TINCORA

DE VLOODT

Dutch Trade and Navigation
in the South China Sea during the 17th Century

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Jan Pieterszoon Coen.

Around 1600, when the first Dutch explorers arrived in the South China Sea, Chinese and Japanese vessels had already been plying its waters for more than three hundred years. Everywhere along its coasts, at Taiwan, the Philippines and the Malay peninsula, in Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, the Indonesian archipelago, and even far beyond on the island of Kyushu one would find small settlements with Chinese originating from the southeastern coastal provinces of Fujian and Guangdong.[1] Some fifty years earlier, imperial prohibitions had stopped all Chinese overseas trade and had led to a Portuguese monopoly on direct navigation between Macao and Japan,[2] but after twenty years the ban on the southern trades had been lifted again. Chinese junks were now carrying silk, porcelain, ironware, gold, copper, pepper, Moluccan spices and rice between the markets of the South China Sea, and Japanese merchants, provided with vermillion passes to show that they had special permission from the shogun, would meet them there to barter their silver.[3] At about the same time, the arrival of the Spaniards in the Philippines with their silver from Mexico had given an additional boost to the eastern branch of the trading network. Departing from the Bay of Amoy (Xiamen) in 1597, almost one hundred and twenty junks left China. Half of them had a license for the Philippines, Borneo and the Moluccas; the rest had Cochin China (the southern region of Vietnam), Champa (the central coastal region of Vietnam), Cambodia, South Sumatra and West Java as their destinations.[4]

At the time that the Dutch arrived, the Portuguese were already close to losing their monopoly on the direct China-Japan trade. In 1580 the traffic from Japan had begun to intensify, and in 1591 the first Japanese ship was registered in Manila, but in around 1600 the Chinese ships also began to reappear

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VOC attack along Java's coast, in the late 17th century.

in the Japanese ports. In the early part of the seventeenth century more than thirty, and up to sixty Chinese ships visited Japan annually, and from 1604 until its "closure" in 1635, more than 350 Japanese ships left for South East Asia,[5] of which eighty-seven went to Cochin China, fifty-four to Manila, fifty-five to Siam, forty-four to Cambodia, six to Champa and thirty-seven to other parts of Vietnam.[6]

The timing of these voyages was largely dictated by the monsoons: northeast from about October until April, southwest from May until September. Delays in ship departures could have disastrous effects. Other uncertainties were the volume and pricing of the goods available at the points of destination and the sudden changes in governmental trade policies in the form of prohibitions or increased tolls and excise. Furthermore, trade and piracy were never far apart. Omnipresent pirates posed a constant threat to property, merchandise and life, and even combined Chinese-Japanese raids on the China coast were not unusual.

This article tells the story of the Dutch intrusion into the South China Sea, how and why they tried to acquire access to the existing trading networks, why and where they failed, and where and when they were successful.

THE DUTCH PRELUDES

When the first Dutch arrived in Banten (northwest Java) in 1596, they found a thriving international market with large numbers of Chinese, Indian and Portuguese merchants living in communities outside the city walls, the Chinese community being the largest. Pepper, nutmeg, elephant tusks and sandalwood were the main products that were carried to China, and in return the Fujianese from the Changzhou area would bring iron ware, medicines, porcelain, gold thread, silk, piece goods and, probably as ballast, lead coins, the *picis*, as the Javanese called them.[7]

Java had no coinage of its own, and the Chinese lead coins, with a square hole in the middle so that they could be put on a string, were not only of great use in the Banten area, but also penetrated into the coastal areas of Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes. As the sole suppliers of these coins, the Chinese in Banten had a dominant position in the financial transactions in that area. They acted as middlemen between the pepper producers in the hills around Banten and the market, and it was only their money that gave direct access to the trade in Banten. The Europeans, in order to buy pepper, first had to exchange their silver reals for *picis*. The rate of exchange they could obtain was largely dependent on the supply of reals, which after the exchange were exported to China, whereas the price of the pepper was dictated by the supply and demand position of both the pepper and the *picis*.

For the Europeans this situation would remain a source of frustration until they found alternative sources of supply. The early Dutch voyages to Asia that took place before the Dutch Indies Company (VOC) was founded were intended to make short term profits, and the investors were therefore very alert to the information coming back from the East on how to get access to the places where the spices were grown. In 1599 the first four Dutch ships visited the Moluccas and made use of the animosity between the rulers of Tidore and Ternate to buy cloves and nutmeg. In the same year, a fleet of the Zealand Company arrived in Aceh to purchase pepper, but they were unlucky as, at that point in time, the relationship between the Portuguese from Malacca and the ruler of Aceh happened to be excellent. The Dutch were attacked, many members of the crew including the admiral were killed, and one of the captains and a few members of his crew were held as prisoners. They were liberated in 1601, when four vessels of their own company arrived, bringing a letter from the Prince of Orange, requesting their release and offering cooperation in "their common war" against the Portuguese. The King of Aceh responded positively and put an embassy on board to visit the Netherlands and find out what the red-haired Dutch really stood for, but he sold only a small portion of his pepper for a very high price. Two of the vessels continued their voyage to Siam, and the other two ended up in Patani.[8]

After pepper and Moluccan spices, Chinese silk was the next most desirable commodity for the European market. The decision to send a fleet to the East to get acquainted with the Chinese silk market was therefore easily taken. After Jacob van Neck had returned from a very profitable voyage to Banten, he left Amsterdam again in June 1600 and arrived almost a year later at Ternate, from where he continued his voyage to Patani. Due to bad weather he lost his way

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Insulae Moluccae. Petrus Plancius, 1592.

and ended up in Macao. The Portuguese merchant community did not take kindly to this unexpected visit and immediately imprisoned the Dutch who had come ashore. Most of them were killed, three of them were taken to Goa and several years later one of them succeeded in getting back to the Netherlands where he could tell his story. In order to justify their action, the Portuguese explained to the Chinese governor that the Dutch were nothing but ordinary pirates.[9]

After this bad reception, Van Neck sailed southwards to Patani, where after long haggling about the price and quality of the pepper that came from Jambi (Sumatra), he concluded a contract with the queen, who was a vassal of the King of Siam, "to be allowed to build a house" to trade.[10] The two ships that had come from Aceh found him there after he had spent seven months, finishing his business and waiting for the favourable monsoon. They were not only able to help him with their ample supply of biscuits, but could also load full cargoes of pepper for half the price they had paid in Aceh.

Van Neck and the two ships of the Zealand Company were still in Patani when Admiral Jacob van Heemskerck, the commander of the first VOC fleet, arrived there to buy pepper. On the way there he had captured a Portuguese vessel carrying a letter with the news of the killing of the Dutch in Macao. The VOC, founded in 1602, had wider objectives than the first individual Dutch voyages: not only trade, but also the establishment of a military and maritime presence in the East, to harm the Spanish and Portuguese wherever they could, and still make a profit. The Board of Directors in Amsterdam, or the *Heeren XVII* (Gentlemen Seventeen) as they were called, had instructed Van Heemskerck to retaliate against the Iberians whenever necessary and accordingly, in February 1603, with the assistance of the Johoreans, who were anti-Malacca at this point in time, he

captured the famous Portuguese carrack *Santa Catarina* near the mouth of the Johor river. The cargo included 1200 bales of raw Chinese silk and Van Heemskerck sent the ship to his homeport. The ambassador of the ruler of Johor with his officials and servants joined and travelled on the admiral's vessel.[11] At auction the cargo yielded approximately 3.5 million guilders, of which the silk alone fetched more than two million guilders. No doubt this sum of money inspired the imagination of many entrepreneurs in the United Provinces over the profits that could be made from the trade with China, and the following year two further attempts were made to approach the authorities there, but both failed. In the eyes of the Chinese authorities, Van Heemskerck had confirmed that the Portuguese opinion about the Dutch was one hundred percent correct.[12]

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After their ships had returned to the Netherlands in 1603, the representatives of the Zealand Company, which now had become part of the VOC, reported back to the States-General on their experiences in Aceh and Patani. They specifically supported further contact with the latter place: "The position of this country is very favourable for the East Indies trade, not only that the pepper is cheap, but the Chinese there are big traders of all kinds of merchandise, with big ships of at least a thousand tons, so that one can obtain all sorts of goods from China, which they will bring there, provided they will yield a reasonable profit, because the Chinese will not allow any foreign nation in their country." On the other hand they stressed the competition from Arab, English and even French traders in Aceh and the fact that the factors who had stayed behind there were complaining about the low quantities of pepper that were available and the high prices.[13]

PATANI

In the early plans of the VOC, Patani and Banten were to become the two main bases for the Asian trade, whereas Patani was seen as a good starting point for the direct trade with China.[14]

However, setting up an entrepôt, where the flows of money and merchandise would more or less fit together in terms of quantity, demand, value and time, was not an easy affair. The Chinese junks, coming in with the northeast monsoon from February till May, were bringing raw silk and silk products, porcelain, sugar, ginger, rhubarb root (used as laxative), aloë wood, alum, arak, camphor, paper, mercury, and vermillion. In turn, the Chinese merchants living in Patani were trading with Pahang, Johor, Siam, Cambodia, Sukadana (Borneo), Banjermasin, Banten and Grisse (north Java). So, if there was a lack of rice on Java, it could be purchased in Patani, to where it was brought from Siam or Cambodia. At the time that the Dutch arrived, the Japanese were sailing to Patani to buy raw silk and the Dutch were keen to take that business over. Demand for porcelain was also high in Holland, in the beginning in particular for the coarse big saucers, but, after 1617, due to a refinement of taste, the Dutch preference went to finer porcelain, which had to be pre-ordered.

The pepper harvests around Patani took place twice a year, but the quantities brought in from Jambi, Pahang, Kedah and Johor were larger and were sold for a higher price. The Dutch and Chinese were trying to stay ahead of each other and lay hand on the indigenous product, but the Dutch did not always have the money available. Admiral Matelief was the first to notice this problem and to recommend attracting the Chinese to Jacatra (the original name for what is now Jakarta) as a new centre of the Company's trade and to give up Patani. But the head merchant of Patani lodged his protest directly at the door of the Directors in

Amsterdam and Matelief was overruled by his superiors.

The relatively small volume of the Dutch Patani trade was improved somewhat by the opening of the trade with Japan. Gradually more ships went that way with silk, textiles and pepper in exchange for Japanese silver that could replace the silver coming from Banten. Japanese silver had a problem however: its impurity. Although it had already been refined in Japan, with a loss of 13 percent, in Patani it still caused a loss of 6 to 7 percent. In the opinion of the head merchant the trade with Japanese silver was a great swindle. Even after it had been melted to improve the purity 3 to 3 1/2 percent above that of the reals of eight, the Malays and Chinese still refused to accept it because they preferred the reals of eight from Banten or the gold from Patani.[15] Later on, due to the good services of the director of the VOC factory in Ayutthaya (Thailand), which had been opened in 1608, contracts could be concluded with the local rulers of Ligor, Songkhla and Phattalung, which specified freedom from tolls and customs for the Dutch, exclusion of other western nations, better treatment of the Chinese merchants, and no extra charges on the tolls and customs they had to pay. Payments could be made in gold or silver, and the Japanese silver could be changed at the mint in Ligor against local currency, which was of equally bad quality, but was accepted. However, this improvement was not enough to give the Dutch a handle on the Queen of Patani. In order to have sufficient money available for their purchases, they had to borrow money from her against steep interest rates.[16]

Realizing that the Chinese did not like to make long voyages with their best cargoes, from 1617 the Dutch tried to establish relations with places and countries situated nearer to China, such as Quinam in Cochinchina and Champa, but they were not very welcome there, and in Quinam they found again the Japanese working in the same market. Also, other competitors were coming in from the West. In 1616 the King of Siam had made a treaty with the Portuguese, and Patani soon followed this gesture. From then on the Dutch had to suffer the sight of many small Portuguese vessels sailing along the coast, which they could not touch, because they were under protection of the Queen of Patani.

Market at Batavia, 17th century.

In 1614, the Gentlemen XVII had already begun to express their concern about the many offices that were being opened up, which brought more risk and higher costs and led to the dispersion of capital over too many places and to ambitious merchants buying more and more products, without knowing whether there would be a market for them. It took the Governor-General and Council of the VOC a few years to make up their mind. The fact that in 1617 the pepper trade in Batten had become a monopoly of the indigenous authorities worked in favour of Patina. However, the year thereafter the Patina pepper cultures suffered from inundations, heavy gales prevented the arrival of the Chinese junks, and if one arrived, the Dutch were short of reals. At the same time the Patina authorities became unfriendly toward Chinese imports. Because of the danger of the English competition, the Patani operation was continued, but as part of the Banten silver now went to Jambi to cover the shortage of pepper, the head merchant again had to borrow money from the Queen.

In 1620 the Patani office made an attempt to open an office in Cambodia, but Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen expressed his preference for Batavia as the VOC trading centre, so although VOC

ships still continued to come and buy pepper, in 1621 the Patani office was officially closed.

BATAVIA

Jan Pieterszoon Coen is the famous and infamous name closely connected to the foundation of Batavia (present-day Jakarta) and the great leap forward of the VOC into the Asian trade. In 1613 he became director of the VOC lodge in Banten, and by using one of the Chinese as the preferred supplier of pepper and the preferred buyer of cloth and sandalwood, he was able to undermine the common front of the Chinese merchant community.[17] However, the Dutch were not the sole importers of cloth, and if the shipments from Malacca were large, textile prices tended to fall. In his letters to the *Heeren XVII*, Coen also continued to express his dissatisfaction with the low exchange rate of *picis* for silver reals and with the fact that the Chinese manipulated the pepper market, buying up everything that was available and offering it above the price previously agreed. At the same time the local ruler continued to increase his import and export duties. In response, thereby damaging the English at the same time, the Dutch attacked and further depressed the already amply supplied textile situation by dumping large stocks of cloths on the market, selling them at half the normal price. The first batches were eagerly picked up by the Chinese, but the continuing stream of cloths made prices fall still further so that the Chinese could no longer afford to buy up enough pepper, and consequently the pepper prices also came down.

In order to get away from the Chinese dominance and the local ruler who insisted that all pepper should be sold through his hands, in 1618 the Dutch moved their entire Banten office to their lodge in Jacatra. After hefty skirmishes with the English and Bantanese and the total destruction of the town, a new settlement was established with the name Batavia. Here, copper and silver coins became the only officially recognized denominations for the purchase of pepper, and until the end of the 1630s, the VOC itself would manufacture lead coins for the Chinese to use in their trade on Java and to attract Indonesian shipping to Batavia.

Batavia would become the centre of the VOC operations in Asia. Its location was chosen not only because it was close to the Malacca and Sunday Straits, the two passages to and from the West, but also because it was accessible to Chinese junks. The instruction of the *Heeren XVII* to Jan Pieterszoon Coen, when he was appointed Governor-General, was very particular on this point: "so that it may be easy for the Chinese to get there with a monsoon, safely and without risk." Coen himself was also well aware that an active Chinese community in Batavia would be highly desirable if not indispensable, and he used various devious ways to get the Chinese to live in Batavia, in his own words, "either voluntarily or by force." With a lengthy blockade of Banten (until 1659!), the Dutch succeeded in destroying its trade, and as a result many of the Chinese middlemen moved to Batavia. In addition, in 1619 Coen ordered Chinese crews to be removed from their vessels to populate the establishment.

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Besides his interest in Chinese as potential colonists, Coen was also a great defender of the independent trading rights of the free burghers, the servants who had left the Company and were staying behind in Asia. He was even prepared to allow them to make use of Company ships, provided they paid their freight and tolls. Most probably, in developing these ideas he had Manila in mind, where a small number of Spaniards and a Spanish government profited from the trade, agriculture and other economic activities of more than 20,000 native, Chinese and Japanese families.[18] By 1641 the issue of how to provide a living for the free burghers, or one step further, how to establish a Dutch colony in Batavia that would find an existence outside the institution of the VOC, had faded away. The Chinese however, were not only welcome as merchants but also as artisans, carpenters,

ships' crews, fishermen or agricultural labour. Thus, Batavia was to become not only the hub of the Dutch trade in Asia but also one of the bigger Chinese settlements. As tax paying citizens, the Chinese would become the largest group living in and directly outside Batavia and the main pillar of its economy. But in the early 1620s there was still a long road to follow.

JOHOR

Notwithstanding the first bad experiences, the Dutch maintained a commercial interest in Aceh. Along the west coast of Sumatra, Aceh had acquired large areas of pepper cultivated land, including a part of the Minangkabau hinterland, which was also rich in gold. However, the Aceh trade was mainly directed toward the West, and it was of limited importance for the trade in the South China Sea. On the other hand, Johor had a wide network of king-vassal relationships in the south of the Malay peninsula, the eastern part of Sumatra, and the many, many islands in between.

The Dutch interest in Johor was created initially by the fact that it offered the possibility of an attack on Malacca from the landward side, which could be combined with a maritime blockade. Secondly, they saw it as a possible centre of their Asian business.[19] Thirdly, if they would be allowed to build a fort in Johor, it would enable them to control the Portuguese traffic between the Malacca Strait and the East. However, the degree to which the Dutch could demonstrate their friendship for the Johoreans was limited by their relations with Patani and Aceh, which were both arch enemies of Johor, and of course by the Portuguese, who resisted the Dutch presence around Malacca by all possible means. Any temporary disturbance of the equilibrium in the political triangle Malacca-Aceh-Johor would cause some reaction and friction amongst them, and for many years, intentionally or unintentionally, the Dutch were doing just that, almost always to the detriment of Johor. As a result, during the whole period of Luso-Dutch confrontations in Asia, both the Dutch and the sultans of Johor demonstrated themselves to be the most unpredictable allies. After the relocation of the Banten office to Batavia, the Dutch lost a great part of their interest until in 1637 they prepared for a new siege of Malacca.[20]

JAMBI

Jambi, the pepper collecting and shipment area on the east coast of Sumatra, was far more important for the trade of the South China Sea than Aceh. The Chinese, Malays, Makassarese and Javanese had already been familiar with the area for a long time, and from the 1580s the Portuguese had been using this port, located about sixty miles inland, as a supply point for pepper. Unlike Banten, where the Chinese were getting their pepper by going uphill to the producers, in Jambi the growers themselves used to come downstream and sell their produce. From old times, they were dependent on the *raja* for anything they wanted to export or for anything from "far away."

It took the English and Dutch until 1615 to discover the loading port of Jambi. In order to get the quantities they wanted at the right time, they sent their own agents, mainly Chinese, uphill to barter the cloths given to them on credit by the VOC. The producers in turn would receive credit for the crop of the next season, with obvious consequences when the next season gave a low yield or when production exceeded demand. The only defence they had was to expand their cultivation areas, which finally reached into the Minagkabau region, with different rulers and the possibility to use different outlets for their pepper, such as Aceh.

The one who benefited the most from the increased trade, in the form of customs duties, gifts and port dues, was the ruler of Jambi, who together with his family took part in the pepper trade. According to VOC sources, he would have made a profit of 30 to 35 percent on his sales. The influx of money created a demand for European-style jewellery and rare and expensive cloth, especially amongst the ladies of the Jambi court, and their lifestyle came into sharp contrast with the relative poverty of the producers upstream. Another change was the introduction of the *picis*, which originally had been brought in by the Chinese, but were soon manufactured in Jambi itself, to the advantage of the local ruler. From the 1650s silver coins were preferred because they could also be used as jewellery.

By the 1640s the general overproduction of pepper in Asia caused low prices in Jambi. Obviously, the Company had started the system of giving credit, and in 1644 the VOC signed a treaty stipulating that anyone owing money to the Company should be

compelled, in the name of the king, to pay. As a result, the ruler not only became a collector of tolls and customs and a mediator in disputes, but also a highly unpopular collector of debts. The deterioration of the pepper market in Jambi expressed itself not only in low prices, but also in its deteriorating quality, the pepper being mixed with all kinds of rubbish. Additionally, the producers were finding alternative ports on the east and west coast of Sumatra, where Malays, Javanese and Chinese offered higher prices than could be obtained in Jambi. In the last quarter of the century, conflicts with Johor and Palembang caused pepper sales to be transferred to the latter town, where the VOC also had an office, and in 1697 the Dutch Jambi lodge was closed, only to be re-opened again in 1706 with a far greater Dutch involvement in local politics.[21]

THE JAPAN TRADE

The Dutch were very quick in collecting information about the most important Chinese trading settlements around the South China Sea and their potential for buying pepper and silk for the European market. However, it took them quite some time to realize that far away Japan, due to its silver production, was a major key to the trade with the rest of Asia, including China, and that vice-versa, Chinese silk would open the door to the trade with Japan. There is a great divide among experts over the precise volume of silver that was exported from Japan, but it is a safe bet that until the export was prohibited in 1668, it dwarfed the European and South American imports into Asia.[22]

The Dutch received their first trading license in Japan in 1609, rather more by coincidence than by careful planning. By adroit maneuvering against the Portuguese Jesuits, who until 1614 acted as the middlemen for the Portuguese traders from Macao, the Dutch succeeded in creating a positive image of themselves in the shogun's mind. The exchange of diplomatic letters between the Dutch Prince of Orange and the Shogun Ieyasu further paved the way to mutual recognition and the issue of passes for Dutch shipping and trade. However, for the time being, the direct trade between Japan and China remained almost completely in the hands of the Portuguese and Chinese,[23] and the Chinese and Japanese merchants continued to exchange their wares in their meeting places around the South China Sea.

The directors in Amsterdam and the governor-general complained frequently about the poor performance of Hirado, and the Dutch trade from Patani was rather insignificant. The Japanese market for spices was very limited, and European goods, deer hides and ray skins from Siam and Cambodia were the main products the Dutch had to offer. The factory was mainly used for the dispatch of goods captured from Portuguese and Chinese vessels, and Dutch exports from Japan consisted largely of rice, wheat, beans, flour, copper, iron and timber. Furthermore, it served as a refreshment and outfitting station for the fleets that were roaming the China Seas in search of carracks and junks and as an office for the recruitment of Japanese auxiliary soldiers.

From 1621 the Dutch managed to import some silk into Japan, in 1622 in exchange for silver,[24] and in 1623 Specx and his successor Camps as VOC representative in Hirado were able to convince both Coen and the *Heeren XVII* of the enormous potential of the trade with Japan if the VOC could gain access to the Chinese silk trade.[25] It is understandable that the *Heeren XVII* felt their hands itching when they received Coen's letter of 20 June 1623 with a note that Lenart Camps had calculated, "an amount of 1,008,000 reals of eight spent on Chinese merchandise could be sold in Japan, every year, for 1,862,375 reals of eight, yielding a profit of 854,375," assuring them there was "no doubt that every year so much and even more could be made with Chinese goods in Japan and another 100,000 reals of eight by changing gold against silver." As will be shown hereafter, the profits promised by Camps completely changed the lukewarm attitude of Batavia and the *Heeren XVII* toward the Japan trade.

AYUTTHAYA

The relationship of the VOC with Siam was a very special one and lasted for more than one hundred and fifty years. The first contact took place in 1604 after a Siamese ambassador, coming back from Borneo, passed through Patani and suggested that the Dutch should join the next Siamese embassy to China to lay the foundation for a VOC-China trading relationship. Two Dutchmen were sent to the Siamese capital, Ayutthaya, to make the necessary arrangements, but the enterprise had to be postponed because Siam was at war with Burma and because the king died. In the

The court of the Sultan of Aceh. From W. S. Unger, *De Oudste Reizen van de Zeeuwen naar Oost-Indië* (Linschoten-Vereening, The Hague, 1948).

end Van Warwijck thought the costs were running too high and recalled his representatives.[26]

King Naresuan had spent fifteen years at war with Burma, Cambodia and the northern Lao kingdoms, leaving the treasury empty, and therefore he and his successors eagerly sought contacts with the Portuguese in Goa and the Spanish in Manila and at the same time welcomed the Dutch and English as new sources of revenue. In 1607 the king expressed the wish to send a diplomatic mission to the Netherlands. At first the Dutch representatives in Ayutthaya objected because of the high costs involved, but they had to give way when they were asked why such unimportant rulers like those of Aceh and Johore had been allowed to send embassies. The size of the embassy was reduced to five men before Matelief took them on board his return fleet, but they were well received in the Netherlands and finally returned in 1610 with the fleet of Pieter Both, the first Governor-General of the VOC in the Indies. Besides the necessary presents, they brought a letter from Maurits, the Prince of Orange, and from that moment the kings of Siam apparently felt they had found a counterpart of their own stature with whom they should maintain a regular correspondence. To their displeasure, the Dutch did not always respond and when the royal letters were left unanswered, the Company would often get into difficulties.

In the meantime, in 1608 the King of Siam had given the Dutch permission to open a factory in Ayutthaya. The first barters were of European cloth, gold yarn, tinsel, paper, glassware and sandalwood against Chinese raw silk, silk goods and porcelain. The Patani office was not enthusiastic because the influx of traders from India and Japan into Ayutthaya made the Chinese goods more expensive than in Patani. But by the mid-1610s, after the Dutch office in Japan was opened, the factory in Ayutthaya became the prime source of deer hides, sapan wood and ray skins for Japan, with the Portuguese as strong competitors. In addition, it exported lead, camphor, radix china, cardamom and vermillion, and after the Banten office was moved, Ayutthaya also became a supplier of rice

and coconut to Batavia. In turn it imported silver, iron, copper, munitions and luxury items for the king.[27]

Whereas the VOC interest in Ayutthaya was only commercial, the king's interests were also of a political nature. In 1620 he sent a letter to Batavia, asking for maritime assistance, and Coen answered with a friendly letter but took no further action. In 1621 Cambodia renounced its status as vassal, and the King of Siam, sending forces by land and by sea, asked again for help from Batavia. This put the Company in a difficult position because they had just opened an office in Cambodia and was already planning to close all offices in 1622, including Ayutthaya. Sending an expensive gift in return, Coen excused himself, writing that he did not have the ships available. The Governor-General and his Council in Batavia had already concluded that the profits of the Ayutthaya office did not cover the costs. The king was astonished to hear that the Dutch intended to leave, and on his request one man was left behind.[28]

PIRACY AS A COMPANY BUSINESS

Pieter Both, the first Governor-General of the Indies, had received the instruction from the VOC Directors that "the trade of China of the fine white silk and all kinds of rarities… should be promoted in all manners and as far as possible, either by trading directly in China, or otherwise; yes, in any case, one should endeavour that the Chinese bring all kinds of Chinese products to you," to which they added that the best silk cloth could be obtained not in Macao or Canton (Guangzhou), but in the province of Nanjing.[29]

His successor, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, would give his own interpretation to these words. To begin with, in 1616 he had started seizing the junks coming from Banten, Jambi or Patani and heading for China, confiscating the pepper they had on board and reimbursing them against the purchase price and the costs of shipment, and in 1622 the Dutch destroyed eighty Chinese junks on the coast of China. One year later he made a plea to capture all the Chinese he could lay hands on and to send them to Batavia, the Moluccas, Amboina or Banda, a migration policy that was indeed converted into a hard and gruesome reality.[30] The *Heeren XVII* were strongly opposed to his actions, which according to them "were very harsh and beyond all the limits of justice," and they insisted that in future Coen would have to "make do with decent, legal means which were not subject to scandal," but Coen was not impressed and continued to confirm the reputation of the Dutch with acts of piracy against the Chinese junks and their crews.

However, very soon these acts of piracy would be legalized as "privateering"[31] and become a regular part of company business. Contrary to what is generally postulated, during the first twenty-five years of its existence, the VOC was not a great commercial success. In fact, the shareholders complained vociferously because the dividends they received were mainly in the form of surplus spices, which the Company was unable to sell profitably elsewhere. In view of the competition between the Dutch, the English and the Portuguese on the European markets, this was not surprising, but in contrast with the EIC (East India Company), the Dutch were at the same time investing heavily in their forts, garrisons and maritime power in Asia "to take the offensive, in whatever manner, against the Spaniards, Portuguese and their allies. This in order to protect our people, the inhabitants of the islands and our other friends, also to the advantage and security of the East India trade."[32] In 1614 the States-General of the United Provinces confirmed their full support for this approach, and from 1616 the Dutch engaged in annual blockades of the Philippines. Manila was dependent on food imports from the mainland, but it was also the place where the Chinese exchanged their silk for American silver, and the objective the Dutch had in mind was to damage the trade and, thereby, the treasury of Manila. Of the ten junks captured in 1617, seven were fruit junks and three were loaded with silk. Yet, the total value of the cargoes amounted to more than 750,000 guilders. Because of the bad experiences in the years thereafter, Jan Pieterszoon Coen became very much opposed to sending four to five of his best ships to Manila every year "only to catch a bird in the air,"[33] but in 1620 he received the news that the VOC and EIC had decided to cooperate in their war against the Iberians and in the spice trade. Very quickly a combined expedition to the Philippines was undertaken to privateer against Spanish ships and to prevent the Chinese from trading in Manila. In the meantime, the Directors in Amsterdam had also become convinced that an annual blockade of Manila, in particular directed against Chinese ships, would be very useful to "spoil the Chinese trade with the enemy and to attract this to some of our locations, so that we

will be able to make it a stable business." As an afterthought, six months later they advised Batavia to go with two ships to Changzhou to pre-warn the Chinese of the Dutch blockade awaiting them before Manila, and to offer to buy their silk directly on the spot.[34] The issue must have been uppermost in their minds, because half a year later they repeated this advice, suggesting *Ilha Formosa* "or other nearby easily accessible places, to have a good trade with the Chinese, ensuring for them security and the least risk."[35]

As far as the Philippines were concerned, the blockades only led to a discontented mood in Manila because of the rise in food prices, whereas the imports of Spanish silver continued to rise.[36] Nor did they bring any military or strategic gains: the VOC would have had an opportunity to set foot on land by taking sides in an internal conflict, but never tried.[37] Also with respect to the objective to move the Chinese trade to Batavia, the blockades of Manila were unsuccessful, and in around 1625 the enthusiasm for the blockades of Manila began to diminish. In the first place, because after the "massacre" or "resurrection" of Amboina in February 1623 the bottom had fallen out of the Anglo-Dutch cooperation, and in the second place, because in the meantime Coen had developed a new plan: the conquest of Portuguese Macao.

FORMOSA

In his letter of 21 January 1622 to the *Heeren XVII* Coen had already explained how "those from Macao, being nothing but a small, little town" made large profits from their trade with Japan, Manila and Malacca, and that the town could easily be taken with 1,000 or 1,500 heads, and two months later he dispatched his plan of attack.[38] If that would fail, the Dutch would settle at the Pescadores or, as a last option, following the proposal of the *Heeren XVII,* on the peninsula of Taiwan (or Tayouwan as the Dutch called it) on the west coast of *Ilha Formosa*. From there they would seek to trade with China and if that should be refused, the Dutch would use force.[39] The protest of the Directors against Coen's plans[40] came too late: when their letter arrived in Batavia, the fleet of Cornelis Reyersen was already well on its way, and in May 1622 it arrived before the coast of China. Charles Boxer has described in great detail how the attack on Macao ended.[41] After the battle, Chinese officials came down to the beach to take the heads of some of the slain Dutchmen to Canton as proof of the Portuguese subservience.[42] After his resounding defeat Reyersen could only withdraw to the bare and sandy islands of the Pescadores.[43] However, the Chinese governor refused to accept a Dutch establishment in an area where piracy prevailed, and negotiations were started to get the Dutch to move to Formosa in exchange for the promise that there they would be allowed to trade with the Chinese from the mainland.[44]

By adroit maneuvering against the Portuguese Jesuits, who until 1614 acted as the middlemen for the Portuguese traders from Macao, the Dutch succeeded in creating a positive image of themselves in the shogun's mind.

One of the prevailing pirates happened to be the famous Zheng Zhilong, whom the Dutch called Nicolas Iquan.[45] Born in Quanzhou, he had left for Macao at the age of eighteen, and after sailing with a Macao fleet to Hirado he had entered the service of the Hokkien entrepreneur Li Dan, who was the leader of an extensive illegal trading network that operated, via Formosa, between China and Japan. Cheng worked his way up to become one of Li Dan's most important supporters, and during the negotiations of the Dutch with the Chinese authorities, he acted as the interpreter in service of the VOC, whilst Li Dan fulfilled the role of mediator. Cheng also used Li Dan's ships to lend piracy services to the VOC against Fujianese shipping to Manila, requiring them to pay excise and plundering the ships that did not pay. After Li Dan died in 1625, Cheng was chosen as the leader of the enterprise and undertook various raids against the China coast.

In August 1624 the Dutch set foot on the peninsula of Taiwan, where first they had to find a

Southeast Asia.

place to build a fort in order to protect themselves and their merchandise against the seawater and the cannibalistic and warlike natives, who were less impressed by the show of Dutch military force than by the Indian cotton cloths which they received in exchange for food. In the meantime Jan Pieterszoon Coen had returned to the Netherlands, where he was able to convince the *Heeren XVII* that it would be possible to get access to the Chinese market: "There can be no doubt that we will be allowed to take part in the Chinese trade, either by force, or through mildness, or by connivance or by public concession of the King of China."[46] In the course of time and with the use of military force, Taiwan would develop into the first Dutch colony,[47] but it would take about nine years before it could more or less take the place Coen and the *Heeren XVII* had had in mind.[48]

In the first place, the trade with China was slow to develop, and until 1633 it produced only scanty quantities of silk. The Chinese authorities had intended the Dutch to make their purchases from Li Dan's trading partner in Amoy, Xu Xinzu, whom the Dutch called Simsou. In 1627 the latter was killed during an attack by Zheng Zhilong, who, after a lengthy orgy of piracy and raids, surrendered to the new Governor-General of Fujian, became a Ming military official in charge of the coastal defense and took over Simsou's position in Amoy as the middleman with the Dutch.[49]

Secondly, from 1628 the trade with Japan ran into serious difficulties. After the arrival of the Dutch on Taiwan, the Japanese merchants, protected by the vermillion pass of the shogun and the Dutch presence on the island, continued to use the island as a meeting point with their Chinese counterparts. The Council of the VOC Fort Zeelandia saw this as an infringement on its rights as traders and tax collectors and wanted to levy a 10 percent toll on goods brought into Taiwan, which the Japanese refused. After confiscating one of their cargoes, the Dutch confirmed their lack of understanding of East Asian trade relations by sending the new, inexperienced twenty-seven-year-old Governor Pieter Nuyts to Japan, to put things straight. His visit had little effect, and once he was back in his position of governor, he again confiscated a Japanese junk. The Japanese merchants, in response, took him hostage, and after lengthy negotiations, the Dutch Council of Fort Zeelandia had to let their ships go, taking some Dutch hostages, including the son of Nuyts, with them.[50] Upon their arrival in Hirado, all Dutch were arrested and all business with them was stopped. It was only brought to life again in 1632, thanks to the insight and

understanding of "things Japanese" of Specx, who by then had been promoted to Governor-General.[51] Nuyts was sent to Japan again, to be surrendered to the authorities and to stay a few years in prison. Soon hereafter the whole issue evaporated: the Japanese were no longer allowed to navigate to Taiwan, and in 1635 all maritime trade by Japanese was prohibited.

The revival of the Dutch Japan trade coincided nicely with the events along the China coast. In 1632, in their instructions to the new Governor-General Hendrik Brouwer, the *Heeren XVII* seemed to be making a complete turn-around. Diplomacy, rather than brute force, was now becoming the right approach toward obtaining access to the Asian trades: "The General and Councilors will have to ensure and instruct everybody, that all Indian natives will be treated kindly and that no improper actions will be taken against them and in particular the Chinese, whom you will have to bring on your side with all politeness, in order to more and more increase their trade on Batavia." The message apparently came too late because in July 1633 the new Dutch governor Hans Putmans, frustrated by his lack of success, launched a blockade on the Chinese coast and attacked the fleet of Zheng Zhilong near Quemoy (Jinmen), leaving the Dutch fleet and its crews to suffer three months of wear and tear during the typhoon season. Zheng Zhilong finally responded by setting his own ships alight and letting them float toward the Dutch, of which only three ships could escape back to Taiwan. After having demonstrated in this manner who was in command in Chinese waters, "Iquan" became indeed the sole supplier of Chinese wares to the Dutch in Taiwan. In the period 1636 till 1640 the Dutch were able to import about 76 tons of silk per year into Japan and export annually 43 tons of silver.[52] In those years, 87 percent of the total value of the imported silk came from Taiwan.[53]

From 1635, with the ascendance of a new shogun, the Japanese were no longer allowed to travel abroad or to return home; which meant in practice the end of the *shuin* system.[54] The original prohibition was posted in Nagasaki, forbidding Catholic priests to come to Japan, the taking of Japanese arms to foreign countries and Japanese to go abroad, unless on an officially licensed ship. The instructions were renewed year by year, but in 1639 only three instructions remained: a total ban on Christians, the prohibition for Portuguese ships ever again to visit Japan and in contrast, an invitation to the Chinese captains: "If you obey our laws, trading ships will ply back and forth and trade will be plentiful; that will be to our mutual advantage."[55] One of the consequences was that the Dutch could take over the Japanese silk trade in Tonkin; and another consequence was that in 1641 Zheng Zhilong began a direct trade with Japan, bypassing Taiwan. During the next thirty years the quantities of silver his conglomerate was able to barter were three to four times those of the Dutch, who were then exporting on average something like fourteen tons of silver per year.[56] Nevertheless, the Dutch factory, which in the meantime had been moved to Deshima, became a relative success because the VOC could still obtain its silk from Tonkin, and also Bengal became a regular supplier. During the years 1641-1654 on average seven tons of silk still came from China, thirty-four tons from Tonkin and from 1645, fourteen tons from Bengal. Thereafter the Tonkin prices became increasingly uncompetitive, and the Dutch average annual off-take reduced to twenty tons, whereas Bengal took over with an overwhelming eighty-five tons of silk. In 1671 direct Dutch trade between Tonkin and Japan ceased.[57]

Notwithstanding the near-collapse of the Taiwanese silk trade, the early 1640s saw a considerable improvement of the financial situation of the VOC on Formosa. Until then, whenever they received a *Generale Missive* from Batavia, its high and forever rising costs remained a misery for the *Heeren XVII*. The Taiwan factory was originally planned as a trading station, mainly for the purchase of Chinese silk, but its main function had become that of an entrepôt between the Far East and the Southeast Asian markets. These activities hardly produced revenues, and the 50,000 to 100,000 deer skins that since 1632 were being exported every year to Japan fell farshort of covering the costs of the Dutch military and administrative expansion on the island. However, at the very moment the silk trade with Iquan shrank to zero, large numbers of Chinese began to invade Formosa, escaping from the advance of the Manchus on the mainland, to build up a new existence in the sugar and rice culture. The revenues from taxes and duties that were levied upon the new Chinese colonists were sufficient to get the finances of the factory of Fort Zeelandia out of the red. At the same time the Dutch were able to generate additional income by exporting the Taiwanese sugar to Persia and Japan.[58]

The Manchu emperor's entry into the palace on 6 June 1644 marked the beginning of the Qing dynasty in China. Zheng Zhilong surrendered to the Qing and was taken away to Beijing, but his son Zheng Chenggong, or "Coxinga" as he was known by the Dutch, decided to follow an independent course, refused to surrender, gradually gained control of the family business and became the most famous Ming-loyalist leader. The Bakufu and most Japanese favoured the Ming loyalists, and Chinese ships where the crew had Manchu decreed pigtails were regarded with apprehension and banned from trade. As a result, in 1656 Zheng Chenggong was able to dominate the trade between Nagasaki, Amoy and Taiwan. He would have had some 5,000 ships under his command with about 60,000 people aboard, and in 1659 he even brought a fleet into the Yangtze to besiege Nanjing. Finally the southeast coastal areas became his power base, where he kept an army of more than 100,000 well-trained troops.

His junks were also seen in Batavia, Tonkin, Malacca, Johor, Patani, Sangor, Ligor, Siam, Cambodia and Quinam, and it became increasingly clear that his merchants were competitors rather than business partners in the Dutch trade of the China seas. Rumor had it that he was planning to invade Taiwan, and that he had also been behind the Chinese revolt there in 1652.[59] Consequently, the Council of Batavia decided to send envoys to Canton to investigate the possibilities of trade and military cooperation with the Qing administration. These first contacts culminated in the sending of the first ever Dutch tributary embassy from Batavia, via Canton to Beijing, which arrived there in 1656. Strongly influenced by the advice from Jesuits and Portuguese, the imperial court let the Dutch know that, in view of the long and dangerous voyage (all the way from Holland!) they would be permitted to present their tribute only once every eight years, which meant that as far as the court was concerned there would be no trade until 1664. Nevertheless, during the next few years, ships coming from Batavia were able to sell everything they brought with the help of the officials in the Canton area, and it may be argued therefore that the mission had been successful.[60]

In the meantime the Qing government was struggling to wipe out the military and naval forces of Zheng Chenggong. However, Qing power was stronger on land than at sea, and attacks by the imperial fleet on Amoy failed. As an ultimate measure, the people in the coastal areas (Fujian in 1661, Guangdong in 1662 and parts of Zhejiang in 1663), were evacuated and their towns and villages burned. These measures made Cheng's position along the southeast coast less tenable, and already in 1661 they pushed him toward an invasion of Taiwan.

In Batavia there was very little concern about the dark clouds gathering above the coast of China. A fleet of twelve ships was sent to Formosa with 600 soldiers on board to lend support in the event of a possible invasion. The commander had been instructed that if the reports of a threat on Taiwan were found to be groundless, as they were expected to be, he should attack Macao. After a quarrel between the Council of Taiwan and the commander about what he should be doing, the latter steered the main part of his fleet back to Batavia, leaving the soldiers and a few of his ships behind. Only a few days later hundreds of sails, heralding the fleet of Zheng Chenggong, carrying over 25,000 men, loomed on the horizon announcing the downfall of the first Dutch colony. On 1 February 1662 Zeelandia castle was handed over, and the VOC had lost its official channel for the direct trade with China.[61] Zheng's next step was to threaten Manila and demand an annual tribute from the Spanish, but before he could put force behind his words, he died. After a long power struggle, his son Zheng Ching became his successor.

AYUTTHAYA REVISITED

In the interim period the position of the VOC in Siam had improved considerably. In 1624, when there was a shortage of rice in Batavia and the *Heeren XVII* and the Council in Batavia had just woken up to the great potential of the Japan trade, the Ayutthaya office had been re-opened, and Coen, who returned from the Netherlands in June 1628, brought a letter from the Prince of Orange to the King of Siam, an answer to *his* letter of seven years previously. At that moment the bottom was just falling out of the Dutch Japan trade, and as a result the trade with Ayutthaya also dwindled to zero, but it smoothed the way to a closer relationship and brought the Dutch to a good re-starting position.

Whereas during the first twenty-five years of contact the VOC had been able to remain outside the internal political affairs of Siam, from 1629 this was going to change. A dispute about the royal succession

led to a rebellion of Patani and Johor, which had aligned themselves with Portuguese Malacca against Aceh. Additionally, Patani had seized goods from Dutch free traders and refused to give them back. The Portuguese, and thereby the Spanish, had now become common enemies. Promptly the Governor-General reaffirmed the Company's friendship with the king, and in 1630 the provisions trade with Java was re-opened. The king wrote, "The Siamese and the Dutch nations were now no longer two but like one under heaven," and the Governor-General thought this to be the right moment to negotiate a yearly contract for the supply of rice for Batavia and in addition, because the restrictions on the Dutch in Japan were being relaxed, a monopoly on the export of sapan wood and deer hides to Japan. However, the special envoys sent to negotiate the contracts and monopolies encountered an atmosphere that was spoilt not only by the bad behaviour of one of the Dutch free traders but also of the VOC employees. The response of the king's representative was that one should not be too hasty, and that these matters could better be discussed the following year, when another letter of the Prince of Orange would have arrived. The sky was indeed cleared again when the next letter came, and due to the re-opening of the Japan trade, the volume of the VOC trade in Ayutthaya more than doubled, the percentage of silver on total imports rose steadily, and whereas a the end of the 1620s the office had only two permanent employees, after 1633 this had grown to thirty or forty.

Of course, the renewed relationship had its ups and downs. Whereas the VOC asked for a sapan wood contract, a monopoly on deer hides, land outside the city to build a new lodge and warehouse and an export permit for rice, as a *quid pro quo* the Siamese wanted VOC assistance in suppressing the ongoing revolts of Patani and Cambodia. In 1636, through the mediation of the King of Kedah, peace was achieved with Patani, but not with Cambodia. The Siamese court approached the Spanish in Manila and the Portuguese in Goa, who were now welcome again in Ayutthaya. In the same year the Dutch opened an office in Cambodia, to make themselves more independent from the Siamese rice supplies, and because it was also an important supplier of hides and ray skins. The fact that some VOC employees got themselves involved in a brawl with Buddhist monks did not help to improve the Dutch position. The head merchant could only save the culprits by distributing gifts and signing an agreement that from now on all Company employees would fall under Siamese law. In reaction, the Governor-General sent a nasty letter, one which the court officials had to edit before it could be read to the king, and the head merchant of the VOC office had to work very carefully again to repair the wounds.[62]

The new Dutch settlement in Ayutthaya became a separate village, from where the heads of the factory could take part in the court-oriented social life. Sometimes the king would even confer title and rank on the ambassadors from Batavia or the heads of the factory, making them part of the court hierarchy. This was one way of getting support for obtaining the essential trading documents from the Siamese officials, but in the course of the difficult negotiations mentioned above it became clear how important it was to have the right interpreter and to maintain a good relationship with the minister in charge of foreign affairs and the treasury. Sometimes, e.g. during the 1640s and 50s, certain people had more influence than the incumbent minister, and a good relationship with them, accompanied by gifts, could then facilitate the export of rice, coconut oil, sapan wood or timber.[63] The contacts of the Dutch sometimes suffered from a lack of understanding or diplomacy, delays in forwarding presents or the late arrival of letters from the Prince of Orange, but hostile translators and middlemen and Portuguese competition in the dealings with court representatives could also bring business to a grinding halt.

During the 1640s the Siamese court took the side of the Company when the VOC had problems in Cambodia and its fleet had suffered a terrible defeat. In return, until 1659 there was continuing pressure on Batavia to assist against rebellious Songkhla and Kedah, and if the Dutch refused they could be sure to meet obstacles in their trade. In 1647 the VOC received a monopoly on the export of deer and cow hides, but in 1652 the Siamese were prohibited to sell rice to the Dutch, and only after the latter had threatened to move to Cambodia, where peace had just been concluded, did the relationship improve, but in 1654 the monopoly on the hide trade was revoked again and opened to other merchants, amongst others to the Chinese.

The accession of a new king on the throne caused new shifts in the relationship. In 1658 the company received a re-instatement of the hide export monopoly, but the next year, after the Siamese had engaged in a

war against Burma, all monopolies, including those on cow, buffalo and deer hides, went to the king's factors. The king and other Siamese traders entered the Japan trade on their own account, manning their junks with Chinese and Indian sailors. Economic considerations and the fact that King Narai had been exchanging ambassadors with "Coxinga", who had just ousted the VOC from Taiwan, led in 1663 to the decision to withdraw from Ayutthaya, but a year later the VOC was back again, at the request of the king. The resultant treaty of 1664 stipulated, amongst other things, freedom of trade in Ayutthaya, an export monopoly on hides, guaranteed free access to the tin trade in Ligor and other Siamese dependencies, extra-territorial rights for its employees and the banishment of Chinese from Siamese ships. The latter point was relaxed after two years because the Siamese were completely dependent on Chinese crews and merchants in their Japan trade.

After 1670 relations improved even further. The Dutch brought clocks, telescopes, cloth from Europe, cannons and munitions, and even supplied such manpower as artisans, military personnel, goldsmiths, painters, carpenters, sculptors, doctors, a glassblower, gunners, powder makers and helmsmen; all for the king's service. The Siamese no longer asked for military assistance, notwithstanding their almost continuous warfare against rebelling kingdoms and vassals. At the end of the 1670s they once again broke away in the direction of the English, who opened a factory in 1674, and the French, who did the same in 1680. By now Ayutthaya was a leading Southeast Asian port, an entrepôt with merchants of many races and religions and several communities of foreign traders, missionaries and mercenaries. The Siamese crown traded in Japan and China, with Chinese-style junks manned and managed by Chinese or Ayutthaya based Chinese, and the market was full of Chinese, Indians, Portuguese and English free traders and merchants of the VOC and the EIC.

In 1688 the English and French departed again, leaving only the Dutch to supply Indian cloths and European goods. With varying degrees of success, the VOC office managed to survive until 1767, when, along with the kingdom itself, the Burmese crushed it.

As noted previously, the relationship between the VOC and Siam was a special one. During the years 1648-1658, the factory was running at a loss, and even during the years that it was calculated to be a profit maker, i.e. during the 1630s and the early 40s and 60s, its total imports were never more than a few percent of the VOC silver exports from Japan. One may therefore wonder whether the income from trade in the Ayutthaya settlement was ever enough to cover its costs.[64] No doubt, Siam was seen as an important supplier of rice to Batavia, but further research into the social history of the VOC in Siam may reveal other reasons that kept the two together for so long.[65]

THE CHINA TRADE AFTER TAIWAN

One would imagine that the loss of Taiwan gave the VOC and the Qing regime a common objective: to chase the new leader of the Zheng conglomerate, Zheng Ching, from the mainland and Formosa and destroy his trade. To a certain extent this was indeed the case. The fall of Taiwan came as a great shock to the VOC; not so much because of the loss of Taiwan itself, but rather because of the loss of face. "The loss of reputation could invite enemies to raise their heads and no longer respect the power of the Company as much as before." In an immediate reaction, already in June 1662, a Dutch fleet was dispatched to attack the Zheng junks trading between China and Japan and, in cooperation with the Qing forces, to raid and burn their settlements along the China coast. As a political counter-move, Zheng Ching suggested to the court in Beijing that he could get tributary status, but this proposal was rejected.

The provincial officials and the court in Beijing indeed expected the Dutch to assist them with their strong fleet, whereas the Dutch were hoping to get in return permission to establish a factory in Fuzhou and to trade freely, every year. However, the approach of the two or rather, as we shall see, three parties, to what the Dutch saw as a very simple deal, was totally different, and it would take about twenty years before most of the problems were resolved as a result of the conquest of Taiwan by the Qing. It is beyond the scope of this article to describe in detail the events of these twenty years, but the following will explain why the Qing and the Dutch were having such difficult times with each other.[66]

As far as the "war" against Zheng Ching was concerned, rather than using straightforward military and naval force, the Qing preferred to win the war by

first undermining Zheng's power, negotiating and plotting with his commanders until they would walk over to the Qing side. The latter approach took time, something the Dutch thought they did not have. But apart from this difference in tactics there were much deeper reasons why the Qing officials and the Dutch found each other difficult to get along with.

To begin with, in the Chinese tradition, contacts with foreigners and privileges given to them were not subject to negotiation. Where the Dutch viewed their aid to the Qing as one side of a bargain, to be rewarded by trading privileges that were ratified by "sealed letters from the emperor," for the Chinese a bargain between the emperor and another party was unheard of. He would give his privileges as he saw fit, not as a result of a bargain.

A request to receive a privilege had to follow the channels of the Qing bureaucracy, beginning with negotiations with the higher provincial officials. The emperor had theoretically absolute power, but of course local officials had to have a certain latitude in their decision-making. The necessary checks and balances at their level were assured by a system of overlapping authorities. In practice this meant that the Dutch always had to discuss their proposals independently with at least two officials, who also took care that the communications of the Dutch that were intended for Beijing were properly worded. On the other hand, written communications from Beijing to the Dutch had to go through the same provincial officials, who passed on what was suitable to themselves.

During the "negotiations" at the provincial level, neither side had much respect for the other, and language problems must also have played a role. The Dutch used Chinese translators from Batavia who mostly spoke southern Fujianese, whereas the officials came from North China. An additional reason for confusion was that because of the monsoons, the Dutch were never able to consult with their superiors in Batavia during the negotiations, and they had to leave the country at a certain time, often before the answer from Beijing had arrived, so the next fleet, the year after, left Batavia without knowing what had been decided in Beijing. Direct contacts with the court, or the other way around, Chinese embassies to Batavia, produced few results, sometimes even the contrary. The Dutch managed to make one or two tributary visits to Beijing, but each time they were enveloped in ceremonies and had no opportunity to defend their case or to build up contacts, whereas the Chinese messengers to Batavia never had any negotiating power.

Besides their obligation to perform their administrative duties as well as possible in line with imperial policies, the provincial officials also had an interest (most probably also a direct financial interest) in maintaining a local clientele, including important merchants who were eager to profit from the Dutch trade and able to absorb the quantities the Dutch were offering. As a result, even though the court rejected the Dutch requests to be allowed to trade, from time to time they got local permission to sell the goods they had brought secretly on an *ad hoc* basis and sometimes every two years. Obviously the local authorities were more inclined to give that permission when they had difficulty getting their imports from elsewhere. The ejection of the Zheng Ching forces from the mainland left the clientele of the officials without a channel for the trade with Japan, so in 1664 the Dutch were able to sell the cargo they had brought with them for more than 100 percent profit.

From the Qing point of view, prospects for cooperation had never been better than in 1664, but the Dutch were getting tired. They realized the Chinese would be less willing to permit trade once they no longer needed the Dutch ships and cannons, so they were no longer so eager to get rid of Zheng Ching because he might offer a way out in case the relations with the Chinese deteriorated, and they were no longer prepared to join in an attack on Taiwan. In August they landed a group of soldiers to reoccupy their post in Keelung at the north end of Formosa and decided not to send an embassy to Beijing that year. When the rest of the fleet arrived on the mainland, they heard that they would receive permission to trade, but only after an embassy was sent. Furthermore, there was a Qing fleet waiting to attack Taiwan together with the Dutch. The Dutch were not prepared for this; the fleet they had sent consisted of merchant vessels and were not really equipped as men of war. Nevertheless, a quarter of the goods were left on land, and the empty vessels went to Taiwan, together with the Qing fleet that left from Quemoy. Approaching Taiwan, the latter part of the combined armada suddenly turned back, apparently because its commander expected bad weather, and the whole expedition was postponed until the spring of the following year—the worst part of the year for weather around Taiwan. Finally, the Dutch

fleet left for Batavia in February with the promise to be back at the beginning of the next north monsoon in September or October. In the meantime, they had sold all their cargoes and had even borrowed to buy more silk. By now the Dutch were totally confused about the Chinese intentions: did they have permission to trade every other year? If they had permission, why had it not been mentioned in the last imperial edict? Had they missed an opportunity by not sending an embassy in 1664? Or should they only send an embassy after trading privileges were confirmed? Did the Qing really intend to attack Taiwan, and if so, would they be prepared to hand it over to the Dutch? And if that would be the case, would they, before doing so, transfer its entire Chinese population to the mainland? And would the Chinese from the mainland be permitted to come and trade in Taiwan?

In 1665 the Dutch had ended assaults on Zheng's shipping because the authorities of Nagasaki were threatening that the Dutch would be expelled from Japan if they continued. At the same time, all kinds of irritations arose between the Chinese and the Dutch, the worst being that the Dutch had exceeded the limits of hospitality and polite harmonious collaboration by sending a second fleet, this time to Changzhou, which would have opened another trading channel with different officials. Obviously, this was totally unacceptable to the officials in Fuzhou. Trade was still allowed, but only so far as necessary for the Dutch to be able to pay back their debts.

In 1666 the council in Batavia sent its second embassy to Beijing. It arrived in June 1667 and was well received. The young emperor (he was only thirteen years old) was particularly pleased with the four Persian horses that the Dutch had brought as tribute. However, the sealed documents the Dutch took back, only to be opened upon their return, did not contain any concession. Quite the contrary: all privileges were revoked. In 1668 Batavia gave it another try by sending two ships to Canton, but they were not welcome if they would not send an embassy to Beijing, and they returned almost empty handed. The council in Batavia concluded that further attempts would be useless. In the fall of 1668 the fortifications of Keelung were demolished, and the garrison left for Batavia. One of the determining factors in this decision was of course the fact that there was now plenty of silk available from Bengal.

Meanwhile, due to the primitive mining technology, the silver production in Japan had been dwindling, and from 1668 the export of silver was prohibited. However, since 1646 the VOC had already been making considerable profits on copper that could be sold in Bengal, Ceylon, Coromandel, Malabar and Gujarat, and it was also in great demand in Europe. Copper and newly discovered gold now became Japan's major means of payment. Gold was the preferred means of metal payment in southern India, but four years later, when its price became unacceptable, copper replaced it.[67]

The provincial officials and the court in Beijing indeed expected the Dutch to assist them with their strong fleet, whereas the Dutch were hoping to get in return permission to establish a factory in Fuzhou and to trade freely, every year.

As far as the China trade was concerned, the council in Batavia had had enough, and left it in the hands of free burghers, but not for long. During the years 1673-75, the southeast coastal provinces on the mainland suffered under a revolt of three Chinese generals against their Manchu masters, and Zheng Ching used that opportunity to re-conquer Amoy and the adjacent coastal area. The Qing therefore showed a renewed interest in obtaining Dutch assistance, and negotiations were resumed along the same lines as in the past. Becoming impatient with the long delays and lack of results, the emperor finally decided to bring his own fleet up to strength, and early in 1680 Zheng was chased away from Amoy.

Meanwhile the Dutch trade had begun to run smoothly, and they were even allowed to open a lodge in Fuzhou, but the Dutch were still not happy. The client-merchants defended their monopoly, surrounding the lodge with soldiers for its "protection"

and intimidating merchants who were not part of their own group. Besides, pilferage and falling pepper prices due to competition from Chinese traders and from another group in Fuzhou that was carrying goods to Japan for the account of the officials made the Dutch China trade less and less attractive. Between 1676 and 1681 the trade at Fuzhou was said to yield a total profit of 400,000 guilders, which was probably hardly enough to cover the costs of shipping and the wages of the sailors.

In December 1681 the VOC left Fuzhou and moved its activities to the islands near Macao. Two years later the conquest of Taiwan by the Qing forces cleared the way for free maritime commerce by Chinese and foreigners, and for tolls to be paid in silver. Chinese trade to Japan, Manila and Batavia increased, and Batavia became incorporated into the Chinese trading system of the South China Sea. Chinese merchants in Batavia offered tea, silk, nankeens, porcelain, iron cooking pans, vegetables, medicines and a great variety of other items, and what they did not bring could be ordered. Consequently, the Dutch voyages to China made no sense anymore, and in 1690 they were terminated. However, reliance on middlemen created its own problems, especially when special designs or qualities were ordered, and it was certainly disastrous for the quality of a new product that became fashionable in Europe: tea.

By the end of the seventeenth century tea became the most important commodity, yielding profits of over 100 percent. Canton became the center for the trade with the European companies, but the Dutch continued to rely on the Chinese junks coming to Batavia. The European competitors, the English and Ostenders, sent their ships directly to Canton, were able to pick the better quality and ship it quicker to Europe, where it arrived fresher than the tea arriving via Batavia. As a result the VOC profits dropped, and in 1729 the *Heeren XVII* sent their first ships directly from Europe to Canton. A factory was established, and from 1736 the ships to China sailed via Batavia, while the home-bound voyages went straight from Canton to the Netherlands.[68]

CONCLUSIONS

The Dutch trade in the South China Sea was not a straightforward success story. In the course of time, the Company retained hundreds of vessels in Asia, and the Dutch National Archive contains piles of documents relating to the policies and actions of the VOC to establish fruitful relationships. Nevertheless, it took about thirty years before the Company could fully exploit its access to Japan and about eighty years before it acquired what it always wanted: free access to the trade in China.

The welfare and progress of the VOC were largely determined by changes in Asian internal politics, but were also very coincidental. Sometimes the Governor-General and his council in Batavia, probably overestimating the value of their maritime power, were stubborn and made serious errors of judgment. On other occasions they demonstrated great flexibility and adaptability toward changing political or commercial circumstances.

During the first twenty-five years of exploration, the main objective was the acquisition of pepper, spices from the Moluccas and Chinese silk for the European markets in exchange for silver from Europe and Indian cloths. From the beginning the Dutch encountered Portuguese resistance against their entry into the indigenous markets. On the other hand, the long-established Chinese trading system around the South China Sea was more than able to provide the sought-after pepper and silk but obviously against conditions set by the Chinese merchants. Patani, Ayutthaya, Jambi and Johore were the first places where the VOC would buy Chinese products and would compete against the Chinese, where necessary using brute force. Batavia became the VOC trade center in Asia, where it dictated the rules, but still remained dependent on Chinese supplies and the Chinese as a workforce.

The closing of the smaller offices and the settlement of the Dutch on Taiwan in 1624 also marked the beginning of a new trade: silk obtained from privateering on Chinese junks, and hides, ray skins and sapan wood from Ayutthaya against Japanese silver and copper with the objective of replacing, as far as possible the shipments of silver from Europe. Attempts to acquire silk directly from mainland China remained unsuccessful, and between 1628 and 1635 the Dutch trade in Japan also ran into difficulties, but in the five following years the Dutch trade in both Chinese silk and Japanese silver reached its absolute zenith. Thereafter, due to a new ruling, which welcomed the Chinese traders to Japan, the Dutch direct trade with

China collapsed again, but at the right time they were able to change their point of supply to Tonkin and thereafter to Bengal.

After the take-over of mainland China by the Qing dynasty, the VOC—with the costs of Taiwan running high, having lost its access to China, and the continuous threat of an invasion by the Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong—tried again to get free access to the markets in mainland China, not realizing the intricacies of such an attempt. By the time they finally succeeded, Taiwan was in the hands of the Qing, Bengal had become the main supplier of silk, tea would become the main export product from Canton, the Dutch were the only Europeans allowed to keep a factory in Deshima, the flow of silver from Japan was exhausted and replaced by copper, and the Chinese merchants of the South China Sea had taken over the trade to Batavia. RC

NOTES

1 For the early developments of Chinese trade around the China seas see Wang Gungwu, "Merchants without Empire: the Hokkien Sojourning Communities," in James D. Tracy, *The Rise of Merchant Empires. Long-distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750* (Cambridge, 1991): 400-421 and Anthony Reid, "Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia," in Anthony Reid (ed.) *Sojourners and Settlers. Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese* (St. Leonards NSW Australia, 1996):15-45.

2 George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea 1630-1754* (Cambridge, 1986): 16-17.

3 Leonard Blussé, "No Boats to China. The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690," in *Modern Asian Studies* 30 (1996): 58-59.

4 Anthony Reid, "An 'Age of Commerce' in Southeast Asian History," in *Modern Asian Studies* 24 (1990): 9.

5 Iwao Seiichi, "Japanese Foreign Trade in the 16th and 17th Centuries," in *Acta Asiatica* 30 (1976): 8-11.

6 A. Reid, "Age of Commerce": 9-10.

7 Leonard Blussé, "Western Impact on Chinese Communities in Western Java at the Beginning of the 17th Century," in *Nampo-Bunka, Bulletin of South Asian Studies (Japan)* no. 2 (September 1975): 26-57, provides an excellent insight into the development of the Chinese trade with the Dutch on the western tip of Java. See also Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company. Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (KITLV, Dordrecht, 1988).

8 W. S. Unger, *De Oudste Reizen van de Zeeuwen naar Oost-Indië 1598-1604* (The Hague, 1948). The journal of the English pilot is in English.

9 The events in Macao, also from the Chinese point of view, have been described by L. Blussé, "Brief encounter at Macao," in *Modern Asian Studies* 22 (1988): 647-664. See however also the comment on his conclusion that Macao initiated the Dutch aggression against the Portuguese in Asia in Ernst van Veen, *Decay or Defeat? An Inquiry into the Portuguese Decline in Asia 1580-1645* (Leiden, 2000): 178, note 14.

10 J. E. Heeres, *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum* I (The Hague 1907) 15; Dr. H. Terpstra, *De Factorij der Oostindische Compagnie te Patani* (The Hague, 1938): 1-17.

11 Peter Borschberg, "The Seizure of the *Sta. Catarina* Revisited: The Portuguese Empire in Asia, VOC Politics and the Origins of the Dutch-Johor Alliance (1602-c.1616)," in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 33 (2002): 31-62.

12 According to W. P. Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China. Eerste deel. De eerste bemoeiingen om den handel in China en de vestiging in de Pescadores (1601-1629)* (The Hague, 1898) 45-46, in China the Dutch were known as savages, arrogant and not to be trusted. He quotes a Chinese author as follows. "They (the Dutch) are greedy and cunning, have much knowledge about valuable merchandise and are clever in seeking their advantage; to make profit they do not spare their lives and there is no place, however far, where they would not go... Also these people are capable and inventive, they make sails like cobwebs, which turn in all directions to catch the wind, so that in each direction they have the wind behind them. If one encounters them at sea, one can be sure to be robbed." Obviously, the Dutch used to express similar thoughts about the trustworthiness of the Chinese.

13 W. S. Unger, *De Oudste Reizen*: 146-148,150-155.

14 H. Terpstra, *De Factorij*: 27-29.

15 *Idem*: 89.

16 *Idem*: 73, note 5. In 1613 the interest rate on 13,000 reals of eight to be repaid in the same month was 5 percent, for three months it was 6 percent and for a year 10 percent, in addition 1 percent had to be paid to the treasurer, and gifts were necessary to facilitate the process of establishing the deal. In 1614 the interest for one year had risen to 20 percent.

17 M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630* (The Hague, 1962): 250-258.

18 M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, *Asian Trade*: 227-238.

19 E. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, 1602 tot 1865* (Batavia, 1870): 9-15.

20 Peter Borschberg, "Luso-Johor-Dutch Relations in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, ca. 1600-1623," to be published in *Itinerario* (2004).

21 Barbara Watson Andaya, "Cash Cropping and Upstream-Downstream Tensions: The Case of Jambi in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in Anthony Reid (ed.) *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era. Trade, Power and Belief* (New York, 1993): 91-122. Meilink-Roelofsz, *Asian Trade:* 258-262.

22 See Van Veen, *Decay or Defeat?*, appendix 4.5.

23 Kato Eiichi, "Unification and Adaptation, the Early Shogunate and Dutch Trade Policies," in Leonard Blussé, Femme Gaastra (eds.) *Companies and Trade* (Leiden, 1981): 213-218.

24 *Ibid.*, Table 1 and 2: 223-224.

25 National Archive The Hague 1.04.02 inv. 1077, fo. 115-119, dated 15/9/1622 and 29/1/1623, H.T. Colenbrander, *Jan Pietersz. Coen. Bescheiden omtrent zijn bedrijf in Indië* (The Hague, 1919-1934) I: 771-772, dated 20/6/1623. Hereafter to be referred to as "*Coen*".

26 George Vinal Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand* (Detroit, Mich., 1977): 11.

27 Sapan wood, similar to Brazilwood, was used to produce a red dye. Rayskins were used to polish wood, but also to make sword hilts.

Radix china was used as a medicine against smallpox, leprosy and other diseases.

28 Hans ten Brummelhuis, *Merchant, Courtier and Diplomat: A History of the Contacts between the Netherlands and Thailand* (Lochem-Gent 1987) 9-44; George Vinal Smith, *The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand*: 10-55.

29 P. Mijer, *Verzameling van instructiën, ordonnanciën en reglementen voor de regering van Nederlandsch Indië* (Batavia, 1848): 8.

30 *Coen*: I, 794-796 and D. A. Sloos, *De Nederlanders in de Filippijnse wateren vóór 1626* (Amsterdam, 1898): 5.

31 Piracy and privateering should be sharply distinguished. Privateers carried letters and stood under the protection of their king or their government in exchange for a firmly established percentage of the value of the booty. Pirates were acting for their own account, did not enjoy any protection and could be brought to death without any form of process.

32 Instructions from the Directors to Steven van der Hagen, who sailed in 1603 with the first war fleet. See Van Veen, *Decay or Defeat?:* 154.

33 D. A. Sloos, *De Nederlanders*: 48-51.

34 Gentlemen XVII to Coen 9/9/1620, *Coen*: IV: 445-446, 464-465.

35 Gentlemen XVII to Coen 4/3/1621, *Coen* IV: 494.

36 See Van Veen, *Decay or Defeat?* Appendix 4.2 and 4.3.

37 In 1619 the VOC refused to take sides in the conflict between the kings of Mindanao and Boaya (Sloos, *De Nederlanders*, 49), in 1622 Francx was sent to the Philippines to act as an intermediate between the two parties and to cruise on the silverfleet, but after his ships began to make water he had to take refuge in Hirado (D. A. Sloos, De Nederlanders*:* 65-69). See also R. Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro diplomacy. The Maguindanao sultanate in the 17th century* (Quezon, 1989).

38 Coen to Gentlemen XVII 21/1/1622, *Coen*: I: 690-691. He added further arguments by sending them copies of intercepted letters from Spaniards in Manila and Portuguese in Macao, written in 1621. They proposed a Spanish establishment in Formosa in order to protect the trade with Manila, now that the imperial army had to fight the "Tartars" and the Japanese and Chinese pirates were infesting the coast again. The most important reason was however that the Dutch would be planning to settle on the island, which would cause the trade with Japan to be diverted to Formosa, and the end of the trade between Macao and Manila. [For original documents see N. A., entry 1.04.16.36, inv. 1075 (1622) folio 236-238 and inv. 1076 (1623) folio 110v-112v]. In 1621 the Spaniards landed at the north coast of Formosa, where they established fortifications in Kelang and Tamsui.

39 Leonard Blussé, "The Dutch Occupation of the Pescadores," in *Transactions of the International Conference of Orientalists in Japan*, no. XVIII 1973 (The Institute of Eastern Culture): 32-33.

40 Gentlemen XVII to Coen 14/4/1622, *Coen* IV: 546.

41 C. R. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East 1550-1770. Fact and fancy in the history of Macao* (The Hague, 1948): 72-92.

42 John E. Wills, Jr., *Pepper, Guns and Parleys. The Dutch East India Company and China 1622-1681* (Cambridge Mass., 1974).

43 Although Pehou on the Pescadores had few attractions, the sailors preferred this choice above Formosa, because Pehou could take ships of greater depth (Coen to Gentlemen XVII, 26/3/1622, *Coen* I: 715-716).

44 W. P. Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China. Eerste deel. De eerste bemoeiingen om den handel in China en de vestiging in de Pescadores (1601-1629)* (The Hague, 1898): 168-290, Blussé*,* "The Dutch Occupation of the Pescadores": 28-44.

45 Leonard Blussé, "Minnan-Jen or Cosmopolitan? The Rise of Cheng Chih-Lung Alias Nicolas Iquan," in E. B. Vermeer, *Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (Leiden/New York, 1990): 245-263.

46 *Coen*: IV, 620, "Points of Order and Redress of the State of Affairs of the Company of the Indies," of November 1623.

47 Ernst van Veen, "How the Dutch Ran a Seventeenth-century Colony. The Occupation and Loss of Formosa, 1624-1662," in *Itinerario* 20 (1996): 59-77.

48 Leonard Blussé, "No Boats to China. The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690," in *Modern Asian Studies* 30, I (1996): 64.

49 Leonard Blussé, M. E. van Opstall, Ts'ao Yung-Ho eds. *De Dagregisters van het Kasteel Zeelandia, Taiwan 1629-1662* I (The Hague, 1986) XII-XVII.

50 Leonard Blussé (ed.), "Justus Schouten en de Japanse gijzeling," in *Nederlandse Historische Bronnen*, 5 (Hilversum, 1985): 69-110.

51 Eiichi Kato, "Unification and Adaptation, the Early Shogunate and Dutch Trade Policies," in Leonard Blussé, Femme Gaastra (eds.), *Companies and Trade* (Leiden, 1981): 226. Whereas in VOC circles Specx was generally thought of as a "softy", Japanese historians take a very positive view of him.

52 *Ibid.*, Tables 1 and 2: 223-224.

53 P. W. Klein, "De Tonkinees-Japanse Zijdehandel van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie en het Inter-Aziatisch Verkeer in de 17e Eeuw," in W. Frijthoff, M. Heemstra (eds.) *Bewogen en Bewegen. De historicus in het spanningsveld tussen economie en cultuur* (Tilburg, 1986): 171.

54 R. P. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan. Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu* (Stanford, 1991): 69-110. The *shuin* system was the system of vermillion permits issued by the shogun, allowing Japanese subjects to ship Japanese goods and to import foreign goods, showing at the same time that they stood under the protection of the shogun.

55 W. J. Boot, "Maxims of Foreign Policy," in Leonard Blussé and Felipe Fernández-Armesto (eds.) *Shifting Communities and Identity Formation in Early Modern Asia* (Leiden, 2003:) 7-23.

56 Richard von Glahn, "Myth and Reality of China's Seventeenth Century Monetary Crisis," in *Journal of Economic History* 56 (1996): 429-54.

57 P. W. Klein, *De Tonkinees-Japanse Zijdehandel*: 152-177. Blussé, *No Boats to China*: 66-72.

58 Van Veen*, How the Dutch*: 59-77. Blussé, *No Boats to China*: 68-69.

59 Marné Strydom, "Pride and Prejudice. The Role of Policy and Perception Creation in the Chinese Revolt of 1652 on Dutch Formosa," in *Itinerario* 27-2 (2003): 17-36. Van Veen, *How the Dutch*: 71.

60 Henriette Rahusen-de Bruyn Kops, "Not Such an 'Unpromising Beginning': The First Dutch Trade Embassy to China, 1655-1657," in *Modern Asian Studies* 36 (2002): 535-578.

61 John E. Wills, Jr., "Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang. Themes in Pheripheral History," in Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. (eds.) *From Ming to Ch'ing. Conquest, Region and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China* (New Haven/London, 1979): 203-238.

62 George Vinal Smith, *The Dutch*: 47-97.

63 Dhiravat na Pombeja, *Court, Company and Campong. Essays on the VOC Presence in Ayutthaya* (Ayutthaya 1992).

64 George Vinal Smith, *The Dutch*: 64, Table 3.

65 See e.g. Dhiravat na Pombeja, *Court, Company and Campong.*

66 An excellent account of these twenty years is given by John E. Wills, Jr., *Pepper, Guns and Parleys. The Dutch East India Company and China 1622-1681.*

67 Ryuto Shimada, "Dancing around the Bride. The Inter-Asian Competition for Japanese Copper, 1700-1760," in *Itinerario* 27-2 (2003) 38-39. Blussé, "No Boats to China": 70-72.

68 C. J. A. Jörg, "The Relationship between the Chinese and the Dutch in 18th-Century Canton," in J. Everaert, J. Parmentier, *Shipping, Factories and Colonization* (Brussels, 1996): 125-135.