
CHINÆ
QUICHIU QVANCIS
SUINAN
PAR S
CANTA N
COCHINCHINA
QUAN
CII
PEGU
SIAN
Camb
Cambo

The Portuguese Settlement at Macao

The Portuguese Policy of Expansion in the Far East, in Light of the History of Chinese and Japanese Intercourse and Maritime Activities

Patrizia Carioti*

I. It is well known that the traditional European historiography of Europeans' arrival in the seas of the Far East, and of their expansion, settlements, and maritime activities there, was based mainly on European sources, documents and reports. With accurate descriptions and rich details, a great number of such studies presented the encounter between "East and West," paying particular attention to the activities pursued by the Europeans in their quest to establish their first commercial bases and essential settlements along the coasts of the countries of East Asia. Meanwhile, Chinese and Japanese historians have long analysed that same encounter from their own point of view, mainly using their own historical sources and archives. During the second half of the last century, however, an important degree of co-operation among Western and Eastern historians made it possible to connect and compare Western and Eastern studies and archival documentation. This

G. Mercator/J. Hondius. *India Orientalis,* c. 1606.

meant, first of all, overcoming language barriers. In recent decades, more and more scholars, both Western and Eastern, have become capable of managing several foreign languages, so that many recent studies have been based on the analysis and comparison of documents and sources in different languages.[1] As regards Macao (and all the international commercial outposts in South and East Asia, from Goa to Malacca, Batavia, Manila, Formosa, Hirado, and so on), this is an extremely important result. Consider simply the contradictory versions, Chinese and Portuguese, that we now have to deal with when we examine the establishment of the Portuguese settlement at Macao in 1557 (to mention the date commonly accepted). Portuguese documents and

* Associate Professor and Chair *History of East Asia* (Oriental University of Naples, Italy). Her research field focuses on the 16th and 17th Centuries: Maritime History of China and Japan; International Relations of China and Japan with the Europeans; International Relations between China and Japan. She spent many years abroad, in Japan (University of Tokyo), Holland (University of Leiden), and China (University of Xiamen).

Professora Associada e titular da cadeira History of East Asia *(Universidade Oriental de Nápoles, Itália). O seu campo de pesquisa centra-se nos séculos XVI-XVII: história marítima da China e do Japão, relações internacionais da China e do Japão com os europeus, relações internacionais entre a China e o Japão. Tem passado muitos anos no estrangeiro: Japão (Universidade de Tóquio), Holanda (Universidade de Leiden) e China (Universidade de Xiamen).*

sources give us a different interpretation of this event than do the official Chinese reports.[2]

Nevertheless, although we now have at our disposal many studies on Macao based on both Chinese and Portuguese documents, and therefore certainly reliable, still there are some aspects of the establishment of the Portuguese in Macao in the mid-16th century that deserve more thorough examination. These aspects have primarily to do with two factors: first, the incessant illegal activities of piracy—both by the Chinese and Japanese (*haikou* and *wokou*)—smuggling, illicit trade, and violent raids on the Chinese coast; and second, the Portuguese strategy of insisting upon the establishment of outposts and bases in the Far East, especially Japan. Is it not, in fact, the case that Portugal reached Tanegashima in 1543 thanks to the mediation of Chinese maritime adventurers, exactly during the period in which the Portuguese were unsuccessful in their attempts to establish a base on the Chinese coast? In this sense, then, the two abovementioned factors are closely related to each other: to what extent were Chinese and Japanese maritime activities—legal or illegal—prior to 1577 connected with the Portuguese settlement in Macao? And to what extent was the settlement at Macao tied to the arrival of the Portuguese in Japan?

Over the past twenty years, many studies have been published on Chinese maritime history, shedding new light on the trade activities engaged in by Chinese maritime adventurers, their connections with the overseas Chinese, as well as their international network across the whole of South and East Asia.[3] Yet the role played by Japan in this respect has been somehow neglected. Although Chinese sources and documents report the intensive activities of the *wokou*, it is not yet completely clear to what extent Japan intervened in the international situation of the 16th century, and how Japan was involved in the overseas activities engaged in by Chinese pirates. In fact, there is no clear line separating activities of the *haikou* from those of the *wokou*.[4] Moreover, and more importantly, Japan was very often the "invisible hand" behind the illicit commercial activities of the Chinese pirates, as she was the hidden partner of the Chinese sea-traders. Although the *wokou* were still active during the first half of the 16th century, from the middle of the century onwards, their direct participation in the pirate raids on the Chinese coast was certainly reduced, in comparison to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This was partly due to Japan's domestic political situation, as we shall see. Nevertheless, Japan continued to take part into the overseas trade, financing the illegal activities of the Chinese pirates, investing capital in Chinese overseas activities, and protecting the *haikou*, providing refuge for them on Japanese shores and sharing the profit with them. In other words, Japan utilised Chinese maritime adventurers as intermediaries in its own overseas trade. It is well known that many powerful Chinese pirates also had bases along the coast of Japan; Hirado was one of the traditional shelters for Chinese outlaws. It was in fact at Hirado that Wang Zhi had one of his headquarters, under the protection of the Matsuura *daimyo*, and it was to Hirado that Wang Zhi guided the Portuguese in the year 1550. We will deal more specifically with this topic in the following pages.

To understand the complex situation of Sino-Japanese relations, and how crucial Chinese and Japanese maritime activities and their interconnections were to the Portuguese expansion into the Far East, we have to go back to the 14th century, in an attempt to clarify the real meaning of the term *wokou*, taking into account the political stances of China and Japan at that time. It is also necessary to analyse the relations between China and Japan with regard to the maritime trade and commerce, in order to clarify the pre-existing international state of affairs that the Portuguese faced upon their arrival in the Far Eastern seas and their settlement at Macao.

II.

As soon as the Hongwu emperor ascended to the throne and founded the Ming Dynasty in 1368, he proceeded to establish strong, authoritarian control over the whole Chinese Empire, through strict ordinances and laws. The situation along the coast was not at all satisfactory, as the 14th century saw continuous attacks by Japanese pirates, who plundered the Korean coast as well: these are the pirates we know as the notorious *wokou* (*wakô*).

Let us examine this term, *wokou*, for a moment: as we know, the term is very old, dating from ancient times (the fourth to fifth centuries of the Christian era), and it has mainly been used to identify Japanese pirates, though it is also used in Chinese sources to refer to the whole problem of piracy along the Chinese coast. Nevertheless, in practice, this term came to have another meaning from the 15th century onward, and especially during the 16th century. Although the Chinese authorities of that time did not want to

Portuguese ships and figure-subjects. From a scroll painting in colour on paper. Unknown artist.

formally recognise it, the fact was that most of the attacks launched along the Chinese coast by the so-called *wakô* were carried out by Chinese, not Japanese, pirates.[5]

Yet there is another consideration regarding the use of the term *wokou* and its usual translation as "Japanese pirates." Looking at the historical circumstances of the 14th century, we see that Japan was recovering from the two attempted invasions by Mongol fleets in 1274 and 1281. The archipelago remained in tension for many years after these attacks, as it anticipated a third possible invasion from the continent. In such a context, Japan needed to reinforce its coastal defences, especially in Kyushu—in other words, to reinforce its fleets as well. The attacks on the coasts of an "enemy" that had threatened Japanese territory and national integrity in the first place were perhaps not intended by the Japanese as acts of "piracy," but rather as a sort of maritime "guerrilla" tactic. In this sense, it may make sense to compare the Japanese pirates of that time with the European privateers, who acted under the protection of their countries. In fact, the "Lords" of Kyushu were very often the instigators of such piratical expeditions, from which they could also gain enormous profits. And the local authorities were certainly not blind to such activities. The Matsuura family of Hizen province, based in Hirado, indeed provides an excellent example of this. The same family had faced enemy fleets during the Mongol invasions.[6] Similarly, in the 17th century, Chinese merchants were officially received by the *shôgun* Tokugawa Ieyasu in his residence at Sunpu, while those same Chinese merchants were considered outlaws and pirates by the Chinese authorities.[7]

This ambiguous use of the category of piracy, in fact, corresponds in part to an analogous ambiguity of the *kanhe* system in its practical realisation (*kanhe maoyi*, in Japanese: *kangô bôeki*).[8] The need to identify official Japanese embassies to China through the seals system demonstrates in itself the inconsistencies in the controls exercised over maritime activities both on China's side and more so on the Japanese one, especially after Yoshimitsu's shôgunate.[9]

To synthesise briefly the whole period of the *kanhe* system, we have a first phase, from 1368 to 1404, characterised by the numerous attempts made on the Chinese side to reopen official relations with Japan. During almost this entire period, Japan was politically divided into the Northern and Southern Courts (*nanbokuchô*), and the Hongwu emperor had no official political counterpart in Japan with whom to establish a formal agreement. Several Chinese embassies were intercepted by Prince Kanenaga and never reached the Northern Court.[10] Only after the reunification of the country, realised by Yoshimitsu in 1392, was it possible to start a new dialogue. It was not until 1404, during

the reign of Yongle, that relations between China and Japan were officially reopened, and the *kanhe* system established.[11]

A second phase, then, lasted from 1404 through 1419, under Yoshimitsu and Yoshimochi: this is in fact the first period during which the commercial agreement between the two countries was enacted. The terms and conditions fixed in the official agreements were not terribly satisfactory for Japan, as they imposed the same limitations that were imposed under the general tribute system established by Hongwu in the previous century. Yet, in the case of Japan, the restrictions were less strict, and often the terms were not respected, as the Chinese authorities allowed Japanese ships to come to Ningbo more frequently than they were supposed to, and they did not require the Japanese to observe strictly the limitations on the number of ships authorised to be part of the official embassy (either two or three, depending on the period). This tolerant attitude on the Chinese side is itself a measure of the importance to the Chinese government of keeping good relations with the archipelago: in exchange for this lenience, Yoshimitsu had promised to clear the seas of Japanese piracy. On several occasions, indeed, the third Ashikaga *shôgun* sent captured Japanese pirates to the Ming Emperor as a gift.[12]

The need to identify official Japanese embassies to China through the seals system demonstrates in itself the inconsistencies in the controls exercised over maritime activities both on China's side and more so on the Japanese one, especially after Yoshimitsu's shogunate.

After the interruption of Sino-Japanese relations provoked by Yoshimochi, the years 1432-1549 form the third and last phase of the *kanhe* system. This phase is the longest one, and the most confusing.

Of the Ashikaga shôguns, Yoshimitsu had certainly been the most authoritarian: he had reunified the two courts, centralising the whole country. He was a charismatic leader, sincerely concerned with Chinese culture and civilisation, and deeply conscious of the economic importance, to the Japanese market, of the commerce with China. Moreover, he protected and developed the Gozan Temples, modelled on the Wushan Temples of China, since many official ambassadors to the Ming Court were Zen monks.[13] And, as is well known, Yoshimitsu accepted formal investiture from the Ming emperor, defining himself and signing the famous document of 1404 as the "King of Japan." This led to many criticisms of Yoshimitsu's servile attitude towards the Chinese emperor.[14]

Nevertheless, Yoshimitsu was a keen politician, and very attentive to the economic aspects of the commerce with China. Moreover, there is another aspect of his policy that has been somehow neglected. If we compare Yoshimitsu's maritime policies with those later pursued by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, we clearly see a common goal, though the means employed to achieve it were different in different historical contexts: the centralisation of Japanese mercantile activities under the control of the central authorities of the archipelago.[15] China's policy penalised Chinese overseas activities in order to keep stability along its coasts, as the Chinese authorities had no interest in developing maritime trade: the Chinese political stance aimed to reduce as much as possible such trade, allowing it to exist only through the tribute system.[16] In contrast, Japanese maritime policy aimed at maintaining and developing the mercantile potentialities of the archipelago, yet on the basis of strict controls exercised by the central government over such activities: in other words, it tended to "centralise" Japanese overseas commerce in a cohesive and coercive structure imposed by the authorities. Yoshimitsu's policy was, therefore, a prelude to analogous policies implemented by Hideyoshi and Ieyasu, and given full expression finally in the *shuinsen* system.[17]

After the end of Yoshimitsu's shôgunate, the *bakufu* Ashikaga gradually lost power. Although the *shôgun* Yoshinori reopened official relations with China



Detail of Macao, in *Aomen Jilue.*

in 1432, after the interruption implemented by Yoshimochi, his power was already declining; in 1441, he was killed by the *shugo* Akamatsu (who was, in turn, defeated and killed by the Yamana family). Japan was nearing the Ônin civil war (1467-1477), and the Ashikaga shôgunate was inexorably losing control over the country.

These events, as we can imagine, had a direct impact on official relations with the Chinese continent. Fierce competition arose among the influential families over who would obtain the seal needed to go to China as an officially recognised embassy. The deep instability of the internal political situation, which was slowly bringing Japan into the civil war of the *sengoku jidai*, did not permit any the central authorities of the *bakufu* to exercise any effective controls over maritime activities.

Moreover, the internal conflicts that had already set the Hosokawa and the Ouchi clans on opposite sides of the Ônin War continued to become deeper and more severe, as we can see from the serious incident in Ningbo in 1523, when the two self-proclaimed "official" embassies from Japan—sent by the Ouchi and Hosokawa clans, respectively, reached Ningbo almost at the same time and wreaked terrible damage on the city (Chinese houses were set on fire). This unpleasant episode ended with the unavoidable involvement of the people of Ningbo in the dispute.[18] On other occasions, these episodes of violent dispute between the two families had exploded in acts of "piracy" at sea, when one clan attacked the ships of its rival in order to steal from them the official seals. In addition, there had been several attempts to reproduce false seals. Given such chaotic circumstances, it was impossible to maintain relations with China, and in 1549, when the last official Japanese mission to China returned to the archipelago, the *kanhe* system came to an end.[19]

As we have seen, even the formal delegates who visited the Chinese continent in the name of the Japanese authorities acted as "pirates"—not to mention the continuous smuggling that accompanied the official embassies, on both the Japanese and Chinese sides. Although the limitations imposed by the *kanhe* system were not so strictly observed, the quantity and the type of merchandise allowed under this system, in fact, was nowhere near enough to satisfy the demand of the Chinese or Japanese merchants.[20]

It was precisely in this historical context that the Portuguese reached the Chinese coast and undertook their policy of settlement in the Far East.

III. The interruption of official relations between China and Japan in 1549 coincided with one of the most active periods of piracy, this time mainly carried on by Chinese pirates. It was in fact in the middle of the 16th century that Wang Zhi (known as Ôchoku in Japan) was active in Far Eastern seas.[21] The restrictive policies adopted by the Chinese authorities had heavily constrained and penalised the economy of the coastal areas, provoking as a final, counterproductive result an increase, rather than a reduction, in piracy. Around the middle of the 16th century, all the southern coastal regions of China suffered "years of fire" from piracy, continuous and irrepressible raids and plunder.[22] Prof. Ts'ao Yung-ho, in his paper presented at the ICAS Conference in 1998, connected this violent explosion of Chinese piracy to the arrival of the Portuguese. The same thesis is advanced by many historians dealing with the Portuguese attempts to establish their bases on the

Chinese coasts in the first decades of 16th century: in that uncertain situation, looking for alliances and trying to obtain recognition from the Ming government, the Portuguese made temporary agreements with Chinese pirate groups and bands, or acted as "pirates" themselves, pressing on the Chinese coasts through military attacks.[23] Nevertheless, since they were in need of establishing official relations with the Ming empire, the Portuguese were also very careful in dealing with Chinese pirates and smugglers: on some occasions, the Portuguese sided with the Ming authorities and helped local officials fight against the *haikou*, taking direct part in military attacks with their armed ships. It is also true that the pirates could outfit their fleets with Portuguese firearms, obtained directly or indirectly. Furnishing themselves with advanced Portuguese technology such as cannons and guns was an extremely important aim for Chinese and Japanese authorities as well as for the pirates and outlaws, whether they were *haikou* or *wokou*.

The Portuguese strategy for gradually establishing their presence on the Chinese coast was very tentative. For, on one hand, the Portuguese needed the commercial ties with the Chinese sea-adventurers and pirates in order to gain access to this lucrative trade (as the official position of the Ming regarding maritime trade was one of strict prohibition), and were therefore forced to co-operate with them to a certain extent. On the other hand, the Portuguese were in deep need of being recognised by the Chinese authorities, and could not afford to be seen acting *de facto* against Chinese law or contradicting too openly the prohibitions set by the Ming.

Recently, a great deal of detailed research has been done on the years preceding 1557, describing the various attempts by the Portuguese to establish outposts on China's coasts, as well as the difficult dialogue they conducted with the Ming authorities and local officials. This dialogue sometimes resulted in clear and reciprocal hostilities, while on other occasions it seemed to express the intention of cooperation on both sides.[24] According to some scholars, in order to obtain formal recognition from the Chinese authorities, the main strategy pursued by the Portuguese, which finally prevailed, consisted in demonstrating that they were completely unconnected to the piratical activities of Chinese or Japanese pirates, smugglers, and outlaws. The Portuguese wanted to be considered trustworthy partners for China: and to prove that they were reliable allies, they adopted a shrewd political strategy, joining Chinese troops in their expeditions against the *haikou*. Jin Guo Ping has found evidence of direct military interventions by the Portuguese against the Chinese pirates on several occasions: according to his research, the first time the Portuguese participated in such actions was in 1547, against the powerful pirate Lin Jian.[25]

At that time the situation of the coastal areas was critical; during the Jiajing era (1522-1566) China witnessed terribly violent attacks and raids by both haikou and *wokou*. In that same year, 1547, Zhu Wan was appointed Governor of Zhejiang, with jurisdiction extending over the coastal regions of Fujian. For the Chinese authorities, the presence of the Portuguese, pressing for trade, represented another element of disorder and destabilisation along the coast, and the arrival in 1547 of the last Japanese official embassy at Ningbo (too early, according to the regulations of the

kanhe system) constituted one more problem to be dealt with. Zhu Wan made the Japanese embassy wait for formal authorisation to proceed to the capital, which finally was granted in the following year (1548); in the meantime, the Japanese envoys and crews traded without permission with Chinese merchants, smugglers, and pirates, and with the Portuguese as well.[26]

The connections among the *Wo*, the Portuguese, and the Chinese pirates, and their close ties with powerful families of the coastal regions (families who were all the more influential for having strong connections with high-ranking officials) were all too clear to Zhu Wan: he was aware of these circumstances, yet still seriously intended to bring an end to the *haikou* and *wokou* problem. As we know, Zhu Wan launched the massive attack on Shuangyu, the most active base of piracy at the time. Yet his strong determination to clear China's shores of piracy cost him his life (he committed suicide in1550). Although the attack on Shuangyu destroyed the pirate base there and was in this sense a success, some of the leaders of the pirate groups escaped—among them, for example, Wang Zhi.[27]

It is precisely to the notorious Wang Zhi that we would like now to turn our attention, as he was in fact a key figure in the establishment of the Portuguese bases in the Far East.[28]

All historians working on 16th century maritime history have to deal with the outstanding figure of Wang Zhi, as he was one of the most representative Chinese "maritime merchant-adventurer-pirates" of the period. A native of Huizhou, Wang Zhi belonged to the pirate group headed by the Xu brothers, although at first he was involved in overseas activities mainly as merchant, more interested in maritime trade and smuggling than in true acts of piracy. The Xu band had already conducted some lucrative joint operations with the Portuguese in Malacca in 1522, and it seems to have been at the Xu brothers' suggestion that the Portuguese attacked the Guangdong coast in 1523.[29] It should be remarked that 1523 was also the year of the incident at Ningbo, provoked by the Japanese embassies. When the Xus were defeated by the Chinese fleets and their dispersed group remained without a leader, Wang Zhi did not lose the opportunity to take over command of the band. His sphere of overseas activities included South and East Asia, and in particular Japan. Due to the critical circumstances of the Chinese coasts, due to

the prohibitions on maritime trade that had been more strictly enforced by the Ming in those years, Wang Zhi needed to have safe havens abroad: and Japan, given its deep political instability, was a prime location. The Japanese, whether they were *daimyo*, merchants, sea-traders or *wokou*, were all eager to trade with the Chinese continent, and did not consider it of any importance if those trades were licit or illicit for Ming China.

According to Japanese research, it seems that already in 1540, Wang Zhi had reached the Goto Islands, establishing his first outpost there; soon after, in 1542, he had landed on the shore at Hirado, invited by the powerful *daimyo* Matsuura Takanobu. It is necessary, at this point, to discuss briefly the historical

circumstances in Japan at the time, particularly in regard to the Matsuura family and the situation on Kyushu.

The central decades of the 16th century witnessed the peak of the *sengoku jidai* in Japan: the country was indeed in complete chaos and anarchy. The Ashikaga *shôgun* had completely lost control over Japan, and the powerful families fought each other to affirm their supremacy. Temporary agreements and alliances were easily made and broken; enemies quickly became allies, only to suddenly change back into enemies again: everybody was merely looking out for his own profit and advantage. These were the years just prior to the rise of Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi and finally Tokugawa Ieyasu. The Kyushu regions were shaken by the civil war as well, and the Matsuura family was no exception. Gradually prevailing in the numerous fights and alliances among the *sengoku jidai*, the Matsuura clan had succeeded in subjugating several smaller military families—such as the Minu, Sashi, Shisa, Yatsunami, Kôda, Uku (Goto), Aokata, etc.—and in establishing firm control over them. The Matsuura's territory was centred in Hizen province, and their sphere of influence included the region of northwestern Kyushu.[30]

Thanks to the ongoing trade with countries in the Far East (the commerce with China was the most profitable, but not the only one the Matsuura clan engaged in), for which Hirado had long been a traditional stopping-point, the Matsuura clans were powerful enough in those days. Nevertheless, their relations with the other more powerful *daimyo* of Kyushu — rival clans such as the Ouchi, the Omura, the Otomo, the Arima, the Shimazu, etc.—were not so satisfactory. All of them were involved in overseas commerce, for residents of the Kyushu region had been deeply interested and involved in overseas activities since ancient times.[31] The Shimazu clan, for example, controlled the commercial routes to Liuqiu (the Ryukyu Islands); the So family was engaged in commerce with Korea. In 1563, the So would lose Iki Island—which was, along with Tsushima Island, a key-stopping point for the commerce with Korea—to the Matsuura, who took it by force.[32] Yet, among the powerful *daimyo* of Kyushu, the strongest and most aggressive military clan was the Shimazu of Satsuma, which was gradually enlarging its territory and its influence with the intention of taking over control of all of Kyushu. Only the military pacification campaign

undertaken by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the years 1586-87 would succeed in defeating the Shimazu, and stopping their military aggression.[33]

Nevertheless, in the decades of the middle 16th century, the Shimazu were not so powerful yet, nor were they too dangerous for the Matsuura: the latter had to worry more about the Omura clans, which were closer to the Matsuura territories (which bordered on the Omura area) and with whom the Matsuura's rivalries were fierce and deep, especially after the Portuguese reached the Japanese coast at Tanegashima in 1543. The Omura, centred in the Nagasaki area, were the primary rivals of the Matsuura: for several years, between 1550 and 1564, these two powerful families fought over the Portuguese presence, as both clans wanted to host the Portuguese merchants exclusively in their territories. Moreover, and more importantly, both families wanted to get Portuguese firearms, guns, and cannons. In the condition of civil war that Japan was experiencing, indeed, it was essential to be armed to the utmost, better than one's enemies; and the possession of firearms, introduced by the Portuguese, constituted a vital advantage.

It is logical to suppose that Wang Zhi might have followed the same reasoning when, in 1543, he landed on the Japanese coast in the company of the first Portuguese: expert as he was in commercial affairs, and certainly well aware of the political situation of Japan, Wang Zhi was deeply conscious of the enormous profits that he might have gained as an intermediary if he helped the Portuguese establish a new base in Japan. We have already mentioned that according to some Japanese studies, Wang Zhi reached the Goto archipelago in 1540 and that in 1542 Matsuura Takanobu invited him to Hirado.[34] In those years, Wang Zhi was still using the base of Shuangyu, together with the Xu brothers, where they had several dealings with the Portuguese as well: we may presume that it was not by chance, then, that one year later, in 1543, Wang Zhi arrived in Japan with the Portuguese.[35]

During the following years, until Zhu Wan's attack on Shuangyu in 1547, illegal commerce was still very prosperous along the Chinese coast: Wang Zhi and the Xu brothers continued their profitable activities, connecting China and Japan through trade, and smuggling with the Portuguese. After Zhu Wan's military intervention at Shuangyu in 1547, and the consequent defeat of the Xus' group, as we have seen, Wang Zhi escaped to Japan, taking under his command the rest of the band.[36] That same year the Portuguese joined the Ming fleet in attacking Lin Jian.[37] In a way, then, we might say that the elimination of other pirates was actually an advantage for Wang Zhi, because he would have fewer partners with whom to compete and share the international maritime trade network. The Portuguese did not at all wish to make an enemy of the Ming officials, although the local authorities must have known that Portuguese merchants were involved in the illicit trade with Chinese and Japanese smugglers along the coast. In this sense, the motivation for the Portuguese participation in the attack on Lin Jian appears clear enough. On the other hand, the Portuguese could not and would not renounce the lucrative profits of the trade: they were in the Far East exactly for that reason, to gain as many concrete benefits as possible. This was truer than ever, now that, after their first direct contact with Japan, the Portuguese had foreseen the future potential offered by the establishment of their bases on the archipelago. The new market of Japan appeared extremely significant to the Portuguese, in particular if they considered the still uncertain situation on the Chinese coast, where, after almost half a century of vain attempts, they had been unable to succeed in creating a stable and recognised outpost. In attaining their goal of extending their expansion to the Japanese archipelago, the Portuguese received crucial support from Wang Zhi: in 1550, the first Portuguese ship entered the bay at Hirado.[38]

Matsuura Takanobu was deeply interested in overseas commerce, and for several years already, he had been engaging in trade with Wang Zhi: it seems logical enough to presume that previous arrangements had been made between Matsuura Takanbu and Wang Zhi to bring the Portuguese to Hirado. Since 1542,

The Portuguese wanted to be considered trustworthy partners for China: and to prove that they were reliable allies, they adopted a shrewd political strategy, joining Chinese troops in their expeditions against the haikou.

Takanobu had welcomed Wang Zhi to his dominion and had proposed that he establish his base in Hirado. According to Japanese sources, in those years Wang Zhi had in Hirado over two thousand men under his command as well as numerous ships, each of them capable of holding around 300 men on board.[39] Japanese ships were smaller than those of the Chinese, and that was one more reason to make use of Chinese mediation in Japanese overseas trade. Wang Zhi had at his disposal an entire area of the Hirado *han*, where he lodged his men and established his residence, according to the Chinese custom—a sort of small "Chinese quarter," or *yashiki* (residence) as it is called in the Japanese texts.[40]

At first, the arrival of the Portuguese in Hirado was indeed a satisfactory event for everyone involved.

The *daimyo* Matsuura was eager to enlarge his participation in overseas trade, especially after the interruption of official relations with China in 1549; he warmly welcomed the Portuguese merchants and missionaries, providing them with lodging and offering them some temples to use as churches.[41] Wang Zhi, the "King of Huizhou," had his headquarters in Hirado and could act as intermediary *in primis*: for in fact, although contacts between the Japanese and the Portuguese were now direct, both countries had to rely on Chinese goods and merchandise for their trade, and therefore Wang Zhi's participation was essential. The Portuguese were satisfied as well: they had managed to reach another country, where both trade and missionary work seemed profitable and promising; moreover, here they could finally establish a stable base in the Far East.[42] It should not be forgotten that in the previous year, 1549, Zhu Wan had launched his successful manoeuvres against Shuangyu, compelling Wang Zhi and the others to escape to Japan: this stern action on the part of Governor Zhu Wan had made it even more difficult for the Portuguese to engage in illegal commerce with their Chinese partners, and they had to be increasingly careful in their maritime trade affairs. The year 1549 had been, indeed, a delicate moment for Portugal as well.

The turning point came in 1550. After the suicide of Zhu Wan, when the Ming adopted a more tolerant approach toward the coastal situation of smuggling and illicit maritime trading, Wang Zhi was offered the chance to be pardoned and rewarded, if he could defeat the other pirate groups infesting the Chinese coast. The negotiations under way between Wang Zhi and the coastal officials led to a more relaxed atmosphere along China's shores, and the tension seemed to relent: it seemed possible to finally find a solution to the problematic situation on the coast. Therefore, the Portuguese could agree to join Wang Zhi at Hirado without too much risk of irritating Ming officials—after all, the Chinese authorities were co-operating with the pirate Wang Zhi as well. Yet the balance did not last long. Wang Zhi kept his promise, fighting against other pirate bands in the years 1550-52, for it was indeed also in Wang Zhi's own interests to defeat his rivals in the sea trade (that same strategy, as we know, was to be successfully pursued by Zheng Zhilong later, in the first decades of the 17th century).[43] But China did not respect its promise to Wang Zhi,

Nanban-byobu (16th century).

and in 1553, the latter launched a violent raid on Chinese shores, also supported by some Japanese.[44]

For the Portuguese, the situation was becoming uneasy again, as they did not want to take the wrong stance vis-à-vis the Chinese authorities by co-operating with Wang Zhi at Hirado. Portuguese political strategy was, at this point, at its keenest and most productive. On one hand, they sided with the Ming fleets against He Yiba in 1554, in order to prove their loyalty to and support of the Ming.[45] On the other hand, so as not to lose their position in Japan, they started to cement their connections with the Omura *daimyo*, rival to the Matsuura, firstly in order to enlarge their settlement on the Japanese archipelago, and secondly in order to secure a safer

MACAO BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN

territory for their bases in case the Wang Zhi question became more serious.[46] Moreover, exactly in the years 1553-54, the Portuguese had begun to build their first lodgings at Macao, still without permission, and consequently they had to be extremely cautious in their movements: Wang Zhi was becoming a dangerous partner, and in that context, the Portuguese settlement at Hirado could also appear as a challenge to the Ming's efforts to defeat piracy.

Nevertheless, the Portuguese position in the Far East was not at all weak. Portugal had what all the Far Eastern disputants were profoundly in need of: firearms and advanced military technology. This was the true strong point of the Portuguese policy. And Portugal played its cards well.

If we consider the difficult context of China's coast from a more general point of view, we might better understand China's policies and attitude toward the Portuguese. China's most urgent concern was to prevent pirate groups from being provided with Portuguese firearms and cannons. To have to deal with pirates who were well organised, internationally connected, and equipped with firearms, was indeed a very undesirable and extremely dangerous eventuality, one which would have meant for the Ming government nothing less than total chaos on the coast and the complete impossibility for local authorities to exercise any kind of control over the situation. At any cost, the Ming government had to avoid that. Formally aiding the Ming fleets against the pirates and, at the same

time, furnishing *de facto* those same pirates with their firearms, the Portuguese were imposing a decision upon China. The implicit message they were sending to the Ming was clear: the Portuguese wanted to establish an outpost on China's coast that would receive official recognition, otherwise they would continue to smuggle and to provide Chinese outlaws with their firearms.

In 1555, Chinese reopened negotiations with Wang Zhi, asking him to surrender and once again promising, in exchange, to pardon him and moreover to lift the prohibitions maritime trade. Also on this occasion, Japan played an intermediate role: some Japanese missives on behalf of Wang Zhi, signed by influential *daimyo*, were sent to the Chinese authorities, and Chinese envoys travelled to Japan to conduct negotiations with the powerful "King of Huizhou."[47] Meanwhile, Portuguese ships continued to reach Hirado every year, although relations with the Matsuura were becoming more tense: some incidents had happened between the Japanese and the Portuguese merchants, and the Buddhist elite and monks, deeply irritated by the presence of Portuguese missionaries, were forcing the *daimyo* Matsuura to adopt a stricter policy toward the Christian religion and the Portuguese in general.[48] On the other hand, the Portuguese were already planning to move into the Omuras' territories, as it was their interest to enlarge as much as possible their settlement on the Japanese archipelago. The rivalry between the two influential Japanese families became fiercer: as we know, a few years later, the Omura clan would be successful in gaining the favour of the Portuguese and, in exchange, Portugal received the important concession of the territory of Nagasaki (1571).[49]

The new market of Japan appeared extremely significant to the Portuguese, in particular if they considered the still uncertain situation on the Chinese coast, where, after almost half a century of vain attempts, they had been unable to succeed in creating a stable and recognised outpost.

But as of the mid-1550s, the situation was not yet clarified. On one hand, the question of Wang Zhi was still open, and the Portuguese, not knowing how it would develop, did not want to forgo cooperation with such an important partner in maritime trade. On the other hand, we might further consider that the elimination of Wang Zhi could have been advantageous for the Portuguese too. They might have attempted to replace him as intermediaries in the trade between China and Japan. In fact, that is indeed what the Portuguese partially accomplished. In 1557, Wang Zhi surrendered to the Ming officials: the Chinese authorities, instead of pardoning him as they had promised, imprisoned Wang Zhi and banished his group. In that same year, Portugal received formal permission to settle in Macao. We might suppose that the Ming government had reached analogous conclusions to those of the Portuguese, although from another point of view and with different aims in mind. Nevertheless, both the Chinese authorities and the Portuguese gained advantages from the defeat of Wang Zhi.

In order to solve the problems that plagued its coastal areas, China had to consider several factors: the endemic phenomenon of Chinese piracy; the disturbing and destabilising presence of the "barbarians" along the Chinese coast; the introduction into the Far East of firearms and advanced technology by the Portuguese; Japan's interest in, and pressure regarding, the maintenance of maritime trade connections with the continent, by legal or illegal means; and, last but not least, the intense involvement of the coastal regions in overseas commerce, as the domestic economy and markets of those regions were mainly based and dependent on income from maritime trade and on the flux of imports and exports.[50]

The Chinese government could no longer ignore the serious consequences that the rigid policy of maritime bans and prohibitions had provoked in the local economy, and the consequent disturbances and

disorders it had caused: Ming authorities had to provide a genuine answer to the true economic needs of the coasts. On the other hand, the Ming government could not merely overlook the terrible raids and violent attacks launched by the Chinese, the Japanese, and, on some occasions, the Portuguese pirates on Chinese shores. Eliminating Wang Zhi and allowing the Portuguese to settle at Macao, under the strict control of the Chinese authorities, presented an acceptable solution: in this way, the Portuguese, under Chinese supervision, could help provide the coast with overseas commerce it needed; moreover—and much more importantly—China, in exchange, could obtain directly from the Portuguese the firearms and innovative technology it needed. This political stance taken by the Ming may also have been intended as a first step towards the opening of Haicheng to overseas trade in 1567, and the relaxation of the prohibitions on Chinese maritime activity.[51] Japan would have been satisfied as well: the Portuguese bases on the archipelago, playing a role similar to the settlement at Macao in China, could furnish Japanese markets with the merchandise it needed.

From the 1560s onwards, the Portuguese definitively moved from Hirado to the Omura territories. Still shaken by civil war, Japanese *daimyo* were all in urgent need of gaining access to Portuguese firearms, and continued to contend with each other for Portuguese favour. Gradually expanding their trade and their missionary activities thorough the entire archipelago, in 1571 the Portuguese would settle in Nagasaki.

The establishment of the Portuguese base at Macao, officially recognised in 1557 by the Chinese authorities, was the result of a complex and multifaceted process, involving continuous transformations and changes that involved the entire international setting of East Asia. In such an international context, Japan played an important role: being the most important hidden partner of Chinese overseas activities and illicit maritime trade, Japan indirectly provoked and supported the formal settlement of the Portuguese at Macao.

Nevertheless, for the moment, the Portuguese were the true winners of the international political games played in the Far East. RC

NOTES

1 Research concerning Iberian expansion into East Asia is voluminous; we mention, therefore, only some of the most recent and basic works related to Macao: A.H. de Oliveira Marques, *História dos Portugueses no Extremo Oriente*, Vol. I, Part I: *Em Torno de Macau*, Fundação Oriente, Lisbon, 1998; A.H. de Oliveira Marques, *História dos Portugueses no Extremo Oriente*, Vol. I, Part II: *De Macau à Periferia*, Fundação Oriente, Lisbon, 2000; Rui Manuel Loureiro, *Fidalgos, Missionários e Mandarins: Portugal e a China no Século XVI,* Fundação Oriente, Lisbon, 2000; Wu Zhiliang, *Segredos da Sobrevivência: História Política de Macau*, Associação de Educação de Adultos de Macau, Macao, 1999; Beatriz Basto da Silva, *Cronologia da História de Macau: Séculos XVI-XVII*, Direcção dos Serviços de Educação e Juventude, Macao, 1997; Jorge Manuel dos Santos Alves, *Um Porto entre Dois Impérios*, Instituto Português do Oriente, Lisbon, 1999; Jorge Manuel dos Santos Alves (ed.), *Portugal e a China*, Fundação Oriente, Lisbon, 1999; Jorge Manuel dos Santos Alves, *Portugal e a Missionação no Século XVI: Oriente e o Brasil*, Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, Lisbon, 1997; Gonçalo Mesquitela, *História de Macau*, Instituto Cultural de Macau, Macao, 1996; A. V. de Saldanha and J. M. dos Santos Alves (eds.), *Estudos de História do Relacionamento Luso-Chinês (Séculos XVI-XIX)*, Instituto Português do Oriente, Lisbon, 1996; J. P. A. Oliveira e Costa, *A Descoberta da Civilização Japonesa pelos Portugueses*, Instituto Cultural de Macau and Instituto de História de Além-Mar, Lisbon, 1995; M. da Conceição Flores and J. P. A. Oliveira e Costa, *Portugal e o Mar da China no Século XVI*, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, Lisbon, 1996. Older, but foundational, works include: C.A. Montalto de Jesus, *Historic Macao,* Hong Kong, 1902; Chang T'ien-tse, *Sino-Portuguese Trade from 1514 to 1644*, Leiden, 1969; C.R. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East, 1550-1770: Fact and Fancy in the History of Macao*, The Hague, 1948; C.R. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade, 1555-1640*, Lisbon, 1963; C.R. Boxer, *Estudos para a História de Macau: Séculos XVI-XVII* (Obra completa de Charles Ralph Boxer: I Volume), Fundação Oriente, Lisbon, 1991; C.R. Boxer, *Macau na Época de Restauração* (Obra completa de Charles Ralph Boxer: II Volume), Fundação Oriente, Lisbon, 1993; C.R. Boxer, *South China in the 16th Century*, Nendeln – Liechtenstein, 1967; id., *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549 -1650*, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1951; C.R. Boxer, *Missionaries and Merchants of Macao* (III Colóquio Internacional de Estudos Luso-Brasileiros [Lisbon, 1957]), *Actas*, II, 1960, pp. 210-224; B.W. Diffie and G.D. Winius, *Foundations of the Portuguese Empire*, 1415-1580, Minneapolis, 1977.

2 Cf. Fei Chengkang, *Macao 400 Years*, Shanghai, 1996, in particular pp. 9-40; Jin Guo Ping, "Combates a piratas e a fixação portuguesa em Macau", *Revista Militar*, 1999, n. 2364, Lisbon, pp. 199-228.

3 Concerning the *haikou* and Chinese maritime activity, see: Lin Renchuan, *Mingmo Qingchu siren haishang maoyi*, Shanghai, 1987; Zhang Yanxian (ed.), *Zhongguo haiyang fazhan shilun wenji*, III, Taibei, 1989; Chen Xiyu, *Zhongguo fanchuan yu haiwai maoyi*, Xiamen, 1991; Zhuang Weiji, *Haishangji*, Xiamen, 1996; Zhang Zengxin, "Mingji dongnan haikou chaowai fengqi", in Y.Zhang (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 313-344; Matsuura Akira, *Chûgoku no kaizoku*,

Tokyo, 1995; E.B.Vermeer (ed.), *Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (*Sinica Leidensia*, XXII), Leiden-New York-København-Köln, 1990; So Kwan-wai, *Japanese Piracy in Ming China during the 16th Century*, East Lansing, 1975; Ts'ao Yung-ho, "Chinese Overseas Trade in the Late Ming Period", *International Historians of Asia - Biennal Conference Proceedings*, 1980, pp. 429-458. See also our previous work: Bai Di [Patrizia Carioti], "Yuandong zhongshangzhuyi de fasheng he fazhan", *Xinhua Wenzhai*, 1998 / 7, pp. 213-216.

4 With regard to the *wokou* (Japanese *wakô*), see the important collection of primary sources in 5 volumes by Zheng Liangsheng, *Mingdai wokou shiliao*, Taibei, 1987. See also Ishihara Michihiro, *Wakô*, Tokyo, 1964; Tanaka Takeo, *Wakô to Kangô bôeki*, Tokyo, 1966; Yobuko Jôtarô, *Wakô shikô*, Tokyo 1971; Tanaka Takeo, *Wakô*, Tokyo, 1985. Cfr. *Mingshi*, Beijing, 1974, 322 (20/III): 8341-60.

5 Cf. *Mingshi*, Beijing, 1974 , 322, (20/III): 8341-60.

6 Many historians agree that the Mongol invasions of Japan (1274, 1281) caused the redoubling of Japanese piracy. See: Kyotsu Hory, "The Economic and Political Effects of the Mongol War", in John W.Hall and Jeffrey P.Mass (eds.), *Medieval Japan: Essays in Institutional History*, Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, 1988 (2nd edition), pp. 184-98. Indeed, after these attacks, the Japanese authorities paid more attention to the coastal defences of the archipelago, by building new ships and fortresses, and establishing coastal guards. That gave more power and autonomy to the local *daimyo*, especially the Lords of Kyushu, who often were the hidden organisers of *wakô* raids on the continent: the powerful Matsuura clan, for example, was deeply involved in piracy. See: Toyama Mikio, *Matsuurashi to Hirado bôeki*, Tokyo, 1987; Yobuko Shigeyoshi, *Kaizoku Matsuuratô*, Tokyo, 1965.

7 Many, in fact, were the Chinese sea-traders who reached the Japanese shores in the early 17th century, despite Ming laws: Ieyasu allowed them to trade throughout the whole of Japanese territory, protected them, and encouraged them as much as possible. For this reason, it should not be surprising that some "sea-adventurers" were summoned into the presence of the *shôgun*: it occurred on several occasions. For instance, Zhao Xinrou—we do not have any other information about him—reached the Goto islands in 1610, with a ship coming from Guangdong: that same year he was invited to the Ieyasu's residence (16th day, 12th month, 15th Keichô year) and received the *shôgun* license to conduct trade all throughout Japan (cfr. *Tokugawa Ieyasu monjo no kenkyû*, vol. III [part 1st], Tokyo, 1960 [15th Keichô year, 12th month, 16th day], pp. 641--644; Kimiya Yasuhiko, *Nichi Ka bunka kôryûshi*, Tokyo, 1989, pp. 636-638). When Zhao Xinrou was on the point of going back to China, the *shôgun* gave him a letter addressed to the Superintendent- General of Fujian. In the letter, Ieyasu formally requested the reopening of official commerce between China and Japan, according to the old system of the "Seals Trade" (*kanhe maoyi*). Ieyasu did not receive a reply to his letter; yet, from that moment onward, Chinese ships to Japan became more and more numerous (cfr. Tsuji Zennosuke, *Kaigai kôtsû shiwa*, Tokyo, 1942, p. 485).

8 On this topic, the collection of primary sources—both Chinese and Japanese—by Yûya Minoru proves especially useful: Yûya Minoru, *Nichi Min kangô bôeki shiryô*, Tokyo, 1983. See also: Tanaka Takeo, *Higashi Ajia tsûkôken to kokusai ninshiki*, Tokyo, 1997; Tanaka Takeo, *Zenkindai no kokusai kôryû to gaikô monjô*, Tokyo, 1996; Kimiya Yasuhiko, *Nichi Ka bunka kôryûshi*, Tokyo, 1989; Wang Yi-t'ung, *Official Relations between China and Japan 1368--1549*, Cambridge MA, 1953.

9 See: Tanaka Takeo, "Japan's Relations with Overseas Countries", in John W. Hall and T. Toyoda (eds.), *Japan in the Muromachi Age*, University of California Press: Los Angeles, 1977, pp. 159-78. Wang Yi-T'ung, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

10 Wang Yi-T'ung, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-33.

11 Regarding the letter by Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, see: Y. Wang, *op. cit.*, pp. 22; Y.S. Kuno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent*, Berkeley CA., 1937, pp. 89-100, 266-272; Tsuji Zennosuke, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-16.

12 Y. Wang, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-59.

13 T. Tanaka, "Japan's Relations with Overseas Countries", *cit.*, pp. 163-171.

14 Yoshimitsu signs this letter as the "King of Japan," thus explicitly recognizing Chinese sovereignty. The interpretations of Yoshimitsu's act of submission to China are rather controversial. Some historians emphasize the deep admiration Yoshimitsu showed, on several occasions, for Chinese culture and civilization: he indeed used to dress in Chinese fashion and to imitate Chinese habits and traditions. Some other scholars, however, more realistically see Yoshimitsu's behaviour as motivated by primarily economic and commercial reasons, since the trade with China was of vital importance to Japan. Cfr. Y. Wang, *op. cit.*, pp. 22; Y.S. Kuno, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-100, 266-272; Tsuji Zennosuke, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-16.

15 With the first *shôgun*, Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616), Japan's foreign policy changed radically. Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598), pursuing the reunification of the country and the centralisation of power in a sole legitimate authority, also adopted an aggressive strategy towards other far-eastern countries. This resulted in an extremely rigid and distrustful climate in international relations, both with regard to Japan's relations with China and Korea, and more generally, with all the countries of south and east Asia. As soon as Tokugawa Ieyasu rose to power (1603), he turned Japan's international policy toward the reopening of peaceful relations with other countries, in order to re-establish the commercial relations and trade agreements that were so crucial to the Japanese market. For this reason, Ieyasu sent letters and missives to all the countries of south and east Asia, including Indonesia and the Philippines, in to the attempt to replace the harsh climate left by Hideyoshi with a more peaceful one. In his letters, Ieyasu invited all the countries to engage in commerce and trade (cfr. A.L. Sadler, *The Maker of Modern Japan: The Life of Tokugawa Ieyasu*, Tokyo, 1989, pp. 233-253). Yet, for Japan, the most important trade was that with China; yet official commerce with China was also the most difficult to re-establish. Therefore, the Tokugawa *shôgun* attempted to avoid the problems caused by the interruption of official relations between the two countries (in 1549) by initiating a policy of welcoming Chinese merchants and sea-traders. Concerning the international policy pursued by the Japanese authorities, see: Arano Yasunori, *Kinsei Nihon to Higashi Ajia*, Tokyo, 1988; Arano Yasunori, "Nihonkei Ka'i chitsujo no keisei", in *Rettônaigai no kôtsû to kokka* (*Nihon no shakaishi*, I), Tokyo, 1988, pp. 184-226; Fujiki Hisashi, *Toyotomi heiwarei to sengoku shakai*, Tokyo, 1986; Nagazumi Yôko, *Kinsei shôki no gaikô*, Tokyo, 1990. Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, Princeton, 1984; Mary Elizabeth Berry, *Hideyoshi*, Cambridge MA and London, 1989.

16 Li, Jinming and Liao, Dake, *Zhongguo gudai haiwai maoyi shi*, Nanding, 1995; Ng Chin-keong, "Maritime Frontiers, Territorial Expansion and Hai-fang during the Late Ming and High Ch'ing," in Sabine Dabringhaus and Roderich Ptak (eds.), *China and Her Neighbours*, Wiesbaden, 1997, pp. 211-257. Nie Dening, "Chinese Merchants and Their Maritime Activities under the Ban on Maritime Trade in the Ming Dynasty", in Paolo Santangelo (ed.), *Ming Qing Yanjiu*, Napoli and Roma, 1997, pp. 69-89.

17 Concerning the *shuinsen*, see: Iwao Seiichi, *Shuinsen to Nihonmachi*, Tokyo 1960; id., *Shuinsen bôekishi no kenkyû*, Tokyo, 1958. More generally, see also: Nagazumi Yôko, *Kinsei shoki no gaikô*, Tokyo, 1990; Arano Yasunori, *Kinsei Nihon to Higashi Ajia*, Tokyo, 1988;

Oda Fujio, et al., *Kita Kyûshû no rekishi*, Fukuoka, 1979; Yamawaki Teijirô, *Nagasaki no tôjin bôeki*, Tokyo, 1964; id., *Kinsei Nitchû bôeki no kenkyû*, Tokyo, 1960.

18 Two Japanese embassies reached Ningbo almost at the same time, both pretending to be the official one that was bringing the tribute. The violent clash between the two missions caused serious damage in Ningbo, and claimed numerous victims among the Chinese population. During the Ashikaga period, in fact, the Ouchi and the Hosokawa families fought each other on several occasions in order to control the trade with China; they also robbed each other of the official seals (*kanhe, kangô*) for the tribute missions and send their fleets to China, claiming to be the official embassy of Japan. Cfr. Y. Wang, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-88.

19 *Ibidem*, *passim*.

20 Japanese exports to China fell into one of two basic categories, the official tribute or supplementary goods for trade. The Chinese court did not pay for the tribute goods, but gave various gifts in return. The supplementary articles, whether or not they had been requested by the Chinese government, were purchased by the government at a negotiated price, or, if rejected because of low quality, sold on the open market. Thus, the Japanese embassies carried with them three categories of goods: the tribute to be offered to the Court, the supplementary articles to be sold to the government, and the supplementary articles to be sold on the open market. Tribute articles often consisted of precious or unusual gifts, such as horses, fans, screens, agate, swords, etc. In the case of the supplementary articles, they were sappanwood, copper, long and short swords, etc. In return for their tribute gifts, the Japanese received mainly silver and silks, but on certain occasions, the Chinese Emperor gave them special presents, such as incense burners, vases, animal skins, fine paper and so forth. Although the highest profit came from the supplementary articles, the value of the gifts from the Chinese imperial court was not to be underestimated. Along with this official commerce, many of the members of the embassies brought their own tribute gifts and supplementary goods, in order to conduct private commerce. Cfr. Y. Wang, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-111.

21 With regard to Wang Zhi, see: Jin Guo Ping and Zhang Zhengchun, "Liampó reexaminado à luz de fontes chinesas", in A. V. de Saldanha and J. M. dos Santos Alves, *Estudos de História do Relacionamento Luso-Chinês – Séculos XVI-XIX*, Macao and Lisbon (Instituto Português do Oriente), 1996, pp. 85-135; J.E. Wills, "Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang: Themes in Peripheral History", in J. Spence and J.E. Wills (eds.), *From Ming to Ch'ing. Conquest, Region and Continuity in 17th Century*, New Haven and London, 1979, pp. 210-213; Miyamoto Kazue, *Vikings of the Far East*, New York (Vantage Press, n.d.), pp. 33-47. Concerning Wang Zhi's organisation, see also: Lin Renquan, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-92. On his connections with Japan, and in particular with the *daimyo* Matsuura, see: Yobuko Shigeyoshi, *Kaizoku Matsuuratô*, Tokyo 1965, pp. 160-181.

22 Patrizia Carioti, "Le attività marittime del Fujian, 1567-1628", in Paolo Santangelo (ed.), *Ming Qing Yanjiu*, Napoli and Roma, 1992, pp. 61-79.

23 Jin Guo Ping, "Combates a piratas e a fixação portuguesa em Macau", *cit.*, pp. 199-228; Fei Chengkang, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-40.

24 Jin Guo Ping, "Combates a piratas e a fixação portuguesa em Macau," *cit.*, *passim*; Fei Chengkang, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-40. See also: J.M. Braga, *The Western Pioneers and Their Discovery of Macao*, Macao, 1949, p. 117.

25 Jin Guo Ping, "Combates a Piratas…", *cit.*, pp. 200-203.

26 See: Kwan-wai So, *op. cit.*, p. 177, *passim*.

27 Lin Renquan, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-92.

28 See note n. 21.

29 Jin Guo Ping and Zhang Zhenchun, *art. cit.*, p.108.

30 "Hiradohan no seiritsu to hatten", *Hiradohan*, in *Nagasaki kenshi* (*Hanseihen*), Tokyo (Yoshikawa Kôbunkan), 1973, pp. 386-396.

31 Oda Fujio, Arikawa Yoshihiro, Yonezu Saburô, Kanzaki Yoshio, *Kita Kyûshû no rekishi*, Fukuoka, 1979.

32 "Hiradohan no seiritsu to hatten", *Hiradohan*, *cit.*, p. 391.

33 Fujiki Hisashi, *Toyotomi heiwarei to sengoku shakai*, Tokyo, 1986, pp. 12-38.

34 Seno Seiichiro, *Nagasakiken no rekishi,* Tokyo, 1972, pp. 108-111.

35 On the identification of Wang Zhi, see: Hiroshi Arimizu, "Os primórdios das relações históricas luso-japonesas: Discussão sobre uma hipótese de intermediação dos piratas sino-japoneses," in Roberto Carneiro and A. Teodoro de Matos, *O Século Cristão do Japão* [*Actas do Colóquio Internacional Comemorativo dos 450 Anos de Amizade Portugal- Japão (1543-1993)*], Lisbon, 1994, pp. 259-266.

36 Lin Renquan, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-92.

37 Jin Guo Ping, "Combates a Piratas…", *cit.*, pp. 200-203.

38 Toyama Mikio, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-155.

39 *Ibidem.*

40 *Ibidem.*

41 See our previous work: Patrizia Carioti, "Hirado, postazione internazionale dell'Estremo Oriente, nella prima metà del secolo XVII" (Part I: Le premesse storiche: Hirado da base commerciale dei traffici sino-giapponesi a crocevia internazionale delle rotte estremo-orientali), *Il Giappone*, 1999, XXXVII, pp. 55-68; Patrizia Carioti, "Hirado, postazione internazionale dell'Estremo Oriente, nella prima metà del secolo XVII" (Part II: La presenza europea e l'intermediazione cinese alla luce della politica marittima del Giappone), *Il Giappone*, 2000, XXXVIII, pp. 47-67.

42 On the general context of Far East Asia in those years, see: Roderich Ptak, "Sino-Japanese Maritime Trade, circa 1550: Merchants, Ports and Networks", in Roberto Carneiro and A.Teodoro de Matos, *O Século Cristão do Japão* [*Actas do Colóquio Internacional Comemorativo dos 450 Anos de Amizade Portugal-Japão (1543--1993)*], Lisbon, 1994, pp. 281-311.

43 See our previous work: Patrizia Carioti, "The Zheng's Maritime Power in the International Context of the 17th Century Far Eastern Seas: The Rise of a 'Centralised Piratical Organisation' and Its Gradual Development into an Informal 'State'", in Paolo Santangelo, (ed.), *Ming Qing Yanjiu*, Napoli and Roma, 1996, pp. 29-67.

44 The long negotiations between Wang Zhi and the Chinese authorities, as well as the complex events the happened on China's coasts in those years, have been described in great detail by Kwan-wai So, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

45 Jin Guo Ping, *art. cit.*, pp. 203-212.

46 Patrizia Carioti, "Hirado, postazione internazionale dell'Estremo Oriente, …." (Part II: La presenza europea e l'intermediazione cinese….), *art. cit.*, pp. 47-67.

47 Kwan-wai So, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

48 Toyama Mikio, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-155.

49 *Ibidem.* See also: Yamamoto Kitsuna, *Nagasaki Tôjin Yashiki*, Tokyo, 1983, pp. 30-50.

50 See for example, the interesting essays by Chang Pin-tsun, "Maritime Trade and Local Economy in Late Ming Fukien," and by Lin Ren-ch'uan, "Fukien's Private Sea Trade in the 16th and 17th centuries," both collected in: E.B.Vermeer (ed.), *Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (*Sinica Leidensia*, XXII), Leiden, New York, København and Köln, 1990, respectively pp. 63-81, and pp. 163-215.

51 See our previous works: Bai Di [Patrizia Carioti], "Yuandong zhongshangzhuyi de fasheng he fazhan", *art. cit.*, pp. 213-216; and Patrizia Carioti, "Le attività marittime del Fujian, 1567-1628", in Paolo Santangelo (ed.), *Ming Qing Yanjiu*, Napoli, 1992, pp. 61--79.