Sino-Vietnamese Pirates and British Invaders
Maritime Crises, Oceanic Governance and Sovereignty in Mid-Qing China

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ABSTRACT: At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Qing state confronted its most serious maritime threat since the conquest of Taiwan in 1683. From the 1790s to 1802, huge Chinese pirate fleets allied with the newly unified Vietnamese state (Tayson regime, 1778-1802) and ravaged the coastal frontier of South China. Worse yet, Britain, hoping to grab a much-needed foothold in East Asia, launched two naval expeditions to occupy Macao, a long-time Portuguese settlement under Chinese ownership, in 1802 and 1808. This paper takes the Sino-Vietnamese pirates and British intruders as a prism to view the complexity of the Qing's oceanic governance. Furthermore, it examines how this dramatic combination of transnational and global crises affected the Qing's notions of maritime sovereignty and suzerainty before the full onslaught of Western aggression in the first Opium War. As the first step, this paper studies the contested constructions of oceanic space in late imperial China and how those constructions shaped government policies and precipitated violence at sea. It also throws new light on the contingent, piecemeal and experimental nature of British imperialism in China.

KEYWORDS: Piracy; Vietnam; Britain; Macao; Qing China; Oceanic governance; Sovereignty; Suzerainty;

The turn of the nineteenth century witnessed a series of crises in Qing dynasty China, culminating in a dramatic upsurge of maritime violence along its southern coast. From the 1790s to 1802, large pirate fleets collaborated secretly with the newly unified Vietnamese regime (that emerged from the Tay Son rebellion of 1771) and ravaged the littoral communi-

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ties of Guangdong and Fujian provinces.[1] The sponsorship of Chinese sea bandits by a long-term tributary vassal state presented a veiled challenge to the Qing suzerainty, making this calamity qualitatively different from the earlier piracy problems. Exploiting the chaotic situation along the China coast as well as the concomitant Great Wars (1792-1815) in Europe, furthermore, Britain launched two naval expeditions to occupy Macao in 1802 and 1808 which directly violated the Qing sovereignty over this Portuguese settlement. These two invasions, albeit failed, represented the most critical confrontations between the two great empires before the first Opium War (1839-1842).

The multifaceted crisis mentioned above not only foregrounded the complexities of China's trou-

bled oceanic engagement, it also precipitated new ideas about the empire's sovereignty and suzerainty before the full onslaught of Western aggression in the mid-nineteenth century. My article takes piracy as a prism through which to view how maritime violence affected oceanic governance, diplomacy and vice versa. As the first step, I will examine the construction of maritime space in traditional China as well as its deep-seated dilemma and broad implications.

The Chinese Construction of the Maritime World

According to Philip E. Steinberg, the maritime space is defined by a complex process of "social construction" based on different utilization, perception, and representation of this space by a wide range of sociopolitical groups.[2] My article stresses the importance of violence, especially piratical violence, in this multifaceted process of construction. Spatially, it is primarily concerned with the northwestern corner of the South China Sea, a transnational water world encompassing the Qing's southern coast and its shared maritime zone with Annam—the Gulf of Tonkin.[3]

To make sense of the vast sea, officials in traditional China sought to divide it into discrete places and to partition its threat, rather than resort to a process of military conquest.[4] Specifically, they split the oceanic world into two different but interrelated parts —the inner ocean/sea (*neiyang*, or *neihai*) and the outer ocean/sea (*waiyang*, or *waihai*)—with distinct functions and hence distinct ways of governance/engagement. This simple and ambiguous demarcation, as a predominant maritime discourse in the Middle Kingdom, constituted a cartographic grammar that shaped the delineation of its territorial sea space. Notwithstanding their critical significance, there was nothing natural about these two relational concepts whose meaning and boundaries changed over time depending on the state's governing capacity and broader geopolitical situations.[5]

The imperial Chinese state imposed this idea of a divided sea to help manage the structural limits of

its *de facto* authority across the vast ocean space. The relatively narrow and shallow belt of inner sea blended with intricate networks of waterways spreading out in the surrounding coastal areas as well as their labyrinth of inlets, coves, bays and islands. It was this unruly topography of land and water that created ideal hiding places for various nonstate and antistate groups. Local authorities rarely had the resources to mount regular patrols of these troubled areas, many of which remained bureaucratic headaches well into the twentieth century.[6] On paper, however, the inner sea marked the furthest extent of Chinese maritime authority. Hence it was always deemed a legitimate and controllable arena subject to sustainable state governance and economic extraction. This territorial right, for instance, was asserted clearly and forcefully by the Manchu authorities in response to Britain's two abortive invasions of Macao in 1802 and 1808.[7] Yet three decades later, the same right had become virtually indefensible as the Qing proved unable to counter the greater British aggression in the first Opium War.

Beyond the relatively calm littoral waters one enters the vast high sea, a capricious and dangerous domain beyond Chinese comprehension, politico-military control and economic exploitation. For the state, this seemingly "endless" region of blue water was a great void between "real" spaces. More *distance* than *territory*, it was an *asocial* space that remained outside state governance and insulated from the power struggles of land-based societies.[8] Functioning like a maritime Great Wall, the high sea defended China's continental civilization against oversea "barbarians" by precluding an imminent danger from them. Little wonder that the Chinese were obsessed with security within the inner sea and coastal regions. Their time-honored maritime strategy, furthermore, was passive "sea defense" (*haifang*) against local/regional marauders like pirates rather than active projection of naval power through "sea war" (*haizhan*) against encroaching foreign states. From a broader perspective, Sebastian R. Prange and Robert J. Antony argue that "The

political history of the early modern world is above all a history of the quest for sovereignty. At the core of this quest, furthermore, was an endeavor about control of the sea."[9] The latter half of this important argument is less true in Ming-Qing China, given its prioritization of overland defense against nomadic incursions. The Middle Kingdom, in general, had much less interest in developing maritime power prior to the Opium War, which created ample opportunities for sea bandits of various kinds.[10]

The dissection of a natural oceanic realm into two artificial parts functioned to set limits on the reach and responsibilities of the Chinese state, allowing it to ignore acts of violence at high seas. As the Qing emperor Jiaqing (r.1796-1820) lamented during the Sino-Vietnamese piracy crisis, his coastal officials, afraid of venturing into the outer ocean, repeatedly wrote off incidents in faraway waters as beyond their jurisdiction and thus were of little concern.[11] Whereas the outer sea was the place where Qing maritime governance ceased, it attracted various marginalized groups, like pirates, smugglers and traders, that sought to maximize their interest and autonomy. The state's construction of the inner-outer sea thus created a *de facto* fence which limited its own pursuit of maritime raiders.

The seafaring people of coastal China, in various ways, ignored or rejected the official construction of the maritime space as a divisible one. For those who made fields from the sea (*yi hai weitian*), the land-water boundary was blurred from birth. In their eyes, the sea united rather than divided, serving as an integrated "middle ground" that linked people, goods and communities across the maritime, littoral and inland areas.[12] The livelihood of those seafarers, moreover, depended on their routine traversing of the ambiguous bounds that differentiated the inner-outer sea/ocean.[13] Some audacious ones, moreover, deliberately took advantage of this farfetched demarcation to carry out maritime raiding and to flee justice. They often vanished without a trace by exiting to the outer ocean where the government forces refused to go. The vast

expanses of the ocean, together with its rugged coasts, elongated peninsula and numerous islands, made it extremely difficult for the Qing naval forces to locate and pursue these maritime bandits. Thus, as the Fujian and Zhejiang governor-general Yude (1800-1806) complained, offensive strategies like search-and-destroy missions were hard to implement on the high seas.[14]

To make the matters worse for the authorities, some ambitious pirates could heighten their nonstate or antistate operations by garnering support from supra-national powers, thus embroiling themselves in regional power struggles as this piracy crisis suggests. Due to repeated Qing suppression, desperate sea bandits from Guangdong and Fujian sought refuge in neighboring Vietnam and joined the newly-established Tay Son navy. They not only received protection, weapons and training from this fledgling rebel regime but also held official titles and ranks as evidenced by the Tay Son-issued brass seals, certificates, and passes. Apart from using Chinese pirates to reinforce their military power, the financially strapped Tay Son regime also dispatched those naval mercenaries back to coastal Guangdong and Fujian to pillage local communities and shipping.[15] Their main goal was to procure much-needed revenue to support their nascent project of war-making and state-building.

The Vietnamese Sponsorship of Chinese Piracy

The Tay Son regime had much to gain and little to lose from their secret sponsorship of Chinese piracy which was essentially a form of privateering. As an inexpensive and ingenious method of state building, it reflected the conscious effort of a unifying vassal state to overcome its financial-military constraints while renegotiating its status within the Sino-centric tributary system. This sort of maritime mercenarism was similar to the "marketization and internationalization of nonstate violence" in early modern Europe that profoundly shaped its naval warfare and state-building. According to Janice E. Thomson, a basic operating principle of European privateering was "plausible deniability." As he elaborates, "If a

The Qing's Anti-piracy Campaign in the South China Sea, Early Nineteenth Century.

private undertaking that a ruler authorized met with success, he could claim a share in the profits. If the enterprise caused conflict with another state, the ruler could claim it was a private operation for which he could not be held responsible."[16] The Tay Son did the same when the Qing accused them of supporting Chinese piracy. Seen from this perspective, one can use the Western-derived rule of plausible deniability to make sense of the privateering practices in the Sino-Vietnamese water world.

In their lengthy campaign against transnational pirates, the Qing navy had confiscated a number of aforementioned certificates, brass seals, and passes issued by the Tay Son. When questioned about them, the latter would deny any association and avert responsibility. Some Qing officials became so frustrated that they wanted to punish the audacious vassal state. Yet the Jiaqing emperor elected to exercise restraint. He even had those proofs of collaboration destroyed for the sake of imperial prestige.[17] The emperor explained his rationale in the following edict:[18]

"Judging from the confiscated seals and certificates, it is self-evident that many pirates infesting coastal China have been commissioned by the King of Annam…If we demand his collaboration for suppression, there is no way the King would comply with our wishes. If our Celestial Empire cannot stop its own people from becoming sea marauders, how can we expect a barbarian vassal state to do the same? If the King of Annam makes excuses and covers things up, how can we bring him to his senses? It is not worthwhile to launch a punitive expedition which would escalate the conflict. Neither should we send further official inquiries to Annam."

In this and other follow-up edicts Jiaqing further prohibited the Vietnamese pursuit of sea bandits in Qing territorial waters. He took pains to limit the fallout of this transnational crisis by characterizing it as a domestic one, opting to subdue pirates strictly on

the Chinese side of the maritime border *zone*.[19] In so doing, the emperor withdrew from China's traditional suzerain right to exercise coercion beyond its directly controlled maritime zone. Furthermore, the Qing acted increasingly like a sovereignty state that claimed exclusive responsibility for violence emanating from the space in which the ruler monopolized political authority.

In early modern Europe, it was generally accepted that "the state was responsible for quashing piracy within its own territorial waters, that is, where it claimed sovereignty." Seen from the opposite perspective, a state's inability to subdue pirates within certain maritime jurisdiction might raise doubts about its territorial right over the infested waters. Therefore, anti-piracy campaigns could have profound political significance as they helped establish *de facto* territoriality and assert state prerogatives. As Anne Pérotin-Dumon puts it, "Confrontations at sea were both an important instrument of state power and of a measure of the degree to which state authority was actually established."[20] Maritime crises like the south China piracy, similarly, not only raise questions about what lawful authority in oceanic context (transnational or not) was supposed to be; they also posed new challenges as to what sort of power and order could be enforced in watery areas not amenable to human settlement and political control. The suppression of piratical violence, in particular, was closely related to consideration of realistic problems associated with oceanic sovereignty.

The pragmatic Qing strategy mentioned above was reciprocated by the Tay Son regime as both sides sought to tighten security and to fortify border defense. In this process the porous, overlapping and shared frontier *zones* that had long been ambiguously defined in the Sino-Vietnamese water world began to harden into more clearly delineated border *lines* that would later become the "political-legal dividers between two sovereign states."[21] This was a preliminary step of organizing the fuzzy maritime space of the Gulf of Tonkin into territorially bound and self-entailed domains based on a logic of exclusion.[22]

Consequently, maritime violence became territorialized as it shifted from the nonstate and transnational realms of authority into the state and domestic realms of authority.[23] This process contributed to more clearly defined national boundaries by not only institutionalizing the distinction between insiders and outsiders but also asserting the monopoly of legitimate violence. All these were indicative of key changes in the development of sovereignty.[24] Gradually the Sino-centric tributary diplomacy gave rise to harbingers of new notions of territorial sovereignty during the Jiaqing reign, which changed the Qing engagement with its vassal neighbors and the maritime world in general.[25] By examining this process from multiple regional perspectives, one can better understand why Jiaqing made strenuous efforts to limit piracy suppression within the national framework of Chinese waters in which he monopolized political authority. This subtle yet important change should be taken as symptomatic of the Westphalian-like sovereignty in the making rather than a sign of incorrigible dynastic decline as conventional wisdom tells us.[26]

In addition, Emperor Jiaqing largely stood aloof from the geopolitical struggle of Southeast Asia. He refused to intervene when tributary neighbors, including Siam, Cambodia, and Laos, called on the Qing overlord to check Vietnamese aggression in their regional power struggles. Similarly, Jiaqing also declined requests from Nepal for military assistance against incursions from the British-controlled Bengal. In his imperial edicts to the kings of those vassal states, Jiaqing invoked the principles of impartiality and territorial sovereignty: "Our Celestial Kingdom pacifies every tributary state in an equal way; how can we help you while alienating the others?... Both China and its vassal states have definite boundaries that should not be violated."[27] Behind this high-sounding rhetoric of noninterference was Jiaqing's clear-headed understanding of the Qing's limits in shaping events beyond its defendable borders. He was rightly worried that the dynasty's imperial might and military prowess could

no longer effectively deter the Vietnamese and British expansions around China. Most strikingly, the emperor even tacitly agreed that Nepal became a concurrent vassal state of Britain, which was a sea change from earlier Qing diplomacy.

After decades of ineffective rule, the Tay Son regime was demolished by Nguyen Anh who became the founder of Vietnam's last dynasty—Nguyen (1802-1945). In order to renegotiate a new tributary relationship with the powerful northern neighbor, Nguyen Anh withdrew the Vietnamese support of Chinese pirates and, furthermore, drove them out of their safe haven in the Gulf of Tonkin. The ousted pirates had no choice but to regroup in Qing waters near Canton, Xiamen, Macao, Chaozhou, and Taiwan. Thanks to their politico-military experience gained in Vietnam, these sea bandits were able to unite into even larger, better organized confederations under the capable command of pirate chiefs like Zheng Yi, Cai Qian, and Zhu Fen. As a result, violence at sea reached a new peak after 1802 and posed a more formidable threat to the littoral communities and Western traders in South China.[28]

The Macao Expeditions of 1802 and 1808

Apart from the Tay Son sponsorship, the piracy crisis at the turn of the nineteenth century was also fueled by the intensifying commercial relationship between the Qing and the Western powers like Britain. A general dilemma should be highlighted here: The rise of industrial revolution led to increasing production of goods and growing demand for trade, which in turn called for more freedom to navigate the global market without fear of robbery, kidnapping, or death. However, this freedom and security could hardly be achieved because many states (especially non-Western ones) often lacked the resources to effectively curb maritime violence and to impose order on their increasingly enclosed territorial waters. As far as the south China piracy is concerned, on the one hand, it challenged the mercantilist trading system of the West

and affected the coffers of the British (and Chinese) empires; on the other hand, the escalating maritime violence also provided a good excuse for the British to increase their military presence in Chinese waters in the name of protecting their Canton trade, the only form of Western trade accepted by the Qing between 1757 and 1842. As a matter of fact, the Manchu regime had long prohibited foreign warships from entering its inner-sea territorial waters. During the Jiaqing reign, this ban was nonetheless lifted informally by the Canton authorities due to the exigence of the piratical crisis. Lacking the resources to effectively patrol the trade routes in the lower Pearl River delta, local officials acquiesced to the presence of British warships as convoy for the East India Company merchant vessels through the infested waters. What remained off-limit were strategic areas like Bogue located in the middle and upper reaches of the Pearl River delta. Literally meaning "the Tiger's Mouth," Bogue was not only the most important sea pass in this area but also the front doorway to Canton—the provincial capital of Guangdong and the only sea port open to Western trade.[29]

As violence surged in the Canton waters, the local officials faced an increasingly acute dilemma. On the one hand, they were responsible for ensuring trade flow that was the source of Qing custom revenue (and also their own personal profit). For this purpose, to some extent, they needed to accommodate Britain's security and commercial concerns. After all, the scourge of piracy did seriously affect the Western and Chinese shipping in this area, which provided common ground for military cooperation. This became increasingly necessary following the destructive piratical attack on Taiwan in 1805.[30] From 1807 on, some desperate officials began approaching the East India Company's official agents in Canton, the so-called Select Committee of Supercargoes, for secret military assistance. With the Chinese admitting that they could not keep their own house in order, the British were only too eager to answer their requests for help. This collaboration, albeit limited and clandestine, gave the British a wrong

Tsang scheng

Lafau Bge

Uong tong

KANTON (KWANG TUNG)

Pok lo

Tai lik

San long

Ho nan

Tung kong

FUI-

Fatschan

TSCHU

Tung lam

Sei wan

Tscheong ping

Tiger Ins.

Tigris

Bocca Tigris

Pu mun

Schun tak

Tai ping

Sam kok B.

Sifu thong

488

Lyong thu ho

Sei lam

Fuk wing

Li tong

Ngtung Pt.

Ku su

Scha tan

Sam lii

Heong schan

San on

Scham tsot

Mirs

B.

Lintin

Deep B.

Kio L.

550

Lok tschau

Kau luong

Tung tschong

Victoria

Tsin tschau

Lantau

HONGKONG

Patera I.

MACAO

(Brit.)

(Port.)

Ladrone Iⁿ.

Lema Iⁿ.

Maßstab 1:2 500 000

10 0 10 20 30 40 50

Kilometer

10 0 10 20 30

Seemeilen (60=1°)

Östl. v. Greenw.

sense of optimism that led directly to their miscalculation behind the Drury mission of 1808, their second and more aggressive attempt to occupy Macao.

While seeking British cooperation, the Canton officials faced heightened pressure from the Jiaqing emperor who was deeply concerned about Western naval presence in Qing waters.[31] From his vantage point, it was the inability of his officials to subdue pirates within their own jurisdictions that invited foreign intervention. This sure sign of weakness could raise doubts about the Qing territorial right over the troubled waters, according to the newly developed maritime logic elaborated earlier. Taking advantage of this Chinese dilemma, the British accelerated their imperial expansion which had impinged on the edge of Qing territory and reached a peak in their two Macao expeditions in 1802 and 1808. Next I will focus on the second invasion and examine how the Qing dealt with this unprecedented challenge to their maritime sovereignty.

Macao was a small peninsula on the southern tip of the Chinese empire, 62 kilometers west of Hong Kong and 107 kilometers south of Canton. Due partly to their contribution for helping suppress the transnational *wokou* pirates, the Portuguese secured a lease from the Ming government and began settling down on this peninsula in the mid-sixteenth century. As the first European maritime power to establish direct relations with China, Portugal had been the only carrier between the latter and Europe for almost a century. Gradually Macao developed into a flourishing trading post in Asia and the gateway to the Middle Kingdom. Prior to the Opium War, Macao had never been a colony because it ultimately belonged to China. Based on a strange "mixture of autonomy and subjection," this port city actually fell under the joint control of the Portuguese administration through Goa and the Chinese government through Canton prefecture.[32]

In comparison with its longtime ally Portugal, Britain was a latecomer to China. Over the course of the seventeenth century, the Dutch replaced the "de-

scendants of Da Gama"[33] as the dominant Western power in Asia, whose place in turn was superseded by the British as the eighteenth century progressed. Driven by the dual engine of legal tea import and illegal opium smuggling, Britain's China trade became the fiscal pivot of their commercial expansion and their political empire in India. This also allowed them to exert great influence over the Qing's trade with the West. After losing its thirteen colonies in North America, Britain embarked upon a strategic "swing to the East" that sought to expand markets in China. The English found it increasingly urgent to gain a foothold of their own (similar to Macao) along the China coast. One of their most important efforts, for instance, was Lord Macartney's embassy in 1793 which failed due partly to the kowtow controversy. Nevertheless, this delegation did succeed in its secret goal of reconnaissance— the careful gathering of intelligence around Macao in preparation for possible military actions against the Qing.[34] This critical information, along with other precipitating factors, paved the way for the first British invasion of this peninsula in 1802.

The extensive Great Wars (1792-1815) not only plunged Europe into great chaos but also spilled over to the South China Sea, causing significant rippling effects on both the Canton trade and the piracy disturbance. The epic naval war between Britain and France, in particular, could potentially stretch to everywhere their ships might sail. So the British decided to send more warships to Chinese waters in order to forestall both the French navy and the Chinese pirates. As early as 1801, France and Spain had joined forces in invading Portugal, Britain's traditional ally. The Court of Directors of the East India Company in London feared that the French would attack the British and Portuguese possessions in the East. Macao was deemed most vulnerable as the weakest link in Britain's strategic chain in Asia.[35] Triggered by the same anxiety, the Admiralty in London authorized the Marquis of Wellesley, the Governor-general of India, to send a naval fleet to Macao in the name of helping their Por-

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tuguese ally to head off possible French invasion. On February 27, 1802, a task force of six warships commanded by Captain Edward Osborn and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hamilton arrived at Lintin, the island anchorage 29 kilometers northeast of Macao. But, as I have explained elsewhere, they could neither land their troop nor enter the city.[36]

The opportunity to seize Macao came again in 1807 as the menace of French expansionism reappeared and escalated on a global scale. In June, Napoleon's empire defeated Russia and threatened to capture British India and to ruin their China trade. Four months later they went on invading Portugal and forced the Lisbon court to flee to Brazil under British protection. The ninth Governor-General of India, Lord Minto, convinced the Portuguese authority

at Goa that the presence of French warships in eastern seas posed a serious threat. It was thus essential to allow Britain to garrison both Goa and Macao for protection. On July 21, 1808, Rear Admiral William Drury, the commander of British Royal Navy in India, arrived in Macao waters with the first detachment of three hundred marines on nine warships.[37]

For the Macanese Portuguese, trade was the most fundamental issue in their relationship with China and with other Western powers. As Shantha Hariharan and P.S. Hariharan write, they "opposed to Britain or any other nation intruding into their China trade and adopted overt and covert strategies to protect their turf while playing on Chinese fears and suspicions of foreigners."[38] This strategy was on full display in the Portuguese response to the second

A Portuguese illustration of the naval combats between the Portuguese navy in Macao and Chinese pirates in 1809-1810, during the Battle of the Tiger's Mouth in the Pearl River Delta

British invasion. Like his predecessor in 1802, the then Governor of Macao Bernardo Aleixo de Lemos Faria refused to let the British force enter the city, citing the need to wait for superior order from Goa.[39] Even if the French attacked, he explained, no outside assistance was necessary since Macao fell under Qing protection, according to a bilateral convention signed right after the first British invasion. Brushing aside the Sino-Portuguese agreement, Admiral Drury threatened to use force to bring the ungrateful ally to senses if necessary. The standoff was finally broken when another seven hundred British troops arrived from India in four ships. Being militarily much weaker, the Portuguese Governor had no choice but to give in to the British demands. Meanwhile, the more anti-British Chief Judge of Macao (Desembargador) rushed to Canton and requested help from Wu Xiongguang, the Qing Governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces. As the Portuguese reasoned, if the Chinese were serious about their sovereignty over Macao, let them prove it by repelling the British invaders. Henceforth the main conflict had grown from a Portuguese-British one to a Sino-British confrontation.

Wu Xiongguang protested the British for their audacious act of aggression and ordered their naval forces to leave Macao immediately. In response, Drury stressed his "most benevolent intentions" of helping "protect" their Portuguese ally from French attack and of assisting the Qing to eradicate piracy. The Governor-general refused to accept this explanation. After repeated ineffective warnings, he not only shut down the English trade in Canton but also cut off their food supplies in Macao. To avert a full-scale confrontation, however, Wu did not take immediate measures to expel the invaders by force.

Confident of British naval superiority, Drury was not intimidated by Wu's rather restrained reaction. In his China mission, the Admiral depended on the advice and support of the East India Company's official agents in Canton, the Select Committee, which managed the British trade with "superior local knowledge." While in the first Macao expedition the Committee wisely counselled prudence; six years later, with a change in personnel and leadership (under new President John W. Roberts), they had grossly miscalculated the situation and advocated the use of force to make the Canton authorities relent.[40] The Committee in 1808 naively predicted that neither the Chinese authority nor the Portuguese government would oppose the British occupation of Macao. To quote their report to Lord Minto dated March 8: "In our opinion neither embarrassment to our affairs or any serious opposition are to be apprehended on the part of the Chinese government. From the excessive corruption and weakness that exists in this provincial government, all instructions or attempts to suppress the ladrones are either evaded or are nugatory, and we believe they would most cheerfully see Macao in the possession of the English from an expectation that the pirates would no longer be allowed to infest the coast."[41]

Even after this prediction proved wrong, the over-optimistic Committee still insisted that "any objections or impediments on the part of the Chinese would be of temporary nature." They assured Drury that the arrival of his naval force provided the most favorable opportunity to negotiate with the Qing government. Under persistent pressure, the latter would soon restore the commercial intercourse because it depended on Britain for lucrative foreign trade with the West. With Macao under their capable custody, moreover, the British could subdue the pirates, which would in turn repair the sour Anglo-China relations.[42] All of this was wishful thinking, nevertheless, not supported by realistic assessment of the Qing's trade and diplomatic policies. When it comes to China's encounter with the outside world in the traditional period, politics and prestige almost always trumped trade and profit. Even in terms of financial benefit, "Britain needed the trade more than did China as the effect of a stoppage appeared to be minor for China but major for the English. There was always a risk of some other European nation supplanting them."[43]

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Yet this was less clear to the aggressive Select Committee and to the proud Admiral. At the former's suggestion, Drury had decided to flaunt the strength of the world's most powerful navy to overawe and intimidate the Qing into restoring trade. He personally commanded three warships and ventured up the Pearl River, which blatantly violated the Qing law as mentioned earlier. In the name of protecting British trade from piracy attack, the fleet broke through Bogue and anchored at Whampoa (*huangpu*), the inner harbor of Canton where cargoes were loaded and unloaded. Admiral Drury insisted on a personal audience with the Governor-General Wu Xiongguang, threatening to raid into his provincial government, just about 20 kilometers upriver, if his demand was not met. When this ultimatum went unheeded, Drury's warships sailed upstream and were fired upon by the Qing batteries onshore. This "was the deepest that the Great War reached into the orient," as Noel Mostert puts it.[44] Finding his ships in a highly precarious situation, the Admiral balked and withdrew to Macao, against the hawkish advice from the Select Committee. He had no intention of starting a full-scale war that, in his own words, might "exclude the English forever, from the most advantageous monopoly it possesses in the Universe."[45]

In both cases of British invasion, the Canton authorities hoped to solve the crisis before Emperor Jiaqing discovered it. So they tried to keep Beijing in the dark about the actual realities on the ground. When this became impossible, they turned to the convenient strategy of selective reporting that would minimize both difficulties for the British and suspicion toward themselves.[46] Not surprisingly, the Jiaqing emperor was astounded and furious when he finally pieced together the whole picture of Drury's intrusion. On September 26, 1808, he issued a fiery edict to both Governor-general Wu Xiongguang and Guangdong governor Sun Yuting, which was later delivered to John W. Roberts, the President of Select Committee. Jiaqing not only scolded and dismissed the two officials for acting cowardly when Drury first landed at Macao; he also lambasted the British for their self-acclaimed "most benevolent intentions:"[47]

Macao City View from French Expedition, 1787

"The law on the national defense of the Celestial Empire is extremely severe. We will not allow anyone to challenge it. If the Portuguese and the French will fight and slay each other, that is a matter which concerns only the barbarians. We, the Middle Kingdom, will not intervene. In recent years, Burma and Siam have warred against each other, and often they appealed to China for help. Yet the Grand emperor treats both of them equally and without partiality.

E DE MACAO EN CHINE.

Both China and her vassal states have definite boundaries which should not be violated. Remember that the warships of China have never sailed overseas to land and quarter troops on your territory. However, the warships of your country dare to sail into Macao to land and live there! This is indeed a grievous and rash blunder. You say you fear that France might attack the Portuguese; do you not know that the Portuguese are living in Chinese territory? How dare the French invade and plunder at the risk of offending the Celestial Empire? Even if France conceived such an idea, the law of the Celestial Empire is adamant and effective. We would not tolerate an invasion by the French, and would immediately send our mighty army to suppress and annihilate them in order to maintain our maritime defense. There is no need of your country to send soldiers here to act as protectors of the Portuguese."

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Jiaqing also chastised Drury's pretext of offering help in the anti-piracy mission:

"If you say you come because the pirates have not yet been suppressed and you are eager to serve the Celestial Empire, this is utter nonsense! The pirates on the seas have been repeatedly suppressed, and now they are powerless, driven to escape now to the east, now to the west…Within the near future, the remaining pirates will be annihilated. We do not need to borrow military aid from your country. We can well imagine that the barbarian merchants of your country, jealous of Portuguese privileges at Macao, wished to take advantage of the critical moment when the Portuguese were weak, and attempt to occupy Macao and live there. If this is the case, you have drastically violated the laws of the Celestial Empire."[48]

In this scathing edict, Emperor Jiaqing charged that the British understood Macao to be Qing territory. Any foreign military presence in this area would not only violate the Qing's law but also jeopardize its sovereignty. In so doing, the emperor asserted his undisputable power to determine legality and to monopolize violence within Qing territorial boundaries. Instead of rehashing the traditional rhetoric of tributary superiority that had long dominated Chinese diplomacy, interestingly, Jiaqing took the moral high ground through another route which appealed more to Western sensibilities. Specifically, he advocated the relatively new norms of formal equality, territorial right, reciprocity, and nonintervention to counter the pressure from both tributary neighbor and Western power. In so doing, Jiaqing retreated from the empire's unsustainable claim and onerous responsibility of inclusive universal suzerainty for the purpose of safeguarding its core interest of exclusive domestic sovereignty. He thus not only reconciled the Qing's acute dilemma between rhetoric (*de jure* suzerainty) and reality (*de facto* sovereignty) but also exposed Britain's "organized hypocrisy." As Stephen D. Krasner explains, "organized hypocrisy" is an enduring attribute of international relations which refers to the presence of longstanding norms that are frequently violated by those state holders who promoted them in name.[49] After reading Jiaqing's edict, Drury confided to the Select Committee that it was "dictated by Wisdom, Justice and dignified Manhood in support of those Moral Rights of Man, of Nations, and of Nature, outraged and insulted."[50]

Although one tends to associate the aforementioned principles of equality, territorial right, and non-intervention with a post-Westphalian European order of sovereign states, they were not utterly alien to the Qing political thinking. Neither did they necessarily result from the process of "Western challenge, Chinese response" during and after the Opium War. Generally speaking, the Sino-centric tributary system divided the world into spheres of influence rather than realms of sovereignty. As a civilizational powerhouse in most of its traditional history, the Chinese empire had long claimed to exercise symbolic, universal suzerainty within its known world ("All under Heaven" in Chinese), with power getting more and more attenuated with distance from the throne. This time-honored system of trade and foreign relations between China and its vassal states created a patchwork of overlapping boundaries and incomplete rights of governments characterized by plural allegiances and ambiguous identities. This was no way to run an empire, nevertheless, in the dog-eat-dog age of predatory national states in the late nineteenth century. It was during this peak of foreign aggression that China developed a fully-fledged concept of sovereignty, referring to absolute and perpetual power vested in an imagined political community. Yet it must be emphasized that, as discussed earlier, some preliminary notions of territorial right and political equality had already germinated amidst the power brokering within the tributary system by 1800. When it comes to drawing rather clear borders on a map, it was part of a repertoire which the Qing had used before (albeit rarely), as evidenced in the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk with expansionary Russia in

A British Plan of the city and harbour of Macao : a colony of the Portuguese, situated at the southern extremity of the Chinese Empire (1796)

PART of the ISLAND of MACAO belonging to the CHINESE

A PLAN
of the
CITY AND HARBOUR OF MACAO
A COLONY OF THE PORTUGUEZE
situated at the southern extremity of the
CHINESE EMPIRE
in Lat 22.12.15 N. Long 113.35.0 East of Greenwich.

THE INNER HARBOUR

TWEE-LIEN-SHAN

USUALLY CALLED

PATERA

MACAO

REFERENCES

FORTS
1. 1st Fort of Guia called the Main Guard
2. No de Guia
3. Fort de la Barra
4. Nª da Bom Parto
5. S. Francisco
6. S. Pedro de Penha

PARISHES
7. The Cathedral
8. S. Lorenzo
9. S. Antonio

COLLEGES
10. The Royal College of S. Joseph
11. The College of S. Paul

CONVENTS
12. The Augustins
13. The Dominicans
14. The Franciscans
15. Sª. Clara

CHAPELS
16. Of the Hospital La Misericordia
17. Of the Hospital S. Lazaro
18. Nª Sª da Penha de França
19. La Misericordia

20. The Custom House
21. The Gallows Beach
22. The Isle of S. Jerome
23. The Isle of S. Francis
24. The Pole of S. Francisco
25. The Fosse de S. Francisco
26. The Square of La Misericordia
27. Small landing place
28.
29. The silver landing place
30. The small bazar
31. Fort. S. Tiago
32. Parade All Tree
33. Tribe, being a Chinese city which the Emperor does Macao
34. Chinese Temple

37. The English Factory

A Scale of 1200 English yards.

ISLAND FORMING
the
NORTH SIDE OF THE TYPA

ISLAND ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE TYPA

1689. How much of a trend the two cases represent is subject to interpretation. In any event, they showcase the Qing's capacity to cope with changing geopolitical conditions by employing new conceptions of state power and by appropriating new sources of legitimacy.

The South China piracy and the two Macao incidents, I argue, played an important role in this process of change and adaptation by setting in motion political tensions and by reshaping the Qing's maritime consciousness. Together they brought some of the submerged ideas about the Sino-centric tributary system more to the fore, including the principles of practicality, autonomy and nonintervention. For instance, the Jiaqing court began to deemphasize the ritualistic display of its symbolic supremacy while becoming more sensitive to the realpolitik of the empire and its limitations. They pragmatically modified the China-centered hierarchical diplomacy in order to meet the unprecedented geopolitical challenges posed by the rising tributary neighbors and by the industrializing Western powers. This change, as Frederic Wakeman put it, precipitated "the development of a new sense of imperial diplomacy that largely erased the lines between realistic statecraft and ritualistic culturalism long before the British imposed the unequal treaty system upon the Chinese after the Opium War."[51] This convergence of culturalism and statecraft narrowed the gap between the normative principles of Qing tributary diplomacy and the actual nature of its interaction with the outside world. It also made Qing officials more rational in dealing with a new set of diplomatic and military challenges during the nineteenth century when China's geopolitical condition kept deteriorating.

After the narrow escape from a war outside Canton, Drury realized that the crux of the problem was that the Qing would never allow the British force to remain in Macao on any terms. The only way to preserve the China trade was to disembark his warships back to India, which he did on October 25.[52] In a final report to his superior in India, Drury described

the expedition as "the most mysterious, extraordinary and scandalous affair that ever disgraced such an armament." He further commented on the role of piracy in his debacle, taking it as a necessary component of Qing empire building by safeguarding against strangers settling in Macao. As for the Qing authorities, by driving the English out of the peninsula, they sent a clear message to the world that Portugal was just a lucky tenant on Chinese soil, thanks to the goodwill of the landlord—the Manchu emperor. In this sense, Jiaqing turned crisis into opportunity by using the piracy disturbance and the British expeditions to reassert the Qing sovereignty over Macao.[53]

Like the Tay Son sponsorship of Chinese pirates, the British invasions alarmed the Qing court and raised their awareness about territorial sovereignty. They also galvanized some Chinese officials and intellectuals to pay more attention to the maritime world, global geography, and Western learning during the early nineteenth century. Albeit limited, their effort laid the foundation for a larger geographical reorientation of imperial attention from the northwest to the southeastern coast after the Opium Wars.[54]

In his study of the Drury affair, the early-twentieth-century French sinologist M.C.B. Maybon commented that the Qing regime, "alongside its well-known arrogance, was able to demonstrate an energy of attitude, a will of resistance against foreign participation, a standpoint of opposition with the instruments of war capable to force a great European power to back down."[55] Like the first episode of British expedition, the Drury affair demonstrates how a so-called "declining" traditional empire was able to safeguard its sovereignty against foreign incursions by forcing a leading industrializing power to give in. Both crises also show how Europe's Great Wars were exported to Asia via maritime means and, more importantly, how certain European powers took advantage of other states' domestic disturbance to advance their imperialist missions.

Britain's two failed expeditions to Macao also shed light on the contingent and experimental nature of its imperialism. One should not assume the latter to be a basket of traits, capabilities, skills and strategies that any states could acquire simply by developing superior industrial and military power. Imperialism was neither a one-size-fits-all formula ready for universal application nor a predetermined goal that can be attained once for all. Instead it was a trial-and-error process that advanced in a piecemeal fashion. Its success hinged on pragmatic interstate bargaining and down-to-earth compromise dictated by local incidents, regional power struggle, and global geopolitical considerations. All of these explain the different forms, rhythms, and outcomes of imperialism across the globe.

By the same token, the British policy toward China could have gone in different directions, rather than taking a linear path from Macartney's diplomatic mission, to the military confrontation in the Opium Wars, and to the establishment of the extraterritorial treaty-port system. Each major upheaval within the late Qing empire, furthermore, was a green light for Britain's imperialist charge. Before they could really impinge on the Chinese empire, however, the British must *learn* to do so—to negotiate patiently and to wait for the right moment. The two Macao incidents tell the story of an inexperienced imperialist power which miscalculated and was only able to reorient itself by making pragmatic compromises. Albeit unsuccessful, such efforts paved the way for future British endeavors in the Qing empire. View in this light, the explosive Opium War and the unequal treaty it produced were not as a watershed event as it might seem to be.

Conclusion

In very general terms, Mark Shirk defines sovereignty "as the practice of drawing and redrawing boundaries around political authority." As for the sovereign state, it is "the polity constructed by these boundaries." Moreover, sovereignty is predicated upon the simultaneous existence of its opposite, the anti-sovereign, like pirates in the context of oceanic space. Hence these sea bandits served as a constitutive rhetoric of sovereignty through "negative identification."[56] Neither a Western monopoly nor a permanent norm of international order, sovereignty evolved in multiple parts of the world (including imperial China) in adaptation to the changing configuration of local, regional and global power relations. This complicated, multifaceted process of evolution underlines the "variable, contingent, and practical nature of sovereignty."[57] As an institution that organizes regional and global politics, sovereignty not only depends upon a set of interstate relations but also is constituted and reproduced through the practices of nonstate/antistate actors and their interactions with the authorities.

My article is concerned with the historical development of sovereignty in the maritime context of the Qing empire as well as the role of piracy in this contentious process. It examines China's social construction of the oceanic space and highlights the dilemma that top-down political construction of the South China Sea often conflicted with bottom-up social perception and utilization of such space by local and transnational groups. This quandary profoundly affected China's strategy of maritime governance; it also provided a central dynamic behind the escalating piracy disturbance at the turn of the nineteenth century.

Whether treated as a discourse or a wide range of violent maritime practices, piracy is a sociopolitical tool that can be used by different groups and/or states for different purposes. For the marginalized seafarers, it was a "weapon of the weak" to reproduce their autonomy in areas of ambiguous jurisdiction and to resist unwelcome state control; for the Western powers, it became a convenient excuse for their imperialist charge and colonial expansion. For the Qing regime, it was a good opportunity to clarify maritime boundary by exercising sovereignty over the infested waters through state efforts of piracy suppression. This article addresses the general question of governability in

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the oceanic space and how it was compounded by transnational actors like pirates, vassal state rulers and Western colonizers. Efforts to address the multifaceted maritime crisis during the Jiaqing reign, I argue, facilitated the Qing's transformation from an inclusive traditional empire which exercised symbolic universal suzerainty to a more territorially bound sovereignty state that retained exclusive rights over its territory and domestic affairs, to the exclusion of all external powers. Such state, in Thomson's words, "held one another accountable for any individual violence emanating from their respective territories. Sovereignty was redefined such that the state not only claimed ultimate authority within its jurisdiction, defined in geographic terms, but accepted responsibility for transnational violence emanating from its territory." It was in this process that the fine line between

legitimate and illegitimate practices of maritime coercion was established.[58]

From the Qing's interactions with its southern neighbor and with the leading Western power, one can see some preliminary signs of the China-centered Confucian system of tributary hierarchy transitioning to a poly-centric system of more equal interstate relations, something described in older stories as a total European import. Efforts of this type, albeit limited and piecemeal, would ease the shift from a traditional dynastic empire to a modern nation state that started well before the West opened China in the Opium War. Just in this sense, one can argue that the Qing was a polity with attributes of both empire and state. The tensions between these two logics of rule are important for understanding the rise and fall of piracy as well as its role in the development of China's maritime governance and sovereignty. RC

NOTES

1 Whereas Western piracy had long declined from its heyday (1650s-1730s), its Chinese counterpart entered the final stage of its golden age at the turn of the nineteenth century. Robert J. Antony, Like Froth Floating on the Sea: The World of Pirates and Seafarers in Late Imperial South China (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2003), 165-167.
2 Philip E. Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 21.
3 For almost a millennium, successive Chinese dynasties had referred to their southern neighbor as Annam (Pacified South).
4 This is very similar to the case of Tokugawa Japan. See Marcia Yonemoto, "Maps and Metaphors of the 'Small Eastern Sea' in Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868)," Geographical Review 89 (1999): 177.
5 Dian Murray, "Piracy and China's Maritime Transition, 1750-1850," in Maritime China in Transition, 1750-1850, eds. Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin-keong (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004), 55.
6 Among China's coastal provinces, Guangdong and Fujian administered the largest inner ocean/sea that required an active state presence. In this vast water world government resources were often overstretched to a dangerous level during the Ming-Qing period. Local seafarers could easily adapt to piracy and exit to the outer ocean when that became their best option,

making the two provinces the hardest-hit in most of the empire's piracy disturbances.
7 Wensheng Wang, White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates: Crisis and Reform in the Qing Empire (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2014), 102.
8 Steinberg, The Social Constructaion of the Ocean, 52.
9 Sebastian R. Prange and Robert J. Antony, "Piracy in Asian Waters Part 2: Piracy, Sovereignty, and the Early Modern Asian State—An Introduction," Journal of Early Modern History 17 (2013): 1-7.
10 A major exception is Zheng He's several maritime expeditions in early Ming (1405-1433).
11 Jiaqing daoguang liangchao shangyudang (Imperial Edicts of the Jiaqing- Daoguang Reigns) JQSYD (Guilin:
12 Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2000). vol.1, 8.
13 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
14 With more fish in the deeper outer ocean than in the inner sea, for instance, the fishermen's survival relied on their freedom and abilities to range back and forth across the imagined boundary. Wang, White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates, 104.
15 JQSYD, vol.10, 298, 304.
16 Wang, White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates, 213.
17 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 21.
18 Emperor Jiaqing's edict of July 23, 1797, JQSYD, vol.2, 205.

19 Emperor Jiaqing's edict of January 9, 1797, JQSYD, vol.2, 7.

20 This maritime border zone between the Qing and Annam was customarily demarcated by the contested water bridge of Jiangping and Bailongwei. Located in the center of the Gulf of Tonkin, this water bridge marked a recognizable natural barrier or buffer region between the two countries. Murray, Pirates of the South China Coast, 43.

21 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 115-116; Anne Pérotin-Dumon, "The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and Law on the Seas, 1450-1850," in James D. Tracy ed., *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 202.

22 R. Randle Edwards, "Imperial China's Border Control Law," Journal of Chinese Law 1(1987): 35.

23 This slow and contentious process has broadened and continued to this day, evident in the lingering territorial disputes between China and Vietnam over the South China Sea.

24 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 19.

25 This process has continued to this day, evident in the lingering territorial disputes between China and Vietnam over the South China Sea.

26 Many of these new ideas seemed to resonate with the Vietnamese side as this unifying vassal state began to accept the pragmatic logic behind the renegotiated tributary system.

27 Robert Antony, "State, Continuity, and Pirate Suppression in Guangdong Province, 1809-1810," Late Imperial China 27 (2006): 23.

28 Alexander Woodside, "Ch'ien- Lung Reign," in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 9, The Ch'ing Empire to 1800, pt. 1, ed. Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 265; see also Qingdai waijiao shiliao (Archives on Foreign Diplomacy of the Qing Dynasty, hereafter QDWJSL) Museum of the Forbidden City, ed., (Taipei: Chengwen, 1968), 97, 123, 131-135; see Lo- shu Fu, ed., A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, 1644-1820 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), pt. 1, 371, 401.

29 Cai Qian and Zhu Fen even collaborated with each other from 1806 to 1808, trying to set up maritime regimes by occupying Taiwan. But this effort failed due to internal conflict and government suppression.

30 It is humen in Chinese, or Boca Tigris as the Europeans called it.

31 Jiaoping caiqian zougao (Memorials on the Suppression of the Pirate Chief Cai Qian) (Beijing: Guojia tushuguan fenguan, 2004), vol. 1, 31.

32 Pérotin-Dumon, "Pirate and the Emperor," 202; Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 115-116.

33 Located on the western coast of India, Goa represented the Portuguese Crown and controlled all its possessions in the East, including Macao. Shantha Hariharan, "Macao and the English East India Company in the Early Nineteenth Century: Resistance and confrontation," Portuguese Studies 23(2007):145.

34 Demetrius Charles Boulger, History of China (London: W.H. Allen and Co., 1881), vol.3, 9.

35 J. L. Cranmer-Byng, "The Defences of Macao in 1794: A British Assessment," Journal of Southeast Asian History 5(1964):135-143.

36 Chung Tan, China and the Brave New World: A Study of the Origins of the Opium War (1840-42) (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1978),107; Alastair Lamb, T*he Mandarin Road to Old Hue*: *Narratives of Anglo-Vietnamese Diplomacy from the 17th Century to the Eve of the French Conquest* (Shoe String Pr Inc, 1970), 57; Boulger, History of China, vol.3, 28; Hosea Ballou Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China 1635-1834 (Oxford University Press, 1926), vol. 2, 369.

37 Wang, White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates, 235-237; Herbert J. Wood, "England, China, and the Napoleonic Wars," Pacific Historical Review 9 (1940):139-156.

38 Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, 44.

39 *Shantha Hariharan and P.S. Hariharan, "The Expedition to Garrison Portuguese Macao with British Troops: Temporary Occupation and Re-embarkation, 1808," International Journal of Maritime History 25 (2013): 90;* Hariharan, "Macao and the English East India Company in the Early Nineteenth Century," 145, 152.

40 Actually the Governor of Macao adopted a familiar policy of "calculated indifference" to the orders of the Viceroy of Goa in consideration of the local interest and wisdom. Hariharan, "Macao and the English East India Company in the Early Nineteenth Century," 145, 152.

41 Wood, "England, China, and the Napoleonic Wars," 151, 156.

42 Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, Vol. 3, 86-87.

43 Ibid, 87-88; Wood, "England, China, and the Napoleonic Wars," 147; *Shantha Hariharan and P.S. Hariharan, "The Expedition to Garrison Portuguese Macao with British Troops," 105, 112.*

44 *Shantha Hariharan and P.S. Hariharan, "The Expedition to Garrison Portuguese Macao with British Troops," 104.*

45 Noel Mostert, The Line Upon a Wind: The Great War at Sea, 1793-1815 (New York: Norton, 2008), 593.

46 Wood, "England, China, and the Napoleonic Wars," 150, 153; Stephen R. Platt, Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age (Knopf: 2018).

47 Wood, "England, China, and the Napoleonic Wars," 147.

48 The imperial edict of September 26, 1808, JQSYD, vol.13, 587; QDWJSL, 176; The translation is from Fu,

A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, part 1, 369-370; Wood, "England, China, and the Napoleonic Wars," 152.

49   Fu, A Documentary Chronicle, 369-70.

50   Stephen D. Krasner, "Organized Hypocrisy in Nineteenth-century East Asia," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 1(2001):173-197.

51   C. Northcote Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1954), 331.

52   Frederic Jr. Wakeman, "Drury's Occupation of Macau and China's Response to Early Modern Imperialism," East Asian History 28 (2004): 27.

53   Six days later the British trade in Canton was restored. *Shantha Hariharan and P.S. Hariharan, "The Expedition to Garrison Portuguese Macao with British Troops," 106.*

54   Morse, Chronicles of the East India Company, vol. 3, 88-91.

See also QDWJSL, 245, 248; Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, 331; Third Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons (London, 1832), 547-548.

55   Further research is needed to elucidate this momentous shift in the nineteenth century.

56   Maybon, "Les Anglais à Macao, en 1802 et en 1808," Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient," tôme 6, 1906, 325. See Wakeman, "Drury's Occupation," 33-34.

57   Mark Shirk, "Bringing the State Back into the Empire Turn: Piracy and the Layered Sovereignty of the Eighteenth Century Atlantic, International Studies Review 19(2017):146; Robert Elliot Mills, "The Pirate and the Sovereign: Negative Identification and the Constitutive Rhetoric of the Nation-State," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 17 (2014): 105-135.

58   Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 12.

59   Ibid, 19.

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