The Macao-Manila Route under the Iberian Union (1580-1640)

Ubaldo Iaccarino*

ABSTRACT: The union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal in 1580 affected the relations between Macao and Manila and gave rise to new possibilities of cooperation and mutual trade. This paper will analyse and give new evidence to the political and economic role of the Macao-Manila route throughout the period of the Iberian Union (1580-1640), according to the developments of the Portuguese trade network via Luzon and the fight against the Dutch and English East India Companies.

KEYWORDS: Manila; Macao; Trade; Smuggling; Iberian Union; Maritime routes.

Rivalry and Divergences

When the Spanish conquistadors settled in the Philippines, in the late-1560s, the Portuguese had to face the problem of the 'Castilian' presence in the China Seas for the first time. Manila was principally founded with the aim to "gain the commerce with China", as Legazpi declared in a well-known letter of 1569, written in Cebu.[1]

In 1572 already ten Chinese ships came to the Philippines to trade. In 1574, the 'Pearl of the Orient' was visited by fourteen vessels, and in the following years an increasing number of Fujianese junks and champans sailed to Luzon with cargoes of textiles, porcelain, minerals, foods, etc.[2] The Chinese had built their trade connections in the Philippines especially in Song times, and by the middle of the sixteenth century they were regularly visiting the ports of Luzon and Mindoro to trade with the natives. The cooperation between the newcomers and a few smugglers and former-'pirates' from South China made way for the first Spanish attempts to enter the Middle Kingdom via Luzon and through the 'Sangley' connection. These attempts, though unsuccessful, affected the still unstable Sino-Portuguese relationship and shook up Macao's political stability.

In 1575, two Augustinian missionaries, Martín de Rada and Jerónimo Marín, set sail for Fujian with a group of soldiers and *encomenderos*. They were accompanied by the fleet of the Chinese general Wang Wanggao 王望高, who had been sent to Manila to capture the Cantonese 'pirate' Lin Feng 林鳳 (Limahón).[3]

In July 1575 they arrived in Zhangzhou, thus setting foot on the Chinese soil for the first time. Rada's mission to "Chincheo" has been celebrated for several reasons. The Augustinian friar was in fact the

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Murillo Velarde's map of the Philippines

first Spanish missionary to carry an embassy to China and to leave a detailed description of its people and customs. The Spanish delegation visited several cities of the province of Fujian among which Quanzhou and Fuzhou, where it was received by the local officials. The Spaniards had come with the intention of gaining a trading post in China, in order to stimulate the silk-for-silver exchange between Manila and Zhangzhou and permit the entry of the mendicant orders (i.e. Augustinians, Dominicans, and Franciscans) into the Celestial Empire. The mission came back to Manila in June 1575 with a delegation of Chinese officials followed by a long coterie of servants and soldiers. The Spanish ambassadors carried some letters addressed to the acting governor Guido de Lavezaris (in office from 1572 to 1575), and the promise of obtaining an outpost on the island of Zhongzuosuo (中左所, Xiamen), from where to trade with the ports on the banks of the

Jiulong River.[4] That was considered a reward for the capture of Lin Feng, who, after his ruinous attack on Manila (in the summer of 1574) had been trapped by the Spaniards in the gulf of Lingayen (Pangasinan). It goes without saying that the establishment of a Spanish outpost in Fujian would have ruined the trade of the 'Great Ship' and create serious problems to the Jesuit mission.[5]

Nonetheless, fortunately for the Portuguese of Macao, not only did Lin Feng manage to escape from the Spanish naval blockade put at the entrance of the Agno River, but the Spanish officials themselves contributed to the failure of the diplomatic mission, underestimating the importance given by the Chinese to the 'etiquette' (禮) and ignoring the strict protocols of the Ming tributary embassies.[6]

Be that as it may, what is relevant here is that the mission of Martín de Rada set a precedent that encouraged other Spanish missionaries to enter China at the turn of the 1570s.

In July 1579 a group of four Franciscan friars, accompanied by three members of the third order, set sail from Ilocos to Haicheng. Yet, the ship that should have brought them to Fujian was pushed by the monsoon winds to the coast of Guangdong province, thus reaching the mouth of the Pearl River and the port of Guangzhou.[7]

Upon landing at Guangzhou, the missionaries were questioned by the Chinese authorities and had several meetings with the local mandarins. At the beginning of November the Custodian of the Franciscan order, Pedro de Alfaro, was allowed to proceed to Macao with one of this confreres (Giambattista Lucarelli), whereas all the other members of the mission were expelled from China and sent back to Manila via Zhangzhou. That was the first time for a Spanish ship to reach Guangzhou from the Philippines, as it was the first time that a group of Spanish friars visited both China and Macao.[8]

Three years later, in 1582, it was the turn of Father Alonso Sánchez of the Company of Jesus to visit the 'City of the Name of God'. Sánchez sailed to Macao in March to bring the news of the accession of Philip II to the throne of Portugal, and to transmit the dispositions of the *Cortes* of Tomar to the city. The ship on which he traveled, however, was driven by contrary winds into a port ("Uto", Zhelin 柘林)[9] of the northern coast of Guangdong. The twenty-six passengers were detained by the Chinese coastal authorities and put under arrest, while their ship was seized. After meeting some local military officers, Alonso Sánchez began his pilgrimage through the Celestial Empire accompanied by a coadjutor (Nicolás Gallardo) and two Franciscan friars (Juan Pobre Díaz Pardo and Diego Bernal). On their arrival in Guangzhou, they were all hosted by the Jesuits in the residence of the Italian Michele Ruggieri.[10]

The presence of the Spanish missionaries in Guangzhou caused serious problems for the Portuguese, who were summoned to Zhaoqing to provide an explanation to the "Viceroy" (*Liang Guang zongdu* 兩廣總督) Chen Rui 陳瑞. The Chinese official wanted to know what kind of relationship linked them to the Castilians, who had sent an embassy to Fujian in 1575 and an unauthorized mission to Guangdong in 1579. Moreover, Chen began inquiring the local mandarins in Guangzhou and Zhaoqing, raising uncomfortable questions about the presence of the Portuguese in Macao: who had given them permission to settle and trade, and how much did they pay for that privilege? Who had authorized them to trade with the Japanese? Why did they administer justice regardless of Chinese law? Etc. As if that was not enough, between 1582 and 1583 a new group of Spanish missionaries, soldiers and merchants coming from the Philippines, Cochinchina, Lima and Acapulco joined the twenty-four prisoners already under arrest.[11] In the end, the Portuguese had to pay a bribe of 2,000 *escudos* and present some precious gifts to the mandarins in order to solve the problems raised by the mission of Alonso Sánchez and to save their presence in Macao.

The release of the captives and the return of Sánchez to Manila, however, did not put an end to the Spanish attempts to enter China via Macao-Guangzhou. In 1587 it was the turn of the Dominicans to try. The mission of Fr. Antonio Arcediano, Alonso Delgado and Bartolomé López — even though it failed to set foot on Chinese soil — is particularly relevant here, since these missionaries did not sail from the Philippines but they went to Macao directly from Acapulco aboard a Spanish galleon, the *San Martín*, which belonged to a group of local merchants. The arrival of the Castilian friars in Macao was harshly criticized by the Portuguese, and it gave rise to annoyances and complaints. The three missionaries were thus expelled from the city after the Viceroy of Goa declared the illegitimacy of their presence in the territories of the *Estado da Índia*. The Dominicans did not abandon their hopes of evangelization, and tried again in 1590, 1593, 1599, and 1604. Yet all the attempts to enter China through Haicheng and Guangzhou failed miserably due to the opposition of both the Chinese and the Portuguese.[12]

The last and more dangerous Spanish attempt to gain a foothold in China was made by Captain Juan de Zamudio in 1598. Zamudio settled in an island located off the month of the Pearl River (probably in Lantau Island, Hong Kong), indicated in Iberian sources as "Pinal" (Pinhal, Piñal, Piñar).[13] A few months later, he was joined by the former governor of the Philippines, Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, who obtained a temporary permit to stay in the island from the Chinese authorities. The Spaniards hoped to get a foothold in Pinal to participate in the seasonal fair of Guangzhou just like the merchants of Macao. Yet, the Portuguese were not willing to allow the establishment of a Spanish settlement in China, and vividly protested with the local mandarins and with the government of Manila. When Dasmariñas moved closer to Macao, reaching the banks of the Pearl River around Lampacau Island, a fleet under the command of D. Paulo de Portugal was sent against him to throw the Spaniards out from Pinal. On January 17, 1600 a naval combat broke out, and several men were killed. In view of the great damages and losses suffered during the fight, Dasmariñas decided to flee, and was finally forced to abandon China and come back to Manila with empty hands.[14]

With regards to the Macao-Manila route, it is interesting to note that in a letter written to Governor Francisco Tello de Guzmán (1596-1602), Luis Dasmariñas invited him to authorize the voyage of a Portuguese ship to Manila, as a remedy for the damage and losses caused by the Spanish presence in Pinal.[15] By the end of the sixteenth century, the existence of a direct route between Macao and Manila was already a fait accompli.

From Conflict to Cooperation

The ascension of Philip II of Spain to the throne of Portugal was accepted in Macao in 1583, after the return of Alonso Sánchez to Manila. This unexpected event gave rise to several projects of collaboration among the Iberians and soon lead to some joint military projects. Throughout the 1580s, for example, plans were made to regain the Portuguese fort of Ternate, which had been lost in 1575.[16] In 1582, Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa (1580-1583) sent an expeditionary force of nearly 1,800 men under the command of General Pedro Sarmiento and Captain Juan Ronquillo, which after capturing Ternate had to retreat to Manila because of the outbreak of a malaria epidemic that spread among the soldiers. Two more expeditions were sent in 1584 and 1585, under the government of Santiago de Vera (1584-1590), and another one in 1593. This last military enterprise was led by the governor of the Philippines himself, Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas (1590-1593), with a contingent of more than 3,000 soldiers, a galleon, six galliots, and one hundred or so smaller ships.[17] The Dasmariñas's expedition failed before it started. D. Gómez lost his life by hands of some Chinese mutineers before reaching the Moluccas, and at the end the project to conquer Ternate had to be abandoned and postponed to the next century.



A sixteenth century Manila Galleon from the Boxer Codex, Lilly Library, Indiana University.

It is important to point out that the first Spanish intervention in the Spice Islands was not an initiative of Manila but was solicited by Portuguese through Captain Diogo de Azambuja, who was in charge of the Lusitanian fortress in the nearby island of Tidore. As a matter of fact, the Portuguese were willing to collaborate with the Spaniards in the recapture of the Moluccas, and supported the efforts of the Manileños and their Filipino allies throughout the end of the sixteenth century up to the final 'conquest' of 1606.

Soon new challenges appeared on the horizon, and a military cooperation between the two rival ports was considered impellent. Already in 1579, the English corsair Francis Drake was able to reach the Spice Islands across the 'Spanish lake', and in 1587 Thomas Cavendish attacked the port of Arevalo (Iloilo) in the Visayas,

causing much harm to the Spanish shipyards.[18] However, the biggest problem was represented by the Dutch and their joint stock company (VOC: *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*), which was established in 1602. The appearance of the Dutch ships in the Far East at the beginning of the 1590s, put at risk the Portuguese trade in Southeast Asia (especially in the Moluccas), as well as the voyages of the Great Ship to Japan and the transpacific crossings of the Manila Galleons. In Spanish eyes, it quickly became clear that the only way to stop the advance of the 'Lutherans' in Asia was to cooperate with the Portuguese, against a common enemy who seemed far more dangerous than the Chinese, the Japanese or the Malays. It is important to note here that after the Pinal episode of 1598, the Spaniards made no more attempts to gain an outpost in China. By that time, and especially after the 'conquest' of the Moluccas in 1606, Manila became *de facto* the political center of the Crown in the region. It assumed responsibility to defend the Portuguese economic interests in Asia, and was called to intervene against the enemies of the Empire in the entire maritime area of the Far East.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch began their offensive against Spain and its possessions in Asia. In 1600, Captain Olivier van Noort reached the Philippines and put a blockade at the entrance of the Manila Bay. Governor Tello responded by sending two war galleons against him under the command of Antonio de Morga. The latter was successful in repelling the enemy, but one of the galleons, the *San Diego*, was lost during the fight.[19] The next year (1601), van Noort moved on to Macao, where he gathered information on the city and its defences before sailing back to Holland. In 1603, the Dutch sized a Portuguese ship off the strait of Singapore,[20] and in the following years fights broke out in several ports of Southeast Asia, in the Moluccas and Java. Macao was reached again by the Dutch ships in 1603 and 1607. In 1609, after a failed attack on Iloilo (in the Visayas), the fleet of Admiral Frans de Wittert put a new blockade at the Manila Bay. The Spaniards sent out their galleons under the command of Governor Juan de Silva. In the resulting engagement, which took place at Playa Honda, they managed to sink three enemy ships and achieved a crushing victory. Yet this military exploit did not put an end to the Dutch blockades on the Philippines. The Manileños had to repel the VOC fleets for another two times, in the same location, in 1617 and 1625.[21]

By the mid-1610s, it became clear that a resolute military action had to be taken against the enemies of the Crown and the Church with the help of Goa, in order to save the trade of the Indies and to assure the continuity of the Catholic evangelization in the region. The Iberians had to rely on their superior military power to eradicate the Dutch problem once and for all, before it was too late.

Therefore, in 1615, Governor Juan de Silva (1609-1616) set sail to Banten, where the Dutch had established the headquarters of the VOC, to thrown them out of Java and put an end to their presence in Asia. The fleet could count on an astonishing number of ships, with ten war galleons and several hundreds of men aboard of each ship. The Portuguese sent reinforcements from Goa which should have joined the Spanish armada in Malacca before heading toward Banten. The Dutch, however, proved to be faster than their enemies, and thanks to an Acehnese fleet commanded by a young Sultan Iskandar Muda (r. 1607-1636), they were successful in destroying the eight galleons and galleys sent by Governor Jerónimo de Azevedo (1612-1617), from India.[22]

It is important to note that these events were occurring at a time when the governments of Madrid and the United Provinces had just put aside their global rivalries with the signing of the Twelve Years' Truce (1609-1621). It is a well-known fact that this truce was not fully observed in Asia, and that the fight between the 'Lutherans' and the 'Papist' continued without interruption throughout the first half of the seventeenth century.

The Dutch intensified the attacks on the Iberian outposts in Southeast Asia, and tried to intercept not only the Manila Galleons, but also the Portuguese ships plying between the Philippines, Macao, Malacca, and Nagasaki. As far as Manila is concerned, the blockades put at the entrance of its bay almost every year after the defeat of Silva's armada (1616) were particularly harmful, because they hindered the voyages of the Chinese junks from Fujian. In contrast to the large numbers of ships of the early 1610s, only seven Fujianese junks reached Manila in 1616, and even less in the following years.[23] Although the Spaniards were always successful in defending themselves against the Dutch, yet their military power was seriously weakened by the constant state of war and the unceasing naval battles. Between 1620 and 1623 the Anglo-Dutch fleet of defence attacked the Spanish shipyards in the Visayas and patrolled the area around Luzon trying to intercept as many foreign ships as possible. In 1622, a force of around 1,300 men backed by thirteen ships under the command of Captain Cornelis Reijersen landed in Macao with fire and sword to take possession of the city. The invaders were miraculously repelled by the Portuguese, but Manila had nonetheless to send two war galleons there as reinforcements for a possible second attack of the Dutch.[24]

Needless to say, the Crown's military effort against the North-European East India private companies had a very high cost, and the economic resources of Manila were not sufficient to guarantee the defence of the 'Islands to the West', including Macao, without support and reinforcements from Mexico and Madrid.

Trade and Smuggling

The Macao-Manila trade route was inaugurated in the early 1580s, at the time of Alonso Sánchez's visit to China. As mentioned previously, the Spanish Jesuit sailed to Macao in 1582 to transmit the dispositions of the *Cortes* of Tomar to its citizens. It is important to point out that not all the Macanese merchants considered the union of the Crowns an unfortunate turn of events. On the contrary, far from opposing the Castilian presence in the Philippines, some of them took the chance to expand their commercial networks in the Spanish territories.

At the beginning of the 1580s, some Lusitanian privateers started to invest their money in the Philippine trade and even took residence in the Philippines. The names of Diogo Fernandes Vitória (Diego Hernández de Victoria) and António Dias de Casseres

(Antonio Díaz de Cáceres), among others, have already been pointed out by several scholars. Vitória moved to Manila in 1580 from New Spain. He run business in Asia and America, sending Chinese and Indian goods to Mexico, Peru, the Caribe and Brazil. His coinvestors were principally Mexican and Peruvian Old and New Christians, and among his agents there were several Chinese and Japanese traders. James Boyajian indicates a certain "Quinco", who was entrusted with more than 7,000 *cruzados* in 1597 to buy Chinese goods in Guangzhou on his behalf. António Dias de Casseres, on the other hand, was a Seville-born New Christian who had took residence in Manila in those same years, probably prior to 1580. Seemingly, he owned several vessels that plied the China Seas, and invested in both the Asian and American markets.[25] Some officials of the Crown, like Jerónimo Pereira, who was *capitão-mór* of the Japan voyage in 1588, or Governor Gómez Dasmariñas (d. 1593), associated with these and other merchants, thus obtaining the benefits of entering their circles. Being one of the members of the City's Council (*Cabildo*), Vitória was particularly influential among the Portuguese community of Manila. In 1591, he was chosen and elected by the principal regidors of the Council as their attorney-general "in whatever process, whether in or out of court".[26] The election, as we will see, had much to do with Macao and the infringement of the Crown's disposition on matters related to trade.

By that time, Iberian sources tell us, there were not a few Portuguese *Casados* in Manila, who covered the route between Macao and the Philippines to sell Chinese silk, Indian cotton, and Southeast Asian spices. The first merchant to send a trading ship to Manila from Macao was Bartolomeu Vaz Landeiro, a very influential man, known as the "King of the Portuguese", who controlled the triangular trade between Macao, Manila and Nagasaki at the end of the sixteenth century.[27] One of his ships, captained by his nephew Sebastião Jorge, carried Alonso Sánchez back to the Philippines in March 1583. On that occasion, Landeiro was permitted to trade in Manila, selling silk, cloth, linen, marble, wine, medicines, and several other products from India, China, and Southeast Asia.[28] The next year, he personally sailed to Manila with two more junks to confirm the establishment of the still 'unofficial' route between Macao and the Philippines and get contacts with the Spanish officials.

Taking advantage of the unexpected political events, some Mexican and Portuguese merchants also tried to establish a direct link between China and the Americas bypassing the Philippines and the intermediation of the Chinese traders at Manila. In 1587 a Spanish galleon of ca. 400 tons, the *San Martín*, was sent to Macao directly from Mexico. The ship, which had already visited the city four years before, in 1583, was dispatched with the approval of the viceroy of New Spain, who had sold it to a group of private investors. Before reaching Macao, the *San Martín* touched the coast of China, near the province of "Chincheo" (Fujian), where it was "very warmly received" by the Chinese, "with much show of friendship and kindness".[29] Whether or not the above report is reliable cannot be checked, as it is difficult to tell to what degree the Portuguese were happy about the success of this commercial voyage. One may assume that they did not treat the Spaniards with the same "kindness" granted by the Fujianese mandarins. While still in Macao, the captain of the ship, Lope de Palacios, secretly wrote a letter to Bishop Salazar asking permission to leave the city for Manila, "because he feared that they [the Macanese] were about to kill him in order to gain possession of his property".[30]

However, not all the Portuguese merchants were against the idea of establishing a direct trade route between Macao and Acapulco, and some of them, along with other traders residing in Mexico-city, envisaged the possibility to put their hands on the transpacific exchange of silk and silver by means of their agents. In 1589, the former Captain of Malacca, João da Gama, set sail to Mexico with a Portuguese carrack of 600 tons that should have sailed to India with a cargo of Chinese and Japanese goods. This new and unexpected

transpacific crossing was undertaken without permission of the Loyal Senate (*Leal Senado*), whose members officially complained against the intrusion of the Spaniards inside the Portuguese sphere of influence as well as their violation of the laws of the Indies. Goa's response came in the same year with two letters written by Manuel de Sousa Coutinho (1588-1591) in April 3 and June 30, in which the viceroy denounced the "great injury" caused by the Spaniards to the royal Treasure as well as to the Christian evangelization carried on in Asia by the Jesuits and the friars under the Portuguese *Padroado*. According to his judgment, any direct trade link between Macao, Acapulco, and Callao would have been to the detriment of the *Estado da Índia* and, more generally, against the interests of the Crown itself.[31] Two years before, Philip II had declared to his predecessor, Duarte de Meneses (1584-1588), the illegitimacy of the Spanish trade in China and the Moluccas expressing at the same time his desire to keep the ports of Macao and Manila strictly separated. The ship of João da Gama was permitted to trade in Acapulco and part of its crew came back to Macao, via Manila, in 1592 with a cargo of silver bullion. Its commander, however, was put under arrest for contraband, and his goods were confiscated.

Clearly, the Portuguese wanted to control the Macao-Manila route by sending their own ships to the Philippines, but were not willing to accept the presence of Spanish ships in Macao or, even worse, in Guangzhou. Needless to say their precarious position in China was another factor of risk.

In order to put an end to these insubordinations and find a remedy to the problem of the Spanish commercial voyages in China, the Crown issued in 1589 a decree prohibiting any form of direct link between Asia and the Americas, and only allowed the Spanish trade in the Philippines. At the same time, it strictly outlawed the Macao-Manila route and any other Portuguese voyage to Manila. At the beginning of the 1590s, Madrid also prohibited the voyages between Peru and the Philippines, as well as between North

Map of Macao from António Bocarro's "Livro das Fortalezas da Índia Oriental", National Library of P

and South America. In 1593, it was decided to permit only one voyage per year (generally made by two galleons) between Manila and Acapulco, through a fixed route that passed south of Japan. The value of the annual cargo was fixed to 250,000 pesos at Manila and 500,000 pesos at Acapulco.[32]

Before the enforcement of these last dispositions and regulations, more ships sailed to Macao from the

Portugal.

Americas. In 1590, the Peruvian merchant Juan de Solís left the port of Callao and headed to China. His plan was to buy silk and porcelain at the annual fairs of Guangzhou and then come back to America without calling at Manila. However, once in Macao, he was put under arrest by the Portuguese, and his ship and silver were confiscated. As a result, Solís had no chance but to ask the help of the Jesuits, and thanks to the intercession of the Father Visitor, Alessandro Valignano, he finally gained his freedom and obtained the restitution of part of his silver. In that same year, Solís sailed with Valignano to Japan, where he met another Spanish merchant called Eduardo Antonio, who was about to sail to China from the southern province of Satsuma. The latter's plan was to trade in the Middle Kingdom before setting sail back to America across the North

Pacific route. Yet, his plan was frustrated by the arrival of the diplomatic mission of the Dominican friar Juan Cobo, who visited Kyūshū in 1592 as ambassador of Governor Dasmariñas to Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 (1537-1598).

It is significant to note that the Mexicans and the Peruvians were not the only merchants to push for the opening of a direct trade route between China and the Americas. Some Portuguese traders shared the same desire, being eager to send their ships to the ports of the New World, to sell Chinese silk and Indian cloth to the Spaniards and the natives. In 1588, the Bishop of Malacca detected the advantages that would have derived from the opening of an official trade route between Macao and New Spain. The plan arose the hostility of the citizens of Manila who would have been outclassed by the great merchants of Mexico and Peru. On the contrary, the Manileños principally tried to obtain a trading post in China, as we said, in order to reduce the price of the Chinese silk in the Philippines, which was raised by the presence of too much silver (coming not only from America, but also from Japan) and the transport cost from Fujian and Guangdong.

What we said about the transpacific route from Mexico and Peru also applies to the Macao-Manila route. In the summer of 1590, Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas sent a mission to Macao to buy gunpowder, saltpetre, and copper from the Portuguese. The new governor of the Philippines wanted to cut down Manila's dangerous dependence on Chinese and Japanese imports, and at the same time he aimed at finding a solution to the issue of the Macao-Manila route. The mission was entrusted to Pedro de Brito, one of the Regidors of the city. On its arrival in Macao, de Brito had the ship confiscated by the port authorities and all its passengers arrested. The Portuguese also detained the money belonging to the royal treasure and to some private merchants of Manila. According to Spanish sources, the Manileños had invested more than 120,000 pesos for the purchase of silks, porcelains and other goods destined to the Acapulco market.[33]

The incident was settled in 1592, on the return to Macao of the 600 tons carrack which had sailed to Acapulco in 1589 under the command of João da Gama. The Portuguese gave the money back to the Spaniards and the two parts reached an agreement. The Manileños implicitly accepted to turn a blind eye to the Portuguese commercial voyages to the Philippines in exchange for their participation in the trade of the East Indies.

In 1594, following the death of Dasmariñas by hands of the Chinese mutineers of one of the galleons destined to the expedition against Ternate, another Spanish ship was sent to China. Its aim was to inform the mandarins of the incident occurred in the previous year and to ask for compensation. It seems that the acting governor, Luis Pérez Dasmariñas (1593-1596), who replaced his father in December 1593, had as second intention the establishment of a military alliance with the Chinese against the ambitions of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and as a support for his plans of expansion in Southeast Asia. On this account, it is no surprise that the Portuguese decided to put the ship to fire and finally sent all the Castilian intruders back to the Philippines.

In the following years, especially after the reception of Hideyoshi's first letter to the governor of Luzon (呂宋),[34] rumours spread about a probable Japanese invasion of the Philippines, and the Spaniards had to face the threat of new and old enemies. Moreover, the problem of the Sino-Japanese raids on the north-western coast of Luzon and the attacks of the 'Moors' on the Visayas were still an unsettled issue. The Spaniards aimed at building a common front with the Portuguese in the fight against the enemies of the Crown and the Church, at a time when the Dutch were still far from the horizon and when the battle was waged principally against the 'infidels' of the Malay sultanates of Aceh, Brunei, Ternate, Sulu, Maguindanao, etc.

At the beginning of the 1590s, East Asia was shaken by the break out of the Imjin War (1592-1598), and as a result an intense diplomatic activity was carried on between the Philippines, Japan, and China (to

say nothing of Siam, Cambodia and the Moluccas). It is important to note here that at a time when Luis Dasmariñas was trying to make contacts with the mandarins at Guangzhou to secure their support against a possible Japanese attack, his deceased father had just established an 'alliance' (*alianza*) with the government of Hideyoshi, by sending a tributary embassy to Nagoya (名護屋, Kyūshū). In 1593-1594, some Franciscan friars had settled in Kyōto as ambassadors of the King of Spain, thus opening a process of reconsideration of the Japanese role in Asia, outside the Chinese World Order and against the Ming tributary system.[35]

In those years, the shipments of metals, saltpeter, and gunpowder from Macao had become particularly important, because the Court of Beijing had strengthened the prohibition on the exports of such strategic products, under the pain of death for the transgressors. One of the reasons for that was China's involvement in the Imjin War and the necessity to stop the smuggling of gunpowder, saltpeter, and copper to Japan.

The Spanish participation in the trade of the East Indies had been strictly prohibited by the treaty of Tordesillas, in 1594, and that of Zaragoza, in 1529. After the union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal, this prohibition was confirmed in several occasions, according to the pact between King Philip and the Portuguese *Cortes* gathered at Tomar in 1581. Although the captain-merchants of Goa, Malacca, Macao, and Nagasaki obtained the exclusivity of trade in India, China, and Japan, nevertheless they had to renounce to the American market, with all its gold and silver bullions. It goes without saying that the lure of the Galleon Trade was too big for them, and therefore any edict ordering the separation between the Iberian spheres of influence in Asia remained a dead letter.

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, several groups of Iberian investors were sending ships across the China Seas and controlled most of the maritime routes around the Philippines. Old and New Christians from Goa, Malacca, Macao, Nagasaki, and Mexico, as well as some Chinese, Japanese and Malay traders participated with quotas in the silk-for-silver exchange through the transnational network built by the Portuguese after the union of the crowns. According to Antonio Morga, who was deputy governor of the Philippines in 1595-1596, judge (*oidor*) of the Audiencia, and a witness of the exceptional growth of trade in Manila back from the days of Legazpi, the Portuguese sold principally spices (cloves, cinnamon, and pepper), cotton cloth, precious stones (diamonds, rubies, sapphires, topazes), amber, ivory, carpets and tapestries from Persia and Turkey, "beds, writing-cases, parlor-chairs [*silletas de estrado*], and other finely-gilded furniture, made in Macao", as well as fruits and other products. Clearly enough, Macao was the point of redistribution for most of these products, although its name (for obvious reasons) is not quoted by Morga, who only states the arrival of ships from India, Malacca, and the Moluccas.[36]

The Macanese also provided Manila with metals and minerals, and the Mexican market with Chinese mercury and slaves. Moreover, the Spaniards obtained from Macao ship's supplies, like nails, sails, ropes, etc. The issue of the cost of the Philippine shipyards became particularly relevant at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the problem of the Dutch attacks was impellent and called for an immediate solution.

In exchange for the above goods, the Portuguese carried away American silver (for China), Philippine gold (for Japan), as well as wax, cotton, musk and other forestry products.

One should note that the success of the Macao-Manila route was partly determined by some dispositions of the Spanish government, which were proposed on a local level. For example, in 1589, Madrid agreed on eliminating the customs duties on the imports of ammunition and supplies in Manila, and in 1608, after the 'conquest' of the Moluccas, it also permitted the annual voyage of one ship between Macao and Manila to provide the 'Pearl of the Orient' with military supplies.[37] As a matter of fact, most of the Portuguese trade in the Philippines was exempted from Crown

dues and taxes (because it was prohibited), which on the contrary were levied on both the Chinese and the Japanese shipping.

By the early seventeenth century, the Macanese had developed a triangular trade route between Guangzhou, Manila and Nagasaki. Some Portuguese captain-merchants were successful in becoming the official agents of the Japanese government (*Bakufu* 幕府)[38] for the commercial voyages to the Philippines. Captain António Garcês received Vermillion-Seal licenses (*shuinjō* 朱印状) for Luzon almost every year from 1604 to 1609, and was plying between Manila and Nagasaki already in the early-1580s. He was recommended to Ieyasu directly by Governor Pedro Bravo de Acuña (1602-1606), who entrusted him with several missions to Japan. This man is probably the same António Garcês who, in the late 1590s, was sending precious stones, jewels, carpets, cloth and slaves from Malacca to Manila on behalf of the aforementioned Diogo Fernandes de Vitória. In the early seventeenth century (just like in the late sixteenth century), there were several other Portuguese traders who privately sailed across the China Seas to sell silk, gold, and silver. Bartolomé Medina, for example, is one of them. He was known to the Japanese as the "lord of Luzon" (呂宋ノしんによろ[*Señor*/*Senhor*]) and took part to most of the Spanish missions to Japan between 1602 and 1606.[39]

During the 1590s, the reduction of ships sailing from Macao to Manila was compensated by a sudden development of the Nagasaki-Manila trade route and the Japanese shipments to Luzon. According to Manila's customs accounts, the commercial voyages from Japan continued until 1634, with an average of three/four ships per year under the command of Japanese, Chinese and Iberian captains. Some ships also sailed to Manila via Macao, carrying on board both Japanese and Chinese products. The Spanish officials applied to their cargos a lower percentage of *almojarifazgo* tax: a 3% tariff instead of the 6% imposed to the Chinese from 1610.[40]

In 1620, a Japanese ship captained by Don Alonso Fajardo y Ocsaba ("Yocosama Funguin", よこ様法眼?), came to Manila from Macao laden with Chinese goods. The owner of the ship (a "galliot"), called *Nuestra Señora del Rosario*, appears to be the lord of Sendai (*rey de Ojú* [奥州]) Date Masamune (伊達政宗, 1567-1636), who had sent a diplomatic mission to Madrid and Rome in 1613.[41] Don Alonso, who was the acting governor of the Japanese community of Manila (Dilao's *Nihonmachi* 日本町), carried goods for a total value of 16,875 pesos, paying 1,012 pesos and 4 tomines of *almojarifazgo* tax, at a 6% tariff. The year before, another Japanese ship captained by Juan Singuin, "japón", and piloted by a certain Domingo Leal, carried five slaves from Japan, probably destined to the American market. Two years later, one more ship under the command of the Portuguese trader Esteban Penis came from Japan via Macao (*vino de Macan y de Japón*) paying to the customs officers 1,397 pesos, 3 tomines, and 6 grains.[42]

After the expulsion of the Spaniards from Japan in 1624 and the end of the issuing of the Vermillion-Seal licenses to Luzon, the Portuguese and the Chinese became the only traders to ply the route between Kyūshū and Luzon. The Macao-Manila route (just like the Nagasaki-Manila and the Nagasaki-Macao routes) fell into disuse in the early 1640s, after the end of the Iberian Union and the loss of Nagasaki following the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan (1639).

Below is an overview of the number of ships that plied the Macao-Manila route between 1580 and 1640, with some additional information.[43] The list is far from being complete, since many ships did not pay customs duties and most of the times escaped registration, to say nothing about the contraband trade carried out in other ports of the Philippines.[44] RC

Year	Number of Ships sailing the Macao-Manila Route
1580	2[1]
1583	1 Ship captained by Sebastião Jorge (one of Landeiro's nephews). It carried Alonso Sánchez back to Manila.
1584	2 Two junks belonging to Bartolomeu Vaz Landeiro.
1587	2 "Dos [navíos] de portugueses de la çiudad de Macán".[2]
1588	1[3] "De los portugueses de Macán a venido un navío grande con cantidad de mercadurías".[4] A ship owned by António Dias de Casseres, sailed from Manila to Macao, in 1587 or 1588.
1590	1 The Spanish ship *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción* (or *San Pedro*) captained by Pedro de Solórzano.
1592	2 Return to Manila of the *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción*. Return to Macao of the Portuguese carrack which had sailed to Acapulco in 1589.
1596?	1 A ship owned by António Dias de Casseres sailed from Manila to Macao about 1595-97.
1604	1[5] The ship *Santiaguillo*, captained by Marcos de la Cueva.
1605	1[6] One ship under the command of Antonio Rodríguez (*maestre*)
1606	1 According to Gil (2011), this ship ("bound to Japan") was the little patache *Santiago el menor* (or *Santiaguillo*), which had already visited Japan in 1603 and in 1604.[7]
1609	1 A ship sailed to Manila from Macao, but was shipwrecked (probably in Taiwan?)[8]
1610	1 A ship was sent to Macao (in January) to inform the Portuguese of the Dutch presence off the bay of Manila.[9]
1612	[?] Some ships came in this year from Macao[10]
1618	In September, one ship was sent from Manila to Guangzhou to buy ammunition and supplies. It reached Macao in 1619.
1619	A galleon was sent to Manila in June, but was forced to come back to Macao due to bad weather. It sailed again in 1620 and reached Cavite on the seventh of June (so, it has to be one of ships enlisted below).[11]

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Year	Number of Ships sailing the Macao-Manila Route
1620	c. 9[12]
	Nuestra Señora de Salvación, captained by Miguel Cardoso
	Nuestra Señora de Salvación, captained by Pedro Días Carvalho
	Nuestra Señora del Rosario, captained by Simón de Oliveira
	Nuestra Señora del Rosario, captained by Francisco Botelho (champan?)
	Nuestra Señora de Atocha, captained by Gaspar Barbosa
	Nuestra Señora de la Piedad, captained by José de Vides
	Galliot *Nuestra Señora del Rosario*, captained by the Japanese don Alonso Fajardo
	Ship captained by Pedro Tufino
	Ship captained by Sebastián Hernandez[13]
1622	c. 6
	Ship captained by Esteban Penis
	Ship captained by Francisco Diaz
	Ship captained by Antonio Teixeira
	Galliot captained by Cristobal de Teixeira (it arrived in Ilocos)
	Ship captained by Pedro de Andrade
	A Portuguese frigate belonging to a certain "João Batista *Inari*", and captained by a Chinese merchant called Salvador Díaz (Don Luis?), was captured by the Dutch while heading to Manila.[14]
	This year Governor Alonso Fajardo sent one hundred soldiers to Macao as reinforcements against the Dutch. The commander of the Spanish contingent was the Sergeant-Major Fernando de Silva. He and his men (ca. seventy Spaniards) left Macao for Siam in 1624 aboard a Portuguese ship.[15]
1623	3
	Ship captained by Francisco de Sousa Pereira
	Ship captained by Cristobal Nardi
	Galliot captained by Juan Xuarez
1624	1[16]
	Champan captained by Francisco Tavares
1625	3
	Galliot captained by Rodrigo Cabral
	Galliot captained by Diego Vivero
	Ship captained by Juan de Torres
1626	4
	Ship captained by Pedro Suarez
	Ship captained by Juan Teixeira
	Ship captained by Christobal de Mercado
	A champan entrusted to Manuel Correa

Year	Number of Ships sailing the Macao-Manila Route
1627	6[17] Champan *San Nicolás*, captained by Domingo de Cunha (de Acuña) Champan captained by Nicolás de la Peña Galliot *Nuestra Señora del Rosario*, captained by Leonel de Sosa [de Lima] Galliot *Nuestra Señora del Rosario*, captained by Gaspar Borges This year, the governor of the Philippines, Juan Niño de Tavora, sent two galleons (*San Ildefonso* and *Nuestra Señora de Peña de Francia*) to Macao under the command of General Juan de Alcarazo.[18]
1628	2 *Nuestra Señora del Rosario* (capitana), captained by Leonel de Sosa [de Lima] *Nuestra Señora del Rosario* (almiranta), captained by Gaspar Borges.
1629	5 Ship entrusted to Ponciano de Abreo Ship entrusted to Manuel de Aranda Junk *San Antón*, captained by Francisco Vieira. Two ships (*capitana* and *almiranta*) of the fleet of Juan de Alcarazo, which had both sailed from Taiwan.
1630	6 Three ships, all called *Nuestra Señora del Rosario*[19] *Nuestra Señora de Atocha* *Santísima Trinidad* *Nuestra Señora de la Limpia Concepción*
1631	4 *Santa Cruz*, captained by the admiral Nicolás de Sequeira Galliot *Buen Jesús*, captained by Juan Daniel da Rocha Ship entrusted to Juan Fiallo ("no pagó derechos por aver venido cargado de géneros para Su Magestad") *Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes*
1632	3[20] Ship entrusted to Juan Correa de Acosta Ship *Santa Cruz* *Nuestra Señora de la Limpia Concepción*
1633	4 Champan entrusted to Jorge Pinto Ship entrusted to Nicolás de Sequeira Ship *Nuestra Señora de la Limpia Concepción*, entrusted to Juan Fiallo (owner) Ship *Nuestra Señora del Libramiento*, captained by José Matos.[21]

ROTAS MARÍTIMAS

Year	Number of Ships sailing the Macao-Manila Route
1635	4 Urca *Nuestra Señora de Guía*, captained by Diego de Miranda Enriques (Enríquez) Galliot *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción*, captained by Manoel de Moraes Pimenta (Manuel de Moras Pimenta) Patache *Nuestra Señora de la Limpia Concepción*, captained by the Spanish Luis Alonso de Roa A ship belonging to the captain Simão Teixeira (Simón Texeira)
1636	2 Two ships (the *capitana* was called *San Antonio*) captained by Lourenço de Lis Velho (Lorenzo de Lisuello).
1637	2[22] Spanish galleon *San Juan Bautista*[23] Ship entrusted to Lorenzo de Lisbello (Lourenço de Lis Velho/de Lisuello) The Spanish galliot *San Bernardo*, belonging to Manoel de Andrade, sailed to Macao in November but was pushed back to Manila by contrary winds.[24]
1638	3 Spanish galleon *San Juan Bautista*, captain by the Spanish Juan López de Andoáin (Anduin) Champan entrusted to Miguel de Alonso Ship *Santa Cruz*, captained by Alejo de Mezquita Pereira (Alejo de Amexqueta Pereira)
1639	1 *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción*, captained by Francisco de Mota (a *cho*)
1640	2[25] Ship entrusted to Juan Barreto *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción*, captained by Pedro Gomes de Pina (Pedro Gómez de Piña) Ship *Santa Cruz*
1641	2[26] Cho *San Francisco Javier* entrusted to Francisco Barreto (owner) *Nuestra Señora de la Limpia Concepció*n, captained by Alejo da Mezquita (Amexqueta)
1642	4[27] Ship entrusted to Fernan Barreto (Fernando Barreto de Almeida) Ship entrusted to Vicente de Tavares Ship entrusted to Gerónimo de Sosa Ship entrusted to Antonio de Acosta (Antonio de Acosta Benucho)

NOTES

1 Blair and Robertson 1903-1909, III, 58.
2 Chaunu 1966, 148-151; Gil 2011, 575-580.
3 González de Mendoza 2008, 161-245; Ollé 2002, 53ss.
4 San Agustín 1975, 446-450.
5 Boxer 1988.
6 Ollé 2002, 66-72.
7 AGI, *Patronato*, 46, r. 11.
8 Wingaert 1933, 12-92, 103-160.
9 Ollé 2002, 98.
10 Colín 1900-1903, I, 265ss. Cfr. U. Iaccarino, "Mediating the Spanish Presence in China: Michele Ruggieri's involvement in the Missions of Pedro de Alfaro O.F.M. and Alonso Sánchez S.I. (1579-1585)", in Xie Mingguang 謝明光 *et al.* (eds.), *Michele Ruggieri: Portrait of a Jesuit Missionary at the Dawn of the Dialogue between China and Europe* (Beijing: China Social Science Press 中國社會科學出版社, 2019) (currently under print).
11 Ribadeneira 1947, 109-110, 115-120.
12 Borao 2009.
13 Colín 1900-1903, I, 197-198.
14 Sousa Pinto 2008, 33.
15 "Fuesse servido que los de Macao pudiesen enviar en un navío hazienda suya a Manila para rremedio de la perdida y nesçessidad grande que avían tenido y en que estaban". AGI, *Filipinas*, 6, r. 8, n. 134.
16 Ollé 2003.
17 Argensola 1992, 157.
18 Spate 1979, 262-263, 282-283.
19 Laarhoven and Wittermans 1985, 490.
20 The *Santa Catarina*, which was sailing from Macao to Malacca. See Borschberg 2004b.
21 Blumentritt 1882.
22 Borschberg 2004a.
23 Schurz 1959, 98; Gil 2011, 592.
24 Boxer 1946, 158.
25 Boyajian 1993, 76-85.
26 Blair and Robertson 1903-1909, VIII, 179.
27 Souza 1986, 36-39; Sousa 2010.
28 Videira 1987, 9; Costa 1967, 49-50.
29 Blair and Robertson 1903-1909, VI, 316.
30 Blair and Robertson 1903-1909, VII, 73-74.
31 Blair and Robertson 1903-1909, VII, 79-82.
32 Schurz 1959, 155. From 1565 until 1606 still another galleon was permitted to sail to America from the port of Cebu.
33 Blair and Robertson 1903-1909, VIII, 183.
34 In Hori Kyōan's *Chōsen seibatsu ki* 朝鮮征伐記 (seventeenth century). Murakami 1966, 29-34.
35 Iaccarino 2017.
36 Morga 1997, 314.
37 Boxer 1988, 74-75.
38 The shogunate.
39 Murakami 1966.
40 Gil 2011, 50-54.
41 Cfr. Gil 2011, 593.
42 Gil 1991, 443.
43 AGI, *Filipinas*, 24; Chaunu 1960, 148-159; Gil 2011, 575-605; González 2017; D'Ávila Lourido 2000, 221.
44 Ollé 2013, 238.
45 Chaunu 1960, 148.
46 Santiago de Vera to the King, June 26, 1587. AGI, *Patronato, 25, r. 36; Colín 1900-1903, I, 354.*
47 Pierre Chaunu (1960) indicates two ships.
48 Gil 2011, 576. "Francisco Sobrino, of Goa […] came to Manila in eighty-eight with two thousand odd pesos in Chinese goods, and left a year later with eleven thousand three hundred pesos." Blair and Robertson 1903-1909, VIII, 182-183.
49 Chaunu (1960) indicates five ships.
50 Chaunu (1960) indicates two ships.
51 Iaccarino 2017, 53-56.
52 The captain of the ship was a certain "Tijon". Blair and Robertson 1903-1909, XVII, 129-130 (*Relación* by Gregorio López, S.I.).
53 *Ibidem*, pp. 130-132.
54 D'Ávila Lourido (2000, 221) indicates 6 or 7 ships.
55 Blair and Robertson 1903-1909, XIX, 69.
56 "From Macan ten Portuguese ships have come with much valuable merchandise". Blair and Robertson 1903-1909, XIX, 69.
57 One of these last two vessels was probably the ship *Nuestra Señora de la Vida* indicated by Gil 2011, 593. Cfr. González 2017, 8.
58 Borao 2001-2002, I, 62. Cfr. Van Dyke 2003, 78.
59 Colín 1900-1903, I, 226-227; Boxer 1988, 111-112.
60 Several Portuguese ships came this year to Manila from India, Malacca, Siam, and Cambodia.
61 Pierre Chaunu (1960) indicates two galleons, three gal liots, and three champans.
62 Colín 1900-1903, I, 236-237. According to the registers of the Royal Hacienda, indicated by E. González (2017, 16), another Spanish ship, the *Santísima Trinidad*, arrived in Macao from Manila. It had sailed this same year to Taiwan.
63 "Tres galeotas que vinieron de Macan a cargo de diferentes personas".
64 Chaunu (1960) indicates four ships.
65 González 2017, 9.
66 Chaunu (1960) indicates three ships (ca.).
67 "Un navío que de esta ciudad salió para Macán". Cfr. González 2017, 15-16.
68 Gil 2011, 602.
69 Chaunu (1960) indicates three ships.
70 Chaunu (1960) indicates three ships.
71 E. González (2017) indicates three ships: the cho *Nuestra Señora de la Limpia Concepción*, captained by Antonio de Acosta Benucho; the cho *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción*; the ship Santa Cruz. All three vessels had as captain major (capitán mayor) Fernando Barreto de Almeida. According to the author, the *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción* came also in 1641 with Gerónimo de Sosa as its captain.

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