting a junk so he could recover the money he claimed that he had lost. He had previously visited Atche and Johore, and he was well aware that junks from Canton arrived at the latter port every year. Hamilton also owned other ships that were trading in those ports so he was well aware that Leanqua sent vessels there as well.⁵⁷

Upon approaching Johore in early April, Hamilton attacked a Chinese junk at anchor which he suspected had come from Canton. With the aid of a couple of Portuguese from Macao, who could speak and read Chinese, they examined the shipping papers aboard the junk and determined that part of the cargo belonged to Leanqua. Hamilton wasted no time in confiscating goods to the amount he claimed was owed to him.⁵⁸

Hamilton then set off for Batavia where he arrived on 5 May 1704. The Dutch recorded his ship *Lucky Hour* (*Geluckige Uur*) to be 600 tons, with 30 cannons, and a crew of 100 men (35 Europeans and 65 Lascars).⁵⁹ The Chinese junk would probably have had a comparable crew size, but those vessels generally

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only had a few cannons aboard and were no match for a well-armed European ship. It is thus not surprising that Hamilton had no difficulty overpowering the vessel.⁶⁰

In a report that Hamilton gave to the English supercargoes in Batavia on 23 June 1704, he claimed to have taken cargo from the junk 'to the amount of about 6,000 Dollars' (ca. 4,320 taels). In his journal, Hamilton mentioned that he captured '80 Chests of Copper, and 200 Peculs of Toothengue'. The tothenague, he claimed, was the same product that he had purchased in Canton and that had not been delivered to him. He claimed that he could prove the slabs belonged to him because they had 'my own Mark on them'.⁶¹

When the English supercargoes arrived from Batavia to Macao in August, they talked to Leanqua about Hamilton's exploits. Leanqua claimed that the value of the goods Hamilton had stolen from his junk amounted to 11,000 taels (ca. 15,278 Spanish dollars). Leanqua claimed to have written proof that Hamilton had been treated fairly, and had not been cheated as he claimed.⁶² Leanqua brought this matter up to the English supercargoes in hopes that they would help him to recover his losses. He also suggested that if the Mandarins in Canton found out about the matter, it could raise problems with the English trade there.

As far as the records reveal, Leanqua never recovered his money. As a general rule, Chinese officials did not concern themselves in offenses to Chinese citizens that happened outside of China. Leanqua was of course well aware of this so his best hope at recovering his loss was to plead to the English supercargoes for help. But because this was a private matter between Leanqua and Hamilton, they refused to become involved and, as far as the records reveal, that was the end of it.⁶³

In the meantime, the English were very skeptical about going upriver in 1704, owing to rumours that were circulating in Macao then an 'Emperour's Merchant' had recently arrived at Canton from Beijing. For 'a sum of money' (42,000 taels), this man

had convinced the emperor's son to grant 'him a patent to trade with all Europeans in Canton, exclusive of all other Merchants'.⁶⁴

Leanqua reassured the English supercargoes that this man had no goods to trade and no capital or credit to invest. In such a financial state, it was not in the best interests of the Hoppon (who would not be able to extract anything from him), or in the interest of the trade in general (for the sake of increasing the emperor's duties), to allow this man a substantial portion of the trade. Moreover, Leanqua argued that this intruder may have had permission from a prince, but he did not have permission from the emperor. Leanqua gave the impression that permission from a son was not the same as permission from the father.⁶⁵

On 13 September 1704, 'Leanqua and his partners came to the factory' to negotiate a contract. 'On the 15th the contract for wrought silks was concluded with Leanqua, Empshaw, Anqua, Hiqua, & Pinqua'. Because the matter of the emperor's merchant had not yet been settled, Leanqua and his associates requested that the British keep the contract confidential until further notice. He was still uncertain whether the emperor's merchant would be allowed to trade under a license from the prince, and if so, to what extent.⁶⁶

On 18 October, Hoppon An Tai (安泰) left for Saukien to meet with governor general Guo Shilong (郭世隆) to discuss the matter of the emperor's merchant. They concluded that because 'the Emperor's merchant was incapable of dispatching the ships' and because Leanqua and his partners had agreed to pay the governor general 'a valuable consideration' for allowing them the trade of the three English ships at Whampoa (*Kent, Eaton, and Streatham*), that Leanqua and his associates should be granted the privilege of that commerce. Leanqua later confessed that they had to pay the governor general 5,000 taels for the privilege of the English trade that year.⁶⁷

Although Hamilton may have had a different understanding of how the trade was conducted in

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1703, the payment to the Hoppo that he claimed Leanqua had made, was probably done under similar circumstances. If Leanqua had not paid the Hoppo the 4,000 taels (as stated) for the privilege of the trade with Hamilton, then that officer would have held up his trade until someone else came up with the money. This outcome would potentially cause further delays for Hamilton, and he would still have to bear the expense of the license, by paying higher prices for the goods he purchased.

Officials might not have been allowed to engage in direct trade at this time, but they had other means of privately taxing the commerce. Hamilton obviously did not understand the situation at the time. If no one had been willing to pay the Hoppo for the privilege of Hamilton's trade, then he might have had to leave without a cargo.

Before the trade was completed in 1704, the English supercargoes suffered a couple of setbacks. 'The Linguists brôt a monstrous account of fees to be paid the Hoppo's Officers before the *Eaton* can be dispatched'. They found the fees to be 40 taels higher than what ship *Fleetwood* had to pay. They were unsuccessful at reducing the fees.⁶⁸ And there were problems with some of the silks they ordered.

On the 18th Dec. they [the English supercargoes] received another parcel of Silks from Leanqua, in which they found, notwithstanding all the care they had taken, that the Weavers had greatly mistaken the shoot of the colours, they therefore gave notice that unless this was altered in the remainder they would not receive them. Leanqua now complained that, since the arrival of the Manilla Ship, the Weavers had neglected the Kent's Investment and had sold the Manilla Ship some of the Kent's Silks, though he had advanced them money on that account. On the other hand the Weavers complained that Leanqua and

*Company had bound them down so hard, that they could not make the Silks of the fineness required by the Supercargoes. Added to this, several of the Weavers employed by Leanqua & Co. were broken, and had ran away with the money advanced them.*⁶⁹

The 'Manilla Ship' is probably a reference to a Spanish ship. They often traded at Macao, and infrequently sent ships upriver to Whampoa. Regardless of where they anchored, they had to go to Canton to purchase their wares. Unlike other European traders, the Spaniards traded mostly in silk, and exported little or no tea. Chinese merchants and shopkeepers were often eager to accommodate the Spaniards, because they paid for everything with silver dollars.⁷⁰ Thus, it is not surprising to see the weavers neglecting the English after the arrival of the 'Manilla Ship'.

The silks were finally shipped on December 30, but then another problem arose. Within the lot were some yellow fabrics, which was one of the imperial colours and forbidden to export. Leanqua had to bribe the customs officer with 100 taels to enable the fabrics to pass inspection.⁷¹ In the end, the ships were all loaded and sailed away, with the foreign traders being more or less contented with the results.

No information has survived about Leanqua and Anqua in the years from 1705 to 1709. As Morse has pointed out, there is a gap in the EIC records from 1705 to 1711.⁷² But there are references to the two men in 1710 and later years.

It is important to point out a change that took place in the British trade at this time. Before 1709, there were actually two British companies that traded in China, namely the English (Old) Company and the London (New) Company.⁷³ In that year, the two companies merged. I will simply refer to those nationals as British, English, or the company, without distinguishing between the two companies. I do not have sufficient information to clarify which company each ship, captain, and supercargo

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belonged to. From 1709 onwards, I refer to the British company as the EIC.⁷⁴

We know that the English intended to engage Leanqua in 1705 because at the end of the 1704 season they left a letter with him to be handed to the supercargoes of the next season.⁷⁵ We also have a letter in 1710 from Leanqua and Anqua to the EIC directors, which is copied below. In the letter, the two men admitted that they had ‘done most or all the English business in this Port [Canton] for this four or five years past’. Thus, even though we have no specific data from those years, we know they continued to be the main suppliers of the British ships up to 1710. I copy the letter below in its entirety, but the spelling and language can be a bit cumbersome to understand.

*To the Honourable Managers for
Affairs of the R^l Hon^{ble} United
English East India Company
Honourable S^{rs}*

*By M^r Nicholas Sup^{re} Cargoe of Ship Loyall
Cooke who arrived here 20th In. we receiv’d
Nine hundred and thirty Tale; being the
Ballance of the Respondentia Bond Lett to
Mess^{rs} Hille, &c. on your Accounts and have
delivered him up the Bond for y^e same. M^r
Nicholas wholly employed us in the Investing
your Cargoe upon this Ship Loyall Cooke,
which we doubt not but twill be well approved
by you, and that the goodness will demonstrate
it self by the sale at your #ndle. We also hope
that our soe early dispatch of the Ship will be
esteemd as an acceptable peice of Service to
your [i]n which we must doe M^r Nicholas that
justice, he has added very considerable thereto,
by his industry and dilligence, together with
his long experience in this Country.
As we have done most or all the English
business in this Port for this four or five years*

*past, we think it an incombant Duty upon
us to acquaint Your Honours by what ways
and means the Trade may be carryed on for
the Credit of your Nation, Security and little
expence to your selves, Six years agoe the H____
[Hopppo] of this place obliged the English to
pay him a new duty of four PCent upon all
their Trade Imported and Exported, which
is very considerable more then the Emperors
Customs, especialey upon a Europe Cargoe,
this unreasonable Duty has bin continued
ever since which they now demand as their
due, and so likely t[o] continue till Your Hon^{rs}
think fitt to be at the charge of about thirty
or fourty Thousand Tale (three [o]r four of it
in curiositys) to have the same represented to
the Emperor, when doubtless a Grant may be
procured for the English to pay so much on a
Ship and no more, and we give your Honours
this Assurance nothing shall be wanting on our
part to effect the same.*

*We have by M^r Nicholas taken the Liberty
to send Your Honours a small Present as
P[er] inclosed List which comes to beg your
acceptance of from.*

Honour’d S^{rs} Your most Obd^t hum^{ble} Serv.

Leinqu 晏 連

Canton 20th November 1710 Anqua 官 官

Letter from Leinqu and Anqua Merchants of
Canton

Rec’d by the Loyall Cooke the 8th August 1711

Read in Court the 10th [of August 1711]⁷⁶

As we have seen from other studies, Hong merchants sometimes attempted to take matters into their own hands in order to bring about changes to the trade. In this letter, they are trying to undermine the Hoppo’s attempts to tax the trade. This was very risky business, because if they got caught, it could raise

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serious problems with that official. Similar attempts were made by the merchant Tan Hunqua in the late 1720s and early 1730s, where he sent several letters to British and Dutch directors in Europe in order to change the way their trade was being conducted in Canton. After the Hoppon found out about those correspondences, he accused Hunqua of trying to monopolise the trade for personal benefit and threatened his life if any more letters were sent. This led to Hunqua being expelled from the trade for several years, arrested off and on, and having a lawsuit filed against him. Other similar attempts were made by Chinese merchants in the 1760s and 1770s.⁷⁷ Thus, Leanqua and Anqua entered into dangerous territory by sending this letter to Europe.

If nothing else, the letter shows the frustrations that Canton merchants had when new impositions were introduced into the trade. The partners clearly felt it was worth the risk of getting caught, if they could somehow bring about a change to the new taxes. In order to understand their situation better, and to correct some misunderstandings that have been circulating in the secondary literature about these taxes, I summarise their introduction (or re-introduction) here.⁷⁸

4. THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF THE *AD VALOREM* TAX

In earlier years, a 6 percent *ad valorem* tax had been applied to exports. In order to encourage more foreign ships at Guangzhou, in 1686 the Kangxi emperor reduced the quota on the duties from Guangdong Province by 20 percent. In 1698, another reduction in duties was granted, amounting to 30,285 taels.⁷⁹ As another study has shown, this second reduction appears to have included the removal of the 6 percent *ad valorem* tax that was introduced earlier.⁸⁰

After more foreign ships began to go to Guangzhou in the early years of the eighteenth century it was deemed time to re-introduce the *ad valorem* tax. After the British ships arrived at Macao in August

1702, they opened negotiations with officials in Canton concerning the terms of the trade. The Hoppon then stated that this year there would be an *ad valorem* tax of 3 percent on exports.⁸¹

This new tax created many protests from foreigners and Chinese merchants alike. In order to ensure that the tax would be introduced as planned, two Chinese guards were positioned in front of the British factory to prevent anyone from engaging the English supercargoes. They stood guard for more than two months, from mid-September to 1 December, while the negotiations continued. In order to provide further incentives, the Hoppon threatened to charge them 5 percent *ad valorem* instead of 3 percent. This tactic made the 3 percent tax look more acceptable, and eventually everyone succumbed. The *ad valorem* tax was effectively re-introduced that year.⁸²

In 1704, the *ad valorem* tax was raised to 4 percent.⁸³ In the letter above from 1710, Leanqua and Anqua asked the British to help get this tax removed, which they had been paying for the past six years. There were rumours circulating that the emperor had not sanctioned the tax, and so if the British could just write a letter to the Imperial Court in Beijing, it might have the desired effect of removing the tax, which did not happen.

In 1711, another rumour began circulating that the Hoppon was willing to remove the 4 percent tax in exchange for a payment of 10,000 taels. According to one entry, the Hoppon was to place a stone 'in the customhouse, declaring the duty to be unsanctioned by the Emperor'.⁸⁴ None of these rumors appear to have had any merit. The *ad valorem* tax had been previously written into the Guangdong tariff book so it obviously had the emperor's approval. It could not be arbitrarily removed with a one-off payment to the Hoppon.⁸⁵

Leanqua and Anqua were unsuccessful at getting the tax removed. In fact, at some point around 1720 it was raised to 6 percent *ad valorem*. In early 1723, the British asked for it to be removed, but again, to no avail.⁸⁶

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5. THE HEIGHT OF LEANQUA AND ANQUA'S TRADE (1711–1717)

The next entries to Leanqua and Anqua in the EIC records do not appear until 1716. However, there are a few earlier entries to them in the British free merchant John Scattergood's papers. There are also some entries to them in French sources.

In 1711, the two men supplied over 76,000 taels worth of merchandise to the private English ship *Bussorah*. They accepted a parcel of pearls in exchange for quicksilver and vermillion. Most of the goods the partners supplied to the English were paid for with silver coin. Scattergood also purchased 30 bars of gold worth 74,900 taels from Leanqua and Anqua.⁸⁷ Gold was illegal to be exported, but was a means to generate quick capital. Many of the top merchants in Canton were involved in these illicit transactions.⁸⁸

The French arrived in Canton from Peru in late February 1711, and opened negotiations with Leanqua and Anqua. The two men's status with the French had increased considerably from being described as 'honest people' in 1702 to now being referred to as 'the most famous merchants of the city'.⁸⁹ Unfortunately, no figures survive from the French trade this year.

The British ships *Streatham* and *Herne* arrived at Macao in mid-July 1712. They opened discussions with the Hoppos and he recommended that they deal with Leanqua and Anqua. In fact, the British stated that they were 'compelled to deal with them and no other' merchants. This statement suggests that the Hoppos were probably still charging merchants for the rights to trade with ships.⁹⁰

In reality, however, what usually happened was that one Chinese firm was allowed to supply the largest share of the merchandise for a ship in exchange for accepting responsibility for those foreigners while they were in China. If anything went wrong, that merchant would be held responsible to solve the problems. As we see from the examples above, there were many other merchants supplying cargoes to foreign ships, but

they did not have as large a share. This practice later developed into what became known as the 'security merchant system', whereby every ship had a merchant who stood security for all of the men aboard and all exchanges with that vessel.⁹¹

In a letter sent to the directors in London, the officers of the *Herne* complained grievously about Leanqua and Anqua, but no specifics were provided.⁹² Another source says that Leanqua and Anqua 'traded with the Money of the Mandarins, which they held at Interest'.⁹³ If this statement is true, then the two men were apparently borrowing money from the Mandarins in order to finance their operations. These types of connivances and conflicts of interest between government officials and merchants continue to show up in the records until the 1730s.⁹⁴

A famine struck South China in 1713. When John Scattergood arrived on the ship *Amity*, he described the situation in Canton as follows:

*ye poor people was up in a mutiny and were for robbing all ye Hounghs [Honges]. The Maderins giving them Rice and makeing all ye Merch^{rs}. contributing their quotas kept them quiet*⁹⁵

'Contributing their quotas' undoubtedly meant that each of the licensed merchants was required to give a certain amount of rice to relieve the poor, which would keep them from raiding the honges. Part of the problem with insufficient rice at this time was owing to merchants exporting the grain for profit. As is shown below, the Kangxi emperor later banned the export of rice, and in late 1716, forbade Chinese from carrying on trade with Southeast Asia. There were other reasons for initiating this embargo, but stopping the export of rice was clearly one of the leading factors.⁹⁶

In August 1713, Leanqua and Anqua purchased cotton, lead, putchuck, rosum alloes and gogull from the ship *Amity*, and supplied it with tutenague,




Fig. 3: Map of "The Chart of the China Seas", by William Heather. In *Après de Manneville, Jean-Baptiste-Nicolas-Denis d', Wellesley, Richard Wellesley, Stephenson, John, Heather, William, Horsburgh, James, Heather and Williams and Robert Laurie and James Whittle, The Country Trade East-India pilot, for the Navigation of the East-Indies and Oriental Seas, within the Limits of the East-India Company. Extending from the Cape of Good Hope to China, New Holland and New Zealand, with the Red Sea, Gulf of Persia, Bay of Bengal, and China Seas*. London: Robert Laurie and James Whittle, 1799. Source: <http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-373100400>

quicksilver, alum, china root and camphor. Anqua also purchased a parcel of pearls worth 1,322 taels.⁹⁷ Leanqua and Anqua were now the most prominent merchants at Canton. In a letter addressed to Beauvoir, the author (probably John Scattergood) stated that:

your old freinds Linquah & Anquah are brave and hearty still, and carry on almost all y^e business, but I think they do not ply us fair in some things; you will hear Capt. Newton rail at them and Capt. Hudson & Fenwick praise them as much . . . In short Linquah & Anquah does all y^e Grand [trade] and Comshaw Chounquah and Pinkee all y^e Less [trade].⁹⁸

As we see from these examples, not everyone was pleased with Leanqua and Anqua. The two partners now dominated the trade at Canton, for better or for worse. Notice that in all of these later exchanges, there is no mention of an emperor's merchant or anyone of the like. Men with special licenses showed up in Canton again in the 1720s, but they were unable to make serious inroads into the trade owing to the local merchants dominating the commerce, with the support of the Hoppo. This fact put Canton on a very different track from Amoy and Chusan, which continued to experience great disruptions in commerce from one year to the next, owing to the intrusions from the Mandarins and outside men.⁹⁹

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6. LEANQUA AND ANQUA'S JUNK TRADE TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

In June 1713, Leanqua and Anqua became victims of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1714), which placed them squarely in the arena of international politics. On 26 February 1713, the French Naval Commodore Henri Bouynot, of the warship *Saint Louis*, arrived in Manila from Peru.¹⁰⁰ He had two other ships in his fleet, *l'Éclair*, captain J. de Boisloré, and *François*, captain Le Coq.¹⁰¹ On 12 April, the ships left Manila in search of enemy vessels to capture.¹⁰² In the sea between Pulo Aur, on the southeast coast of Malaysia, and Pulo Condore, off the southern coast of Cochín China (Vietnam), Bouynot captured and plundered a British ship from Madras, a Portuguese ship from Macao, a Chinese junk from Ningbo, and two Chinese junks returning to Canton from Batavia (Fig. 3). He took the captured vessels to Manila, where they were sold.¹⁰³ Bouynot had attacked ships in Asia in 1704 as well so he was acquainted with this type of warfare for profit (which other persons referred to as piracy).¹⁰⁴

Even though France was not at war with China and had no cause to attack Chinese junks, Bouynot could justify his aggression by claiming that they were freighting goods for the Portuguese, Spanish, English, or Dutch. The two junks that he captured from Batavia were owned by Leanqua and Anqua. In one of Leanqua's letters to the governor of Pondicherry, he mentioned that he was personally aboard the junk when it was attacked. He said that they were boarded by 'several hundred thieves' and that they were sailing under a Dutch flag. The cargo, however, was owned by Chinese in Batavia and Canton.¹⁰⁵

Many of the junks that sailed between Canton and Batavia were indeed commissioned by the Batavia government and displayed a Dutch flag.¹⁰⁶ Part of the cargoes that were sent to Batavia was usually consigned to the Dutch, but the rest of the merchandise was the property of Chinese. On the return trip to Canton,

however, the cargoes were more likely to be owned entirely by Chinese.¹⁰⁷ Because they were allowed to fly a Dutch flag, the junks sailed under protection of the Dutch East India Company (VOC).¹⁰⁸ Unfortunately, in this case the Dutch flag was more of a threat than a benefit.

Bouynot could easily justify capturing the vessels simply because of the flag. Leanqua and Anqua had very good relations with the French supercargoes in Canton, so, needless to say, this attack on their vessels was a major affront to them.

News of Bouynot's exploits spread rapidly across Asia, with many protests being sent to the French presidency in Pondicherry. Bouynot left Manila on 30 December 1713 and arrived at Malacca on 26 January 1714. Fig. 4a–b is the Dutch translation of the letter he sent to the Dutch governor Willem Moerman. It simply explains that they were sailing under the authority of the French Crown, and gives a brief account of their voyage from France, to South America and Manila. It mentions that they were now bound to Pondicherry. There is no mention of his exploits in Asia, but the Dutch knew what he had done.¹⁰⁹

When Bouynot arrived in Pondicherry, he faced serious criticism. An investigation was carried out into his naval exploits, and Bouynot was found to be operating completely outside of his authority. He was arrested, 'taken out of the command, & goes home [im]Prisoned . . . & about fourty Europeans, English, Dutch, & French ran away from two French men of Warr'.¹¹⁰ He now had only two ships in his fleet, one of which was the *Saint Louis*.

After Bouynot's arrest, the crew deserted, probably out of fear that they might be charged with piracy. Bouynot, however, never made it back to Europe to stand trial. He died in Bengal in September 1714.¹¹¹ He left behind a huge problem for the French presidency to resolve.

The British presidency at Madras, Portuguese government in Macao and Goa, and the Chinese

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



Fig. 4a–b: Dutch translation of Commodore Bouynot's letter to Governor Willem Moerman at Malacca, 26 January 1714. Courtesy of National Archives, The Hague. VOC 1854, Malacca, pp. 15–16.

merchants in China, all launched protests against the French, and demanded retribution for their loss.¹¹² The Dutch in Batavia and Malacca were also made aware of the attacks. However, because the cargo on the captured junks and ships did not belong to the Dutch, they did not become directly involved in the affair.¹¹³

The attack was an enormous setback for the French trade in China, because not only did the governors general of the respective provinces find out about the attack, but the affair was also reported to the emperor in Beijing.¹¹⁴ Rumours began circulating that greatly exaggerated the extent of Bouynot's plundering. One account stated that he had 'taken and plunder'd about 9 Jounks belonging to this place [Canton] Amoy

and Limpo [Ningbo] and almost ruined Macco [Macao] by taking a Rich Portugese ship belong to y^e place & they are afread they have taken y^e Lisbon Frigate'.¹¹⁵

These rumours spread confusion and fears about the effects the attack would have on the China trade, and of course, many people now viewed the French as nothing but pirates. It took a long time for Chinese to forget about Bouynot's exploits. In 1718, the Kangxi emperor warned officials in Guangdong Province to be alert to all foreign aggressors, but especially to watch out for the French, who he considered to be the cruelest of all the Europeans trading in Asia.¹¹⁶ Bouynot did indeed have an impact on the situation in eastern waters but perhaps not the one he was expecting.

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


Fig. 5: Letter from Leanqua and Anqua to John Scattergood declaring that the French (佛蘭西) had attacked and captured their two junks, dated Kangxi year 53, 10th month (November/December 1714). Courtesy of The National Archives, London. C 106/170.

The British governor Edward Harrison at Fort St George in Madras supported Leanqua and Anqua's case against the French. The two men put together a Statement of Loss with a complete list of the cargo that was stolen from them. The names of the two vessels were *Linyu* (林玉) and *Pétçao*.¹¹⁷ *Linyu* was a junk of 7,000 to 8,000 piculs capacity, making it equivalent to what a 900-ton French ship would normally carry.¹¹⁸ *Pétçao* was a much smaller vessel.

The Statement of Loss from Leanqua and Anqua were written in French, with the aid of Missionaire

Apostolique R. P. Gouille, who was in Canton at the time. Every item that was stolen from the two junks was listed in detail, in English, French, Portuguese and Chinese so there were no misunderstandings. It was probably translated into English and Portuguese in order to gain those nationals' support. Fig. 5 is a declaration in Chinese stating briefly that the French had plundered their two junks. It is signed by Leanqua and Anqua and stamped with the chop of the Fengyuan Hang.

The final draft of the plundered cargo was sent to the Franciscan Claude Visdelou Eveque de Claudiopolus Vicaire Apostolique in Pondicherry. Visdelou had previously lived in China, and had learned Chinese. He put the mark of the Franciscan Order of Friars Minor Capuchin 卄 next to every entry signifying that the translations corresponded with the original Chinese.

Fig. 6a–b shows the first and last pages of the Statement of Loss, with signatures. The document is 26 pages in length, and shows every item in four languages. Leanqua, Anqua, a third joint-owner of the junks Ou Pei Koüan (培官, also spelled Pyqua), and captain Tchín Tekoüan (德官) of junk *Linyu*, signed the documents and stamped it with the chop of the Fengyuan Hang. Unfortunately, they only signed their given names, and not their surnames, so we are unable to trace the men in the Chinese records.

The captain of junk *Pétçao*, Tchín Kokoüan, is also mentioned in the documents, as are all of the other Chinese investors in Canton. None of these other men signed their names in Chinese.¹¹⁹ All of these documents were submitted to the French colonial government in Pondicherry. They are now held in the Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer in Aix-en-Provence, France.¹²⁰

The value of the goods that were stolen from Leanqua and Anqua's two junks came to 86,825 taels for *Linyu* and 17,909 taels for *Pétçao*, which made a total of 104,734 taels (ca. \$145,464).¹²¹ At this time, it was possible to build a moderately sized house in





Fig. 6a–b: First and last page of Leanqua and Anqua's Statement of Loss sent to the French in Pondicherry, February 25, 1715. Courtesy of Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer (ANOM), Aix-en-Provence, C/2/276, ff. 103 and 116.

Canton or purchase a good sized ship for \$10,000 so this loss was equivalent to having fourteen houses or ships burned up in flames.¹²²

If some of this money was borrowed from the Mandarins, as is suggested above, then Leanqua and Anqua would have had to make interest payments on the loans. By the end of February 1715, twenty months had passed since their junks were plundered, which means a lot of accumulated interest. Thus, even if Leanqua and Anqua would have been paid back in 1715, they would likely still have been losers from this attack owing to the outstanding interest owed.

I have found no entry in the French records that shows Leanqua and Anqua actually being paid. Unfortunately, I have found no Chinese records that discuss these matters either. Fig. 7 is a letter sent to John Scattergood dated 1 February 1716, which mentions that they were still waiting for 'restitution'. In the letter, Leanqua and Anqua also thanked Scattergood

for taking care of the Chinese 'passengers'. These men were probably sailors who had been displaced after the attacks, and found their way back to China aboard one of Scattergood's ships. Because Leanqua was aboard the junk when it was captured, he was probably also one of the passengers.

The French trade does not seem to have suffered from this event, as one might expect. In 1716, there were six French ships trading at Canton, and two at Amoy.¹²³ Those financial records have not survived so we do not know which Chinese merchants supplied the cargoes. But we do know that the British were much concerned in 1716 about Leanqua and Anqua gaining control over the largest share of the foreign trade.¹²⁴ The French had the largest number of ships in port at this time so we can assume that the two partners were probably supplying a good part of their cargoes.

I have found no other letters from Leanqua and Anqua complaining about their plundered junks so the

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


Fig. 7: Letter from Leanqua and Anqua to John Scattergood thanking him for taking care of their Chinese 'passengers' and declaring that they have not yet received any 'restitution' from the French for the loss they have suffered, February 1, 1715. Courtesy of The National Archives, London. C 106/170.

outcome of the matter is unclear. If they were not paid outright for their loss, they would have most likely found other ways to recapture some of their money such as paying less for French imports and charging more for exports. There would likely have been some way for the partners to extract extra money from the trade to make up for the items stolen.

The records in 1714 have a few more details about Leanqua and Anqua's trade. The partners purchased cotton, lead, rosum aloes, and putchuck from Scattergood that year. They also informed Scattergood that the Armenians in Macao had acquired 'a good quantity of quicksilver, tutenaugh and some gold for Madras', which would be sent to India on one of the Portuguese ships.¹²⁵ This knowledge was important

to have, because if too many of those items arrived at Madras at the same time, then the market would become saturated, and prices would fall. In addition to those products, Scattergood also purchased Japanese copper, sugar candy, and 150 shoes of gold from the two men.

While Leanqua and Anqua were waiting to be paid for their losses from 1713, another incident occurred in Amoy that brought them back into the international spotlight. Besides showing the vast extent of their commercial network, this event also shows that the Canton trade did not operate in isolation, because whatever occurred in one Chinese port could have a dramatic impact on the trade of other ports.

At some point around August 1714, the private English ship *Anne* arrived at Amoy. John Jones was the captain, and John Raworth and Richard Bouchier were the supercargoes. They experienced many difficulties. By this time, Amoy had been receiving foreign ships for more than twenty years, but it was nonetheless still a very chaotic place to do business. Every year, the captains and supercargoes had to renegotiate the terms with local officials. The fees and privileges could change drastically from one year to the next. Foreigners could not rely on previous arrangements or protocols, as was now the case in Canton.

Part of the reason for this uncertainty was the frequent change in senior officials, who often held their offices for one to three years. Another source of uncertainty was the unpredictable arrival of emperor's merchants, which seemed to plague Amoy and Chusan. Those men might show up with no advanced warning and demand a share of the trade. When that happened, of course, all previous arrangements were either negated or put on hold. It often took many months at Amoy to come to terms with officials and merchants and then it took many more months before they could actually receive their cargo.

Raworth and Bouchier did their best to move things forward, but ended up having to layover an

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Fig. 8: Map of “The Chart of the China Seas”, by William Heather. In *Après de Manneville, Jean-Baptiste-Nicolas-Denis d’, Wellesley, Richard Wellesley, Stephenson, John, Heather, William, Horsburgh, James, Heather and Williams and Robert Laurie and James Whittle, The Country Trade East-India pilot, for the Navigation of the East-Indies and Oriental Seas, within the Limits of the East-India Company, Extending from the Cape of Good Hope to China, New Holland and New Zealand, with the Red Sea, Gulf of Persia, Bay of Bengal, and China Seas*. London: Robert Laurie and James Whittle, 1799. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-373100400>

entire year at Amoy in order to get enough merchandise to fill their hull. There was much pressure placed on them by the Amoy merchants and officials to accept merchandise that they had been delivered, even if they did not order or want the items. After more than 15 months of haggling, both sides were completely fed up with each other and the discussions ended in a stalemate. According to British accounts, the *Anne* was eventually expelled from the port with only a partial cargo.

The *Anne* moved to Amoy’s outer harbour in January 1716, and prepared to leave. But in a last-ditch attempt to make things right and to get the remainder of their cargo, Captain Jones captured

a fully laden junk that was anchored nearby. It was bound for Batavia. He then sent word to the Amoy merchants that he would release the junk as soon as he had received the goods he had paid for.

This move had just the opposite effect they had hoped for and brought the Chinese navy into the picture. War junks were sent out to destroy the *Anne* and recapture the junk. Before getting trapped in port, Jones set sail with the captured junk as hostage. The crew consisted of 100 men, some of whom jumped overboard when the junk was captured. Most of the Chinese crew remained on board and were forced to put her under sail in convoy with the *Anne*.¹²⁶

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They sailed all the way to Johore, where Captain Jones released 70 of the men. The remaining 22 Chinese seamen proceeded with the junk to India. The 70 men were seized by the Malays and sold at Johore as slaves for \$10 per head (Fig. 8). But they were later 'redeemed at that price by the master of a junk' that belonged to Leanqua and Anqua in Canton. The men were then transported to Batavia in order to seek passage home from there.¹²⁷

Additionally, the *Anne* and the junk arrived at Madras on 14 February 1716.¹²⁸ Of course, Jones, Raworth, and Bouchier, were well aware that they would have to answer to the EIC for this act of violence done to the Chinese. They handed over the junk, its cargo, and the rest of the Chinese crew, to Governor Harrison. Guards were placed on the vessel so that no one or thing could enter or leave without permission. A detailed inventory was made of the contents.¹²⁹

Jones, Raworth, and Bouchier met several times with the Madras Council to give an account of their actions. They submitted an official report of the circumstances surrounding their trade at Amoy. All of this discussion, of course, was intended to justify their aggressive actions, and to show that they had been treated unjustly.¹³⁰

The outcome of their 20-month adventure to Amoy, from July 1714 to February 1716, was a 15 percent loss on their principle investment. This calculation does not take into account the capture of the junk, but only what the merchandise aboard the *Anne* produced after its sale. The venture was a complete disaster, which they claimed 'was Wholly owing to those land Pyrats, the Mandarinés of Amoy'.¹³¹ Rather than earn a profit, everyone who invested in the voyage suffered loss, and that does not take into account the 20 months of costs and interest that could have been earned on their investments.

As might be expected, this incident created a huge uproar in Amoy and Canton. Rumours began

circulating that 'several Chinamen were put to the sword [sword], and wounded at seizing the Junk'. The loss to the Chinese was estimated at 80,000 taels.¹³² Other rumours circulated throughout the foreign community and the Portuguese in Macao claiming that the capture of the junk had reached 'the Emperour's Ears at Pecking' and that Chinese would now try to 'make reprizall on all' British.¹³³ The British supercargo Edward Fenwick, who was in Canton in October 1716, mentioned that 'if there is not immediate care taken to make this matter up, I believe it will be very dangerous for any English to come hither, either Company's or private ships'.¹³⁴

Being the most prominent merchants in the foreign trade, Leanqua and Anqua were put in charge of recovering the money for the Amoy merchants.¹³⁵ Governor Harrison sent the following letter to the two men, in hopes of settling the matter peaceably. It was written at Fort St George, but addressed to Leanqua and Anqua.

Fort St George May 1716

*You will undoubtedly have heard of the hard treatment our Ship Anne mett with at Amoy from some of the Merchants supported by the Hythong, who had placed them of so much money that they were utterly disabled from fullfilling their agreement, & notwithstanding our people found means, by applying to the Vice Roy of the province, to procure an order for full satisfaction to be made us; which order cost us above 1000 Tales; far from paying due regard thereto, they forced our Supra Cargo's off the shoar, stop'd all boats with provisions from going aboard the ship, & order'd them immediately to be gone out of the Harbour, tho they had then about 20,000 Tales owing them, besides infinite other damages by loss of their Monsoon, and improper goods forc'd upon them at unheard of prices.*¹³⁶




Fig. 9: Map of “The Chart of the China Seas”, by William Heather. In *Après de Manneville, Jean-Baptiste-Nicolas-Denis d', Wellesley, Richard Wellesley, Stephenson, John, Heather, William, Horsburgh, James, Heather and Williams and Robert Laurie and James Whittle, The Country Trade East-India pilot, for the Navigation of the East-Indies and Oriental Seas, within the Limits of the East-India Company, Extending from the Cape of Good Hope to China, New Holland and New Zealand, with the Red Sea, Gulf of Persia, Bay of Bengal, and China Seas*. London: Robert Laurie and James Whittle, 1799. Accessed February 26, 2022. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-373100400>

Of course, the entire incident was blamed on the ill treatment of the Mandarins. Governor Harrison then continued, saying, ‘I would have sent back the junk & her cargo to you if it had been practicable; but most of the goods, & especially the Tea, would have been spoiled besides many other hazards & inconveniences’.¹³⁷ It was thus decided that the best action to take was to sell the cargo and junk at public outcry, which was done under the management of the EIC. They did not think that the tea would bring any amount in India, so it was shipped to England to be sold there in the Company’s auction. An account was

kept of all the sales, and the Company would decide later who would receive the proceeds.¹³⁸

As for the Chinese who arrived in the junk, Governor Harrison wrote the following.

*I would have sent the Chinese, taken in the Junk, by this ship if the Macao Captain would have carried them; I must therefore find some conveyance for them to Malacca or Jehore. The accompanying petition in the China Language you may produce, to satisfy everybody that they are alive and well treated here.*¹³⁹

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The Chinese were later transported to Bencoolen (Fig. 9), and from there, they presumably found passage back to Canton.¹⁴⁰ Governor Harrison commissioned Edmé Bongré, a Frenchman from Pondicherry to go to China and meet with Leanqua and Anqua. He had lived many years in Canton and had learned Chinese. Bongré was instructed to make an account of the cargo and value of the junk so that they could determine the losses.

The letter above was delivered to Leanqua and Anqua by Bongré. Harrison requested the Chinese merchants to provide Bongré with all the particulars so that he could return to Madras with the information and then the council would decide what to do with the proceeds from the junk and cargo.¹⁴¹ In Bongré's instructions, Harrison felt that 'if the matter have been hid from the Emperor, I believe the Business might be accomodated by the agency of Linqua and Anqua who are of the Chinchu [Quanzhou] country'.¹⁴² Quanzhou was in Fujian Province, so Harrison thought that connection would help the two men deal with the Mandarins and merchants there.

The incident, however, was reported to the emperor. The British supercargoes in Canton later reported that

*The Emperor, upon this first notice [of the capture of the junk by the English], despatched a messenger to Amoy, with a commission to enquire into the cause of it. Thus he came to a knowledge of the whole matter; and finding his own people the first aggressors, he disgraced several Mandareens, and imprisoned one more immediately connected with the native Merchants, who withheld the remains of the investment due and contracted for, and seized all his Estate.*¹⁴³

Thus, as far as the emperor was concerned, the foreigners did this act because they had been mistreated and pushed to extremes. This is a clear sign of the

importance that the Imperial Court now placed on the foreign commerce. Officials in Canton had already known this to be the case, which probably accounts for things turning out much differently there.

Bongré carried out his own investigation, independent from all the others. He stayed in the French factory in Canton, away from the British. Even though the English supercargoes often went to the French factory to meet with him, Bongré did not release anything to them about his investigation.¹⁴⁴ Whether this distancing was done according to Bongré's own design, or according to instructions given to him by Governor Harrison, is unclear. His objective approach, however, probably produced a more unbiased report.

Bongré returned to Madras at the end of May 1717 and reported that the Mandarins had reported to the Court in Beijing that the capture of the junk was a 'Pyritical action, performed by Pyrates, not under the protection of any nation'. The Amoy merchants, however, testified 'that the Junk was not taken by Pyrats, but by English Merchants in reprisal for gross injuries done them on shore, for which they could have no redress from the Mandarins, to whom they applied for Justice'.¹⁴⁵ Bongré asked Leanqua and Anqua to help settle the matter with the Mandarins at Amoy so that they could put this affair behind them.¹⁴⁶

In the meantime, in June 1717 three letters were sent to Governor Harrison, 'one from the King of Siam Vizier, another from the Bercalong of Siam (superintendent of trade), & a third from Leanqua & Anqua China Merchants at Canton'. The first two letters clarified that the junk that was captured was in fact owned by the king of Siam, and that being the case, he demanded to be reimbursed in full for the loss of the vessel and its cargo. Harrison suspected that this was just a ploy to regain the money, because he learned that 'the Bercalong of Siam is a relation of the said Tytucks [in Amoy] from whom He must have receiv'd the particular Invoice of the Junks Cargo'.¹⁴⁷ The EIC

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was trading regularly with Siam at this time, which the Chinese in Amoy would have been aware of.

The EIC finally settled the matter by offering the Bercalong of Siam, in June 1717, the 1,200 pagodas that they had received from the sale of the junk. They argued that the matter of the cargo had already been settled by the Chinese emperor, by charging the Mandarins for the loss. The Bercalong responded by saying that the junk was worth 4,000 pagodas and that he would accept nothing less. In June 1719, the EIC finally agreed to give him what he was asking for the junk, so that their trade there would not be interrupted.

As for the lost cargo, it was sold at auction for 11,515 pagodas. When we add the 1,200 pagodas received for the junk, the total comes to 12,715 pagodas.¹⁴⁸ In August 1720 — four and a half years after the capture of the junk — the owners of the ship *Anne* petitioned the Court in Madras for the remaining balance from the sale of the junk and cargo. The Court agreed to pay the owners whatever balance was remaining, but I have not found an entry showing the exact amount.¹⁴⁹ All of the costs and the extra amount given to the Bercalong of Siam would have been deducted from the balance so the final payment was probably about half of what was realised from the auction. The original amount that they claimed the Amoy merchant owed to them was 26,070 pagodas.¹⁵⁰ Thus, despite capturing the junk, all of the investors of the *Anne*'s voyage from 1714 to 1716 were losers. As for the merchants at Amoy, they presumably were paid by the Mandarins for the loss of their cargo, but of course, there is no way to confirm this.

In 1717, Leanqua and Anqua continued to dominate the trade in Canton. The British reported that 'Linqua & Anqua have of late provided most part of the Cargoes for our Europe Ships' and 'aim at engrossing the whole trade of the English at Canton'. These complaints led to the EIC directors issuing more instructions to the supercargoes to do what they

could to keep the two men from monopolising the commerce.¹⁵¹

Other British ships continued to go to Amoy, despite the disaster with the *Anne*. They were instructed, if the topic of the captured junk should arise, to just tell the merchants and Mandarins that the matter was being managed by the council at Madras and that they had every intention of carrying on a fair and peaceful trade with China. This excuse seems to have worked, because English ships continued to go there.¹⁵²

7. THE END OF A LONG PARTNERSHIP AND DECLINE OF LEANQUA (1718–1720)

While Leanqua and Anqua had clearly maintained their dominance of the trade up to 1717, there were other factors at play now that turned their fate towards the worse. For some reason, Anqua disappears from the records after 1717. Leanqua's name is now often spelled Linqua. The man named Amoy Anqua was now trading in Canton as well, but he posed no threat to Leanqua's business.¹⁵³

In late 1716, the Kangxi emperor placed an embargo on the trade with Southeast Asia, which effectively stopped Chinese junks from going there. From 1717 to 1722, the junks were not allowed to leave China.¹⁵⁴ This gave a much needed boost to the Portuguese merchants in Macao, who often went to the same places as the junks and traded in the same products. Now they had no competition from the junks.

According to historian Gang Zhao, the embargo was not officially removed until 1729.¹⁵⁵ The trade with foreigners in Chinese ports was not affected by this stoppage, only the Chinese junks. We know that Leanqua and Anqua owned several junks, and conducted trade each year to Batavia and other places in Southeast Asia, so they were certain to have been impacted by this embargo. There is not a lot of information about Leanqua after 1717. He traded with a number of foreign ships in 1719.¹⁵⁶ He was now an old man and no longer ranked as a prominent merchant in Canton. After his

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partner Anqua disappeared from the trade, Leanqua's business seems to have deteriorated rapidly.

By the mid-1710s, Canton had clearly emerged as the preferred port of commerce in China. This standing encouraged more merchants from Fujian Province to move there. Tan Hunqua begins to show up in the records in 1713, Tan Suqua in 1716, Cudgin in 1720, and many other men in the years that followed.¹⁵⁷ Competition was now fierce in Canton, and the new men very quickly began grabbing some of Leanqua's market shares.

In an undated letter from circa 1719, the author (probably John Scattergood), made the following comment.

*Thank God have gott almost all we left behind us last year except a little from Linqua y^e Hong losses their credit prodigiously every body y^e [that] have delt wth them this year complains very much and swears they will not have any dealings more wth them, especially now old Linqua is a going to retire to Chinsu [Quanzhou] and leaving their business to Chouqua & Emsa.*¹⁵⁸

This entry refers to Leanqua's house in the plural ('their credit' and 'not have any dealings more wth them'). We can logically assume that he had a number of people working in his house, which would be normal for such a large operator. We know that Chouqua had worked in his house in the past, but the connection to Emsa is unclear.

In another letter from 1719, the author (probably also John Scattergood) mentions that

*Old Linqua decays apace in Age and Credit for everybody y^e [that] has delt wth him this year complains very much. He gives out he designs to retire to Chinsu [Quanzhou] y^e next year and leave his Hung to Emsa & Chouqua.*¹⁵⁹

Unfortunately, Leanqua does not seem to have worked out his retirement as planned. When the British arrived in Canton on 28 August 1720, they learned that 'Linqua the great Merchant of this place died the same day'.¹⁶⁰

The foundations of the Canton system were now firmly in place. Officials were now banned from having any direct involvement in the trade, and those who were caught doing so, were prosecuted.¹⁶¹ The payments to officials for the 'privilege' of trading with each ship were also done away with.

Of course, officials found other ways to exact payments from merchants. They continued to receive 'gifts' and 'donations' from merchants. While those payments might appear to be given voluntarily, they were usually coerced from the merchants. They would lose their 'privilege' in the future if they did not submit to the exactions.

Nevertheless, the trade was now very stable which set Canton apart from other Chinese ports. Those other places continued to have endless problems with connivances, with senior officials demanding payments, and with outside men claiming they had been granted special privileges to the commerce.¹⁶²

8. LEANQUA'S SUCCESSORS

What do we know about Leanqua's successors? Emsa had been in business from at least 1703. His name was spelled variously, and is the same person as the Hemshaw and Empshaw mentioned above. He shows up in the records off and on from 1703 to 1721, and then disappears.¹⁶³

Chouqua's alias was Pinky or Pinkee Winkee. When the name Chouqua is used, it is difficult to follow him, because there were several other merchants with names similar to this. Thus, for the most part, we can only track him when he is referred to as Pinky. His Chinese name was Zhang Zuguan (張族官) and he traded out of the Suicheng Hang (遂成行). I have written his story covering the years from 1721

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to 1756.¹⁶⁴ When I did that research, however, I was unaware that he had been previously working with Leanqua. After that story was published, some earlier references to Pinky emerged.

In 1711, a Pinke Winkee alias Choqua (or Chouquah) shows up in the Scattergood papers.¹⁶⁵ His name appears regularly thereafter under various spellings including Pinqy, Pinkee, Pinkie, and in 1714 as ‘Pinkee Winkee alias Chouqua’.¹⁶⁶ Thus, we can now show that Pinky was active in the trade from 1711 to 1756 and had close ties to Leanqua and Anqua. In the early years, Pinky operated as a clerk for Leanqua and Anqua, handling trade for them while at the same time carrying on some of his own business.¹⁶⁷ There were other Zhang (張) merchants who were involved in the trade after Pinky disappears, but it is unclear whether they were related to him.¹⁶⁸

The last reference I have to Leanqua and Anqua is from 1727. On April 22 of that year the EIC ship *Prince Augustus* arrived at Batavia. On April 28, the British supercargoes ‘found a Person who was formerly one of Linqua & Anqua’s head Servants’.¹⁶⁹ Leanqua and Anqua had been involved in the trade at Batavia for decades so it is not surprising to find one of their former employees there.

The British asked this man to write a letter for them in Chinese to the Hong merchant Suqua (Chen Shouguan 陳壽觀, the Tan Suqua mentioned above). The letter was written and sent to Macao by a Portuguese ship. These British officers wanted Suqua to go to Amoy instead of Canton, as they were unhappy with the new impositions that were now in place in the latter port. Because ships were now arriving regularly, Qing officials decided to add an additional 10 percent surtax to the trade. The British hoped to avoid paying this tax by going to Amoy.

Suqua received the letter, but declined to go to Amoy out of ‘fear of having his houses & other effects seized by the great Mandarines here [Canton]’.¹⁷⁰ Canton was now the centre of the foreign trade,

and in order for it to remain the centre, government officials took the drastic measure of threatening the merchants with retaliation against their properties and their families if they tried to leave. As Suqua’s response shows, the threats were effective.¹⁷¹

The 10 percent surtax was later removed by the Qianlong emperor in 1736, and then all voyages to other Chinese ports ceased.¹⁷² After 1736, all of the foreign ships went to Canton. This was their decision and not the result of changes in Chinese policy. The only exception to that rule was a few Spanish ships from Manila that continued to visit Amoy, off and on. When the English attempted to open another port to trade in the mid-1750s, the Qianlong emperor responded quickly and forcefully. In 1757, he designated Canton to be the only port open to foreign commerce.

CONCLUSION

It was not until recently that I had obtained enough information about Leanqua and Anqua to write their story. While they have been mentioned in a number of history books in the past, only bits and pieces of their story have been told. Moreover, because all previous accounts of Anqua mixed up his story with that of Amoy Anqua, the outcome has been confusing.

All of the information about Leanqua and Anqua comes from foreign sources. The EIC records in the British Library and the records from Fort St George in India were especially helpful. The Dutch records at Jakarta and the National Archives in The Hague and the French records in the Archives Nationales d’Outre-mer at Aix-en-Provence and Archives Nationales in Paris were equally rich in detail. Private records from John Scattergood’s collection in The National Archives in London and Captain Alexander Hamilton’s published journal, helped to fill in some of the gaps in their story. There were also a few useful entries in the Portuguese records at Macao.

Scholars familiar with the Ostend General India Company will note correctly that those ships traded at

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Canton as well, from 1715 to 1733. The records from 1715 to 1719, however, have not survived. I checked the records at the Stadsarchief in Antwerp and the Universiteits Bibliotheek in Ghent, which cover the years from 1720 to 1733, and found no references to Leanqua or Anqua. I had hoped that the Flemish supercargoes, who had been to Canton prior to 1720, might have mentioned the two men, but that was not the case.

No single collection gives a clear picture of Leanqua and Anqua. All of the records needed to be consulted to put their story together, which has taken many years. Once the data had been assembled, it became clear that the two men were going to provide us with a lively account of maritime trade in the early eighteenth century.

After the Qing Maritime Customs was established in 1684, government officials in Guangzhou continued to have a hand in the trade, as they had done before. Anqua was sent to Batavia by one of the governors general in order to encourage the Dutch to do more trade with Guangzhou. Some of the junks that were sent to Java were actually called by the Dutch, the Sontock's junk. The governor's general sent agents to Batavia, and communicated directly with the Dutch government via written correspondences.

These envoys disappeared after 1690, and shortly thereafter the letters between the Dutch government and the governors general also come to an end. These changes are probably the result of the Qing government tightening control over the trade, and removing areas where there were conflicts of interest. Government officials such as the Hoppo continued to benefit from the trade, but those exactions became more subtle and indirect. Leanqua and Anqua had to purchase the rights to trade, from the Hoppo, for each of the French and British ships that arrived at Canton. The Hoppo could easily disguise those payments as 'presents' or something of the like so that it did not look like they were benefiting from the commerce.

The emperor reduced the quota on duties

collected from Guangdong Province in 1698, in an attempt to encourage more trade. That initiative paid off, because shortly thereafter more foreign ships chose to go to Canton rather than Amoy, Chusan, or Ningbo. With the increase in the trade of 1702, the Hoppo re-introduced an *ad valorem* tax of 3 percent on exports. In 1704, the tax was raised to 4 percent. At some point around 1720 it was increased to 6 percent. But it should also be noted that this was only done, after the trade had grown, and could support it. Another 10 percent tax was added in 1726, but then later removed in 1736. In these early years, Qing officials experimented with different forms of taxation to find out what policies worked best and could be sustained in the long term.

The emperor's merchants and other such persons who acquired special licenses from the imperial family, or from senior government officials, popped up in Canton from time to time, but they never had much control or influence. As long as the officials in Canton, and especially the Hoppo, were benefitting from the local merchants, there were no incentives to allow these outsiders a part of the trade. Moreover, foreigners also did not want to deal with men who had no capital or experience in business, so for the sake of encouraging ships to return, it was best to keep those special license holders at a distance. This practice set Canton apart from other ports, where those outside men were more successful.

Leanqua and Anqua suffered two attacks on their junks. In early 1704, Captain Hamilton left China with grievances against the partners, whom he thought had cheated him. In order to make things right, he attacked one of their junks at Johore, and forcibly extracted cargo from the vessel to the amount he thought he was owed. As far as the Qing government was concerned, this happened outside of China and was a private matter, so Leanqua had no recourse other than to plead with the foreigners for justice.

In the attack on Leanqua and Anqua's two junks

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in 1713 by French commander Bouynot, the Chinese government did become concerned, perhaps because a junk from Ningbo had also been robbed. But it is interesting to note that even though the French were very much afraid that this event would cause problems in their trade with China, it actually had little impact. There were likely some angry words exchanged between the two parties, but then as time wore on, the matter just disappeared. Collecting more imperial revenues was more important than getting justice for Leanqua and Anqua. So in the end, the government did not come to their aid. Bouynot's attack darkened the French reputation in China, but not to the point that their trade was affected.

In early 1716, the English Captain Jones captured and ran away with a fully laden junk from Amoy that was bound to Batavia. Leanqua and Anqua were put in charge of settling the matter with the British, who were now also very much afraid that their trade with China would come to an end. Qing officials were much alarmed at this bold act of piracy in one of their harbours. But after investigating the matter, officials in Amoy were blamed, rather than the English traders. The maintenance of the foreign trade was now very important to the imperial court. The merchants, Mandarins, and Leanqua and Anqua, again had no support from government to help reclaim their money.

Except for the last incident, we do not know how the other two offences were settled. Leanqua and Anqua probably found ways to get at least some of their money back. Their only course of action was to plead with the foreign offenders for retribution, which was a very long drawn out ordeal with little prospect of success. This was the case because once the foreigners discovered that their trade in China was not interrupted, there was no incentive to correct the wrongs that had been done in the past.

In late 1716, an embargo was placed on the Chinese junk trade to Southeast Asia. After that happened, Leanqua and Anqua, and all of the other junk traders,

had to depend solely on the trade that they could muster together in their home ports. This led to Chinese merchants from Fujian moving to Canton instead to engage in the trade with foreigners. The increased competition is one of the factors that contributed to Leanqua's rapid decline thereafter. After 1717, Anqua disappears from the records. Leanqua continued for a few more years, but without much success.

In 1719 Leanqua expressed his desire to retire to Quanzhou. For some reason, that did not happen, perhaps because he was now suffering financial difficulties. In August 1720, his dream of retiring came to an end when he died in Canton. Before his death, he designated Pinky (Chouqua) and Emsa to be his successor. By this time Tan Suqua had emerged as the dominant merchant in Canton, and took over Leanqua and Anqua's former position as the number one trading house. Pinky and Emsa may have inherited Leanqua's trade, but it was now so much reduced that it could not come close to competing with Suqua.

Taking all of these factors together, Leanqua and Anqua have given us some well-documented reasons for Canton's emergence as the centre of the trade in the early eighteenth century. There were many problems that had to be overcome, but officials in Canton consistently honored the rights of the local merchants over the rights of emperor's merchants and other persons who showed up with special licences. That fact is important for creating a stable environment and avoiding the chaos that occurred in Amoy and Chusan. Qing officials also adjusted the duties on the trade so that they did not discourage, but rather encouraged, foreigners to return. While there were many angry complaints about new taxes, and how they were being applied, foreigners nonetheless continued to return to Canton.

In some regards, it is difficult to say that Leanqua and Anqua's story ends on a positive note. The real tragedy of their story is not so much how it ended but rather that we do not know their names. Their ancestors today probably have no idea that they

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even existed, which is perhaps a worse outcome than going bankrupt.

On the bright side, the two men enjoyed quite a few years of wealth, fame and glory. Their memories were sure to have survived for many years after their deaths. The fact that the British supercargoes ran into one of their former employees in Batavia in 1727 is a clear example of their continued legacy. The EIC officers not only remembered Leanqua and Anqua, but also trusted their former employee to write a letter for them to Suqua.

Leanqua and Anqua were among the most prominent men in Canton, and they became widely

known and respected across Asia and Europe, as two of the greatest merchants and international negotiators of their time. They handled affairs for many of the top officials in Canton and Amoy, and were likely involved in correspondences with Beijing. Their names are now recorded in many documents, in several countries. That outcome in itself is very impressive for two merchants, who just wanted to carry on their business. They stumbled into international conflicts, not by choice but by fate. They pulled through those difficulties remarkably well and in so doing, helped to put the Canton trade on track for the great expansion that would occur decades later. **RC**

NOTES

- 1 For the development of the trade in these early years, see Paul A. Van Dyke, "From the Open Seas to the Guangzhou System," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian Commercial History* (Chicago: Oxford University Press, 2020) <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.623>; Zhao Gang, *The Qing Opening to the Ocean. Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684–1757* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013); and Angela Schottenhammer, "Characteristics of Qing China's Maritime Trade Politics, Shunzhi Through Qianlong Reigns," in *Trading Networks in Early Modern East Asia*, ed. Angela Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010), 101–143.
- 2 Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*. 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926. Reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 1: 135 n. 1, 150 and 2: 1; Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident. Le Commerce a Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and Album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 1: 324; Weng Eang Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton. Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 34–35, 59, 68 n. 32; Peng Zeyi, *Guangzhou yanghuo shisan hang* (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2020), 13. See also Ng Chin-Keong, Trade and Society. *The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683–1735* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), 178.
- 3 Paul A. Van Dyke, "Amoy Anqua (1696–1723) and the China Trade before the Rise of the Canton System," *Review of Culture*, International Edition 66 (2021), 96–111.
- 4 "Linqua and Anqua who are of the Chinchu [Quanzhou] country". British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/8, p. 1317; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 152.
- 5 Aix-en-Provence, Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer (ANOM): C.1.9, letter dated 1715.02.25, ff. 81–82, C/2/276, ff. 89v, 94r.
- 6 ANOM: C/2/276, ff. 103r, 116r. Thanks to Professor Huang Chao for helping me decipher the name on the stamp (*yinzhang* 印章).
- 7 'Comme l'a affirmé en France le P. Bouvet, qu'il y a quatre ans, qu'Ankoua, un de nos marchands de Canton, fut envoyé à Batavia par le *tsongto*, le *titou*, et quelques autres mandarins avec de bonnes lettres pour solliciter les Hollandais à venir à Canton pour y faire commerce, et pour leur offrir l'assistance et la protection de ce mandarin'. Claudius Madrolle, ed. *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine. La Compagnie de la Chine 1698–1719* (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1901), 152–153.
- 8 'An Koua raconta comment, il avoit esté envoyé à Batavia par le *tsongto* et le *titou*'. Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, 167. See also 152–153.
- 9 Cheong mentions that Anqua went to Batavia in 1694, and stayed there for two years but then returned to Canton empty handed. He cites Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, 152–153 as his source. Madrolle discusses Anqua's trip to Batavia, but there is nothing about it happening in 1694. Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton*, 34, 68 n. 31.
- 10 For examples of the different official names, trade names, and nicknames, used by Chinese merchants in Canton, see the appendixes in Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*. Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011) (hereafter MCM 1); and Paul A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Success and Failure in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*. Vol. 2 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University

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- Press, 2016) (hereafter MCM 2).
- 11 John E. Wills, Jr., Pepper, *Guns and Parleys. The Dutch East India Company and China, 1622–1681* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 194.
 - 12 National Archives, The Hague (NAH): VOC 1407, 1685.11.23, ff. 3247r–v.
 - 13 NAH: VOC 1438, 1687.03.10, f. 799r, VOC 1440, 1688.01.29, f. 2347v, VOC 1462, 1689.04.28, f. 174r.
 - 14 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Batavia Castle *dagregisters* (DR) 2503, 1688.01.30, f. 32; NAH: VOC 1453, letter dated 1688.02.24, pp. 259–262. Cheong has suggested that Leanqua (Linqua) might have been the same person as Lin Qifeng (he spelled the name Lin Ch'i-feng). We know this could not be the case because that man died in 1689, and Leanqua died in 1720. Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton*, 32.
 - 15 ANRI: DR 2503, 1688.01.13, ff. 32–33.
 - 16 Wills, *Pepper, Guns and Parleys*, 158–159, 179.
 - 17 NAH: VOC 1407, ff. 2818–2819, 2826, 2830.
 - 18 Wills, *Pepper, Guns and Parleys*; John E. Wills, Jr., *Embassies and Illusions, Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K'ang-hsi, 1666–1687* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); John E. Wills, Jr., *1688: A Global History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001); John E. Wills, Jr., ed., *China and Maritime Europe 1500–1800. Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy, and Missions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
 - 19 Wills, *Pepper, Guns and Parleys*, 158–203; Wills, *Embassies and Illusions*, 173.
 - 20 Zhao, *The Qing Opening to the Ocean*, 116.
 - 21 For examples, see Morse, *Chronicles*, 4: index entries under 'viceroy'; and Van Dyke, MCM 1 and MCM 2: index entries under 'governor general'.
 - 22 W. Ph. Coolhaas, *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, Deel V: 1686–1697 ('s-Gravenhage: Verkrijgbaar Bij Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 316; and ANRI: DR 2504, 1689.04.25, f. 254.
 - 23 ANRI: DR 2504, the contract is dated 1689.03.10 but it is placed under the date 1689.04.25, pp. 254–361. For more information about the carrying out of these contracts with the governor general in Canton, see related letters in NAH: Japan nos. 1532–1539.
 - 24 All of these communications between the Dutch and governor general Wu Xingzuo's agents are summarised in Wills' two books *Pepper, Guns and Parleys* and *Embassies and Illusions*. Some of the letters have been transcribed and printed in Coolhaas, *Generale Missiven*, Deel V, 157, 174, 219–221, 269, 316, and 361. Lilauya's death in early 1689 is mentioned on pages 269 and 316. Onglauya's contract with the Dutch in 1689 and governor general Wu's letter (both written in Dutch) can be seen in ANRI: DR 2504, pp. 256–261.
 - 25 ANRI: DR 2507, 1691.01.16, p. 18, 1691.06.20, p. 284.
 - 26 NAH: VOC 1462, 1689.04.28, f. 174r.
 - 27 ANRI: DR 2504, 1689.06.25, pp. 400–408.
 - 28 ANRI: DR 2504, 1689.06.25, pp. 400–408.
 - 29 Van Dyke, "Amoy Anqua," 104–107.
 - 30 Van Dyke, "Amoy Anqua," 96–111. Amoy Anqua continued trading after 1703, and up to 1723, but he never recovered from the debts he had accumulated owing to the Mandarins and/or special license holders taking away his profits.
 - 31 The man who arrived at Amoy in 1702 to partake in the trade was called both a 'king's' and 'emperor's' merchant. BL: IOR G/12/14, pp. 84–85. In this year, the trade of the locally licensed merchants at Chusan was suddenly interrupted as well when the emperor's second and fourth sons arrived with special permission to trade with the British ships. And then another man emerged, named Inqua, who was called the 'General's Merchant'. BL: IOR G/12/6, pp. 898–899, 907. In 1709, one of the main reasons the British gave for staying away from Amoy in the previous two years was that they were forced to trade with the emperor's merchants. BL: IOR G/12/14, 1709.01.10, p. 118.
 - 32 For a more detailed account of the developments in this early period, see Van Dyke, "From the Open Seas to the Guangzhou System". For an example of a local merchant in Amoy being ruined by these outside intruders, see Van Dyke, "Amoy Anqua," 96–111.
 - 33 *Arquivos de Macau* (Fevereiro 1964) (Macau: Imprensa Nacional, 1964), series III, vol. I, n.º 1, pp. 23–24.
 - 34 George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630–1754* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 130–131.
 - 35 *Arquivos de Macau*, series III, vol. I, n.º 1, pp. 23–24; Souza, *The Survival of Empire*, 130–131; Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton*, 31–32.
 - 36 'il y a déjà plus de dix ans que je fais ce commerce'. Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, LVI–LX. The quote is on page LVII.
 - 37 'moy LIN YU j'ai fait faire un vaisseau à mes depens à la manière des Européens. J'ay receu la permission des mandarins'. Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, LVII.
 - 38 'ce que j'ay gagné j'entretiens ma femme et mes enfans'. Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, LVII.
 - 39 Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*; BL: IOR G/12/5–6, G/12/16, L/MAR/A/CXXIII.
 - 40 'tous deux honnetes gens, autant que les Chinois peuvent l'estre'. Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, 166.
 - 41 'Le *tsongto* lut le *Tietze* par deux fois, le plia, le mit dans sa poche, et n'en parla plus'. Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, 167.
 - 42 'Le *tsongto* lut le *Tietze* par deux fois, le plia, le mit dans sa poche, et n'en parla plus'. Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, 167.
 - 43 Jean-Baptiste du Halde, *Description Geographique Historique, Chronologique, Politique, et Physique de L'Empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie Chinoise*. 4 vols. (Paris: P.G. le Mercier, 1835. Reprint, The Hague: Henry Scheurleer, 1836), 2: 213–246.
 - 44 Huang Chao and Paul A. Van Dyke, "The Hoppo's Books and the Guangdong Maritime Customs 1685–1842," *Journal*

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- of *Asian History* 55, no. 1 (2021): 89–119.
- 45 Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, 191–192.
- 46 BL: IOR G/12/6, 1702.09.26, p. 868.
- 47 BL: IOR G/12/6, pp. 878–880.
- 48 Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, 192.
- 49 Van Dyke, “Amoy Anqua,” 96–111.
- 50 ANOM: C.1.18, extract dated 1703.12.15, f. 99.
- 51 BL: IOR G/12/7, p. 1025.
- 52 Alexander Hamilton, *A New Account of the East-Indies being the Observations and Remarks of Capt. Alexander Hamilton from the year 1688–1723*. 2 vols. (London: 1739), 2: 219–225.
- 53 Hamilton, *A New Account of the East-Indies*, 2: 228–229; Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 102–103; Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident*, 1: 323.
- 54 BL: IOR G/12/7, 1704.09.20, p. 1031.
- 55 Hamilton, *A New Account of the East-Indies*, 2: 233–234.
- 56 Hamilton, *A New Account of the East-Indies*, 2: 233–234.
- 57 Hamilton, *A New Account of the East-Indies*, 2: 98–159, 208; NAH: VOC 1677 pp. 47, 307.
- 58 Hamilton, *A New Account of the East-Indies*, 2: 234; Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 104.
- 59 ANRI: DR 2525, 1704.05.05, pp. 214–215; NAH: VOC 1677, Malacca, pp. 47, 307, VOC 1691, Malacca, p. 21, and VOC 1683, p. 1349. Citing Hamilton's journal, Morse mentioned that his ship was 'large' with '40 guns' and 'a crew of 150'. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 102. Morse did not mention the page number, and I could not find this entry in Hamilton's journal. My failure to find, however, it is probably owing to that journal having a very confusing narrative that continually bounces around from the year 1688 to 1723. It is impossible to establish clearly which ship he is in each year, because he rarely mentions their names.
- 60 Hamilton also owned ship *Francis*, which visited Malacca and Johore about the same time that Hamilton was there. The Dutch in Batavia and Malacca referred to Hamilton's ship by two different names, the *Geluckige Uur* (Lucky Hour) and *Vinte Gorre* (Twenty Hats?), respectfully. However, they appear to be the same ship. They had the same number of cannons aboard, the same size crew, and both were said to be 600 tons. Except for the names, the narratives of Hamilton's voyage appear to be the same in both the Malacca and Batavia records. ANRI: DR 2525, 1704.05.05, pp. 214–215; NAH: VOC 1677, Malacca, pp. 47, 307, VOC 1691, Malacca, p. 21, and VOC 1683, p. 1349. As detailed as Hamilton's *A New Account of the East-Indies* is, he amazingly avoids mentioning the name of his ship.
- 61 Hamilton, *A New Account of the East-Indies*, 2: 233–234; BL: IOR G/12/7, pp. 1024–1025. This affair was also reported to the Court of Directors in London. BL: IOR B/48, 1706.03.29, p. 151.
- 62 Hamilton, *A New Account of the East-Indies*, 2: 233–234; BL: IOR G/12/7, pp. 1024–1025.
- 63 BL: IOR G/12/7, pp. 1024–1025.
- 64 BL: IOR G/12/7, p. 1025.
- 65 BL: IOR G/12/7, pp. 1025–1026.
- 66 BL: IOR G/12/7, pp. 1026–1027.
- 67 BL: IOR G/12/7, pp. 1026–1027; Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 102–103; Peng, *Guangzhou yanghuo shisan hang*, 16.
- 68 BL: IOR G/12/7, 1704.12.11, pp. 1046–1047.
- 69 BL: IOR G/12/7, 1704.12.13, p. 1047.
- 70 Paul A. Van Dyke, “200 Years of Spanish Shipping in Canton and Macao (1640–1840),” *Review of Culture* (International Edition) 69 (2022): 79–111.
- 71 BL: IOR G/12/7, 1704.12.30, p. 1049.
- 72 Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 146.
- 73 For a couple references to the two companies operating in China in the early 1700s, see BL: IOR G/12/6, pp. 854–855.
- 74 For more about the merging of the old and new companies, see K. N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Reprint, New Delhi: S. Chand & Co. Ltd., 1978), 434–437.
- 75 BL: IOR G/12/7, p. 1052.
- 76 BL: IOR E/1/2, Miscellaneous Letters Received 1710, “Letter 117 Linqua and Anqua, merchants at Canton to the Court relating to the duties imposed by the Hoppo on foreign trade,” pp. 214–215. Thanks to Richard Morel of the British Library for bringing this letter to my attention.
- 77 These correspondences between Hong merchants and European directors are reproduced in Van Dyke, MCM 1: Plates 06.01 to 06.04; and MCM 2: 70–71, and Plate 01.11.
- 78 There is a lot of confusion in the secondary literature about these *ad valorem* taxes. The primary sources sometimes also contradict themselves. Nevertheless, we now have sufficient data available to sort out what happened. See Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 106; Earl H. Pritchard, *Anglo-Chinese Relations During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 85–89; Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident*, 1: 317–319; Dilip Kumar Basu, “Asian Merchants and Western Trade: A Comparative Study of Calcutta and Canton 1800–1840” (PhD diss., Dept. of History, University of California, Berkeley, 1975), 320; Cheong, *Hongs Merchants of Canton*, 101, 194–198; Peng, *Guangzhou yanghuo shisan hang*, 16; Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *Qingdai qianqi de yuehaiguan yu shisan hang* (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2014), 74–76.
- 79 *Qing shi lu Guangdong shi liao*. 6 vols. (Guangzhou: Guangdong sheng chubanshe, 1995), 1: 1686.03.03, p. 193, 1698.05.28, p. 214; Fu Lo-Shu, ed., *A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644–1820)*. 2 vols. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), 1: 86, 110.
- 80 Huang and Van Dyke, “The Hoppo's Books,” 89–119.
- 81 BL: IOR G/12/6, p. 869. Hai Shou 海壽 was the Hoppo in 1702. Liang Tingnan, *Yuehaiguan zhi* (1839. Reprint. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2002), 124.
- 82 BL: IOR G/12/6, pp. 869, 877–879.
- 83 Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 142–143. The original entries appear to have come from BL: IOR G/12/7, pp. 1046–1047. However, that file seems to contain paraphrases of the original documents. The entries in Morse's book show the 4 percent *ad valorem* tax, whereas the entries in G/12/7 do not. But much

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- of the wording is the same as in Morse.
- 84 “A Succinct Historical Narrative of the East-India Company’s Endeavours to Form Settlements and to Extend and Encourage Trade in the East, and of the Causes by which Those Endeavours have been Frustrated,” *The Asiatic Journal* (March 1822): 209–220. See 214.
 - 85 Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preuischer Kulturbesitz: “The Hoppo-Book of Canton” (1753). See Hirth’s comments in the introduction. Accessed September 24, 2017. http://digital.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/we rkansicht?PPN=PPN3346157598&PHYSID=PHYS_0001&DMDID=.
 - 86 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1723.05.27, p. 1417, G/12/21, 1723.05.23, p. 21. Without providing a reference, Basu states that the tax was raised to 6 percent in 1720. Basu, “Asian Merchants and Western Trade,” 320. Morse mentions that the surtax was raised to 6 percent in 1708, but he did not provide a source, and that does not agree with the letter above or other sources. ‘In 1708 a surtax of 6 per cent. Was added’. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 106. See also p. 81 ‘the legal rate of Chinese customs duty, according to the official tariff, was . . . at the general rate of 6 per cent *ad valorem*’. On pp. 158 and 175, however, Morse acknowledged that the tax was 4 percent in 1718, and had risen to 6 percent by 1723. We know that the tax was still at 4 percent in 1718, because the British petitioned the Hoppo for its removal that year. BL: IOR G/12/8, 1718.07.17, p. 1350.
 - 87 London, The National Archives (TNA): C/106/171 Scattergood v Raworth. This collection has many different types of documents, with no titles and no page numbers. For the references mentioned here, see the account book for 1711.
 - 88 For examples of gold being smuggling out of Canton, see Van Dyke, MCM 1 and MCM 2: index entries under ‘gold’.
 - 89 ‘les plus fameux marchands de la ville’. Archives Nationales, Paris (ANP): 4JJ 129.3.3 ter Journal de le Vaisseaux Solide, p. 34.
 - 90 “A Succinct Historical Narrative,” 214; and “Endeavours of the East India Company to Settle and Prosecute Trade in China,” in *Report, Relative to the Trade with the East Indies and China, from the Select Committee of the House of Lords* (1829), 360–411. See 380.
 - 91 Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005. Reprint, 2007), 11–12.
 - 92 *Records of Fort St George. Despatches from England 1713–1714* (Madras: Government Press, 1927), p. 3 par. 12.
 - 93 “Endeavours of the East India Company to Settle and Prosecute Trade in China,” 380.
 - 94 See the conflict between Tan Hunqua and Tan Suqua in Van Dyke, MCM 1: Chapters 5 and 6.
 - 95 TNA: C/106/171, undated letter from autumn 1713.
 - 96 *Qing shi lu Guangdong shi liao*, 1: 248–249, 255; Zhao, *The Qing Opening to the Ocean*, 153–156; Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company* (Providence: Foris Publications, 1988), 132. For examples of the Hong merchants encouraging rice imports in the 1780s and later, see ‘rice’ in the indexes of Van Dyke, MCM 1, MCM 2, and Paul A. Van Dyke and Maria Kar-wing Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822: Reading History in Art* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015), 38.
 - 97 TNA: C/106/171, account book for 1713.
 - 98 TNA: C/106/170, letter addressed to Beauvoir, unsigned and undated, but it would be from 1713/1714. In another letter dated 6 March 1714, a tough negotiating Indian merchant named Rustome, was described as ‘another Canton Anquah . . . and 10 times worse’, which further suggests that Anqua was considered to be a tough negotiator. TNA: C/106/171, letter addressed to Mr. Phipps, dated 1714.05.06.
 - 99 Van Dyke, “Amoy Anqua,” 96–111.
 - 100 ANRI: DR 2540, 1714.04.06, ff. 384–387. Bouynot left France in April 1711, arrived at Rio de Janeiro in October 1711, and arrived in Peru in February 1712. NAH: VOC 1854, Malacca, first book, letter dated 26 January 1714, pp. 15–16, which is reproduced in Fig. 4a–b.
 - 101 In the Dutch records, the *l’Éclair* is referred to as ‘*de Klock*’ or ‘*de Clock*’ because it was a Dutch-built vessel, and that was its former name (see Fig. 4b). Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, LVI–LX. The French vessel, *François d’Argouge*, captain Pierre Buisson, was in Manila from 24 May 1713 to 18 October 1714 so it did not partake in the attack. Denis Nardin, “La France et les Philippines sous l’Ancien Régime,” *Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer* 63, n.° 230 (1976) : 5–43. See page 9. The names of the ships in Bouynot’s fleet are listed in Fig. 4a–b, as well.
 - 102 Nardin, “La France et les Philippines sous l’Ancien Régime,” 9.
 - 103 Nardin mentioned that Bouynot arrived back in Manila on 10 August 1713 with the captured ships, which included ‘no less than one Portuguese, one English, one Chinese, and one Dutch’ (‘il ramène en ce port, le 10 août, pas moins de quatre prises — 1 Portugais, 1 Anglais, 1 Chinois, 1 Hollandais’). Nardin, “La France et les Philippines sous l’Ancien Régime,” 9. The Dutch ship is possibly a reference to a Chinese junk from Canton, which was returning from Batavia. Nardin’s source is not clear about the total number of ships captured, which should be five rather than four. As far as I have been able to confirm, there were no Dutch ships among them. For the Portuguese ship, see Manuel Teixeira, *Macau no séc. XVIII* (Macau: Imprensa Nacional de Macau, 1984), 121.
 - 104 Niccolao Manucci, *Storia do Mogor; Or Mogul India 1653–1708*, trans. William Irvine. 4 vols. (London: John Murray, 1908), 4: 104–105.
 - 105 ‘centaines de voleurs’. ANOM: C/1/9, letter dated 1715.02.25, ff. 81–82.
 - 106 ANRI: DR 2540, 1714.01.02, ff. 3–5; NAH: VOC 1854, Malacca, 1713.12.28, pp. 39–42; W. Ph. Coolhaas, *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, Deel VI: 1698–1713 (’s-Gravenhage: Verkrijgbaar Bij Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 48, 103, 185, 229, 284, 338, 464, 473, 485, 595, 661, 842, 914, 924.
 - 107 In 1714, the Dutch mentioned that the junk cargoes that Bouynot captured were owned by Chinese in Batavia. ANRI:

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- DR 2540, 1714.04.06, ff. 384. However, as is shown in the discussion below, these Batavia-based Chinese were loading the junks for Leanqua and Anqua in Canton.
- 108 For an example of a Canton junk flying a Dutch flag, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Plate. 9.
- 109 W. Ph. Coolhaas, *Generale Misiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, Deel VII: 1713–1725 ('s-Gravenhage: Verkrijgbaar Bij Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 68–69.
- 110 *Records of Fort St George. Despatches to England 1714–1718* (Madras: Government Press, 1929), p. 5 par. 28.
- 111 Nardin, “La France et les Philippines sous l’Ancien Régime,” 9; Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, 4: 462, 507.
- 112 *Records of Fort St George. Despatches to England 1714–1718*, p. 5 par. 28, p. 9 par. 50; *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1714* (Madras: Government Press, 1929), 120; *Arquivos de Macau* (Setembro 1964) (Macau: Imprensa Nacional, 1964), series III, vol. II, n.º 3, p. 160; Macao Archives: MO/AH/LS/333, 1713.10.18, p. 40; ANOM: C/2/276 ff. 50–116.
- 113 ANRI: DR 2540, 1714.01.02, ff. 3–5; NAH: VOC 1854, Malacca, 1713.12.28, pp. 39–42.
- 114 ANOM: C/2/276, ff. 50–116.
- 115 TNA: C/106/170, letter addressed to Beauvoir, unsigned and undated, but it would be from 1713/1714. The Dutch in Malacca also heard that Bouynot’s fleet plundered nine Chinese vessels, as well as several European’s ships. NAH: VOC 1854, Malacca, 1713.12.28, pp. 39–42.
- 116 *Qing shi lu Guangdong shi liao*, 1: 258–259, 1718.03.09; Fu, *A Documentary Chronicle*, 1: 125–126.
- 117 *Pétçao* is called a ‘shanshishan tongchuan’ 杉貫杉通船, which is the type of vessel rather than its name. I have not found the characters for *Pétçao*. ANOM: C/2/276, f. 111r.
- 118 ANOM: C/2/276, f. 110r. The French ships that traded at Canton in the 1760s were around 900 tons capacity, and they carried an average of 7,245 piculs each. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 147.
- 119 The transliterated names of the other Chinese merchants in Canton who had invested in these two voyages were ‘Limpt Tching, Hoey Hing, Ou Sin, Hui Yong, Chines Tching, Le hing yang y venly Linsie hou Kouo hoho y en Jayhing Long, Tching King et autres’. ANOM: C/2/276, translation of Chinese letter dated 1713.09.17, f. 84r. A copy is also in ANOM: C.1.9, f. 59, and see also ff. 81–82. A list of the items stolen can also be seen in Madrolle, *Les Premiers Voyages Français a la Chine*, LVIII.
- 120 All of these documents are now held in ANOM: C/2/276, ff. 50–116. There are copies of some of these documents in ANOM: C.1.9, ff. 57–84.
- 121 ANOM: C/2/276, f. 109v and 116r.
- 122 Van Dyke and Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1760–1822*, 68 n. 10, 75. There were many ships sold in Macao in the eighteenth century for anywhere from a couple thousand dollars to \$15,000, depending on their age, size, and condition.
- 123 BL: IOR G/12/8, letter dated 1717.06.12, p. 1334 says ‘there were six French ships with them [at Whampoa], and two more very rich, at Amoy . . . It is believed that those French ships at Wampoo, have not less than 2,400,000 Tales in Silver’. See also Susan E. Schopp, *Sino-French Trade at Canton, 1698–1842* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2020).
- 124 ‘The Court having been informed that Linqua & Anqua, aimed at engrossing the whole trade with Europeans at Canton, and thereby to charge their own prices-ordered the supercargoes to do all in their power to thwart the design’. BL: IOR G/12/8, 1716.12.07, p. 1340.
- 125 TNA: C/106/171, account book for 1714.
- 126 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1716.10.10, pp. 1313–1314. See also Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 150–153; and Dermigny, *La Chine et l’Occident*, 1: 277–278.
- 127 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1716.10.10, pp. 1313–1314. See also Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 150–153; and Dermigny, *La Chine et l’Occident*, 1: 277–278.
- 128 *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1716* (Madras: Government Press, 1929), 22. A reference from December 1717 states that the junk arrived at Madras on 16 February 1715, but this is incorrect. BL: IOR G/12/8, 1717/12/11, p. 1346.
- 129 *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1716*, 138.
- 130 *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1716*, 138.
- 131 *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1716*, 138.
- 132 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1716.06.24, p. 1327; and TNA: C/106/170, letter written by Ed. Fenwick to John Scattergood dated 1716.10.10.
- 133 TNA: C/106/170, letter written by Ed. Fenwick to John Scattergood dated 1716.10.10.
- 134 TNA: C/106/170, letter written by Ed. Fenwick to John Scattergood dated 1716.10.10.
- 135 BL: IOR G/12/8, p. 1316, 1716.10.18, p. 1329; *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1716*, 66–67; *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1717* (Madras: Government Press, 1929), 88–89.
- 136 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1716.05, pp. 1317–1318.
- 137 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1716.05, p. 1318.
- 138 BL: IOR G/12/8, pp. 1309–1310.
- 139 BL: IOR G/12/8, p. 1317.
- 140 *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1718* (Madras: Government Press, 1929), 1718.11.06–08, pp. 195–196. We know that these men are not the Chinese ‘passengers’ referred to in the letter above from Leanqua (Linco) and Anqua (Anco), because that document is dated in Canton, 1 February 1716. The Chinese on the Amoy junk did not arrive at Madras until two weeks after this letter was written.
- 141 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1716.05, pp. 1318–1319; Peng, *Guangzhou yanghuo shisan hang*, 13–14.
- 142 BL: IOR G/12/8, p. 1317.
- 143 BL: IOR G/12/8, p. 1315.

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- 144 BL: IOR G/12/8, p. 1316; Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 152–153.
 145 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1717.05.28, p. 1319.
 146 *Records of Fort St George. Despatches to England 1714–1718*, 115.
 147 *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1717*, 1717.06.03, pp. 88–89; *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1719* (Madras: Government Press, 1930), 1719.06.12, p. 81.
 148 For a breakdown of the proceeds from the auction and the related costs connected to the junk and cargo, see *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1716*, 195.
 149 *Records of Fort St George. Diary and Consultation Book of 1720* (Madras: Government Press, 1930), 133.
 150 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1717.12.04, p. 1345.
 151 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1717.12.04, p. 1344.
 152 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1717.12.11, pp. 1347–1348.
 153 Van Dyke, “Amoy Anqua,” 107–109.
 154 Blussé, *Strange Company*, 132.
 155 Zhao, *The Qing Opening to the Ocean*, 153–168; Blussé, *Strange Company*, 132.
 156 TNA: C/106/171, account book for 1719.
 157 For the stories of these new men, see their respective chapters in Van Dyke, MCM 1.
 158 TNA: C/106/171, letter addressed to Brother Elihu in the letter book for 1719.
 159 TNA: C/106/171, letter addressed to Brother Fenwick in the letter book for 1719.
 160 BL: IOR G/12/8, 1720.08.28, p. 1372.
 161 For example, see the controversy in the early 1730s between the Hong merchants Tan Hunqua and Tan Suqua, where Hoppo Zu Binggui 祖秉圭 was accused of pocketing money from the trade. Van Dyke, MCM 1: Chapters 5 and 6.
 162 Van Dyke, “Amoy Anqua,” 104–107.
 163 BL: IOR G/12/22, 1721.10.19, page numbers are hard to read, but it seems to be p. 25.
 164 Van Dyke, MCM 1: Chapter 12.
 165 TNA: C/106/171, account book for 1711.
 166 TNA: C/106/171, account book for 1714.
 167 TNA: C/106/171, account book for 1714, clearly states that Chouqua was Linqua and Anqua’s servant.
 168 Van Dyke, MCM 1: Chapter 12.
 169 BL: IOR G/12/26, 1727.04.28, p. 1.
 170 BL: IOR G/12/26, 1727.06.14, p. 5.
 171 These threats against the merchants’ families are also what kept them from going abroad and opening up direct trade with India, Europe, and the Americas. As long as the Hong merchants stayed in Canton, they had no fears of their properties being confiscated or their families being arrested and punished. Van Dyke, MCM 2: 12–13.
 172 Huang and Van Dyke, “The Hoppo’s Books,” 101.

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