


Manila in the Zheng Clan Maritime Networks

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RIVALRY AMONG MARITIME MERCHANTS IN EAST ASIA

A study of Spanish and Portuguese missionary and administrative texts, as well as the registers produced in 17th century Manila to control maritime goods casts light on the informal maritime merchant networks and communities—particularly those of the Spanish in Manila—that were controlled by the Zheng clan. We will try here to identify and evaluate these sources, to underline their contributions and conceptually re-establish the historiographic discourse around Chinese piracy in the 17th century.

We can define the interactions, contacts and conflicts among the Spanish of East Asia and the Chinese merchant maritime networks led by the Zheng clan as a process of interaction between two merchant networks. The Flemish Jesuit Francisco Rogemont describes this Zheng maritime trading network in his valuable *Relaçam do estado politico e espirital do imperio da China, pellos annos de 1659 atè o de 1666*, published in Lisbon in 1672. In Rogemont's words Zheng

Zhilong 郑芝龙 was a '*príncipe dos navegantes*'.¹ The Zheng clan involved

maritime power interactions which largely took place in the areas of commerce and intermediation, and which also include some episodes of diplomatic contact and non-implemented projects of military confrontation (Wills 1979: 203, Calanca 1997: 979).

As we are describing informal economic networks, which are always qualified as 'pirate' by their rivals, emphasis is placed on their illegal character or on the use of violence as a means to monopolise routes or to attack rivals. However, one must not forget that the use of violence and coercion as an instrument associated with commerce was not exclusive to the Asiatic 'pirate' networks; it was a constant factor in the strategies and the development of the European 'merchant warriors' in the area (Winus and Vink 1991). The era of commerce in maritime Asia in the second half of the 16th century and almost all of the 17th century is characterised by the zeal to establish monopolies. This is especially applicable to European merchant communities competing in both business and the Asian coastal and territorial area, and also for the Chinese and Japanese mercantile communities, all of whom were illegal or violent to a greater or lesser degree. Maritime Asia in this period was an area that was not controlled by any norm of international law (Blussé 1988: 647-8). Ferocious competition was established in its centre with regard to the monopolisation of ports, routes, markets and areas of production, and systematic campaigns were undertaken in order to interfere with or sabotage from

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outside any mercantile systems which threatened the monopoly.

The period between 1567 and 1627 was one of relative calm and prosperity in the South China Sea. Chinese trading relations were relaxed with the successive increases in the number of boats authorised to leave the ports of Fujian (Wills 1979: 213). During the last decades of the 16th century, the large itinerant naval formations dedicated to piracy on the margins of legality disappeared from the seas of Southeast Asia, yet practices would persist that subverted the restrictions imposed. Together with the Portuguese establishment in Macao, and the opening of a viable trading connection between China and Japan, the arrival of the Spanish in the Philippines was a factor for channelling and stimulus in the dual process of trade and emigration. It promoted a considerable amount of Chinese emigration from the province of Fujian to the coast close to the island of Luzón, which accelerated from the last two decades of the 16th century, and also introduced this interchange of regional area into a large scale trading route, which linked Acapulco with Manila and the coast of Fujian and which involved a

new port of entry for silver in the form of silver Mexican *pesos* (Chang T'ien-tse 1934: 108, Flynn and Giraldez 1996: 309-38). The control of the commercial flow that it created was very important and highly attractive for the various trading networks that competed and interacted in the China seas, among which the Zheng clan were notable and acquired a central role between the 1620s and the 1680s.


The irruption of the Dutch into east China, which represented the exportation of the conflicts between the Spanish and the Dutch to the South China Sea, became a destabilising factor that destroyed the

regular trading routes and promoted the resurgence of piracy and illegal trade. After 1616 the immediate Dutch objective of obtaining profits with the taking of rival boats caused a series of recurring annual blockages of the port of Manila, coinciding with the arrival of the Manila galleon loaded with Mexican silver (which was never captured by the Dutch) or of the three or four dozen Chinese boats of between 25 and 350 tonnes that are calculated to have visited Manila each year from Fujian in the favourable sailing season between

March and June (Van Veen 2001: 90-6). In the specific case of the ascent and the consolidation of the Zheng clan, the collaboration with the Dutch by Zheng Zhilong, in command of three ships and a hundred men, in one of the frequent Dutch attacks on the Chinese junks that traded with Manila would be fundamental in this change (Wills 1979: 217).

During the period between 1567 and the second decade of the 17th century, the majority of Chinese junks and the emigrants who settled in Manila came from the southern Fujian port of Yuegang (Haicheng) in Zhangzhou Prefecture, the port that since 1567 had been permitted annually

to charter dozens of junks with a licence to trade in the seas of Nanyang, the South China Sea. From the second decade of the 17th century, and especially after 1627, a change occurred in the control and monopoly of the illegally trading Chinese naval fleets that shifted their central area of operations towards the more northerly area dominated by the mercantile maritime power of the Zheng family, which at that time was dominated by Zheng Zhilong. The southern Fujian ports of Quanzhou and Amoy (Xiamen) were the operational bases for the fleet that was controlling the sea routes between Japan, Taiwan, Luzon and Batavia.



Frontispiece of Rogemont's *Relaçam do estado politico e espirital do imperio da China, pellos annos de 1659 até o de 1666*

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This change also affected the origin of the community of overseas Chinese that had migrated to Manila. The old trading networks of Zhangzhou were to a large extent moved towards Macao due to Dutch pressure (Chang Pin-tsun 1983: 290). When Zheng Zhilong managed to control the trade route to Manila (and to Dutch Taiwan), the event coincided with his surrender to the Chinese authorities of Fujian and their legal recognition of his maritime company in exchange for the pacification of the straits, controlling different smuggling and pirate factions, and keeping the Dutch at bay (Carioti 1995: 59-60).

Three phases can be distinguished in the interactions between the naval trading communities linked to the Zheng clan and the Spanish in Manila, each marked by the leadership of the three successive chiefs of the clan: Zheng Zhilong (Nicolas Yquam, Chichilla or Chinchillon in Spanish sources from the period), Zheng Chenggong 郑成功 (Koxinga or Cuesing)² and Zheng Jing 郑经 (Quinsie, Sipuan or Punpuan in Spanish documents of the period).

LI DAN AND ZHENG ZHILONG

The first phase, which corresponds to the formative stage of the new informal mercantilist coalition and Fujian's naval power, opens with the testimony of the presence of Li Dan 李旦 in Manila in 1604 and extends into the times of the leadership of Zheng Zhilong before the fall of the Ming (1644). One should first point out the importance this phase had on the new intermediary role between the Asian and the European commercial networks that these 17th-century informal Chinese maritime mercantile networks and privateering leaders had and their personal links with the Iberian colonial cities of Macao and Manila. In this first phase, we should also mention how the trading network organised around Zheng Zhilong would play its Dutch card (Fort Zeelandia) and its Spanish card (Manila) at the same time, making the most of the confrontation between the Iberians, and managing to control both the route to the Dutch enclave in Taiwan and the route to the Spanish enclave in the Philippines, as well as its connection to the Japanese area through Hirado. In both cases, the driving force of the Fujianese migratory process was to transform the Chinese communities in Fort Zeelandia of Dutch Taiwan and in Manila of the Spanish Philippines into

key pieces of this strategy. This period was to be that of the greatest intensity in the galleon trade and that of the boats from Fujian that sailed to Manila. It also coincides with the presence of the Spanish in the north of Taiwan, in Danshui and Jilong, between 1628 and 1642. The Spanish of Taiwan were unable to attract sufficient immigrants or Chinese traders to be able to make their venture profitable, and they found themselves excluded from trade with Japan as well.

It is believed that in 1626 the informal maritime coalition, which had initially been led by Li Dan and which was inherited by Zheng Zhilong, controlled 120 ships. The next year the figure multiplied to 700, and in 1628 the governor of Fujian estimated that 1,000 ships were under the control of the Zheng clan (Chang Pin-tsun 1983: 289-90). Together with this position of absolute control of the coast of Fujian, another determining characteristic was also the key position in the intermediation between the different European commercial-imperial systems of the area and the Chinese coast. Li Dan and his successor Zheng Zhilong would intervene as an essential buffer between the Chinese Empire and the Dutch of Fort Zeelandia, reproducing the situation of Manila: Europeans were not permitted to enter China, but permission or 'semi-permission' was granted to Chinese fleets which left the coast to visit the European ports of East Asia to sell products in exchange for silver.

At the end of the 1620s trade between Manila and Fujian increased significantly. In 1632 it was calculated that more than two million Mexican pesos a year circulated between Manila and the coast of Fujian (Atwell 1978: 615). The Franciscan friar, Antonio Caballero de Santa María, mentioned the trading relationships of Zheng Zhilong with Manila in a letter written in 1660 to the governor of the Philippines, in which he summarised Zheng Zhilong's career, emphasising his move from pirate activities to the control of business in Manila based on his control of the land and sea in the area of Amoy. Antonio Caballero de Santa María mentioned the continuity of the domination of the Manila route by the Zheng clan and pointed to the existence of the few ships from either Zhangzhou or from Quanzhou that escaped his control.³

The first great leader of the new communities of Chinese merchant-pirates was Li Dan, named in Japanese sources as Captain Tojin (Tangren), which

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means the Captain of the Tang or Captain of the Chinese. In other sources he appears with the names of Andrea Dittis, Li Tuan or Li Han (Goodrich and Fang 1979, I: 871-2). He was probably born in Quanzhou, and he is said to have been one of the leaders of the Chinese community in Manila until he was condemned by the Spanish to serve as a galley slave as a punishment either for debts or due to a conflict over land claims.⁴ According to the chronology of the diary of Richard Cooks, Li Dan would have escaped his punishment in the galleys in 1607. According to this chronological account it is highly possible that his punishment was related to the consequences of the rebellion of the Manila Chinese which ended in the massacre of 1603, and it is possible that his punishment in the galleys was related to the Spanish offensive in the Moluccan Islands in 1606, which ended in the conquest of Ternate. After fleeing Manila, Li Dan reappeared in Hirado, also as a leader of the Chinese community. In 1619 Bartolomé Martínez wrote his '*Memorial acerca de la Utilidad de la conquista de Isla Hermosa*' in which he refers also to a pirate known as the King of China.⁵ On 24 April 1626, Salvador Díaz also wrote about Li Dan, whom he described as a renegade Christian.⁶

The survival of the mercantile links of Li Dan with Manila beyond that of the episode of 1604 which took him to the galleys is verified by the testimony of a merchant from Manila who was looking for him in Hirado in 1615 in order to recover a debt. The unified coalition of pirate groups which Li Dan began in the second quarter of the 17th century controlled a large quantity of boats and ports in the region. A brother of Li Dan controlled the Chinese community in Nagasaki, and a third brother lived on the Chinese coast and ensured him entry into the country (Wills 1979: 216-17). The incorporation of European military technology, together with the knowledge of languages and institutional, economic and commercial structures learned in Macao and Manila, converted these leaders of local communities into captivating figures with an enormous capacity to make the most of their skills in mediation. In 1625 Zheng Zhilong (known in Spanish sources by the Romanised names of *Chinchila* or *Chinchilla* or, more frequently as Nicolas Iquam, a name which he acquired in his childhood in Macao) succeeded Li Dan in the management of the main fleet of illegal Chinese merchants who were operating in the straits of Formosa. Zheng Zhilong had

grown up in Macao and maintained strong personal and commercial connections with the Chinese and Portuguese communities of Macao. According to the anonymous testimony of a short story about the two most important leaders in the Zheng clan, dating from Manila in 1662, the pirate leader Zheng Zhilong spent several years in Manila.⁷ This alleged presence of Zheng Zhilong in Manila is supported by the testimony of the Dominican priest Victorio Ricci.⁸

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Zheng Zhilong's links with the Iberian settlements in Asia (we should not forget that despite the ongoing rivalry, Macao and Manila belonged to the same crown between 1581 and 1640) did not come to an end in his infancy or childhood. This was explained by the Franciscan friar Antonio Caballero de Santa María⁹ when he wrote in 1649 from the Amoy area (Xiamen), about how 'the mandarin Yiquam', in other words Zheng Zhilong, maintained close family contacts with Macao: his daughter was married in Macao to a man called Antonio Rodríguez, son of Manuel Bello.¹⁰

The testimony of the Franciscan friar Buenaventura Ibáñez, written in Anhai on 3 February 1650, is also of great interest. To certify the truthfulness of a series of descriptions he makes of the customs of the mandarins, he refers to Manuel Bello, who was in Peking for two years accompanying the 'mandarin Iquam' as an authority on the subject. The most interesting piece

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of information is that the Franciscan friar indicated that the house in which he lived in Anhai belonged to precisely Manuel Bello of Macao—in other words, that the Franciscans of Anhai lived in a house belonging to Zheng Zhilong's father-in-law (Wyngaert 1936, III: 21, Jin Guoping and Wu Zhiliang, 2007: 374).

In this way we can see how the two main Chinese leaders of 17th century informal maritime power were essentially linked to the two Iberian cities of East Asia: Manila and Macao. This is a fact which might seem irrelevant, but it shows how the Zheng clan maritime power arose in a world where the presence of the Iberians and the Dutch altered all the rules of the game and the trading horizons in the maritime area of East Asia.

The perception of complicity and close relationship between the Chinese communities of Manila and the Zheng clan appears in several testimonies. For example, the Franciscan friar Antonio Caballero de Santa María commented on this link, from the times of Zheng Zhilong to those of Zheng Chenggong, in a letter to the governor of Manila dated 12 January 1660.¹¹ Caballero de Santa María insists on this involvement of the Zheng clan in Manila trading when he warned about the plans that Koxinga might have been hatching to conquer Manila. In a letter to the governor of Manila, dated 12 January 1660, he asked them not to trust Zheng Chenggong. He deduced that most of the Chinese in Manila were loyal to the Ming dynasty, and that, after the failure of the Nanjing offensive of 1659, Zheng Chenggong could propose an invasion of the Philippines.¹²

This does not mean that the Chinese of Manila were organically or systematically linked to or dependent on the Zheng clan, nor that from 1625 the Chinese junks that came to Manila always belonged to the Zheng's trading network. After the military confrontation of 1633-4 between the Dutch boats and the Chinese traders' boats led by Zheng Zhilong, there was a period of tense calm marked by fierce commercial rivalry. Zheng Zhilong based his force and his commercial strategy on complicity and collaboration with both his supporters and close allies on the China coast and the various overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia.

In the blockage of the port of Xiamen in 1633-4, which the Dutch governor of Taiwan, Hans Putmans promoted, one of the objectives pursued was that of forcing the opening of a trading flow between Fort

Zeelandia and the ports of Fujian, but at the same time it was designed to impede the access of the Chinese junks to Manila. The objective was the monopolisation of the commercial flow with the Chinese coast. This was stated in the letters that Putmans and Zheng Zhilong exchanged (Boxer 1941: 425, n. 30). Zheng Zhilong's fleet attacked and defeated the boats of the Dutch East India Company in Liaole Bay, in front of the Isle of Jinmen (Quemoy). This victory consolidated the position in the area of the trading clan organised around Zheng Zhilong. This supremacy was recognised by the Ming authorities, which appointed him vice military commander of Fujian (*fu zongbing* 副总兵, aware that the only way of having any kind of control over the waters of the straits was by setting up alliances with the pirate fleets of Zheng Zhilong).

Diverse Spanish sources attribute the second rebellion of the Chinese of the Parian of Manila, which broke out in November 1639, to Zheng Zhilong's direct influence.¹³ The rebellion was brutally repressed by the Spanish authorities, as had happened on previous occasions. The immediate triggering of this rebellion is attributed to the outbreak of a process of discontent with the abuses of the 'protector of the Chinese,' in other words, the governor of the Chinese community, Luís Arias Moya, in the agricultural area of Calamba. It was also said that the Chinese of Manila were keen to do away with the existing conditions. According to diverse sources, the rebellion had Zheng Zhilong as its clear instigator and direct inspiration from a distance: the Dominican father responsible for the evangelisation of the Chinese of the Parian, Father Alberto Collares, warned people several times after 1638 of the ill-will that existed in the Parian (Colin 1902-1904, III: 736).

A report printed in Madrid in 1642 explained how the leaders of the rebellion exchanged letters with Zheng Zhilong (called Iquan Sanglus). The rebellion that broke out at the beginning of November 1639 occurred unexpectedly early. The uncontrolled feeling of popular discontent did not wait until the planned date, which foresaw a rebellion and later naval intervention and invasion of Manila by Zheng Zhilong just before Christmas 1639 (Santamaría 1966: 103). The governor of the Philippines, Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera corroborated this intervention of Zheng Zhilong and attributed the rebellion to the result of an agreement between Captain Icoa (Zheng Zhilong)

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and the Dutch. According to this agreement, Zheng Zhilong would have sent 3,000 soldiers to Manila camouflaged as traders, waiting for the right moment to take to their arms and seize the city (Martínez e Zúñiga, 1893: 48-54).

The immediate triggers of the second great Sangley rebellion in 1639 were, on the one hand, the drastic reduction of the arrival of silver in Manila and, on the other, the restrictions and abuses imposed by the Spanish authorities on the Chinese. The deterioration of trading relations was what sparked off the conflict. The desire of Governor Hurtado de Corcuera that the Sangleys of the Parian should be obliged to grow rice in the surrounding areas of Manila also influenced events (Schurtz 1992: 111). The Sangleys, who paid expensive rent for their dwellings, workshops and shops in the Parian, refused to obey, and violence broke out.

In 1635 the Royal Visitor, Pedro de Quiroga, set up a rigorous regime of intervention on the Manila galleon (Schurtz 1992: 82). Governor Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera had not allowed the two galleons that were about to sail to Acapulco to depart. His pretext was that there was an excess of Chinese goods in New Spain. In 1636 an investigation was made in Acapulco promoted by the Crown, following the directives of the dominant mercantile system that aimed to stop the draining of Mexican silver to China. The investigation centred on the determination of the real volume of the exchanges of the Manila galleon. The person commissioned for this job was Don Pedro de Quiroga y Moya. The galleon that reached Acapulco that year carried goods for a declared value of 800,000 pesos. Quiroga's investigation determined that the real value was five times greater: four million pesos. The royal commissioner, Don Pedro Quiroga y Moya ordered all the goods to be seized. In the following years, this decisively altered the trade between Manila and the traders of the other Asian ports—especially Xiamen and Macao—who went to the Philippines to sell their products. The silver that arrived that year in the Manila galleon was clearly insufficient to pay the debts that the Spanish had contracted with the Chinese and Portuguese traders. We should remember that, to a large degree, the galleon operated within a credit system. The drastic decrease in the flow of silver complicated the

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situation between 1637 and 1639. Tension broke out, creating one of the recurrent rebellions of the Parian: the Chinese community rose up in a rebellion that, between November 20 1639 and 15 March 1640, was repressed to blood and fire by the Spanish authorities, producing a virtual extermination of the Chinese of Manila, as had happened in 1603 and would happen again (Souza 1986: 82, Blair and Robertson 1973, XXIX: 208-58 and Pires 1987: 28).

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ZHENG CHENGGONG

The second phase of the interaction between the trading networks of the Zheng clan and the Spanish of Manila occurred in the times of Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga or Cuesing),¹⁴ which was a time of turbulence as the new Manchu Dynasty overthrew the Ming dynasty. This second phase of interaction took place between 1644 and 1662. It was a period during which a certain reduction and a greater irregularity of the number of Chinese boats that came to Manila were detected (Chaunu 1960: 164-5). Both the regional instability and the crisis in the importation of Mexican silver influenced the decrease. There is also mention of the interference of the Dutch, who once again intercepted the Chinese boats that were on their way to Manila (Blair and Robertson 1973, XXXV: 177). In this second phase of interaction between the trading networks of the Zheng and the Spanish of Manila

we can also find evidence of the importance of the supply from Manila for the general barracks of Zheng Chenggong.

Another distinctive feature of this second period of the relationship was the formalising and specification, through different embassies between Manila and Xiamen, of relations that since the date of the first embassy, in 1556, had been commercially very intense, though indirect or informal. This second phase ended with the conquest of Taiwan and with the threat by Zheng Chenggong, in 1662, of conquering Manila, implicitly formulated in a request for tributary submission.

An interesting testimony on the value of precious metals in Xiamen in the times in which Zheng Chenggong controlled the city is offered by the Franciscan friar, Buenaventura Ibáñez, in a letter dated 23 October 1660, when he reported the price at which he had managed to change gold for silver on the coast and inland China. 'Father Juan Baptista de Morales sold the 30 taels of gold in Amoy for 27 taels of silver and 6 reals because further inland one loses much on the gold, and it is difficult to find anyone who will buy it.'¹⁵

The testimony of the Dominican priest, Victorio Ricci, in his unpublished book *Acts of the Order of Preachers in the Empire of China* (Borao 2002, II: 586)¹⁶ is particularly detailed and rich with information about the relations between the Spanish and the Zheng clan in the times of Zheng Chenggong. After spending five years preaching to the Chinese of the Parian of Manila, Victorio Ricci went to Xiamen in 1655 to take care of the Chinese who had been baptised in Fujian, looking after orphans and acting as an intermediary between the Manila authorities and the Xiamen authorities. From that year on, his contacts and direct perceptions of the Zheng clan took on greater intensity and documental value. Apart from influencing diverse very well-known episodes of the biography of Zheng Chenggong, his disputes with the Manchu army and his personal nature, Victorio Ricci gives other interesting information in his book, such as the fact that in 1657 there was an epidemic of smallpox that caused a great number of deaths in Xiamen.

At the end of 1655 rumours reached Xiamen about an imminent attack from the Manchu fleet. Zheng Chenggong decided to reorganise his administration and his troops, as well as to bring together his entire

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
fleet in the port. He thus interrupted the trading of the Dutch of Taiwan as well as the Spanish of the Philippines. This withdrawal strategy fitted in with the heavy restriction on trading in the coastal area imposed by the Manchu authorities of the Qing dynasty. In the spring of 1656 no Chinese boats reached Manila (Shepherd 1993: 96). Alarmed by the serious consequences that this absence of Chinese boats in Manila represented for the economy of the Spanish colony, Governor Sabiniano Manrique de Lara decided to send an embassy to Xiamen to re-open trading. The embassy was made up of Andrés Cueto and Pedro de Vera Villavicencio, and had Victorio Ricci as interpreter and adviser. This initiative was a success, and as a result of it, in the following year, 1657, Koxinga sent an embassy to Manila, led by a Mandarin whom Ricci called Ting-ye, who sealed the agreement to re-open trading contacts (Wills 1980: 243-57, González 1955: 31 and Carioti 1995: 108-9).

In his unpublished manuscript, the Dominican priest, Victorio Ricci described a confrontation with Zheng Chenggong's son, called Zheng Jing (named Quinsie in this manuscript), who would later become

his successor and leader of the island of Taiwan during the two decades in which it was a prefecture of Ming China between 1663 and 1684. The reason for the falling out was the ambition of the mandatory of the Zheng family, who wanted to keep the Dominican's mansion, which was situated just in front of his own. In the context of this dispute, in 1658, Victorio Ricci was accused of being a traitor. He was alleged to have written to the Spanish in Manila telling them not to sell rice to the Chinese junks so that they would die of hunger in Xiamen. From this statement, we can deduce the crucial role Manila played in the survival economy and the supply of basic goods in the Xiamen controlled by the Zheng clan.

Just a few months after having expelled the Dutch from the Island of Taiwan, Zheng Chenggong sent Victorio Ricci as ambassador to Manila with a letter in which he demanded tribute and submission. This initiative unleashed anxiety and restlessness among both the Manila authorities and the Chinese community. Governor Sabiniano Manrique de Lara tried to expel the inhabitants of the Parian. A considerable number of Chinese from Manila fled

Zheng Chenggong landing in Taiwan in 1662.



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to Taiwan. The rebellion broke out followed by the consequent exterminating repression. The death of Zheng Chenggong left the threats ungrounded. During the following decades, coinciding with the period of dominance over Taiwan by the family clan of the Zheng, descendants of Koxinga, the flow of Chinese boats to Manila registered in the customs taxes diminished considerably (Chaunu 1960: 160, Abella 1969: 295-334 and Guerrero 1966: 34).

ZHENG JING

Finally, the third phase in the interaction process between the trading networks of the Zheng clan and the Spanish of Manila covered the period of the dominance of Zheng Jing on the island of Taiwan, converted into a prefecture of the Ming. This third phase started with a peace embassy and trading agreement in 1663 and closed with the arrival in Manila in 1686 of an unusual number of Chinese ships, which can be related to the end of the Zheng clan and which became the trigger for the fourth rebellion of the Chinese from the Parian of Manila. During this period, Manila became one of the annual, important destinations for ships from Taiwan. The reception in Manila of a significant Taiwan embassy in 1663, led once again by the Dominican priest Victorio Ricci, opened a continuous, relevant influx of Taiwanese boats into Manila in the following decades.¹⁷ Zheng Jing diversified his commercial interests with the various European trading networks in Asia. He maintained exchanges with the Spanish of Manila, the Dutch from Batavia, and the British, who set up a stable office in Taiwan in 1670. It was, at the same time, a period in which the number of boats that came into Manila from the coast of China declined. The boats that travelled from Taiwan to Manila between 1663 and 1686 carried products that, in the initial years, mainly came from Japan, and in later years started to include products from the Chinese continent (Fang Zhenzhen 2001). Despite the flow of commerce during the Zheng Jing period, various projects and initiatives to conquer the Philippines from Taiwan were documented.

The year after the death of Zheng Chenggong, Victorio Ricci, with great difficulty, convinced his successor of the strategic convenience of setting up a trading agreement with Manila. He was in charge of the mission to inform the authorities of the death of

Koxinga and the signing of a peace agreement. Here, Victorio Ricci's testimony is of great interest again. He arrived in Manila on 19 April 1662,¹⁸ as in previous embassies, 'dressed in the splendid garb of a mandarin'¹⁹ he was received by the Spanish authorities with great honours as the representative of the Kingdom of China. After some weeks, the General Board of Manila agreed to what Taiwan was asking for. We should mention that to establish peace between the two kingdoms, measures of resolution of the conflict created with the third rebellion of Manila were approved: the return of the weapons and goods confiscated from the Chinese of the Parian, and the expulsion of the 'recalcitrant Chinese'. Together with these measures, there were others that were aimed at taxes: that the registration of boats should be more moderate.

The documentation in Manila shows the arrival in the Philippines of rumours or more specific news about the various plans to conquer the Philippines from Taiwan between 1662 and 1672. The first plan corresponds to the one suggested by Zheng Chenggong a few months after conquering Taiwan and which was activated with the embassy by Victorio Ricci in 1662. The second conquest plan must have been led by Shilang in 1664-5, in the times of the Philippine Governor Manrique de Lara. However, a rebellion in the Xiamen area brought the project to a halt. Finally, the documentation created by the British trading office in Taiwan, set up between 1670 and 1684, certified the origin of the news that reached Manila in 1670 and 1671 about the third plan of Zheng Jing to invade the Philippines from Taiwan during the time of Governor Manuel de León, who governed between 1669 and 1677 (Borao 2002, II: 658).

The fourth rebellion, in 1686, of the Chinese in Manila appears to have been motivated by various simultaneous factors, also related to the circumstances of the Zheng's trading networks. Coinciding with the defeat of the Zheng clan in the twenty-third year of the reign of Kangxi (1684), the Chinese Empire revoked the policy of 'the closure of the sea,' which was the radical prohibition of sailing and legal commerce. This favoured the arrival in Manila of an unusual number of boats and new merchants and emigrants and probably groups who were fleeing Taiwan after the defeat of the Ming cause. It is calculated that more than 40,000 returned to the Chinese continent after the demobilisations that followed the definitive defeat of

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the Zheng clan. Those involved in this sudden increase of Chinese emigrants in Manila in 1685 (seventeen officially registered boats arrived compared with the less than five per year average of previous years) (Shepherd 1993: 96) were seen in Manila as hordes of delinquents from Taiwan and continental China, who destabilised the precarious balance of Sino-Spanish co-existence in Manila. Some sources point to the arrival in Manila of rumours concerning a possible flight of the troops defeated in Taiwan to Manila (Wills 1991: 69, n. 50). In conjunction with these external factors, in religious circles the non-baptised Chinese were increasingly accused of perverting the customs and beliefs of those who were baptised. In September 1685 all the Sangleys who were not baptised were evacuated from towns close to Manila, such as Tondo in the Pasig River basin, in which baptised Sangleys had authorised residence, and were driven to the interior of the Parian. The new migratory contingents escaped from the strict enclosure of the Parian and began to spread in an uncontrolled manner.²⁰

On the night of 28 May 1686, a group of Sangleys entered the residence of Nicolás de Ballena, the government official charged with collecting residence taxes. After killing him together with other Spaniards, they attacked the house of the governor of the Parian, who managed to escape. The Spanish

managed to capture eleven of the Chinese attackers. They dismembered their bodies and threw them into the Pasig River. It was suspected that the Sangleys planned to add glass and porcelain dust into the bread of the institutional Chinese bakeries.²¹ The rebellion and repression started all over again.

The decisive role played by Chinese migration to Manila in this interaction between the Castilians and the Zheng clan informal maritime power cannot be left aside. The connections between the Zheng clan and the overseas Chinese communities in these European colonial cities in Asia were very close. One must also recall that the first leaders of the informal maritime network that ended up grouping itself around the Zheng clan (Li Dan, Zheng Zhilong) arose in direct contact with the Chinese communities of Manila and Macao. Their trading activity would be an important focal point and have significant benefits with regard to interaction with the rival European mercantile communities in East Asia: the Portuguese, the Spanish and the Dutch. Neither must one forget that the Chinese conflicts and rebellions in Manila (in 1603, 1639, 1662, and 1686), which were sternly quashed by the Spanish of Manila, causing tens of thousands of deaths in each event, are indirectly or directly related to the process of interaction with the clan of the Zheng. **RC**

NOTES

- 1 '(Nicolao) ia nam era navegante mercantil, mas principe dos navegantes, com un cabedaltam grosso que tinha juntamente correspondentes no Iapan, em Manila, em Siam, na India & com seus antigos senhorios os portuguezes, mandando pera quasi todos os portos do Oriente suas naos cheias de mercancias da China' (Francisco Rogemont, *Relaçam do estado politico e espiritual do imperio da China, pellos annos de 1659 até o de 1666*, p. 8).
- 2 Koxinga, or Cuesing, from Guoxingye (Lord with the Imperial Surname) are the traditional Western spellings of the popular appellation of Zheng Chenggong (1624-62).
- 3 Antonio Caballero Santa Maria, 1660: 'With power and command over sea and land, that comes from the King, he (Zheng Zhilong) no longer stole openly; rather, he dominated possessions and multiplied the treasure he had once stolen with his gains and tyrannical oppression. From Anhai and Xiamen, where has was the lord, he sent his possessions to Manila and to other places and carried on this way until 1643 when the new Tartar King succeeded in this empire' (Maas 1917: 118-22, Borao, 2002, II: 587).
- 4 In the diary of the British East India Company agent in Hirado, Richard Cooks, we find an entry for 1616, which states that Li Dan:

'was governor of the Chinas at Manila in the Philippines and in the end the Spaniards picked a quarrel on purpose to seize all he had, to the value of more than 40.000 taels and put him into the galleys, from whence he escaped some 9 years since and came to Hirado where he has lived ever since' (Wills 1979: 216-17).

- 5 'Another of the motives for which the Chinese did not come until now is due to the great fear they have of the Dutch and having been destroyed by past losses, and because there are many Japanese and Chinese pirates. This year a Chinaman, who called himself the king of China, went robbing with eighty ships. Among the Chinese themselves many civil wars have started' (Borao, 2001, I: 46-7).
- 6 'Os Olandeses da Ilha de Pescadores tinhao huà fortaleza com quatro baluartes e artilharia; E por quanto esta Ilha pertenece ainda as terras da China, O Chumpin Capitaõ Geral da Provincia de Foquem, onde esta o Chincheo, foi lá ter com os Olandeses, sendo terceiro entre elles hum china christao avenegado chamado Lituan, que de Manila fugira com outros chinas por duevibas, e se fora para o Japao onde se ajuntou co os Olandeses em Firando, por vis deste disse o Chumpim aos Olandeses que aquella terra era del Rey da China

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- ppr tanto se pasassem dali para a Ilha Formosa.' Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid), mss. 3015.
- 7 'Este fue tan pobre que por no perecer de hambre pasó a esta ciudad de Manila ... y vivió en el Parián, extramuros de ella, haciendo oficio de corredor o de regatón.' *Breve Historia de Iquama y Koxinga*. Manila 1662. Archivo Ateneo de Manila, Anales Eclesiásticos de Philippinas, ff. 131-133 (Borao, 2002, II: 580-5).
 - 8 Victorio Riccio: 'Fue natural de un pequeño lugar de pescadores, llamado Chiochy, enfrente del puerto de Ganhay (Anhai), y viéndose miserable y pobre, determinó probar su fortuna saliendo de su patria y de su reino. Pasó primero a Macao, donde recibió el bautismo, y se llamó Nicolás, y de allí a Manila, ejercitándose en ambos lugares en oficios viles y bajos.' Archivo Provincial del Santo Rosario or Archivo de Extremo Oriente (Riccio, 1667, III, I), (Borao, 2002, II: 587).
 - 9 Antonio Caballero Santa Maria's Chinese name was Li Andang.
 - 10 'Este mandarín supradicho tenía en Macao una hija suya, casada allí con un hijo de Manuel Bello, vecino de aquella ciudad, de la cual les hizo venir a esta con toda su familia y parentela antes de que se fuese a Pequín, a los cuales yo conocí y visité en Macao (...) A pocos días después nos vino a visitar el dicho Manuel Bello y su hijo Antonio Rodríguez, que es el marido de la hija del mandarín.' *Relación del Franciscano Antonio Caballero sobre su llegada a Xiamen en 1649, comentando sobre Yquam y Koxinga* (Maas, 1917, I: 28-41).
 - 11 Antonio Caballero de Santa Maria, 1660: 'La mayor parte de los champanes chinos de comercio que a esa ciudad van y han ido desde los tiempos referidos en que comenzó el referido corsario Chinchillón, después de él lo han continuado hasta el presente el dicho corsario Cuesing, su hijo, todos son y han sido cargados de haciendas suyas o robadas o compradas de plata no suya, sino también robada y precedida de lo que han saqueado' (Maas, 1917, I: 118-22).
 - 12 'Supe después acá, por una que ha poco recibí de Manila, haberse dicho en esta ciudad que el marítimo corsario del puerto de Emuy (Amoy, Xiamen), de donde salen para allá el mayor número de champanes del comercio, pretendía pasar con poder a Manila para levantarse con la tierra... Bien es que esa ciudad e Islas se recelen de este corsario que, frustrado de salir acá con su ambicioso intento, puede ser que intente pasar a Manila, que ya tiene allá buen número de su gente, que su divisa de reconocerle a él y negarle la obediencia al nuevo rey tártaro que hoy tiene este sínico imperio es no cortarse el cabello, como esos chinos del parían' (Borao, 2002, II: 578).
 - 13 About the Taiwan rebellion in 1652, see: Huber 1990: 265-96.
 - 14 The Flemish Jesuit Francisco Rogemont affirms that Zheng Zhenggong in their infancy lived some years in Manila: 'Era este moço filho de Nicolao & de hua molher natural do japão &, nuça for a instruido na fê, ne recebera o santo bautismo, os primeiros annos de sua mocidade passou parte em Manila co os castellanos, & parte na ilha Formosa co os olandeses, com os quais tinha um grande conhecimento a amizade' (Rogemont, 1672: 14).
 - 15 'Los 30 taes de oro vendió el P. Juan Baptista de Morales en Emuy por 27 taes de plata y 6 reales, por causa que tierra adentro se pierde mucho con le oro, y con dificultad se halla quien los compre' (Alcobendas, 1933: 21).
 - 16 There are two copies of this unpublished manuscript in the Avila dominican archive, Archivo de la Provincia del Santísimo Rosario or Archivo de Extremo Oriente, Sección China, Tomo 1-2. Avila (Borao 2002, II: 586).
 - 17 The Flemish Jesuit Francisco Rogemont describes the strategic link between Taiwan and Manila in the times of Zheng Jing: 'Succedeo a Quesingo seu filho, & començou a administrar o governo do novo Reyno, & das grossas armadas do seu pay: assentou logo paz e amizade com os Hespanhoes pera prosseguir a difficultosa & cruel guerra co os Tartaros & olandezes' (Rogemont 1672: 73).
 - 18 AGI, Filipinas 64, vol. 1, 147r-149r.
 - 19 'con ricos hábitos de mandarín,' Riccio 1667, III, 22, 7 (Borao 2002, II: 616).
 - 20 AGI Filipinas 64, parte 2, fol. 295v-297.
 - 21 About this rebellion and their judicial process: AGI, Filipinas, 67, 69, and 202. Also Real Academia de la Historia (RAH), sig. 9/2668 and 9/2669. In Archivo Histórico de la Provincia de Toledo de la Compañía de Jesus (AHPTS), Alcalá de Henares, there is an anonymous document about it: Documentos sobre Filipinas, M-92-2 (Legajo 321-6, ff. 464-522) 'Rebelion de los Sangleyes o chinos que vivían cerca de Manila, contra los españoles (mss 58 ff incompleto) Includes a very detailed description of the different chinese rebellions in Manila, and also information about the controversy of Chinese settlers expulsion plans after 1868.'

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