

Philip II King of Spain and Portugal and the Relations between the Philippines and Timor

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Portrait of Philip II by Sofonisba Anguisciola, Italian artist (1532-1625).
Original at the Museo del Prado, Madrid.

One of the last times that I visited East Timor, some months before the formal declaration (or restoration) of independence in May 2002, I went to the Manatuto district in the north-eastern region. I was quite surprised with the deep, warm relations between the local people and a company of Filipino soldiers working for the UN peacekeeping forces. When I asked people from different social and cultural backgrounds about the reasons for these close relations, almost all my informants explained that the “people of the Philippines are very similar to the East Timorese.” When we turn our attention from present peacekeeping officials to some of the most important East Timorese institutions, we are immediately obliged to research the dominant Catholic Church, harbouring nowadays perhaps 95 percent of Timor’s almost 800,000 inhabitants. In the East Timorese church, we met dozens of Filipinos working, teaching and preaching in several different Catholic institutions. In fact, one of the rare non-East Timorese parish curates is the Filipino priest of the Bobonora district. Some other Filipino priests have very relevant ecclesiastical tasks: the General Vicar of the Dili diocese is a very active Filipino; this is also the case of the secretary for social communication; and it is possible to

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find many other Filipino priests and nuns, from Salesians to Franciscans, leading church hospitals, brotherhoods, charity works or even directing some interesting pharmacies offering the alternative medicines that are generally preferred by the ordinary East Timorese people, who distrust the strange and expensive western medicines.

As a professional historian, I was even more surprised when I found collections of dozens of silver reales from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries among the few remains of the former Dili Museum, which are now kept in provisional storage, as well as in some private collections and even in local antiques markets.¹ These collections remind us of the large invasion of American silver coins that were carried by the Spanish traders and colonisers of the Philippines who sailed the arduous Pacific route to Acapulco. I was even more astonished when I realised that most of the traditional East Timorese jewellery had been made with precisely these smelted older Spanish silver reales. We can even observe several traditional local kings' helmets (*kaibauk*) that still show decorations with those famous reales that crossed the world, used proudly by the warriors in the major social and religious local festivals. This cultural tradition is so strong that nowadays the rare old traditional jewellers that are still working, mainly for the foreigners of several UN and NGO offices, continue to prefer those large nineteenth and early twentieth century silver Mexican pesos that we can buy at the popular textile market in central Dili. The questions that came to my mind, from the "warped" perspective of a professional historian with over twenty years' experience, were the following: where in time and space did these old American silver reales and pesos come from, which still constitute today some of the most important traditional treasures of local kingdoms and sacred houses (*uma lulik*)? How can we explain these fraternal relations with Filipino soldiers and officials who, from local priests to the common people, are considered "brothers"? Last but not least, how can we explain the large Filipino influence and presence in the East Timorese Catholic Church?


A general answer that can immediately be suggested must take into consideration that, despite centuries of an often violent Portuguese colonisation, East Timor is and will always be a Southeast Asian country. Nevertheless, friendly relations of the different East Timorese populations with foreigners (*malai*) are very rare, and the general attitude is of distance from

and a clear lack of confidence in those new invaders who bring with them strange clothes, behaviours and economies. Several Southeast Asian national missions working in East Timor are not viewed with reverence and respect, but only as a necessary presence in the context of the peacekeeping process directed by UN resolutions and commitments. We cannot perceive close and friendly relations with the Malays, Thais and even less, of course, with the Indonesians, from journalists to solidarity groups. On the contrary, we experience an ambivalent suspicion: I heard several Thai and Malay officials and UN administrators talking about the inability of the East Timorese to build a coherent nation, and I have also observed several local political leaders talking about the lack of support that their liberation struggle received from ASEAN countries in the recent past. Probably, as always, the truth is more complex and balanced, but I have never heard anybody, on either side, complaining about the Filipino mission or, vice versa, Filipinos criticising or joking about the first steps of that new baby, born independent a few months ago, which for a historian accustomed to dealing with the Braudelian *longue durée* (long-term) is almost nothing. In this perspective, the special East Timorese-Filipino relation must demand new answers, perhaps the answers of a historian.

THE CAPTAINCY OF SOLOR-TIMOR

It is very difficult to find any kind of answer when researching the first Portuguese contacts in the Timorese area, a faraway periphery even for the Portuguese traders and soldiers in the Moluccas and the Malacca enclave. In fact, Eastern Indonesia, from Java to the Timor islands, was first recognised by the cartographic expertise of a young Portuguese pilot, Francisco Rodrigues, a prominent member of the first Portuguese voyage to the Moluccas, in 1511-1512.² Rodrigues and his companions did not pass close to Timor and its adjacent islands, but in his famous seafaring book he drew the first representation of Timor, Flores and Solor, in this case confusing the very small island of this name with Eastern Flores and Adunara. The island of Timor was carefully sketched and received an explicit legend reading, "This is the island of Timor from which sandalwood comes."³ We now know that these maps of Southeast Asia by Francisco Rodrigues were made possible because he

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Solor's fortress, from António Bocarro's *O Livro das Plantas de Todas as Fortalezas e Povoações do Estado da Índia Oriental*, 1634.

worked with oriental maritime maps, probably Chinese seafaring charts used by local traders. After the Portuguese conquest of Malacca, led by Afonso de Albuquerque, the Portuguese found in 1511 in the hands of a “Javanese pilot” one of these large informative oriental maps, and Francisco Rodrigues worked very closely on the transcription of these maps, with Portuguese cartographic skill, to be presented to King Manuel in Lisbon.⁴

An effective Portuguese trade presence was organised only between 1512 and 1556-61. In general terms, this period was marked mostly by private enterprise on the part of merchants and adventurers, and no forms of territorial fixation or colonial institutionalisation were registered. Contacts with Timor took place within the more general context of a regional periphery that official Portuguese documentation designated as the “Islands of Solor”, covering the islands from Flores to Alor, among which Timor deserved special attention for its commercial interest and its generous supply of white sandalwood. Sought after as incense,

perfume and for medicinal uses, sandalwood was exported to China and India, a central element of trade relations that dated back to the fifth and sixth centuries, despite the irregularities provoked by their peripheral position. The sandalwood trade had attracted Chinese merchants and adventurers since the end of the twelfth century, and it intensified during the fifteenth century when connections were established with markets supplied through Malacca. Between 1514 and 1519, the Portuguese of the conquered enclave of Malacca sought to officially dominate the annual sandalwood trade, either directly or in parallel with the spice trade of the Moluccas and Java, following the rhythm of the monsoons, and based on the customs and fiscal control of the Malacca captaincy. However, they could not curb many private enterprises or the activities of these most varied merchants.

In 1522, Antonio Pigafetta, sailing on the *Victoria* with the Castilian remains of Magellan's expedition, reached Timor and described the commercial and symbolic structures of the sandalwood

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trade in the region of Ambenu, noting the presence of Javanese and Malay merchants attracted especially by the sandalwood, but also by the booming wax and slave trade.⁵ At the time, some Portuguese merchants and navigators also sailed the northern coasts of Timor, but preferred to harbour at the small island of Solor, which offered better anchorage conditions and permitted greater control of the Flores Strait. Until 1550, there were no signs of permanent settlement or residence in this area, as the Portuguese merchants preferred to stay on the island only as long as it took to complete their lucrative dealings and load their ships with a few hundred trunks of sandalwood, competing with the local merchants. Later, during the 1560s, a few small permanent centres appeared when these islands were discovered by Catholic missionaries. In 1558, the new Malacca diocese received a Dominican bishop, Friar Jorge de Santa Luzia, who charged the priests and monks of his order with the official evangelisation of this periphery of Southeast Asia.⁶

The exaggerated representations made by Portuguese Dominican sources—extremely fertile terrain for the study of Eastern Indonesia and Southeast Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—describe the favourable welcome they received from the local populations, building churches, establishing parish divisions, and converting more than 100,000 inhabitants to Christianity according to Dominican apologia sources, or no more than 12,000 if we believe the more reliable Dutch sources from the beginning of the seventeenth century.⁷ At the time, these Dominican missionaries had already acquired enormous evangelisation experience in the missions of East Africa, mainly in the central region of present-day Mozambique along the Zambezi River, with its historical relations with the powerful Monomotapa kingdom and the rich Muslim trade from Zanzibar to the Red Sea. In fact, several Dominicans called to the Solor missions used their prior East African experience in comparing the local populations to the *cafres* that they had tried to Christianise in the regions of the Zambezi, Sena and Cuama rivers.

Between 1566 and 1571, the Dominicans had built a fort on Solor, winning the right to appoint the captain with the approval of the Malacca captaincy. The documentation signed in September 1571 by the governor of India is known, granting the Dominicans the privilege of appointing the captain of Solor, and


recognising the institution as precarious, which required minimal military support for evangelisation. This official recognition of the religious activities of the Dominican mission changed with Iberian unification. As with many other areas and movements in Southeast and Eastern Asia, the accession of Philip II to the Portuguese throne introduced changes in the traditional structures, dynamics and especially in the dialectics of the political and commercial centres and peripheries. The strategic centres of regional trade were definitively transferred to the South China Seas, between Macao and Manila.

THE IBERIAN UNION AND THE ORIENTAL PORTUGUESE EMPIRE

After the death of D. Sebastião in northern Africa, in the tragic battle of the three kings of al-Qasr al-Kabir, in July 1578, his old and ill great-uncle succeeded to the throne, the Cardinal D. Henrique, former Chief Inquisitor. His death in 1580 brought a crisis of succession in which several claimants confronted each other, among whom the most important were King Philip II of Spain, son of D. Isabel of Portugal, and a nobleman, D. António, Prior of Crato (1531-1595), the illegitimate son of Prince Luis and a woman of Jewish origin. The latter was the most popular claimant in the kingdom's main cities, but perhaps because of his mother's status as a new Christian, he did not obtain much support among the Portuguese aristocracy. Even before the death of the Cardinal D. Henrique, in an attempt to prevent D. António from being proclaimed king and taking Lisbon, Philip II carried out a large diplomatic offensive, and at the same time assembled a powerful army in the region of the Spanish Estremadura. When news of D. António's acclamation in Santarém was known, Philip II ordered an attack. A contingent of 30,000 men marched into Portugal, forcing D. António to abandon the capital, from where he went to Porto. There, he disappeared for some time before spending many years in exile in Europe.

After his formidable show of force, diplomatic and juridical persuasion and social insinuation, Philip II did not face any opposition in proclaiming himself king

Opposite page: The islands of St. Lazarus, or Philippines, in a 16th century manuscript of the list by Antonio Pigafetta.



Bohol . Raia . Cibahanui

Icy mourut
le capitaine
general

Mattan

Szubu :

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at the Cortes of Tomar, in April 1581, among the diminished numbers of the Portuguese aristocracy who had not fallen or been taken captive during the Moroccan adventure of D. Sebastião. But the most important aspect was his solemn promise to instate a political regime that was to maintain exclusive Portuguese jurisdiction in all of the kingdom with no annexation to Castile in any sphere.⁸ In fact, the Cortes of Tomar agreed that the political government be handed to the recently created Council of Portugal,

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obliged to function closely with the king, no matter where he was. If the king left the kingdom, government could only be carried on in the presence of a viceroy of royal blood or by a board of governors. In practical terms, the Cortes agreed that the organisation of the Crown's institutions be subject to rules which consecrated the identity of the Portuguese kingdom: no foreigners—that is, no one who was not a native of Portugal—could occupy justice and treasury positions. This exclusion also applied to the ecclesiastical clergy (prelature, abbeys, benefices and chaplains), as well as to the appointment of new members of the military orders incorporated under the domain of the Crown. All this judicial-legal prudence, using enactments in the courts as a basis for the king's contractual legitimacy

with the organic entities of Portuguese society amounted, however, to an emblematic and elucidative ceremonial shift in terms of the sources and characteristics of the new imperial power: Philip II requested that the proxies of the three states (clergy, nobility and people) swear allegiance to him and to his heir, D. Diogo, a formal homage that the previous monarchs, D. Manuel, D. João III or D. Sebastião had never required.⁹

In relation to the different territories of Portuguese expansion, the Cortes of Tomar also established *de jure*, in April 1581, the absolute separation of the administration of the respective colonial empires. To reinforce this decision, the recently proclaimed Philip I of Portugal sent clear orders via Goa and Manila, forbidding his subjects in Eastern Asia from entering areas reserved to the country of which they were not native. In any case, when news of Philip II's accession to the throne of Portugal reached Manila, the Castilians in the Philippines—governor, clergymen, merchants, adventurers—rejoiced and manifested renewed interest in penetrating China and in multiplying initiatives to control the spice trade of the Moluccas, until then prohibited, in many cases militarily and brutally, by the dominant Portuguese presence. Manila's enthusiasm did not find an echo throughout the Asian areas of Portuguese expansion.

In Goa, for example, the swearing of allegiance to the new Habsburg monarch took place only on 3rd September 1581, after two days of difficult negotiations, motivated by the doubts of the governor, Fernão Telles de Meneses, who had been raised at Court with D. António, Prior of Crato, from whom it is suspected he received letters.¹⁰ In Malacca, opposition to the swearing of allegiance to Philip II was led by the captain of the Portuguese enclave himself, D. João da Gama. He contradicted the requests received from the ship of Leonel de Lima and delayed the ceremony until 23rd November 1581.¹¹ In the Moluccas, the situation was even stranger, as the captain of Tidor, Diogo de Azambuja, without communication from Goa and Malacca, was only informed of Philip II's rise to the Portuguese throne by the governor and captain-general of the Philippines, Gonzalo Roquillo de Peñalosa, on 10th March 1582, when he received a ship commanded by Francisco Dueñas.¹² The latter formally communicated the dynastic union and took the opportunity to gather important strategic information on Ternate. Even more complicated was the recognition

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of Philip II in Macao.¹³ His accession to the throne provoked unease and suspicion among the Portuguese of the enclave, who feared both the hegemonic ambitions of the Castilians of Manila and their introduction in the Chinese trade that passed through Macao. The news was delivered by the Jesuit Alonso Sanches, after having spent two months on Chinese territory. In Macao, he met a visitor from the Company of Jesus of the province of India, Alessandro Valignano, who made careful, skilful diplomatic contacts to transmit the coronation of Philip II as king of Portugal. The news of dynastic union was in fact disseminated gradually and in a very piecemeal manner, omitting the more controversial aspects: the entry into Portugal of the Duke of Alba's troops that forced the acceptance of Philip II; the sack of Lisbon and Cascais; the almost mysterious disappearance of D. António, Prior of Crato. There was also an attempt to conceal the dynastic union from the Chinese authorities, as it was feared they would become suspicious given the fame the Castilians had acquired as spies and aggressors from the Portuguese of Macao, rumours that had begun to be proved true with the military occupation of the island of Luzon. Only on 18th December 1582 did the Portuguese of Macao agree to swear allegiance to Philip II, after much hesitation. The documentation of the time shows that the Castilian intrusion could be prejudicial to Macao's interests and could put at risk the very security of the Philippine islands.¹⁴

The precarious and strategic nature of the Iberian presence in Eastern Asia based on small key centres along the trade routes to control the hinterland made it practically impossible to comply with the policy of restricted administrative separation and non-interference decreed by Philip II, who sought to accommodate the well-known rivalries and competition. The areas of Castilian and Portuguese influence were so distant in time and space—many months and years of voyage—from the respective centres of peninsular decision and from the Viceroyships of India and New Spain, that it was difficult to impose controls on the sovereignty of local powers and the multiplicity of private enterprises.¹⁵ The lack of effective territorial occupation left vast intermediary zones open to breaches of royal directives and prey to the activities of private merchants, deserters and adventurers, that could be found from Macassar to Timor. In fact, Portugal controlled only a few

fortifications in the Moluccas, and attempted to dominate a few small peripheral enclaves on the islands of the Lesser Sunda, especially to the east of Flores and in Solor. The small communities settled in Nagasaki and Macao were marginal to the reduced official presence in the key port of Malacca, which was increasingly less the centre of these itineraries and peripheries, caught up in the Iberian reorganisation that shifted attention to trade in the South China Seas and Macao. On the other side of Philip's Iberian crown, only a few hundred Castilians were to be found in the Philippine archipelago, concentrated in the port of Manila and in a few small enclaves located on the western coastline of Luzon.¹⁶

The dynastic union was, as Fernand Braudel so rightly asserted, an extraordinary event, which marked the great Iberian shift to the Atlantic, to Brazil, and soon to the gold and silver of Mexico and Peru. Less studied is the impact of Philip II's Portuguese coronation on Eastern Asia. Very little is known of those shadow empires of private merchants and adventurers who multiplied dealings and enterprises in Southeast Asia. It is highly probable that new opportunities appeared as a result of the dynastic union, which opened possibilities for mercantile alliances and solidarities. More importantly, in practically official terms, the new imperial context favoured a clear militarist turn in the different Asian areas under Portuguese and Castilian influence. Thus, based in the Philippines, a renewed strategy of entry into China and the Moluccas was designed, while the so-called *Portuguese State of India* organised its own bellicose projects, such as the attempt to conquer the Islamic sultan of Aceh, encouraged by the highest religious echelons of Malacca, and recover the positions lost during the 1570s in the Moluccas.¹⁷ This military effort had several Iberian dimensions and different initiatives, frequently without any military, territorial and commercial success. Among the different initiatives generated by the imperial optimism of Philip II's rise to the Portuguese throne, we remember only one: In 1583, the Portuguese captain of the Moluccas requested military aid from Manila, which sent such help by invoking the dynastic union. Commanding ten ships, João Ronquilho helped the Portuguese resistance in a military action against Javanese merchants, ending in great violence and without any commercial consequence except for the burning of a few Javanese ships carrying cloves.¹⁸

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Despite Philip II's promises to respect the political and commercial exclusivity of areas in Asia controlled by the Portuguese, in truth, the monarch carried out significant changes in the Portuguese oriental empire in the first years of his reign, both in terms of persons in charge and in structures, favouring

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an old nobility desperately seeking new sources of revenue, to the detriment of the overseas nobility which, both military and higher officers, had multiplied far from the control of the Lisbon court, combining military feats with commercial profit. An important part of Philip II's reformulation also took place in Solor and Timor.

PHILIP II AND THE COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION OF TIMOR-SOLOR

Philip II did in fact nationalise the colonial administration of the small areas of Portuguese expansion in the Lesser Sunda Islands, redefining its peripheral strategy. Thus, the king withdrew the right to appoint from the Dominican missionaries on Solor, and also introduced officers who, among the married and mixed, created a long history of race mixing in

the occupation of colonial posts, culminating in the seventeenth century with the predominance of the *topasses*,¹⁹ a designation for the local mixed races. With political and legal regularity, Philip II appointed the new captains of Solor and Timor, directly dependent on the new crown. In March 1583, redefining the political strategy for this periphery, Philip II named António de Andria captain of Solor and Timor, a *casado* (married man) from Malacca with vast military experience in the region, not of Portuguese origin, thus overcoming the formal political commitment of nominating only native Portuguese for the overseas colonial offices.²⁰ However, without a salary, and involved in some local ventures, it seems that Andria came nowhere near to fulfilling the narrow confines of his captaincy. In consequence, the succession of political appointments was accompanied by the withdrawal of privileges from the Dominicans. In fact, in 1589, Philip II ordered the Viceroy of India, D.

Duarte de Meneses, to reduce the ordinaries of the Dominicans on Solor and Timor.²¹ This peripheral area gained political and colonial expression and provided, due to its specificity, an important area for founding intervention on the part of the new monarch. In an attempt to redefine the interest of this practically last frontier of the Portuguese oriental empire, Philip II made an effort to link the captaincy of Solor and Timor to the government of the Philippines in order to broaden trade routes and collaboration, a strategy followed by his successors.²² Dated from the end of the 1590s, a number of investments and visits took place, which, from merchants to missionaries, linked Timor to the Philippines, bringing to these parts the first reales. These coins would rapidly become objects of decoration rather than circulating currency, which was practically unknown until well into the nineteenth century. But the larger project of Philip II would not succeed, as it failed to survive both the Restoration and, more especially, the redefinition of regional economic spaces that the Dutch VOC would come to control, which sought to install Batavia as the new commercial and financial centre of Southeast Asia.

There is, however, another stranger indication that still today links Timor to Philip II—an indication of opposition. It is worth remembering that, despite the support received in Court and the homage paid by the majority of the Portuguese nobility and clergy, a continued opposition to the dual monarchy always

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persisted in a number of popular and religious circles. This opposition encouraged a messianic and political belief centred on the return of D. Sebastião to Portugal, in which it was believed that the young king had not perished on the fields of Morocco. This Sebastianism manifested itself in different prophecies and popular movements: An artisan from Angra do Heroísmo who, in March 1580, declared he was the longed-for king; later, in 1584, it was a peasant from a village of Penamacor who declared he was D. Sebastião; a little later it was the turn of a hermit.²³ A body of belief appeared, essentially encouraged by an exiled clergyman, D. João de Castro, who, mixing Joaquimism and circles linked to the defeated D. António, discovered prophetic verses attributed to a shoemaker called Bandarra that announced, from 1530, the advent of new times under the action of a mystical king. Many clergymen encouraged these movements of Sebastianism. It reappeared in Venice in 1598 when a young adventurer presented himself to the Doge as D. Sebastião, returned after much travel throughout Africa. Arrested in Venice but released in 1600, he was welcomed by D. João de Castro and the exiled groups, and with them, attempted

to gain support in France and Tuscany. Handed over to the Spanish in Naples, he was sentenced to the galleys in 1602, but the following year, found off the coast of Cadiz, he cultivated echoes of a Sebastianist insurrection. The false D. Sebastião and all those implicated were sentenced to death. They disappeared . . . or did they?

There is at least one group of East Timorese who patiently explain that one should not trust the Filipinos too much because they are a type of “Castilian” who will only harm the greater interests of Portugal in Timor. These Timorese belong to a very “original” political party, the Popular Party of Timor, which, in the elections for the constituent Assembly, elected two representatives.²⁴ Their leader, Jacob Xavier, affirmed several times in public at election meetings and rallies that he was the true king of Timor and Portugal; that he was, in fact, the only legitimate descendant to be king of Portugal. Why? He patiently explained the history of Portugal to prove that he was the direct descendant of D. António, exiled at the end of the sixteenth century to the Portuguese colonial territories of Asia, the legitimate king of Portugal from whom Philip II had usurped the crown and kingdom. **RC**

NOTES

- 1 A former inventory of this museum can be found in *Katalog Pameran Koleksi Warisan Budaya Timor – Timor*, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan/Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan, Museum Negeri Propinsi Timor Timur, Tahun, 1995-1996.
- 2 José Manuel García & Ivo Carneiro de Sousa, *The First Portuguese Maps and Sketches of Southeast Asia and the Philippines (1512-1571)*, Lisboa, CEPESA, 2002.
- 3 Francisco Rodrigues, *Livre Manuscript de Francisco Rodrigues*, fl. 36 (Bibliothèque de l'Assemblée Nationale de France).
- 4 José Manuel García & Ivo Carneiro de Sousa, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
- 5 Antonio Pigafetta, *El primer viaje alrededor del mundo. Relato de la expedición de Magallanes y Elcano*, (ed. Isabel de Riquer), Barcelona, Ediciones B, 1999.
- 6 The main Portuguese Dominican chroniclers for events of this period are the works by Fr. Luís de Sousa, *História de S. Domingos*, (ed. M. Lopes Almeida), Porto, Lello & Irmãos, 1977, 2 vols. and Fr. João dos Santos, *Etiópia Oriental*, (ed. Luís Albuquerque & Maria da Graça Pericão), Lisboa, Alfa, 1989, 2 vols.
- 7 Charles R. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East (1550-1770)*, The Hague, Martinus Nijdhof, 1948, pp. 175-176.
- 8 Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *Portugal na Monarquia Hispânica*, Lisboa, Livros Horizonte, 2001, pp. 21-22.
- 9 Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- 10 Diogo do Couto, *Década Décima da Ásia*, Lisboa, Livraria Sam Carlos, 1974, pp. 42-53.
- 11 Diogo do Couto, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-157.
- 12 Diogo do Couto, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-312.
- 13 Pe. Manuel Teixeira, “Macau prestou fidelidade a Filipe II de Castela na dominação castelhana,” in *Macau e a sua Diocese, I*, Macau, Tipografia do Orfanato Salesiano, 1940, pp. 115-141.
- 14 Manuel Ollé, *La empresa de China. De la Armada Invencible al Galeón de Manila*, Barcelona, El Acatilado, 2002, pp. 107-108.
- 15 Manuel Ollé, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
- 16 Lourdes Díaz-Trechuelo, *Filipinas. La gran desconocida (1565-1898)*, Pamplona, Ed. Universidad de Navarra, 2001, pp. 34-73.
- 17 Manuel Ollé, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
- 18 Diogo do Couto, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-320.
- 19 The probable etymology of this term is the Dravidian *Tuppassi*, meaning interpreter.
- 20 Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais/Torre do Tombo (IANTT), *Chancelaria de Dom Filipe I*, Livro 15 de Doações, fls. 28-28v.; Livro 28 de Doações, fls. 81-81v. – n.º 383.
- 21 Arquivo Histórico do Estado da Índia (AHEI), *Livro das Monções*, n.º 3-A.
- 22 IANTT, *Chancelaria de Dom Filipe II*, Livro 2, fls. 117-117v.; Livro 6 de Doações, fls. 132v.-133; Livro 7 de Doações, fls. 189-189v.; Livro 10 de Doações, fl. 321; Livro 20, fl. 276v.; Livro 23 de Doações, fl. 316v.; Livro 29 de Doações, fls. 193-193v.; Livro 31 de Doações, fl. 101, *Chancelaria de Dom Filipe III*, Livro 23, fls. 349v.-350; Livro 29, fl. 373v.; Livro 40, fls. 255-255v.
- 23 Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58; Yves-Marie Bercé, *Le roi caché. Sauveurs et imposteurs. Mythes politiques populaires dans l'Europe Moderne*, Paris, Fayard, 1990, pp. 16-81.
- 24 Lurdes Silva-Carneiro de Sousa, *Some Facts and Comments on East Timor Constituent Assembly Election*, Lisboa, CEPESA, col. Cadernos, 2001, p. 14.