




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
RC

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ASIAN STUDIES
ESTUDOS
ASIÁTICOS





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RC é uma revista de Cultura e, domínio do Espírito, é Livre. Avassalada ao encontro universal das culturas, servente da identidade cultural de Macau, agente de mais íntima relação entre o Oriente e o Ocidente, particularmente entre a China e Portugal. RC propõe-se publicar todos os textos interessantes aos objectivos confessados, pelo puro critério da qualidade. Assim, as opiniões e as doutrinas, expressas ou professas nos textos assinados, ou implícitas nas imagens de autoria, são da responsabilidade dos seus autores, e nem na parte, nem no todo, podem confundir-se com a orientação da RC. A Direcção da revista reserva-se o direito de não publicar, nem devolver, textos não solicitados.

RC é uma revista trimestral, simultaneamente publicada nas versões Chinesa e Internacional (em Português e Inglês). Buscando o diálogo e o encontro francos de Culturas, RC tem na limpidez a vocação e na transparência o seu processo.

RC is a cultural magazine published quarterly in two versions — Chinese and International (Portuguese/English)—whose purpose is to reflect the unique identity of Macao. The magazine also seeks to promote freedom of expression and through the articles published we hope to stimulate ideas and discussion of topics related to Western/Eastern cultural interchange, especially between China and Portugal.

RC publishes articles covering an extensive range of topics expressing a diversity of views. However, RC is not responsible for ideas and opinions voiced in these articles and thus they cannot be taken as editorial opinion. In addition, we reserve the right to withhold any unsolicited text from publication and the right not to return any unsolicited text.

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A globalização do conhecimento começou em Macau no século XVI quando os *saberes* do Oriente e do Ocidente se cruzaram nesta terra singular do Sul da China.

No século XXI, o intercâmbio cultural entre os *dois mundos* continua a ser a vocação de Macau.

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Knowledge entered into an age of globalisation in Macao in the 16th century when the *wisdoms* of East and West met in this unique part of South China.

In the 21st century, Macao remains dedicated to cultural interchange between *both worlds* in a vocation maintained by *Review of Culture*.

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A NOSSA CAPA
O presente número de *Revista de Cultura*, excepcionalmente todo em língua inglesa, se, por um lado, parece ultrapassar as fronteiras do seu “território editorial”, por outro, espelha perfeitamente um dos seus objectivos estatutários: intensificar e alargar o âmbito do intercâmbio cultural entre a Ásia e a Europa, o Oriente e o Ocidente. O século XXI é o século da Ásia e os estudos asiáticos tornaram-se uma das mais importantes áreas de investigação. Macau, consciente do papel que tem vindo a desempenhar ao longo dos séculos, não pode ficar indiferente a este crescente interesse pelos estudos asiáticos. Assim, a Universidade de Macau com o apoio da Fundação Macau, acolheu, em Junho de 2013, a 8ª Convenção Internacional de Académicos da Ásia. Os textos agora publicados constituem uma pequena selecção de entre o grande número de comunicações então apresentadas e que incidiram sobre uma grande diversidade de tópicos.

OUR COVER
The current issue of *Review of Culture*, exceptionally all in English, if on one hand seems to exceed the boundaries of its ‘editorial territory’ on the other, perfectly mirrors one of their statutory objectives: to intensify and broaden the scope of cultural exchange between Asia and Europe, East and West. The 21st century is the century of Asia and Asian studies have become one of the most important research areas. Macao, aware of the role it has played over the centuries, cannot remain indifferent to this growing interest in Asian studies. Thus, the University of Macau with the support of the Macao Foundation, hosted the 8th International Convention of Asia Scholars in June 2013. The texts published here, focused on a wide variety of topics, are a small selection from the large number of papers then presented.

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
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ICAS 8

Macao 2013

ICAS 8 and the Rise of Asia

TAK-WING NGO*



The rise of Asia has become a defining feature of the 21st century. The impact of Asia comes in two regards, material and epistemological. From the outset, the growing economic affluence and political influence of Asia is changing the historical landscape of our age. This is most observable with the increasing share of Asian markets in the world economy, the development

of a multi-polar international order, and the increasing pressure on global environment and resources. Equally far-reaching is the theoretical significance of Asia. The current development of Asia is challenging many of our conventional understandings about political and economic life. Our familiar ideas about the state and market, rule and governance, nation and identity, network and hierarchy, and so on have shown major limitations in capturing the complexity and hybridity of the Asian cases. There is a need to refine our conceptual lexicons in order to grapple with the idea of Asia.

The International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) constitutes a major forum for such epistemological adventure. It is a premier gathering of scholars of Asian Studies around the world. Since 1998, ICAS has taken place in different parts of the world, including Leiden, Berlin, Singapore, Shanghai, Kuala

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ESTUDOS ASIÁTICOS

ASIAN STUDIES




Lumpur, Daejeon, and Hawaii. Its eighth convention (ICAS 8) was held in Macao in June 2013. Unlike other conferences of Asian Studies where the majority of participants come from the United States and Europe, ICAS is a unique platform with the most diversified cross-continental representation and with the majority of participants coming from Asian countries. New ideas and research findings are unchanged not only among researchers who study Asia but also among scholars who live in Asia. This is important because so far the conceptual lexicons and theoretical tools used in social sciences and humanities have derived almost exclusively from the West. Although these theories and methods have been applied throughout the world with considerable success, their limitations are increasingly apparent, especially in a place like Asia with its long indigenous traditions of organising social relations, its own norms about power and order, and its legacies of implementing rule. As Asian countries emerge to become prominent players in the world, there comes a point when we recognise that the region has something

to offer in the development of social knowledge. In this regard, ICAS plays an instrumental role in this process.

In brief, taking Asia seriously means more than addressing its growing economic and political influence. It also requires us to reconsider the theoretical significance of Asia. The rapid transformation that has taken place in many Asian countries during the last few decades represents not only a radical experimentation with grand reform in human history but also a living laboratory in which social scientists of nearly all disciplines can observe social change and human action from different theoretical perspectives. In this process, even a casual observer will not fail to notice the limitations in our current understanding of Asia. Such limitations, on the one hand, come from the inadequacy of our existing conceptual vocabularies in describing institutional forms and social practices which deviate from Western categories. Examples abound: the blurred boundary between the public and private domains; the overlapping positions and multiple roles assumed by ruling parties, government bureaucrats, and business conglomerates; the ambivalent structures of ownership in enterprises; and the fluid relationship between institutional linkage and personal network. On the other hand, our existing theoretical perspectives also have problems in accounting for numerous paradoxes in Asian politics and societies. For instance, everyday political life in many countries is tightly controlled and yet the electoral regime is open and competitive; nationalism as a unifying ideology runs high in many countries despite the prevalence of strong parochialism and separatism; and market liberalisation has been undertaken with great determination amidst the establishment and strengthening of state monopolies.

These deviations and paradoxes have excited and inspired researchers of different disciplines: testimony to this is in the overwhelming enthusiasm for the call for papers in ICAS 8. The Asian case provides an ideal breeding ground to refine existing theories and to develop new ones. In particular, the time-space compression experienced by countries such as China, India, South Korea, Vietnam, and now Burma, in their radical reforms during the last decades offers a unique opportunity to study some of the most important issues of our time. These include questions of institutional change, social transformation, market reform, ethnic conflict, environmental hazard, national security, urbanisation, migration, political control and



Chinese artist, late 18th century, Macao: a panoramic view of the Inner Harbour.



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resistance, social marginalisation, inequality, etc., to name a few. The reform process has been plagued with problems and impasse while at the same time filled with innovative solutions and unexpected consequences.

Many of these questions have been taken up at the panel discussions during ICAS 8. The mega event took place in Macao on 24-27 June 2013. It was co-hosted by the University of Macau and the Macao Foundation. The rich cultural heritage and the strong historical legacies connecting East and West made



Macao an ideal place to host ICAS 8. Macao was the first as well as the last European colony in China. The interaction between the Chinese and Portuguese traditions for more than four centuries has left Macao with a unique blend of cultural diversity, modernity, and cosmopolitanism. Altogether more than 1200 participants from 56 countries and 600 higher institutes of learning took part in the event. The importance of this event to Macao is manifold. First, it brought fresh knowledge and perspectives to Macao through the exchange with researchers in such areas as urban development, migration, and cultural heritage. Second, it underlined the emergence of Macao as a regional hub, by showcasing to the international academic community the relevance of Macao in knowledge creation and dissemination. Third, it helped propagate the cultural richness, economic diversity, and social vibrancy of Macao to the rest of the world.

What was more important was the exchange of new ideas and up-to-date research findings during the panel discussions. More than 250 thematically organised panels took place during ICAS 8. They clustered around such themes as culture and heritage, globalisation and transnationalism, migration and connectivity, regionalism and urban development, and social and economic transformation. They were attended not only by academics but also by government officials, museum curators, NGO activists, journalists, business leaders, and members of the general public. It was a rare opportunity during which scholars and practitioners across different continents and regions gathered together to explore local and global problems.

This special issue represents a small selection of papers presented during ICAS 8. It serves as a testimony to the scholarship generated during the conference. The majority of the papers will find their publications in journals, edited volumes, and book monographs. Wherever they are going to be published, they constitute part of the epistemological project invigorated by the rise of Asia.

Such ideational kindling will be no less provoking than the emergence of an economically powerful Asia. After all, the global order is not only shaped by the rise and decline of material powers but also by the way



Planisphere by Lopo Homem, 1554 (Istituto e Museo di Storia della Scienza, Florence).

we perceive and theorise our political and economic existence. This will be a key challenge for the next generational of scholars in the new epoch. While scholars working in many areas have been searching for a new way forward, it is anything but straightforward. One of the major problems is the limitation set by our own analytical language. We need to be able to communicate and exchange our ideas. At the moment we use English as our common analytical language. The problem is that even the most basic terms such as society, rights, citizen, authority, etc. are endowed with layers of meaning deriving from European histories. When we use them to analyse other societies we inevitably import the historical traits hidden behind those terms. Avoiding this trap is tricky, because if we abandon terms like power, community, enterprise, and so on in our discussion, we will end up with a conceptual void.

This is certainly not an obstacle that can be easily overcome. That is why continuous dialogue between Asia scholars is indispensable. And this underlines the role of ICAS in such dialogues. By hosting ICAS 8

Macao contributed to building new knowledge about Asia and the global order. Over time Asia should be able to develop its own social theories, methodologies, and concepts applicable not just to Asia, but also in analysing the West. In doing so we will have a more nuanced perception of the world, one which is more historically and culturally sensitive. It will also be a more pluralistic and less hegemonic understanding of humanity. ^{RC}



Asia is Rising—But Where is it Going?

Thoughts on an Emergent Discourse

ARIF DIRLIK*

I am grateful to the organisers of the Convention, especially Prof. Tak-Wing Ngo, for the gracious invitation to deliver this keynote address. It is a great honour. It is also a challenge. To speak to a diffuse, complicated and broad discourse such as ‘the rise of Asia’ requires a grasp of continental spaces and their concrete details that is far beyond my competence. To do so in the presence of experts many of whom are also inhabitants of those spaces presents additional complications in the diversity of political and cultural sensibilities, as well as the different sets of problems that confront scholars in their various disciplinary and regional specialisations. I hope I am forgiven if my discussion seems too much to be in the thrall of the rise of China, which may be unavoidable given my own disciplinary affiliation. In the present context, it may be an advantage as it is China’s ‘great leap’ over the last two decades that drives the discourse, and endows it with a new significance.

I use ‘discourse’ here advisedly: not as a globally ratified and systematically elaborated interlocution but a way of speaking and thinking about Asia that in its drift creates a powerful discourse-effect. This is all the more reason for taking it seriously, but also

critically. I will restrict myself here to some questions of continental scope and significance that I take to be of fundamental importance and urgency, with an eye on intra-continental differences and extra-continental relationships. These questions pertain to the spatial and temporal implications of the discourse, and what it has to say about the consequences of Asian development, as well as what it is largely silent about. They are provoked by phenomena that are the subject of everyday news, scholarly discussion, political attention, and even hot and cold military activity. Their importance for societies in Asia and globally is commonly acknowledged. Yet the discourse goes on, sort of to speak, celebrated by some, viewed by others with suspicion and trepidation. We need to ask, ultimately: is the discourse itself the problem? This is the question that guides my discussion.

The question in the title of this discussion is intended not as a promise of clairvoyance but as a call for closer attention to the implications of a striking dissonance in the current discourse on Asian development: widespread apprehension about the future that haunts the celebration of the present. The dissonance is readily visible in work by commentators from the region as well as outside of it.

Led by the People’s Republic of China in the East, accompanied by India in the South, Turkey in the West and oil-rich Kazakhstan in Central Asia, celebrations of development in societies across the length and breadth of ‘Asia’ inspire prognostications of one or another version of an impending ‘Asian century’. Unlike in the earlier cases of Japan and the ‘miracle’ economies of eastern Asia that developed under United States hegemony, this most recent cycle of development

promises to re-center the world economy in Asia—read, China—bringing an end to two centuries of marginalisation in a world dominated by Europe and the United States.

Just as commonly, these celebrations are qualified in even the most optimistic analyses by sober acknowledgments of deep national and international problems created by the very same development that point to an uncertain future, if not a potentially disastrous one—for Asia, and the globe as a whole. How an ‘Asian century’ might be configured in terms of power relations, moreover, is hotly contested in nationalist ideologies and visions not just without but within Asia.

When these conflicting assessments are not simply dissolved into the hype over ‘Asia rising’, however, they are bracketed as responses to passing distortions, likely to go away in some unspecified future with more development. What refuses to go away are the anxieties that burden the hopes, and for good reason. Unprecedented inequality and inability to address urgent ecological issues in so-called developed countries, not to speak of a profusion of less dramatic problems they suffer from, leaves little room for faith in the evolutionary promises of global capitalism. There is every indication that as products of historical forces reinforced in their relocation within a global modernity dominated by the political economy of capitalism, these developmental problems are not likely to be resolved with the thinking that created them in the first place—a promise that developmentalist hype upholds despite accumulating evidence of serious problems. Empowered by dizzying transformations that have heated up what has become a virtual race into an unpredictable future, and dear nevertheless to the faithful who have been its beneficiaries, the fetishism of development commands such global ideological hegemony that it pushes beyond the pale solutions not in keeping with its norms or aspirations—perhaps more so in Asia than elsewhere. In the process, the seemingly innocent language of development disguises its fundamental premise that development is not just about developing, but developing within the parameters of the capitalist world economy. It is also silent on how the ominous signs of the present might play out in a future that is its product.

The discourse on ‘Asia rising’ is a discourse about Asia. Less apparently, it is also a discourse

about global capitalism: Asia as the success story of the global neoliberal economy. The rise of China which fuels the discourse is contemporaneous with the ascendancy of neoliberalism, and despite the insistence on a ‘socialist market economy’, has been a force in validating its assumptions (Harvey, 2005). Asia as the realm of backwardness and subsequently of revolution is represented presently as the promise of the endless possibilities of capitalism. But the discourse is at one with its predecessors in homogenising Asian spaces and temporalities against striking evidence of the uneven development of societies in the region in their entanglement with global capitalism, which is constitutive both of efforts to define ‘Asia’, and of the relationship of Asian societies to one another. The reification of Asia seeks to turn the tables on an earlier hegemonic relationship with Euro/America, at the extreme by an insistence on ‘Asia for Asians’. But it does so at the cost of reproducing a cartographic reification that throws an ideological cover over deep divisions over the meaning of ‘Asia’ and its possible future, struggles within and without for hegemony, and proliferating problems some of the most intractable of which are traceable to the enthusiastic embrace of the developmentalist promises of unbridled global capitalism behind the disguise of Asian difference.

The space designated as ‘Asia’ all along has consisted of a multiplicity of spaces, and historically shifting spatialities under the force of changing configurations of transcontinental economic and political relationships. It is subject, presently, to the dynamics of global capitalism that is in the process of reconfiguring these relationships, empowering new sources of hegemony, and stimulating efforts to reinvent ‘Asia’. By the same token, confronting problems created by development calls for the imagination of spaces that answer to human needs rather than the logic of economic and political power. Overcoming the spatial mystification of ‘Asia’ is a crucial first step to this end to which we as scholars may make some small contribution.

ASIA ON OUR MINDS

Critical engagement of the discourse must begin with the idea of ‘Asia’ itself. An international relations text published in 2011 in the United States begins

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with the observation that while at the end of World War II, ‘Asia was not much more than a Western geographical expression’, sixty years later, ‘even if Asia lagged far behind Europe in developing regional bodies, it had progressed far from being a mere geographical expression. It had become Asia, a region with a sense of identity, growing self-confidence, and a record of dynamic economic growth that prompted many to dub the new century the ‘Asian century’. (Miller and Which, 2011, pp. 1, 275)

The discourse on ‘Asia rising’ is a discourse about Asia. Less apparently, it is also a discourse about global capitalism: Asia as the success story of the global neoliberal economy.

Evidence of this transformation is overwhelming. Intra-Asian trade and production networks are integrating nations across the breadth of the continent while regional organisations such as ASEAN and SCO are expanding their membership, giving some political form to this economic integration.¹ Migrant networks are giving birth to transnational social spaces the presence of which is more readily acknowledged than in earlier times, especially for elites—a byproduct of forces of globalisation. Equally important is the intensification of an Asia-consciousness, if not an incipient pan-Asianism. Asians are curious about one another. Whereas only a decade ago Asian intellectuals displayed little interest in one another, there is a rapid proliferation of interactions and efforts to find out about other Asians, which is clearly visible especially in societies that have registered significant economic advances over the recent decade: the People’s Republic of China, India and Turkey. There is clearly an Asian cultural market in music and film, reinforced by the internet. There are grassroots efforts as exemplified by such publications as *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, *Asian Review of World Histories*, or the ARENA (Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives) and

minjianchindia networks. A recent work by the Indian writer Pankaj Mishra sees parallels between the present and the birth of an Asia-consciousness in the pan-Asian movements of the early 20th century (Mishra, 2012). It may easily be imagined that with these interactions and the knowledge they produce, Asians in the near future will be less dependent on US and European sources for their understanding of one another, which has been the case in the past two centuries.

It is not quite correct to say that a sense of Asia did not exist earlier, although why the authors cited above may think so is interesting. I will say more about that below.² Nascent pan-Asian consciousness at the turn of the 20th century was a source of inspiration in the growth of radical nationalist movements against colonialism and imperialism, as well as the possibility of rejuvenating native legacies (Karl, 2002; Aydin, 2007; Esenbel, 2004). The search for Asian paths to development was a concern from the beginnings of political and economic modernisation. At least on a regional basis, a sense of Asian solidarity was possibly also a factor in reinforcing solidarity among anarchist and Marxist revolutionaries committed to internationalism in anti-colonial movements (Dirlik, 2005; Hwang, 2010). For some radicals, among others, even the intra-Asian imperialism of the Japanese Empire seemed to be an acceptable alternative to ‘Western’ imperialism in its pan-Asian rhetoric (Hwang, 1999). In the immediate aftermath of decolonisation after World War II, pan-Asian solidarity would be reconfirmed at the Bandung Conference of 1955, albeit within a broader framework of tricontinental solidarity that included nations of Africa, South America and the Caribbean ‘non-aligned’ with the Cold War protagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union (Lee, 2010).

Contemporary Asia-consciousness is in part heir to this legacy of pan-Asianism. Pan-Asianism may be an elusive goal, but its traces persist in a sense of being Asian, at least as an abstraction. I will illustrate this with a personal anecdote. In the fall of 1983, on my first visit to Beijing, I was hiking in the suburbs in the Huayuancun area one day, when I encountered an elderly gentlemen accompanied by his grandson, with a simple seemingly home-made rifle slung over his shoulder. As we exchanged pleasantries, he asked me where I was from. I said the US, and added that I was originally from Turkey. What impressed him

was the latter. He broke into a smile, and with a conspiratorial wink, blurted out: ‘We Asians are smart. These foreigners don’t understand anything’.

When we speak of ‘Asia-consciousness’ as an ideological and sentimental presence, the shared past of struggles against a ‘Western’-imposed colonial order is not to be ignored.³ It is invoked as the basis for a new solidarity in diplomatic negotiation as well as intellectual work, of which Mishra’s own work is exemplary. It is also arguable that the consciousness is presently founded upon a more solid basis. Whereas earlier pan-Asianists owed their inspiration and fleeting solidarity to perceptions of common problems *vis-à-vis* ‘Western’ imperialism, present-day Asia is marked by far more effective market integration and cultural communication, which contribute to the sense of a shared fate.

The possibility of identifying an ‘Asia’ that may be separated out from its global context as economic, political and cultural space is a basic premise of the discourse, past and present.⁴ The persistence of the past—and the European Orientalist cartographic imagination—may be most cogently visible in the continued prevalence of an East-West conceptualisation of the world that underlines the division between Asia and Euro/America. It is the guiding theme of Mishra’s disquisition. The Singaporean diplomat-intellectual Kishore Mahbubani has gone even further to identify East and West with distinctive world-views.⁵ It is freely used by Chinese leaders and intellectuals, more often than not with China substituted for Asia. I suspect it is common to the spatialization of the world across the breadth of Asia, from Turkey to Japan.

The continuity, however, is also misleading. Pan-Asianism at the turn of the century took over a distinction established by a hegemonic European mapping of the world, and made it the basis for Asian solidarity. The commonality it imagined was a product of shared weakness: from the Sick Man of West Asia at one end, to the Sick Man of East Asia at the other. Asian spirituality set against ‘Western’ materialism provided some comfort, without alleviating a sense of impending doom.

Contemporary commonality is heir to the same legacy of European Orientalist mapping of Eurasia. On the other hand, it establishes itself on a sense of shared resurgence backed by material power. It is not a warning of extinction but an announcement of arrival.

If it still boasts of its spirituality, it is now more akin to the ‘spiritual atom bomb’ that Mao Zedong discovered in the consciousness of the people. With contemporary communications, the sense of a shared space is available to a far larger constituency, making Mao’s metaphor more relevant. These differences from the past are important for thinking out issues of Asian solidarity as well as Asia as space in the global system.

The metaphor of East and West provides a convenient illustration of problems of Asian commonality and solidarity, as well as of Asia as global space. Despite its commonly recognised reductionist banality, this metaphor refuses to go away, perhaps because it offers a pithy invitation, attractive in its verbal economy, to imaginary realms of material and cultural exotics and riches that each side dreams of the other. Simultaneously but contrarily, it offers a seemingly plausible cultural map upon which to write out mutual anxieties and antagonisms—as it did during the Cold War, when ‘East’ meant the realm of Communism and ‘West’ that of ‘democracy’ (not capitalism). It has now been restored to its continental dimension, but with similar anxieties if not overt antagonisms. In either case, the juxtaposition reifies and distances the two entities to which it refers, and overwhelms the complex relationships within and without for which it becomes a formulaic (and static) stand-in. It is not merely academic but deeply political and cultural in its implications.

The prevalence in the discourse on Asia of an Asia/Europe or an East-West juxtaposition (the subject-matter here) is the product of an intensified Asia-consciousness both within and without ‘Asia’. In the case of the former, it gives expression to a persuasive effort to carve out an ‘Asian’ political and cultural space to overcome Euro/American domination and hegemony. In its current rebirth, the discourse on Asia aspires once again to modernities that Asians can call their own, which has never disappeared since its appearance in the late 19th century. It has been the substance of much discussion in recent years, both East and West. The juxtaposition divides but also unifies Asia and Europe (or ‘the West’) as contenders in the construction of modernity or modernities. Asia is privileged along with Europe as a source of modernities, with equal claims on modernity but on differing tacks. This certainly is welcome news in Asia though it may not be elsewhere—especially continents

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and civilisations that are left out, depending on how Asia is delineated.

What makes the discourse problematic is an age-old question: what exactly is Asia beyond a geographical designation, and a very troubled one at that. Not to speak of unity or homogeneity, an ‘Asia’ that is a recognisably coherent bounded space exists only in ideological imagination.⁶ Despite strenuous efforts to render it coherent, the idea of Asia seems less plausible than ever before with the globalisation of development. Indeed, as was the case with the earlier Eurocentric conceptualisation, it is not a demonstrable difference along some boundary that produces the distinction between Asia and Euro/America, or the East and the West, but the other way around: the self-conception or the desire for difference that establishes the boundary between the two entities so named—no less for Euro/Americans than for those who would self-identify as Asians. Not very surprisingly, as our contemporary notions of the globe are products of a Eurocentric geography.

It takes but brief reflection to be reminded that East and West are directional terms rendered into static locations, which is what makes them as metaphors. Perhaps because I grew up in a city divided by a narrow strip of water one side of which was in Europe and the other in Asia, the usage has always struck me as an odd one. The oddity has been confirmed over the years by my discovery of many places to the east of where I grew up that claimed to be meeting points of East and West—some of them at the very eastern end of the continent. If there were so many easts and so many wests, what could the terms refer to, and contain?

The answer is obvious. The terms do not refer just to directions, or to the many different easts and wests that come together in particular places. They are informed by a discourse, by now global, that rendered the east into a stand-in for Asia, and the west into another word for Europe or Euro/America. That, of course, presupposed a prior separation of Eurasia from the Afro-Eurasian ecumene, followed by its breakdown into Asia and Europe as geographical units, a separation that was not physical but the product of a cultural(or should I say, culturalist?) operation. It is revealing that by contrast, Europe and the Americas, physically separated by an ocean, are nevertheless united culturally in the term ‘west’ by a reverse cultural operation.

I need not belabor here the problems that arise for ideas of Europe and Asia (as well as other continental units of our political geography) when east and west are restored to their more proper directional sense. One immediate consequence is that it does indeed become possible to have many locations for the meeting of east and west, if not of Europe and Asia. As historians of geography have demonstrated, these terms have been marked by a serious instability of reference since their origins. A crucial consequence was the invention of a ‘middle east’ to account for the serious differences between ‘Asia proper’ and a predominantly Islamic region, itself subject to shifting boundaries. Northern Asia, including Russia, is left out of most serious discussions of Asia. On occasion, India has been removed from the space so designated.⁷ It is not uncommon, both within and without Asia, to encounter the identification of Asia with only one national entity, more often than not, China.⁸ Clearly, relationships of power and perceptions of what constitutes ‘Asianness’ have something to do with the configurations of geography, and render it variable and prone to fragmentation.⁹

This is quite clear in the case of a country like Turkey, which sits astride Europe and Asia, as it were. Turks as an ethnic group have central Asian origins, but Turkey is also heir to the Ottoman Empire which for centuries claimed hegemony over the Islamic world of Western Asia and North Africa. Nevertheless, the East-West distinction is quite clear in the Turkish self-image. Since the founding of the Republic in 1923 under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, Turkey has spent the better part of a century trying ‘to escape from Asia’, much like Japan at the other end of the continent. The resurgence of Islam in Turkish politics since the 1990s has once again complicated matters. The Islamic government has good ideological reasons for once again looking east. But it is not the only version of the ‘East’, as it is challenged by a Pan-Turkist or Pan-Turanian right that identifies the East more with central Asian origins than with the Islamic world. And both have to contend with the secularist pro-‘Western’ legacies of Ataturk which by no means have lost their continued appeal. The Islamic government itself is still very much taken with Turkey’s admission into the European Union, which to most Turks continues to represent the ultimate test of arrival in the ‘civilised’ world. Whatever affinity Turkey’s Islamists may feel for other Muslims or Asians, ‘looking

east’, or moves to link up with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or ASEAN, are very much entangled in political maneuvers to also become a more integral part of Europe (Beukman, 2013; Gursel, 2013).

The possibility of identifying an ‘Asia’ that may be separated out from its global context as economic, political and cultural space is a basic premise of the discourse, past and present.

With national identities in question, it should not be difficult to imagine the magnitude of the problem when it comes to continental identities. The problem is not just ‘Asian’, it is also ‘European’.¹⁰ There is, of course, no self-evident reason why the present should be beholden to the imperial geographies of Euromodernity. Intensifying economic relations across Asia—from Pacific Asia to the ‘Middle East’—may be responsible for a new sense of ‘Asianness’, but surely these relationships do not stop at the Nile or the Bosphorus. For centuries, religious, commercial and even political activity over the continental spaces and oceans of Afro-Eurasia were conducted without an awareness of crossing continental boundaries or defining continental spaces.¹¹ It is a tribute to the continued hegemonic power of Euromodernity that an age marked by the self-conscious pursuit of globalisation should fetishise the continental identities established by its imperial geographies.

The discourse informed by the triple parallelisms of Asia/Europe—East/West—Orient/ Occident is so powerful that even critically-informed and well-intentioned scholars speak on its terms. I hope the organisers will not take it amiss if I refer here to the website for this conference, which describes our present location as an ‘East-West Crossroads’. Macao is certainly a crossroads, but it is both much less and much more than the East-West metaphor suggests. It is a product not just of one east or one west but many easts and many wests which identify its locus as a cross-roads, and

define the particularities that differentiate it from other such cross-roads, say Hong Kong in the neighborhood which also advertises itself as a meeting point between the East and the West.

But our present location, taken somewhat more literally, is also much more than a specific point in space different from other such points. The venue for the conference is a hotel that is part of a global entertainment corporation that spans two continents (and east and west) and a number of such points: Las Vegas, Macao and Singapore which, with all their differences, are bound together by this global chain that also endow them with commonalities that transcend their locations and differences. To use the vocabulary of spatial analysis, they are places encompassed—and shaped—by a trans-place spatial organisation and culture. This culture is not free of other associations, both economic and political. It is the entertainment face of the culture of global capitalism. In this particular case it also derives its political orientation from a Chairman and CEO who is an ardent supporter of the Republican Party and pro-Israel positions in US politics. Our presence here does not make us into supporters of these causes. That is not my point. My point is that factoring these elements into the determination of Macao as place makes Macao into a very different—and much more complicated—place in global positioning than is allowed for in an abbreviated east-west formulation. Like other locations that claim an abridged east-west location, Macao is ultimately a manifest product of the many easts and many wests—global processes—that crisscross it, while stamping on those processes a configuration that defines its particularity and identity.

ASIA: FRAGMENTED AND GLOBAL

In his study of the reception given to the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore in China and Japan in the 1920s and 1930s published four decades ago, entitled *Asian Ideas of East and West*, Stephen Hay argued that pan-Asianism had been subject all along to national perceptions and interests (Hay, 1970). The values claimed to represent the values of a distinctive Asian culture are found upon closer inspection to be projections upon Asia of a variety of national cultures, themselves abstractions by elites from localised differences. Even at a level of generality such as

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‘spiritual Asia’, the evidence of difference in everyday life behavior and values contradicts the notion of an Asian culture with its suggestion of commonality which at some level or another suggests homogeneity or at least shared values of determinant significance across continental spaces (as it does also with the other aspect of the relationship, Europe or Euro/America or simply, the West).

Difference does not rule out solidarity. Indeed, active recognition of difference is a feature of grassroots efforts to construct an Asia-consciousness as it is of contemporary intellectual movements elsewhere. The ‘movements project’ of which the periodical *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* is an issue is a case in point. Such efforts not only display a keen sense of difference, they also welcome it. What shared values there may be are moreover over-determined by values derived from Euromodernity that make for substantial differences. Asia-consciousness in these cases is a process of discovery—and invention—that seeks social reconstruction as the basis for a new consciousness.

It is equally also evident that whatever commonalities there may be, they are easily trumped by considerations of national wealth and power, rendering the construction of an Asia-consciousness highly problematic, if not unlikely. Development has introduced new dimensions to the fissiparous tendencies of the past, undermining possibilities of Asian solidarity. It also has integrated Asian societies more closely into global capitalism, making it more difficult than ever before to speak of Asia as any kind of self-contained space.

There is little need here to dwell on the political and economic issues that presently divide Asian societies, in some cases leading to overt conflict or the threat of it. Some but not all of these conflicts are the work of outsiders to Asia, notably, the United States. If we adopt the most expansive and inclusive idea of Asia, going back to the ancient Greeks, as everything east of the Aegean Sea and the Nile River, there is irresolvable difference and ongoing conflict everywhere: civil war in Iraq and Syria, Palestinian struggles against an apartheid regime, Kurdish struggles for autonomy, war in Afghanistan, antagonism between India and Pakistan with Kashmir as the flash-point, Tibetan and Uighur struggles for autonomy, seemingly irresolvable issues (at least peacefully) in the relationship of Taiwan to the PRC, and the divided Koreas, and most recently

militarisation and the threat of conflict in Eastern Asia, triggered by an expansionist China seeking to reclaim the tributary territories of its imperial predecessors—and then some.¹² While some of this conflict is traceable to legacies of the past, present day competition for power and resources generates its own conflicts or exacerbates existing ones.¹³ Especially virulent is anxiety about resources, including food and water. In either case, the construction of an Asia-consciousness is overshadowed by far by the effort required to contain these hostilities and conflict.

If the burdens of the past continue to haunt Asia, present development generates its own divisions in uneven development across and within national boundaries. Much of the hype about the rise of Asia is really about the rise of the People’s Republic of China, followed at some distance by India. ‘China’s rise’ was in important ways a product of its location in eastern Asia, which already by the 1970s had emerged as the third node of the capitalist world economy under the leadership of Japan, along with North America and Europe. With its rapid development over the last two decades, the PRC has established a dominant status in eastern Asia, and is in the process of extending its reach to southern and western Asia and into Africa. India is a serious contender, while in western Asia Turkey boasts a rapidly developing economy, and a modernity that is held up as a model for other predominantly Muslim societies. Given the highly advanced economies of the region (Japan and the one-time mini-dragons) and the size of the Chinese economy, the weight of the Asian economies is steeply tilted toward eastern Asia which is now home to the second and third-ranked economies in the world.

For all the success of some but not all eastern Asian societies, and of India and Turkey, most Asian societies are struggling with problems of poverty and modernity. Not that these are just problems of societies that have been less successful in their incorporation in capitalism. Uneven development internally is a major stumbling-block to China’s future development, and has led to even more tragic consequences in India where development has been more hesitant, and the poor do not enjoy some of the advantages revolutionary transformation brought to the rural areas of China. The two countries are among the poorest in the world in terms of per capita income. (Depending on the source, by income calculated in terms of purchasing power

parity, China ranks somewhere between 90th and 100th in the world, and India is further down between 120th and 130th).

China presently is one of the most unequal countries in the world. Official poverty figures aside, the so-called ‘middle class’ is huge by world standards, but constitutes only about 20 percent of the population, which is not much of a ‘middle’, and of that only a very small number enjoy the lavish life-styles that capture the headlines around the world. The divisions are a source of discontent, daily disturbance, and anxieties about the future. While India is nowhere close to China in inequality, it is plagued by problems of governance and a poor social and physical infrastructure. It is reported that every half hour an Indian peasant, unable to cope with burdens of debt and oppression, commits suicide. It, too, has its local insurrections, inspired by Maoism imported more than 40 years ago. Both countries suffer from massive corruption, which is a major source of distress among their populations. (For whatever it is worth, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception index, they are close to one another, somewhere in the middle of 176 countries ranked). The corruption is systemic, entangled in development policies that rely largely on unbridled plunder of resources and severe exploitation of the rural populations. This is especially the case in ‘socialist’ China where the state claims ownership of the land, and has few checks on the dispossession of its users under the banner of development. The plunder of rural land for industrialisation, urban development, and road construction for the new mobile society is accompanied by the conversion of dispossessed rural labor into a cheap and cruelly exploited army of labor—the so-called ‘peasant-workers’—that enabled the ‘take-off stage’ of Chinese capitalism; ‘accumulation by dispossession’, in the astute phrase by David Harvey (Harvey, 2003). It’s widely acknowledged even by the leadership that the plunder of the land and the abuse of the rural population is a major source of corruption, as well as popular discontent. Promises to resolve the question have so far led to little, as they have left unaddressed the problem of a mode of development premised upon those very conditions.¹⁴

The consequences are cultural as well as political. The ruling classes (and the ‘middle classes’) who have benefited from development are increasingly oriented to a global consumer and intellectual culture.

The majority, too, may aspire to this goal which is beyond their reach for reasons of poverty and unequal educational opportunities. There is good evidence in the spread of religious activity of a whole range that many seek solace in the realm of spirit what the material world denies them (Goossaert and Palmer, 2011). Uneven development, perpetuated by the plunder of the population by elites anxious to partake of the riches and cultures of global capitalism, is both politically and culturally divisive, with grave implications for the future.

The metaphor of East and West provides a convenient illustration of problems of Asian commonality and solidarity, as well as of Asia as global space.

The internal differences and conflicts that qualify the idea of Asia as a geographical and cultural entity are matched in importance by integration in global economic, political, social and cultural networks which further call into question notions of Asia as a self-contained or coherent bounded entity—as I sought to illustrate above by the example of the over-determined space of our present location here at the Macao Venetian. The distinctions established by the parallel binaries—Asia/Europe, East/West, Orient/Occident—may be less tenable in our day than they ever have been in a history of shifting articulations of those terms, partly due to their incongruence with geopolitical and cultural realities but also motivated in part by changing relationships across Afro-Eurasia and beyond. If the search for ‘Asia’ inaugurated modern globalisation, contemporary globality is defined by the integration of Asian societies into global capitalism with consequences that are not merely economic but political, social and cultural as well. It is often overlooked that the contemporary discourse on Asia is at the same time a discourse on the expansion of the spaces of capital in Asian societies. Since the 1960s but especially since the ‘rise of China’ beginning in

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the 1990s, new frontiers of capital have opened up in Asian societies, which has given credence to the idea of globalisation—as well as the new discourse on the rise of Asia.

The narrative of global capitalism is integral to the discourse of ‘Asia rising’, just as the discourse of Asia rising perpetuates faith in the future of capitalist development, which no longer is identifiable with its birthplace in Europe, or its spectacular unfolding in North America. For all the implausible claims for native origins of success, Asia is the most recent success story of the millennial global expansion of the capitalist world economy. We will recall the Asia Pacific hype of the 1980s, which needs to be viewed in hindsight as the origin of the contemporary discourse on Asia. In an essay written at the time, the US anthropologist Donald Nonini used a concept proposed by David Harvey to describe the Asia Pacific—a euphemism itself for eastern Asia—as capital’s most recent ‘spatial fix’ (Nonini, 1993). The fix would subsequently settle on the People’s Republic of China which, as ‘the factory of the world’, is routinely acknowledged presently to be the motor force of global capitalist development. I think it is fair to say that in the eyes of the managers and promoters of capital, the rise of Asia is for the time being about the rise of China, which is readily acknowledged among Asian elites as well. Some among the Indian elite have begun to wonder if democracy is worth the price of India’s inability to match Chinese success.

Despite the persistence of socialist revolutionary rhetoric, on the other hand, it is equally evident that the narrative of ‘reform and opening’ initiated under Deng Xiaoping after 1978 in its substance is a story of China’s incorporation in global capitalism, and the crucial part it has played in China’s rise. For historical if no other reasons, there is much to be said for the denial of an intrinsic connection between capitalism and the market economy which is the premise of so-called ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. More to the point is the emergence of a corporate economy which has enabled the PRC to establish itself as an economic power. That this corporate economy is so far largely an instrument of state power does not make it any the less ‘capitalist’: state capitalism is no less capitalist for being bureaucratic and authoritarian, even if it is somewhat more threatening in the explicitness of the alliance between state and capital. Champions of global

capital never cease to complain about state controls that hinder access to the Chinese market and the unfair advantages of state-owned corporations, or predict PRC ‘socialism’s’ inevitable attenuation due to its inconsistencies with liberal market orthodoxy. But there is no shortage of praise for the efficient performance of the so-called ‘China model’, which invites admiration mixed with envy not just in developing societies but developed ones as well.

We need also to remember that in the realm of culture, the promotion of Asian culture and values first achieved recognition beginning in the late 1970s, coinciding with the increased prominence of eastern Asian economies, which with the exception of Japan were at the time still led by authoritarian regimes. Before that, these cultures and their values had been viewed as obstacles to development that awaited their inevitable doom with modernisation. Beginning with the Confucian revival in the early 1980s, so-called Asian values were re-valorized as sources of a new path of development. What is interesting is that the promotion of Asian values was a joint enterprise of political leaders and intellectuals from various eastern Asian societies, authorised and legitimised by prominent establishment intellectuals in the US. The collaboration continues to this day, exemplified most cogently by the willingness of academics and institutions around the world to participate in the Confucius institutes, now sponsored by the ‘socialist’ Chinese state. If present-day efforts to construct an Asian culture are likewise infused with the language of Euro/American cultural studies, Asian cultures and values have become a standard component of cultural circulation in a world where multiculturalism has become an unavoidable premise of economic transnationalism.

In a fundamental sense Asian societies had been culturally ‘globalised’ long before their cultures entered global circulation in a big way. The juxtaposition of East and West is perhaps most misleading presently in its suggestion that the entities so named might be strangers to one another, which, if it is the case at all, is more the case with Euro/Americans than with Asians. If ‘the West’ is Asia’s other, it is indeed a very intimate other, to borrow an adjective from the distinguished Indian intellectual Ashis Nandy. From political ideologies to everyday cultural practices, from intellectual discourses to esthetic values, from education to popular entertainment, and even to the most basic level of

kinship practices, Asian societies have been reconfigured under the impact of a Euromodernity powered by capitalism, the nation-form, and unprecedented technological forces unleashed by scientific knowledge. This is not to suggest erasure of received legacies or to deny the localisation of global forms, but only to recognise the importance of the global in the very resistance to it. Another distinguished Indian intellectual, this time the historian Sumit Sarkar, has written that ‘total concentration on the critique of colonial discourse is that only movements and aspects of life demonstrably free of...Western or rationalist taint can be given the status of authentic, properly indigenous protest, resistance and culture’ (Sarkar, 1996, p. 292). It is doubtful that such ‘purity’ is to be found even among those least touched by the age of iphones and the like.

Nevertheless, Sarkar’s protest points to an extremely important issue that often seems to escape notice: the erasure of ‘Westernised’ groups and aspects of society with the intensification of nativism, which draws strength from a global multiculturalism that has been ascendant during the same period. Where once native values and traditions were under assault in the name of modernity—Euromodernity—it is now ideas and cultural practices stamped with ‘Western’ origins—including democracy, equality, secularism and human rights—that have become cause for embarrassment in the quest for ‘alternative modernities’. It is hardly mentioned these days in ‘Communist’ China that Marxism is an import from Europe. The criticism of colonialism easily slides into nativist defense even when it is not so intended, as is the case with self-consciously radical efforts to reinvent Asia in conversation with global cultural transformations, that are otherwise fully cognisant of the new *habitus* that informs their discourse.

The difficulty of containing Asia within a definable space may be most evident in the social realm in migrations of Asian populations that has inspired the term, ‘global Asia’. Migrations that got under way in the 19th century have acquired unprecedented legitimacy and volume during this same period of ‘Asia’s rise’—due both to the proliferation of global linkages but also problems of survival created by development. Unlike earlier times, when migrants were expected to cut off their ties to places of origin (and their pasts), and assimilate to their new homes, it

has become nearly expected in the US and Europe for migrants to retain their ties to their original homelands, facilitated by new technologies, and establish their own social/cultural colonies in places of arrival, living in the security of the cultural practices they brought with them. Indeed, migrant populations such as Asian Americans who emerged to political visibility only 40 years ago in struggles to gain recognition as Americans, have undergone a reorientation to countries of origin in recent years in the new global social and cultural context. In some cases, members of migrant populations even take upon themselves the responsibility of representing their ‘native’ societies or cultures; as with a self-styled ‘Hindu Statesman’ in Nevada who appears in the news every time there is some slur or hint of it against Hinduism, or the Turkish associations who lobby with the US government on behalf of Turkey to refute suggestions of the ethnic cleansing of Armenians in the early 20th century or the ongoing oppression of the Kurdish population. Asian migration, among others, is an important force in the increasing political and cultural incoherence of societies in Europe and North America even as they complicate notions of being Asian.

Asia is no longer just in Asia. While they may insist on retaining their own social and cultural legacies, migrant populations are subject to radical social and cultural transformation in their relocation in new political and cultural spaces. If they are still Asians by virtue of origins, their Asianness is reconfigured by their trajectories and experiences which inevitably distance them from those origins, and there is little reason to expect that they should conceptualise Asia in the same terms as those they left behind. If that is indeed the case, the proliferation of ways of being Asian that is a by-product of the globalisation of Asians would represent a further fragmentation of the idea of Asia itself in its globalisation.

AFTER THE REVOLUTION:
NEOLIBERALISM AND THE DISCOURSE
ON ASIA

The second issue I would like to take up pertains to the temporal implications of the current discourse on ‘the rise of Asia’. It is quite arguable that there is nothing particularly novel about the rise of Asia which has been rising for the past half century. So why all the

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fuss now? And why would a work such as the one with which I started my discussion proclaim that Asia has become Asia now?

The answer is in some ways obvious: the current rise is different from anything that went before as it has brought untold wealth and power to Asian societies like China, India and Turkey. The magnitude of the changes is such that the new ‘middle classes’ it has created sustain global consumption of everything from high-end perfumes to education. The changes have made these societies into lynch-pins of global capitalism, and the promise of its survival, while endowing them with a new status in global power. In the case of the People’s Republic of China, the rise has enabled a challenge to US unilateralism.

Against these changes it is easily forgotten as pre-history that a similar hype of Asia prevailed in the early 1980s with Japan and the mini-dragons leading the way—‘Japan as Number One’, as one US historian put it at the time. The preoccupation with China in East Asia has since nearly marginalised Japan as a spent power, even though it still happens to be the third most powerful country in the world economically, and commands immense technological power and a high standard of living.

There are more ways to understand the term ‘rise’ than that in its guise of success in a neoliberal globalising capitalism. Sharper in the contrast it presents is an earlier ‘rise’ of Asia in a revolutionary guise in the immediate aftermath of WWII. This earlier rise still does occasional lip service. The present celebrates it as the victory of national sovereignty against colonial domination and hegemony. But forgotten or degraded are the social aspirations that had been central goals of struggles for national liberation. Present efforts to revitalise native pasts bypass or explicitly reject the immediate socially radical, secularist, and revolutionary pasts. The repudiation of Mao Zedong in contemporary China is easily attributable to his revolutionary misdeeds, but it conveys a different significance when placed alongside the downgrading of the once sacrosanct Kemal Ataturk in Turkey (and the current assault in the Middle East on the military-secularist regimes), of the anti-developmentalism of Mahatma Gandhi or the socialist aspirations of India under Jawaharlal Nehru. These pasts are remembered as negative examples of how not to go about development.¹⁵

The conscious effort to erase revolutionary pasts in the neoliberal version of the rise is much more readily apparent if we go back to the origins of the contemporary discourse in the early eighties and the initial excitement occasioned by the rise of the so-called Confucian or neo-Confucian societies of eastern Asia. It was beginning then that the current discourse of rise first began to replace the earlier ‘rise’ of Asia as a location of revolutionary struggles against imperialism and colonialism, and a variety of searches for alternatives to capitalist modernity (to be distinguished from alternatives within capitalist modernity). China, of course, would be the most dramatic example of this turn with the ‘reform and opening’ after 1978, accompanied by an explicit rejection of the revolutionary path. It has since emerged to endow the discourse with renewed substance and significance.

If it is possible to speak of these transformations in the language of paradigm change, the significant transformation has been the replacement of Asia as a hothouse of revolutions and liberation struggles, given to the wrong-headed pursuit of some version of socialism or other, by Asia as the ultimate success story of neo-liberal globalisation. When the revolutionary past is invoked presently by elite commentators within or without Asia, it is as a reminder of the old days of poverty and powerlessness, and a warning against the threat of reversion to the bad old days with any deviation from the path of success. The revolutionary past is as much the ‘other’ of the contemporary discourse temporally as ‘the West’ is spatially and culturally. Indeed, the repudiation of the revolutionary past is a common cause on which the twain can meet despite the imaginary gap that otherwise divides them.

Claims to alternative modernities persist, but these are a far cry from the previous search for alternatives. Present-day claims to ‘alternative’ modernities are safely contained within a global capitalism, albeit with insistence on the possibility of local inflections (Dirlik, 2013). Capitalist development is in the process of transforming the physical, social and cultural topographies of Asian societies. Economic revitalisation has been accompanied by demands for the revitalisation of native cultural legacies. Claims to particularity in the name of indigenous historical legacies however, are contained by the demands of political economy in making sure that the past does not

interfere with the primary business of development, or the globalised life-style it promises.

While history may do useful service in claims to alternative modernities, its divisive consequences are equally important, and not so beneficial. History also appears in conflicts over sovereignty and territory that further threaten the idea of Asia. Such conflicts may be found across the breadth of Asia, but once again conflicts associated with development have been most conspicuous in China’s relations with its neighbors. From territorial claims at the borders with the Koreans to the borders with India in the Himalayas, from the East to the South China seas (ironically so named by Europeans), Chinese claims to territories that once fell within the tributary spaces of its imperial predecessors inevitably invoke history as alibi. Even though Chinese international relations scholars readily concede that national sovereignty was an idea imported from ‘the West’ in the 19th century, these claims are expressed in the language of national sovereignty, at odds with the underlying premises of the tribute system—which may bear partial responsibility for puzzling uncertainties in Chinese foreign policy, caught between demands of an international order based on national sovereignty and the pull of memories of a sprawling tributary empire, but also willing to play by one or the other set of rules as it seems opportune. This time around, it needs to deal with political entities that also claim sovereignty. Whether or not these other nations would be willing to compromise their sovereignty in exchange for a market dependency remains to be seen. Indeed, many already seem to be caught between economic dependence on China and a perceived need for outside—US—support to contain expansionist Chinese claims on land and sea. Meanwhile, Asia is becoming militarised.

A SHIFT IN HEGEMONY?

When these issues are brought to the surface of the discourse, it is quite evident not only that ‘Asia rising’ suffers from the pitfalls of inherited orientalist or self-orientalizing discourses, but also that there is much to be apprehensive about what the ‘rise’ might promise: not just wealth and power, at least for some, but also increased possibility of inequality, social and international conflict, political turmoil, and last but by no means least, ecological destruction that is already taking a toll on the population and is global

in its implications. Celebratory forecasts of a middle class expanded to 700 million in China within a few decades is hardly ever placed within the context of what it would mean in terms of resources and environmental destruction on the basis of contemporary experience.¹⁶ We may safely presume that present-day conflicts over resources are due at least in part to apprehensions about the future. Anxiety over food and water security is a driving force of a renewed corporate colonialism in Africa and Latin America in which the PRC is a major player, emulated with greater hesitation by India—another important reason for viewing ‘Asia’ as an integral part of processes that are ultimately global.¹⁷

These are not just Chinese, or Indian, or Asian problems, but systemic problems of the capitalist world system, more severe in some locations than in others, but without distinction between developed and developing societies. Claims to ‘alternative modernities’ are not very convincing in societies striving to become hegemonic within the confines of global capitalism in which they are deeply entangled. If I may quote here Mishra’s pained observation:

Much of the ‘emerging’ world now stands to repeat, on an ominously large scale, the West’s own tortured and often tragic experience of modern ‘development’. In India and China, the pursuit of economic growth at all costs has created a gaudy elite, but it has also widened already alarming social and economic disparities. It has become clear that development, whether undertaken by colonial masters or sovereign nation-states, doesn’t benefit people evenly within a single territory, not to mention across large regions. Certainly, China’s and India’s new middle classes have done very well out of two decades of capitalism, and their ruling elites can strut across the world stage like never before. But this apparently wildly successful culmination to the anti-colonial revolution has coincided with a veritable counter-revolution presided over by political and business elites across the world: the privatization and truncation of public services, de-unionization, the fragmentation and lumpenization of urban working classes, and the ruthless suppression of the rural poor (Mishra 2012, pp. 307-308).

The ‘counter-revolution’, too, is global. As I have already alluded, in its dominant guise, the discourse of ‘Asia

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rising’ is a joint ‘East-West’ product, with contributions from the south. If the discourse is not very forthcoming where its apprehensions are concerned, its silence is deafening when it comes to the relationship between corporate interest, economies founded upon the production of consumption, and Asian problems. As integration in capitalism accounts for ‘Asia’s rise’, it is also a generator of some of Asia’s most unmanageable problems. On the very day last January when Beijing was choking under smog visible from space, General Motors published a report on how many cars it anticipated selling in China this coming year, and how many it would be exporting to other Asian countries from its production in China.¹⁸ Meanwhile, Shanghai is sinking due to a declining water table and under the weight of the real estate it has built to become Asia’s face to the world of finance. A Guangdong provincial academy of science analysis just a few years back reported that Guangzhou might be under water in a few decades (Guangzhou, 2003; ‘Sinking Shanghai’, 2013; Kaye, 2012).¹⁹ The half-hearted efforts of the Chinese government to deal with some of these problems are often greeted in all-powerful stock markets by dismay at slowing down the global economy (Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012).

It seems certain by now that the Chinese economy will surpass in size that of the United States in a few decades to become the foremost economy of the globe, to be followed shortly thereafter by India. Barring regime change which would create more uncertainties, this may also point to a looming hegemonic shift in the order of Euromodernity, enforced presently by the United States. The possibility has long been anticipated by world system analysts Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank and others, who understandably have been reticent over the question of what comes next.²⁰ It is no secret that the People’s Republic of China has openly if cautiously proclaimed aspirations to world leadership in the promotion of ‘the Chinese Model’, a ‘Beijing Consensus’ against that of Washington, ‘the China dream’ which promises to be the preferred slogan of the new Xi Jinping administration, and efforts to project ‘soft power’, of which the so-called Confucius Institutes are emblematic. For the PRC, the rise of Asia implies not just the reformation of the global order in order to recognise the new Asian presence, but also a reconsideration of the rules of the global

game—in other words, not just a reconfiguration of power relations but a paradigmatic transformation of the way those relations are organised. Some Chinese international relations experts have called for a change in the world order, in which the anti-colonialist aspirations of a revolutionary past are blended with memories of a once hegemonic Chinese order in eastern Asia.²¹ As the editorial introduction to an officially sponsored journal put it,

International Critical Thought appears toward what is probably the end of a stretch of history. In the past 500 years, capitalism, with its inclusive and pervasive mode of production and consumption and its social principles, has changed the world in its entirety and in details, sending humanity to heights never before dreamed of or imagined.... However, two years ago, the inner contradictions of capitalism found a once-in-a-century vent in the outburst of financial tumult and economic crisis across the world. From the macro-perspective of history, many examples have combined to indicate one single fact: capitalism is exhausting its institutional and cultural energy. Furthermore, two absolute limits are taking form on the horizon: the end of its extensive development due to the generalization of wage-owners, and the environmental barrier constituted by the increased scarcity of natural resources and by the climate change. Thus, human history has entered a period of uncertainty, and ‘another world’ is not just possible but inevitable (Editor’s note, 2011, p. 1).²²

The authors go on to observe that ‘Western civilisation, that has successfully created and recreated capitalism does not seem to be good enough or rich enough for the construction of “another world”’ (Ibid.) While they advocate dialogue among all concerned in the construction of the world, the two laudatory discussions of the ‘China model’ in the introductory issue as if it had somehow transcended capitalism confirms the impression that China might be next in line to undertake the task.

This may indeed be an opportune moment, for the People’s Republic of China if not for Asia. But despite all the positive or negative hype about China, it is not at all clear that the PRC is desirous of taking over the task of world hegemony beyond its ambitions in Eastern Asia (Lee, 2002).²³ For all its newfound

economic power, China remains an insular society, with little indication that it is in a position to manage the global economy of which it has become an anchor.²⁴ Available studies suggest, moreover, that the Chinese insistence on tending to economic relationships without burdening them with political concerns is at odds with hegemonic aspirations which ultimately call for closer political involvement in international affairs and institutions.²⁵ It is not very helpful that out of cultural pride or anxiety, no longer easily distinguishable, the PRC government and opinion makers should insist on adding ‘Chinese characteristics’ to every imaginable aspect of global culture to find its way into China—from the Marxism the regime claims as its ideological foundation to the most trivial cultural imports that already are part of everyday life. The prevalent political and cultural assumption that ‘the foreign’ should be made to serve ‘the Chinese’—an attitude as old as the history of Chinese modernisation—nevertheless contrasts unfavorably with earlier revolutionary professions of solidarity with the oppressed. It also preempts cosmopolitan engagement of the foreign that may be a precondition of effective ideological and moral hegemony.²⁶ It seems ironic that enhanced economic and political power should serve rather than mitigate a parochial cultural self-obsession.

As the quotation above from Mishra indicates, given available evidence, the domination of the world economy by China or India would hardly add up to a shift in hegemony that would usher in a paradigm change. Mishra once again puts it eloquently:

....this success [Asia’s] conceals an immense intellectual failure, one that has profound ramifications for the world today and the near future. It is simply this: no convincingly universalist response exists today to Western ideas of politics and economy, even though these seem increasingly febrile and dangerously unsuitable in large parts of the world. Gandhi, their most rigorous critic, is a forgotten figure within India today. Marxism-Leninism lies discredited and, though China’s rulers increasingly make gestures towards Confucian notions of harmony, China’s own legacy of ethical politics and socio-economic theory remains largely unexplored. And even if it is exportable to other Muslim countries, Turkey’s Islamic modernity doesn’t point to any alternative socio-economic order.

The ‘Washington Consensus’ may lie in tatters, and Beijing’s Communist regime mocks—simply by persisting as long as it has—Western claims of victory in the Cold War and the inevitability of liberal democracy. But the ‘Beijing Consensus’ has even less universal application than its Washington counterpart; it sounds suspiciously like merely a cynical economic argument for the lack of political freedom (Mishra, 2012, p. 306).²⁷ While many are awed by China’s development, it is not clear how many of those might be willing to live with a Chinese hegemony—in Asia, or elsewhere. Given the global drift to authoritarianism, suppression of dissent, and the institution of a surveillance society, there is no reason to rule out such an eventuality—even in advanced capitalist societies or developing societies like India with their democratic institutions. Societies of the Global South are less keen than ever to follow the United States example. And everywhere, money talks loud, very loud indeed, at a time of global financial crisis. Economic interest would appear to trump qualms about democracy and human rights in the contemporary rush to China (Dirlik and Prazniak, 2012; Fox News, 2013).²⁸

While there is much to be celebrated in their efforts to alleviate poverty, I think it is fair to say that from the perspective of human rights and social justice, neither China nor other up-and-coming Asian societies provide models worthy of emulation beyond the recent leap forward in their economic development—nothing, at any rate, to give them an edge over the hegemony they would challenge. Many of these countries are world leaders in the suppression of press freedoms and the imprisonment of journalists. They also suffer from deep social inequalities, and are plagued with extraordinary gender problems and seemingly incurable rural deformation. Asia leads the world in building mega-cities, but it is also home to the most polluted among them. Indeed, destruction of the environment, readily acknowledged by the leadership, is the aspect of China’s development most likely to extinguish any desire to emulate the ‘China model’. If China continues to rise along the same path, Li Minqi has argued, it will be the end of the capitalist world-system—and, we might add, of the world as we know it, especially if India follows along the same path (Li, 2008).²⁹ In the meantime, such is the power of ‘the desire named

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development’ that it marches past all evidence of accumulating disaster—from global warming to new threats of infectious epidemics, from the Fukushima disaster two years ago to the more recent infestation of Shanghai’s drinking water with thousands of diseased dead pigs (Nigam, 2011; McCarthy, 2013; Ford, 2013).

None of this is to say that the rise of Asia is inconceivable or undesirable. What if these problems are resolved with technological fixes, as promised by the developmentalist faith that probably has more adherents in Asia presently than elsewhere? So much the better, for Asia and the world. But what if they cannot be, for which there is equally if not more compelling evidence—most importantly the failing example of the so-called developed capitalist societies? If ‘Asia’ is to claim a new paradigm, it needs urgently to rethink the developmental path that has brought it to the present crossroads. The hype over ‘Asia rising’, and the rivalries it generates, may be an obstacle to the solution of problems created by development by sustaining faith in their future solution. It disguises, above all, that ‘Asia’s problems are global problems. And global problems are Asia’s problems’.

In a work published in 1979, that was influential in business and government circles, and was one of the first to herald the rise of economies in Asia, especially eastern Asia, futurologist Herman Kahn wrote that, ‘it is probably a waste of time to think ideologically about stopping progress (much less social change) and foolish to regret that much of the physical environment and many established institutions must change’ (Kahn 1979, p. 24). He may well be right, because this is the hegemonic ideology of the present. The question, however, is not stopping development or ‘progress’ or ‘social change’, but to develop differently, with a view to human needs and survival. This is something well-understood, and frequently acknowledged. And yet efforts to address it are routinely hampered by social and political obstacles to changes that are not in ruling interests (‘China Signals’, 2013). There are ideological obstacles, too. Kishore Mahbubani probably speaks for many in Asia (and elsewhere) when he states that insistence on issues of democracy, human rights, and the like, is putting the cart before the horse, because these are questions that should wait upon the more urgent tasks of development (Mahbubani, 2002, pp. 54, 76). Quite the contrary. These values need to be integral to the very process of development, if development is to

serve human needs, rather than needs of nations, classes, or genders. What is urgently needed is not development that serves particular interests or becomes its own end, but fair and humane development that preserves social integrity and justice, and the environment which is the very condition of our existence.

It may take a more restricted and more socially and ecologically responsible sense of ‘Asia’ and ‘rise’ to realise alternative futures beyond the present order which indeed seems to have run its course. In its more restricted sense, the discourse on the ‘rise of Asia’ points to aspirations to an autonomous space outside of Euro/American hegemony for the creation of Asian modernities that promise solution of the problems that have been thrown up by capitalist development. Such a space need not be coterminous with one or another geographical delineation of Asia. There is no apparent reason why different constituencies should not be able to imagine Asia differently, which would suggest the possibility of a multiplicity of Asian spaces. This is already the case, visible especially in migrant communities where different ideas of Asianness are in formation in response to local circumstances. Moreover, to escape some of the problems discussed above, it is probably necessary to conceive of Asian spaces as spaces apart from national entities, with their ambivalent relationships to a notion of Asia and to one another that is not particularly conducive to the construction of an ‘Asia-consciousness. This is as much a necessity now as it was in the first stirrings of such a consciousness at the turn of the 20th century. 

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NOTES

- 1

Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. ASEAN has been around for sometime now. Over the decade since its formal establishment, the SCO has also made impressive headway in extending organisational activity to Western Asia and linkages with ASEAN. See, Karrar, 2009.
- 2

An outstanding example of scholarly interest in ‘Asia’ as a whole, in its time quite popular, is Pye and Pye (1985). The Pyes defended their use of Asia on commonsensical grounds, as a response to interest in ‘Asia’, but also because: ‘The unity of Europe lies in its history; the unity of Asia in the more subtle, but no less real, shared consciousness of the desirability of change and of making a future different from the past’ (p. 2). This study of ‘Asia’, however, excluded Northern and Southwestern Asia (‘more a part of the Middle East’, p. xi), and was held together less by generalities about ‘the desirability of change’ than the cultural authoritarianism that the authors viewed as a general characteristic of the Asian societies they included.
- 3

An eloquent organisational expression of this shared past is BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) which is not, strictly speaking, an ‘Asian’ organisation, and a reminder of the possibilities of a broader solidarity that goes beyond Asia, reminiscent of the Bandung and Third World legacies. Ironically, we owe this acronym(as well as the term, ‘Beijing Consensus’) to Goldman Sachs. The world has changed.
- 4

For a sampling of recent scholarly discussions of ‘Asia’ in English from a variety of perspectives, see, Chen, 2010; Duara, 2001; Harootunian, 2012, pp. 7-35; Harootunian, 1996); Sakai, 2000, Spivak, 2008; Wang, 2011; and, Pala, forthcoming.
- 5

Mahbubani 2002, 2013. On both occasions, Mahbubani sees in his complex family tree the existence of Asia (Mahbubani, 2002, p. 10. His strong claim about an Asia-Europe divide is hardly justified by his rather meek observation that ‘Asians and Westerners do think differently about some things’ (Ibid.)—hardly reason enough to speak of continental or any other divides!
- 6

The discussion here draws on the work of the geographers, Lewis and Wigen 1997. For a critical examination of the idea of Asia, see, Steadman 1969. The ‘stereotypes’ referred to here have been, and continue to be, products of representations and self-representations. Russian orientologists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, trying to deal with Russia’s incongruity with the east-west juxtaposition, proceeded to call into question the Asia-Europe juxtaposition as well (Tolz, 2011, Chap. 2).
- 7

For a discussion of the ambivalence of Indians about being Asian, and ambivalence toward India of other Asians, see, Palat, 2002.
- 8

There is nevertheless variation by country and over time. Presently the preoccupation globally is with the PRC, as it was with ‘Japan as Number One’ in the 1980s. India has held a special place in the UK and in Germany. But there has been a strong tendency among Europeans of assigning special civilisational priority to China, erasing everything between Europe and China, in particular Islam as an obstacle separating the two. This in many ways corresponds to mainstream opinion in the PRC. At a panel discussion held in Seoul, S. Korea, in 1999, the distinguished writer Han Shaogong observed that ‘China’ does not think much about Asia—which is probably a good thing for Asia. His observation makes even more sense a decade later (‘Searching for East Asian Identity: A Modern Myth or Post-modern Reflection’, Sep 30-Oct 1, 1999, Swiss Grand Hotel, Seoul, organised by the Seonam Foundation). For the US, looking West, everything seems to have been blurred West of China, with Japan and Korea as minor competitors. In a book published almost fifty years ago, the historian Akira Iriye argued that the US historically has been unable to handle China and Japan at the same
- 9

A geopolitical/geostrategic analysis that eschews continental divides to focus on persistent regional geographies is offered in Kaplan, 2012. See also Kang, 2010.
- 10

While Europe may claim greater coherence than Asia with the establishment of the European Union, the idea of Europe is by no means a transparent one. For a historical analysis, see, Heffernan, 1998.
- 11

Memories of that earlier age are recalled in the revival of terms like ‘Silk Road’ both on land and along the seas. For an example, see, Simpfindorfer, 2009. The road appears increasingly not as the silk road to China, but the *Chinese* silk road. Nevertheless, closer attention to Central Asia underlines Eurasian continuity, just as attentiveness to the Indian Ocean is reminder of the connectedness of Asia with Africa. Policy institutes such as the Institute of East European, Russian, and Central Asian Studies at CASS are organised according to geopolitical realities, not imaginary continental boundaries.
- 12

While for obvious reasons the rhetoric of anti-imperialism has largely disappeared from political language in the PRC, there is no reason to think that the sentiment has disappeared with it. Indeed, post-revolutionary China remains loyal to the goals of the revolution when it comes to territorial sovereignty. A *Xinhua bao* editorial published in 1949 on the eve of the founding of the PRC stated that: ‘The Chinese People’s Liberation Army must liberate the whole territory of China, including Tibet, Sinkiang [Xinjiang], and so forth. Even an inch of Chinese land will not be permitted to be left outside the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China. We tolerate no longer the aggression of foreign countries. This is the unchangeable policy of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army’. Summary of World Broadcasts, no. 17 (2 September 1949), p. 27, cited in Shakya, 1999), p. 9. Now, we might add, the seas have been added to the land.
- 13

Thus, one analyst writes that, ‘as ASEAN progressively moves towards a closer, unified community in 2015 there is a parallel but contrasting trend of escalating military spending among member states through acquisition of weapons that are offensive in nature such as fighter jets and submarines amidst the increasing tension in the region. This may suggest the emergence of an arms race of sorts among ASEAN member-states’. Syailendra, 2013.
- 14

If it is possible to speak of a ‘Chinese model’, this is one aspect that is usually avoided. The plunder of land and the release of a new labor force has been fundamental to the development of capitalism from its English origins. Chinese success nevertheless no doubt inspires others. See, Asian Correspondent, 2013. Indian entrepreneurs fret that the legal system denies them the ease of plunder enjoyed by their Chinese competitors. For issues of land and popular resistance in India, see, Roy, 2011. This ‘internal colonialism’ is accompanied by a new colonialism driven by food and security concerns, most prominently in Africa (Hazra, 2009; Menon, 2013). This makes it all the more ironic that ‘the rise of Asia’ should separate Asia from Africa.
- 15

Chang Kyung-Sup has coined the term ‘developmental citizenship’ to describe citizenship ‘in nations ruled by developmentalist—democratic or not—regimes’ where ‘the practically observable rights and duties of citizens in regards to their state have predominantly revolved around national economic development and individualised material livelihood’. Under such conditions, development takes
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priority over economic, political, social and cultural rights, and the alliance of the state with capital is a generally recognised condition of development (Chang, 2012, p. 203). We might add that this appears to be a trend also in ‘developed’ societies with the concentration of wealth and sharpening of inequality.

16 China’s development has created severe problems not just within the country, but ecological destruction in surrounding states, Australia, South America, and prospectively, North America. Much of this is due to the voracious appetite for resources, from oil, natural gas and coal to food supplies and water. If China behaves piratically on occasion to secure resources, it is merely following in the footsteps of advanced capitalist societies. But the consequences, including the potential conflict, can hardly be ignored. These matters are daily in the headlines (Zhang, 2012; Chellaney, 2013). The potential for war in conflicts over water in the Himalayas has frightened an observer to speculate on the beginnings of World War III in Kashmir (Kazmi, 2013).

17 News of these activities is everywhere as China ‘rises’. For a recent example involving mining in Ecuador, see, Zaitchik, 2013. China, of course, has also been active ‘land-grabbing’ everywhere, especially Africa, but it is by no means the only country engaged in such activity, which includes Euro/American corporations, Arabian states as well as India (Menon, 2013). In all of these cases, land-grabbing abroad is an extension of land-grabbing at home to finance development. This is one important aspect of what David Harvey has described as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003). For a study, see, Liberti, 2013. English version, forthcoming.

18 For the relationship between automobiles and the smog in Beijing this past winter, see, Lelyveld, 2013. Less dramatic than smog visible from outer space but no less important in consequence is water pollution. For a recent report, see, Reuters, 2013. Both air and water pollution are serious problems of most Asian cities. According to a recent report, in 2010 close to two million people died in Asia of causes related to air pollution. See, ‘Beijing’, 2013.

19 ‘For a discussion of the plight of Asian ‘megacities’, see, Jamil and Ali, 2013.

20 Frank, 1998, and, Arrighi, 2008 have been especially influential. If indeed there are signs of a hegemonic shift presently, it faces political, military and ecological conditions quite different from the last such shift in the late 19th century from a British to a US hegemony, leaving the future open. rather than necessarily shifting to a new center, as would be anticipated in more economic and cyclically oriented versions of world system analysis (Wallerstein, 1996).

21 Wang, 2011, pp. 81-84. For an IR perspective, see, Li, 2005, p. 366. Much as the US scholar John King Fairbank, Li sees the encounter with ‘the West’ as an encounter of two world-views, different in its consequences from colonial relations elsewhere. Li disagrees with the influence on foreign policy thinking of a ‘victim mentality’ (*beihai zhe qingxu* 受害者情绪) that would turn China’s rise—similarly to Mishra—into ‘revenge’ against the ‘West’ (p. 347). The idea of ‘all-under-heaven’ (*tianxia* 天下), along with the familial conception of rule, in his view had historically obstructed the emergence of

national and national consciousness. The absence of an ‘other’ in the tianxia outlook also obviated the need for a sense of the self. For a defense of *tianxia* as the conception of a sense of totality that has logical priority to the parts (nation-states), see, Zhao, 2006. Stress on ‘all-under-heaven’ as a possible framework for global relations also draws attention to ‘ritual’ (*li* 礼), as an alternative to laws, that ideally governed relations with the outside world as it did internally. The problem for Chinese advocates of ‘all-under-heaven’ is that the ‘tribute system’ that was its expression is not very persuasive to nations that claim their sovereignty, and is full of contradiction for the jealous insistence of the PRC on its own sovereignty. In the end, it leaves only the PRC as the sovereign state in the neighbourhood.

22 I am a member of the editorial board of this journal, which is a publication of the Marxism Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. See, also, Xi, 2013.

23 The PRC’s ambitions have expanded with increased economic power, and there are no doubt those who advocate greater assertiveness in world politics. For different perspectives from neighboring states responding to most recent US within the context of China’s ambitions, see, ‘Roundtable’, 2013. For a Russian perspective that shifts the burden to the US because ‘China’s geostrategic plans do not even contain hints at planning an armed expansion anywhere’, see, Voice of Russia, 2013.

24 For a rather bleak assessment of China’s present and future, see, Barnett, 2013. A more optimistic assessment that focuses on economic issues alone will be found in Rapoza, 2013a. The same author’s uncertainties are apparent in a piece written about the same time (Rapoza, 2013b).

25 Wang and French, 2013. According to the authors, compared to other BRIC states (Brazil, Russia and India), China still has a low level of participation in global institutions in terms of personnel and financial contribution. See, also, Wang, 2013.

26 Barne,1999, especially chap. 10, with its colorful title: ‘to screw foreigners is patriotic’.

27 The term ‘Beijing Consensus’, we might add, was coined by a former employee of Goldman Sachs, more recently a member of Kissinger Associates, Inc. (Ramo, 2004). For further discussion, see, Dirlik, 2007, especially chap. 6. Many Chinese intellectuals and party officials were unwilling initially to embrace the term. For a collection of discussion, see, Yu Keping, Huang Ping, Xie Shuguang and Gao Jian (eds.), 2006.

28 There was some talk recently, if only in half-jest, that National Aeronautics and Space Administration in the US, running out of funds, might approach the PRC government for funding (‘To Save NASA’, 2013). Constitutional commitment to the defense of ‘nature’s rights’ has not stopped the government of Ecuador from entering destructive mining deals with Canadian and Chinese companies (Zaitchik, 2013).

29 See, also, Chomsky, 2013. For a thoughtful interview on the global impact of China’s environmental consumption and pollution with Craig Simons, author of *The Devouring Dragon: How China’s Rise Threatens Our Natural World*, see, Wong, 2013.

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The International (Comintern) and the Macao Harbour Project of 1922-1927

PAUL B. SPOONER*


Observing the appearance in Macao between 1922 and 1924 of two of Portugal’s leading political figures of the Portuguese First Republic (1910-1926), provides insight into Macao’s role in the domestic and international struggle to capture control of the Chinese nationalist revolution. Following the foundation of Lenin’s Third International in March 1919, by the autumn Sun Yat Sen 孙逸仙 had re-launched his revolutionary efforts from a Shanghai base. By 1923 Portugal’s General Gomes de Costa and Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues were both in Macao. Their arrival demonstrated a much larger role for Portugal in the global political movements of the 1920s than has heretofore been reported, a role that clearly showed revolutionary change in Portugal could be directly related to similar change in South China.

General Gomes de Costa and Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues represented the opposite ends of the Portuguese political perspective when they were both assigned to Macao from 1922 to 1924. Rodrigues came as a high-level cadre of the left-wing of the Portuguese Republican Party (PRP); Gomes de Costa came as the conservative, right-wing head of a military mission to



Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues, Macao Governor 1923-1925.

the Far East. Dr. Rodrigues arrived as governor on 5 January 1923, exactly three weeks before the 26 January Sun-Joffe manifesto that led to the Comintern funding of Sun Yat Sen and to the creation of the Revolutionary Army in Canton that was to unify China.¹ Rodrigues facilitated the commencement of Macao’s long-overdue and critically important harbour improvement project (‘Outer Harbour Project’), the objective of which was to convert Macao from a silting backwater to a major international port, a project that had been delayed well over half a century.



Map of Macao and neighbouring territories, 1912.

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Two maps of the Macao peninsula illustrate the dramatic changes implemented under the project. A map from 1912 represents the harbour as it looked immediately prior to the Outer Harbour Project in 1922, while that from 1927 shows the projected final 1927 configuration. Not shown is the deep channel dredged from the Outer Harbour into the old Inner Harbour, which had drastically silted up since its days in the early 19th century of being one of China’s most active and famous ports.

The Macao Port of 1922 was to be tied into a huge hinterland, which began with the mouth of the West River just to the west of Macao, and extended back into Yunnan Province nearly to the city of Kunming. Early publicity for the new port project from the early 1920s had emphasised its role with respect to the West River Valley and South China Regions. River and rail transport links for the Pearl River Delta for the period show even more clearly the potential function of the port. Not only was the West River directly navigable up to Canton, but the Pearl River Delta region was only served by one significant rail line, the relatively new Hong Kong-Canton railway. As part of the 1922 Macao Harbour Project another planned rail link was to extend from Macao up to a river port not far from Whampoa.

General Gomes de Costa, who had led the two Portuguese divisions in the First World War under command of General Richard Haking of Britain’s 11th Corps in France, was Portugal’s most renowned military officer. He was sent on a military tour of Asia by Arthur Tamagnini Barbosa de Sousa, the head of Portugal’s Colonial Administration only months after Tamagnini’s older brother João Tamagnini Barbosa, who had been the second ranking figure in the Sidónio Pais regime of 1917-1918, had narrowly missed being assassinated during a left wing coup of October 1921. This coup had seen the execution of the two ‘fathers of the Portuguese Republic’ the naval officers Machado Santos and Carlos de Maia. Carlos de Maia had been the Macao governor from 1914-1916 who Sun Yat Sen had personally thanked for his support during the ‘third revolution’ against Yuan Shikai 袁世凯 during the same period. He had also been a key figure in the push for the resuscitation of Macao’s harbour beginning in the summer of 1914. General Gomes de Costa would return to Portugal in early May 1924, just weeks before Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues was recalled from Macao; and

within 24 months after returning to Lisbon Gomes de Costa would lead the legendary coup of 28 May 1926 that overthrew the Portuguese First Republic, ushering in 48 years of single party rule that became known as the *Estado Novo*.

Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues, a long-term colleague of the leftist Democratic Party of Afonso Costa, had been head of the Portuguese penal system as the new Portuguese Republican government implemented a vicious anti-clerical and anti-monarchist campaign following its October 1910 *coup d’état* against the 350-year-old Bragança Dynasty. After General Gomes ended the First Republic in May 1926, Rodrigues would be sidelined from any government post and with the advent of Salazar in 1928 would never again hold governmental office. He would, however, continue to publish articles in the Portuguese language newspaper of Macao, *Notícias de Macau*, owned by the Republican Herman Machado Monteiro, until Rodrigues’ own death in January 1963.² Notable is the first of a serial article of 5 January 1960 entitled, ‘*Considerações a propósito das posições portuguesas no Oriente*’ (Considerations with respect to the position of the Portuguese in the Orient).³ Monteiro, a follower of Afonso Costa who had arrived in Macao after the overthrow of the First Republic, took full control of *A Voz de Macau* on the passing of the stalwart Republican Rosa Duque in 1947, converting it to *Notícias de Macau*⁴ and publishing it until at least 1963.

It is reasonable to conclude that the Macao Harbour Project of 1922 to 1927 was linked to the creation of the political and military infrastructure that would allow Sun Yat Sen to build a viable military base in South China. Had not the Chinese political structure radically changed with Sun’s death in March 1925, the Harbour Project could have been subsequently used by Sun’s Comintern-financed political organisation to support the unification of China. Hong Kong, of course, was under British control, at a time when Britain had not yet given up hopes on the Northern Government in Beijing, against which Sun Yat Sen was a dedicated opponent. Britain would not pivot towards the KMT (Kuomintang 国民党) government of Sun Yat Sen and Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi 蒋介石) until late 1926 after the KMT seizure of Wuhan.

The commencement of the Harbour Project directly corresponds to the pull-out of Japanese troops

from the Russian Far East Provinces in October 1922, under American pressure, which finally gave Soviet Bolsheviks direct access to Vladivostok, the crucially important port of the former Russian Empire on the Pacific Coast. The finalisation of the new Macao port came in the late fall of 1926 and did not support the launch of Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition in July of the same summer, but would have been able by the summer of 1927. The Comintern Political and Military advisers to Sun Yat Sen, respectively, Mikhail Gruzenberg (Borodin) and Vasily Bluecher (Galen), had not agreed with the summer-1926 date that Chiang selected for the launch of the Northern Expedition, and wished to delay a year. By that time in 1927 the Macao Harbour Project would have been complete and able to support the Comintern’s unification strategy. But, military coups across the globe that took place in China, Beijing and Lisbon by Generals Chiang Kai-shek on 20 March 1926, Zhang Zuolin 张作霖 on 15 April 1926,⁵ and Gomes de Costa on 28 May 1926, effectively eliminated the possibility that the Bolshevik-controlled port of Vladivostok, and the Chinese Eastern Railway that linked it to the Soviet heartland, could also allow the Bolsheviks access to the deepwater port that was being built in South China at Macao.

This chronologically supported assessment is strengthened by noting the absence of corroborating data from virtually all secondary sources reporting on Bolshevik military aid to the KMT: lacking is an adequate discussion of the background of the key Soviet military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, Vasily Bluecher, known during his China assignment as ‘Galen.’ Given his influence it is remarkable that the popular histories of China have not provided an exhaustive biography. Howard Boorman in his thoroughly researched *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China* does not provide a separate entry.⁶ Immanuel Hsu’s *The Rise of Modern China* gives him two short entries, referring to him predominantly by his pseudonym in China of ‘Galen.’⁷ Jonathan Spence describes Bluecher and his fellow advisors to the Whampoa military academy as ‘highly skilled veterans’ asserting that Bluecher advised Chiang Kai-shek in his defeat of leftist rival Chen Jiongming 陈炯明 in February-March of 1925 as Sun Yat Sen was dying.⁸ Leng and Palmer give him only one entry, crediting him with ‘the rise of the new Kuomintang Army, well-trained in both revolutionary principles and military tactics.’⁹ Conrad Brandt

provides nothing more than ‘while in China, Blucher went under the pseudonym of Galen. Even Blucher may have been a pseudonym.’¹⁰ Dan Jacobs provides substantially more data with the major disclosure being that while rumors had him as a Frenchman or captured ‘Austrian general of noble birth’ who ‘converted to communism during the revolution,’ but actually he was ‘a Russian peasant who had joined the Bolsheviks in 1916. For his services during the civil war, he was four times awarded the Order of the Red Banner...and came out of the civil war regarded as one of the Red Army’s future leaders.’¹¹ None of these reports, and others, in the leading secondary literature gets to the core of the man that was central to the creation of the KMT’s National Revolutionary Army. It was this Chiang Kai-shek led army, of course, that successfully conducted the Northern Expedition of 1926, won for the KMT its key Yangtze River Valley bastion that stretched from Wuhan to Shanghai, and was the training ground of China’s most renowned Nationalist and Communist political military leaders, among whom numbered Lin Biao 林彪, Ye Jianying 叶剑英 and Zhou Enlai 周恩来.

Frederick Modlhammer, a German author published in Tokyo in 1939, who is unlikely to be quoted by mainline academic researchers, provided a more pithy report which asserted that Bluecher was one of Five Field Marshals of the Soviet Army, was commander-in-chief of the Soviet Far Eastern Army and had assisted Soviet minister Lev Karakhan in May 1924 to obtain Chinese acquiescence to a permanent Soviet troop presence in Outer Mongolia and Soviet control (not White Russian control) of the Chinese Eastern Railway.¹² Bluecher would arrive in Canton in October 1924,¹³ after having successfully acquired his Chinese Eastern Railroad-Vladivostok supply route for the army he was building for the KMT in Canton. Bluecher’s triumph in the Russian Civil War had been to destroy the army of the White Russian head of the Omsk Government, Admiral Kolchak, and win Siberia for the Bolsheviks as the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet forces in the Far East. After these stunning successes, he was dispatched to assist Chiang Kai-shek and direct the KMT armies and the graduates of the Soviet-financed Whampoa Military Academy in October 1924, one year after the arrival in Canton of the head of the Comintern Mission to China, Mikhail Gruzenberg. Known as ‘Borodin’ in China, he was more widely known in his American base in Chicago as ‘Mike Berg’.



Generall Tamagnini de Abreu, Lieutenant General Sir R Hacking, General Gomes da Costa. (<http://aespeciaria.blogspot.com/2011/06/curiosidades-portuguesas-1926-1930.html>; and http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/da/Generais_Tamagnini_Hacking_e_Gomes_da_Costa.jpg).

His American-born wife, a Chicago school teacher, Fanny Orluk, accompanied him. The Bluecher (‘Galen’) who Modlhammer had described would certainly have found value in a Macao’s new deep-water port in South China. Not under the direct control of Britain, it could serve as a southern terminus for supplies that were being shipped out of Vladivostok for the revolutionary base that he himself was building in South China.¹⁴

One of the generals who undoubtedly opposed the potential use of Macao as a base to support Comintern efforts was Portugal’s General Gomes de Costa, who with General’s Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Tso-lin launched military actions in March, April and May of 1926 that effectively forestalled for the next several decades the capture of the Chinese nationalist movement by Bolsheviks. The *Hong Kong Telegraph* on 1 June 1926¹⁵ displayed General Gomes de Costa’s full regalia of honors, including the KCMG Order of St. Michael and St. George. It pointedly noted his assignment to Macao in 1924 and emphasised on his ‘being much entertained’ in Hong Kong.

COMMON INTERESTS OF PORTUGUESE AND CHINESE REPUBLICANS

The major issue faced by the Portuguese authorities who dealt with Macao between 1849 and 1911 was the inability to come to agreement with the Qing Dynasty over the borders of the jurisdiction. Prior to 1849, Portugal had paid a ground-rent to the Qing for the purposes of occupying the Portuguese city on Macao, which did not extend further than halfway up the Peninsula. Faced with a collapsing economic system following the opening of Hong Kong in 1842, the Lisbon Royal government had declared Macao a ‘free port’ on 20 November 1845 and sent an aggressive naval commander to Macao as governor, Captain João Maria Ferreira da Amaral, to ‘assert absolute autonomy of the colony.’¹⁶ His will was evident from the arm he had lost to cannon-shot 22 years before during Portugal’s failing effort to keep Brazil from independence. He forced the Qing representatives from the City, ended the ground rent, and enforced Portuguese jurisdiction to the narrow isthmus that separated the city from the mainland. On 22 August 1849, Amaral was assassinated near the Portos do Cerco at the barrier on the peninsula.

For the next 40 years Portuguese authorities attempted to obtain recognition from the Qing for their control of Macao as a colony, which was finally granted grudgingly and incompletely on 1 December 1887. Requirements to control the opium trade forced the British head of the Chinese Imperial Customs Service, Sir Robert Hart, to extract resented concessions from the Qing in order to obtain a customs house for Macao similar to the one provided in Hong Kong at Kowloon. The Qing recognised Portuguese control of ‘Macao and its dependencies’ as any of Portugal’s other overseas territories; and the Portuguese pledged never to surrender Macao to any other power without the approval of the Qing. The actual boundaries of Macao and its dependencies were to be settled at a later date. The Qing and the Portuguese never reached agreement on the boundaries.

Portugal sought a jurisdiction that would allow for control of the waterways and harbours on both sides of the Peninsula, as well as the harbour side of Lappa Island which represented a position relative to the Inner Harbour of Macao similar to that which Kowloon represented to Hong Kong’s harbour. The Qing saw Macao as extending up to the old city gate and without

rights to control the surrounding waterways. By 1898, as Britain gained control over the huge stretch of land in the New Territories and related islands that more than doubled the size of the ceded island of Hong Kong, and as France obtained control over an equally large territory at Guangzhouwan on the Leizhou Peninsula in southern Guangdong, Portuguese negotiators were perplexed over their inability to obtain control over boundaries that would incorporate the needed harbour, water resources and defensive positions for Macao. Perfunctory and unsuccessful negotiations followed the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, and continued up past the deaths of the Empress Dowager Cixi 慈禧太后 and Guangxu 光绪 Emperor in 1908. By 1909 the boundary issues remained unsettled.

At the heart of the boundary question was the economic life-blood of the city, the harbour from

which its origin derived. Without clear authority over the Macao waterways, and with continuing Qing opposition to any harbour maintenance or improvements that would suggest Portuguese sovereignty, the harbour was not only silting up, but it could not be converted into a facility that could handle ocean transport. Shipping in the 19th century had of course advanced from smaller sailing craft with less draft to large steam vessels requiring deep water harbours. In the 40 years between 1849 and 1888 Macao had already lost its position as the gateway of China to Hong Kong, Shanghai and a number of other major Chinese cities. The inability for Macao to deploy a modernised harbour would prevent it from forever competing. However, by 1922 Portugal’s previous inability to create a modern harbour in Macao improved dramatically.

Military procession of General Gomes da Costa and his troops after the 28 May 1926 Revolution. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Desfile_de_tropas_28_de_Maio_1926.jpg).



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Before this date, even after the Portuguese and Chinese Republics had been successively established in 1910 and 1911, the historian Montalto de Jesus had reported that ‘as sister-republics Portugal and China have been more than ever at loggerheads so far as Macao is concerned.’ But, he inexplicitly immediately described the fact that after *over a half a century* of problems with China over the delimitation of Macao’s boundaries and contention with Guangdong Authorities over the inner harbour that ‘Macao has, for a wonder, been wide-awake as to devising new plans for utilising the outer harbour.’ Though he recognised that the inner harbour, which had been a source of much conflict, ‘can hardly be made to answer the purpose of being thoroughly adapted to the requirements of modern trade and shipping,’ he did not present a cogent explanation of how the decision to implement the project to create the new Outer Harbour, which also incorporated significant improvements to the Inner Harbour, was undertaken. After decades of Chinese opposition to improvements, he merely stated, ‘Under British auspices an understanding was arrived at, in 1921, for resuming the [inner harbour] reclamation works.’ Other than mentioning Lord Curzon’s issuance of instructions to the British consul in Canton who mediated,¹⁷ he provided no other details.

THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS OF MACAO

There have been few, if any, cogent explanations for how the Macao authorities gained the confidence necessary to move forward with the Harbour Project of 1922-1927, the project that would permit the city to survive the Pacific War years, and then prosper in the late 20th century. The commentator Montalto de Jesus recognised the work of only three Governors under whose auspices the harbour project was completed, those being Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues (1923-1925), Colonel Manuel Maia Magalhães (1925-1926),¹⁸ and Sanches de Miranda (1912-1914). He asserted that the latter used ‘several millions of dollars for the new harbour works.’¹⁹ But Montalto did not provide the dates for the governor’s terms, describe their political relationships with Lisbon and Canton, or detail any of their biographic data. Stunningly, he omitted the key period, 1914 and 1923, when the entire project was conceived and launched. Of Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues and his arrival in Macao, which appeared timed to launch

successfully the initial construction of the Harbour Works project Montalto, provided no background. As for Sanches de Miranda, similarly to Rodrigues, he had been a director of one component of the PRP’s prison system (Lisbon) up until 27 October 1911.²⁰

Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues arrived in Macao as Governor in early 1923 precisely at the time when Sun Yat Sen was beginning his formal relationship with the Comintern. Like the PRP revolutionary leader and then Portuguese President, José de Almeida, he had been trained in medicine at Coimbra University, and then joined the colonial service as a medical officer, returning to Lisbon in the mid-1900s. When the PRP seized power in October 1910 he rapidly ascended its governing ranks, becoming Civil Governor of Aveiro and then of Oporto, during the time when his fellow colonial doctor and Coimbra graduate, José de Almeida, was Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Republican (‘PRP’) Government and had the power to make such appointments.

By 1912 he had also been appointed to head the Portuguese penitentiary system while severe repression was ongoing against monarchists and the Roman Catholic clergy. Jesus Pabón in 1961 suggested that his brother, Daniel Rodrigues, had headed the ‘Formiga Branca,’ the vigilante militia that had grown from the Carbonária that operated as the Portuguese Republican secret police and enforcement system.²¹ Rui Ramos in 1994 supported Pabón in reporting that the Rodrigues family members were close supporters of Afonso Costa, the dominant personality of the Provisional government. In Afonso Costa’s 1913 elected government, there were, in fact, three Rodrigues who relationship remains to be determined: Rodrigo Rodrigues was Minister of the Interior, Daniel Rodrigues was Civil Governor of Lisbon, and Urbano Rodrigues served as Costa’s secretary.²² Ramos noted a particularly frigid relationship between Britain and Portugal during this period: Britain had imposed a diplomatic freeze on the new Portuguese Republic in 1913 as a result of the hostility of the British public following continued publication of disparaging news on the treatment of political prisoners. The deposed King of Portugal, Dom Manuel, remained exiled in Britain, while the Marques de Soveral, the former Bragança ambassador to Britain, retained the place at Britain’s court which was denied to the Portuguese Republican ambassador, Teixeira Gomes.²³

A British Protest Committee under the Chairmanship of the Earl of Lytton had been established to pressure the British government to address the horrendous conditions under which the Portuguese Republican Party kept its political prisoners. It estimated there were at least ‘two thousand helpless victims of political persecution’. These included members of all classes: ‘aristocrats, landowners, military officers, advocates, priests, private soldiers, small trades folk, artisans and peasants united in a common brotherhood of misery.’²⁴ The PRP leadership responsible for this political repression included Afonso Costa, Álvaro de Castro and Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues. Rodrigues was identified specifically as the ‘ex-Governor of the prison’ which had abusively held a prominent Monarchist, Dom João d’Almeida,²⁵ who was the ‘chivalrous descendant of a family whose exploits for many hundred years—from the Crusades down to the Peninsular War—figure brilliantly in the history of Portugal.’

In the Portuguese penal system, up until protests during this period ended the practice, prisoners were required to wear a ‘mask-like hood with three small holes for eyes and mouth.’²⁶ On occasions when the senior PRP leadership visited the Penitentiary for inspection, prisoners ‘were ordered to remove their hoods at the sound of Doctor Rodrigues’ whistle’ while they listened to an oration from the Doctor ‘advising the prisoners to repent their crimes and cultivate a fitting gratitude for their magnanimous rulers.’ Aubrey F.G. Bell, the noted English observer of Portugal, who was acting as a correspondent of the *Morning Post*, on 23 February 1913 wrote,

...except for the fact that the convicts in the Penitenciaria—criminals and Royalists alike—now no longer wear the hood, which, by all the laws of civilisation, should never have been inflicted upon political prisoners, the miserable situation of the Royalist prisoners remains unchanged.²⁷

High-level protest continued in Britain throughout the early Portuguese Republican period. Adeline ‘Duchess of Bedford’ acted as Vice Chairman for the British protest committee, along with M.P. Aubrey Herbert, while the renowned historian George Trevelyan, the grandson of William Gladstone, and the noted Foreign Office African-expert Sir Harry Johnston, who had worked with Lord Salisbury on the consolidation of the

British position in Southern Africa, also participated. The influential group accused the PRP leadership of Afonso Costa of extra-legal repression of its political opposition through the deployment of 32,000 Carbonários as a secret police and vigilante network. This, of course, may have been run by Dr. Rodrigues’ brother if Pabón is to be believed. Monarchists, clergy and anyone who voiced opposition to the PRP policies ran the risk of a two-year incarceration in the most vile conditions while awaiting trial, with a common subsequent criminal sentence of *six years in solitary confinement* followed by a ten-year banishment to the colonies.

The Macao Port of 1922 was to be tied into a huge hinterland, which began with the mouth of the West River just to the west of Macao, and extended back into Yunnan Province nearly to the city of Kunming.

The rationale for Rodrigues’ appointment as Governor of Macao in January 1923 has yet to be definitely determined. But assuredly his appointment was undertaken while his influential medical colleague from Coimbra and the overseas medical service, Dr. José de Almeida, was President of Portugal (5 October 1919 to 5 October 1923). Rodrigues was appointed Governor of Macao without ever having held a previous overseas command position. President José de Almeida had been the leader of the Evolutionists, the middle position party of the three political parties that emerged from the post-1910 coup breakup of the Partido Republicano Português (PRP). Previously, immediately after the German declaration of war on Portugal of 11 March 1916, Almeida had served as both Portuguese premier (15 March 1916 to 25 April 1917) and Minister of the Colonies;²⁸ significantly, as previously mentioned, he had been Minister of the

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Interior under the unelected and post-coup Provisional Government from 1910 to 1911.

Within three weeks of Rodrigues’ 5 January 1923 arrival in Macao,²⁹ Sun Yat Sen and Adolph Joffe in Shanghai issued their joint declaration on 26 January which would initiate Comintern financial, political and military support for Sun Yat Sen’s KMT. Shortly after arrival in Macao, Rodrigues was negotiating with Sun Yat Sen’s representatives in Canton, Liao Zhongkai 廖仲愷 and C.C. Wu (Wu Chaoshu 伍朝枢) on arrangements to allow the Macao port project to move forward. From Shanghai Sun Yat Sen himself arrived back in Canton on 21 February 1923 one month after Rodrigues’s arrival to set up his third and final Canton Government. In the one instance that has been located confirming the Rodrigues-Canton negotiations, Pe. Régis Gervais (writing under the pseudonym of Eudore de Colombar) and Nascimento Moura in a caption to a photograph stated that:

In 1923 the Governor Dr. R. Rodrigues held a conference in Macao with the Portuguese Consul in Canton, Dr. F. Horta, and the Minister of Finance, Liao Zhong-kai and Foreign Secretary C.C. Wu of the Government of Sun Yat Sen.³⁰

Following the negotiations with the Sun regime, Rodrigues was ready to sign a delimitation agreement with the leader of the Canton Government, Sun Yat Sen; but supposedly because of the existence of two governments in China (in Beijing and Canton), the negotiations were not finalised.³¹ Yet the Harbour Project moved forward without complication from the Canton government, despite a half-century of antagonism over the issue.


In reality the ‘two government’ issue which supposedly prevented the delimitation treaty seemed specious. The Northern Chinese government in Beijing which Sun Yat Sen hoped to overthrow had an increasingly weak position between 1923 and 1928 while Sun and the KMT’s military strength in Canton grew spectacularly. Moura finalised the Gervais text from which we quote in 1927, and by the next year, in July 1928, China was nominally unified under Sun Yat Sen’s KMT, albeit led by Chiang Kai-shek. The Northern Government at that point no longer existed and the most important components of the Harbour Project were complete. By the end of the year 1928, Portugal had signed a new treaty with China, which mentioned nothing with regard to the Macao border

delineation, but in which there also was no objection raised to the Harbour Works Project, which had just been completed. Given that the Harbour Project did move forward in 1923, using the existence of the Northern Government to report that Sun’s government was unwilling to sign a public agreement on the Macao Harbour delimitation is an unusual assertion. It suggests substantially less antagonism between the two Chinese governments in Beijing and Canton than should have been expected, and implies Sun Yat Sen was supporting the authority of a government he was attempting to overthrow.

What of General Gomes da Costa? He was particularly close to key elements of the British Military. He had commanded both divisions, sequentially, of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corp (‘CEP’) that had fought in France from early 1917 to 1918 in the British Army’s 11th Corp under General Richard Haking. Shown below during his time as commander of the Portuguese Second Division he stands with Tamagnini de Abreu, the overall Commander of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps (CEP) and Lt. General Sir R. Hacking [sic] of the British 11th Corps to which the Portuguese Second Division was attached in 1918.³²

For his efforts on the Western Front he appears to have been awarded the British decoration KCMG³³ in the fall of 1917. The Portuguese CEP had been an instrument of the mutual rapprochement of the Partido Republicano Português (PRP) with Britain. While some articulated the seemingly specious assertion that Portugal needed to keep its African territories from being ‘lost to Germany,’ and therefore joined the Allies, in reality Britain was in need of Portuguese: manpower on the Western Front and the seventy-six German ships sheltering in Portuguese harbours. Britain had the capability to push home its interests: while Germany in 1917 had no capability to remove Portugal’s African colonies from Portuguese jurisdiction, Britain certainly did. Established under the unity government of the key PRP leaders Afonso Costa and Rodrigo Rodrigues’ associate, Antonio José d’Almeida, in 1916, the Portuguese effort in France by 1917-1918 was administratively organised by Norton de Matos as Minister of War. He was a PRP veteran who would later be Grandmaster of the Portuguese Freemasons and a long-time opponent of the Salazar

General plan of the city and the new port of Macao, 1927



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regime; he eventually ran for Portuguese president in 1948 at the age of 81 as part of MUD (Movimento de Unidade Democrática).

While General Gomes de Costa had contact with Mousinho de Albuquerque and other monarchists in Mozambique before World War One, his institutional pedigree as a protégé of leading PRP personalities seemed assured. But in addition to the links to Britain, Gomes de Costa’s subordinate position to General Fernando Tamagnini de Abreu e Silva, who had overall responsibility for the two Portuguese divisions in the field, suggests a link to the other Tamagnini personalities who were tied to Macao, Mozambique’s key port city of Lourenço Marques and Sidónio Pais, the coup leader of December 1917 who had overthrown the leading leftist Republicans Afonso Costa (then Prime Minister) and Bernardino Machado (President).

Despite his links to key PRP leaders, within two years after returning from Macao, Gomes da Costa launched the military coup of 28 May 1926 that overthrew the First Portuguese Republic. That coup not only ended any possibility that the new Macao Outer Harbour could be used to support Bolshevik designs in South China, but it firmly attached Portugal to Britain during a time when both International Socialists on the left and National Socialists on the right were raising substantially more threatening profiles to both nations in Europe.

To recap, Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues’ arrival in Macao in January 1923 had been intriguingly timed to coincide with the creation of Macao’s Outer Harbour as the Soviet Comintern financed and provided the political and military support for SunYat-sen’s Third Canton Government. But by May 1924 Rodrigues’ objectives appear to have been cut short. Following

General Gomes da Costa’s return to Portugal on 7 May 1924 it was just three weeks before Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues was himself permanently recalled from the city on the 29th.³⁴ He was officially removed as Macao governor the following year on 24 May 1925.

Subsequent to Gomes da Costa’s 28 May 1926 coup, Rodrigues never regained his political standing in Portugal, but his legacy lived on in Macao under Salazar’s policy of ‘*Tudo pela a nação, nada contra a nação*’. For those interested in seeing his visage first-hand, his portrait his prominently displayed in the 2nd floor museum of the *Santa Casa da Misericórdia* located on the Leal Senado square. It sits along-side the most famous of the 20th-century governors of Macao, who include Artur Tamagnini Barbosa (three-time governor from 1918 to 1940), Gabriel Teixeira (governor during the Pacific War, 1940-1947), and Albano de Oliveira (governor as Macao in Postwar period, 1947-1950) among others.

His memory did not disappear from Macao. Not only did Rodrigues publish articles in newspapers in Macao up until his death in 1963, but one of the most prominent avenues in the NAPE, which he helped to create, bears his name. And, one can see through a common internet search that the *Macao Daily Times* reports: ‘Beijing’s “Central Liaison Office (Macao) is situated in Avenida Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues, which was named after the 109th Governor of Macao who ruled the then-Portuguese colony from 1923 to 1925.’³⁵ The address is certainly is a fitting location. This left-of-center Partido Republicano Português (PRP) governor had arrived in Macao precisely at the time when he could have facilitated whatever role Macao was to play in Sun Yat Sen’s new relationship with Vladimir Lenin’s Comintern and the KMT-CCP United Front that followed. **RC**

7 Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, pp. 521, 531. Hsü spells his name ‘Blucher’ and ‘Galen’.

8 Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (Hutchinson: London, 1990), p. 339. Spence spells his name ‘Blyukher’.

9 Shao Chuan Leng and Norman D. Palmer, *Sun Yat-sen and Communism*, ed. University of Pennsylvania Foreign Policy Research Institute (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 77. Leng spells his name ‘Bluecher’.

10 Conrad Brandt, *Stalin’s Failure in China, 1924-1927* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 111.

11 Dan N. Jacobs, *Borodin: Stalin’s man in China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 164. Jacobs spells his name ‘Blyuckher’.

12 F. Modlhammer, *Moscow’s Hand in the Far East* (Tokyo: Nippon Dempo Tsushinsha, 1939), pp. 50-51.

13 Howard Schiffrin, *Sun Yat-sen, Reluctant Revolutionary* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), p. 259.

14 Bluecher appears to have arrived in October 1924, while Rodrigues had been recalled in May.

15 ‘Portuguese Revolution’. *Hong Kong Telegraph*, 1 June 1926.

16 Montalto de Jesus, *Historic Macao* (Hong Kong/New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 318.

17 Ibid., p. 448.

18 Rodrigues was officially governor from 5 January 1923 to 17 October 1925, although he left Macao on 16 July 1924, while Maia Magalhães was governor from 18 October 1925 to 8 December 1926. For the Rodrigues departure date see *A Pátria*, 19 July 1924, p. 10.

19 Montalto de Jesus, *Historic Macao*, p. 483.

20 <http://www.dre.pt/pdf1s%5C1911%5C11%5C27400%5C46784678.pdf>.

21 Jesus Pabón, *A Revolução Portuguesa*. Manuel Emídio and Ricardo Tavares trans. (Porto: Aster, 1961), p. 171.

22 Rui Ramos, *A Segunda Fundação (1890-1926)*. In José Mattoso (dir.), *História de Portugal*, vol. 6 (Lisbon: Estampa, 1994), p. 466.

23 Ibid., p. 495.

24 Earl of Lytton, Adeline Duchess of Bedford, and Aubrey Herbert, *Portuguese Political Prisoners, a British National Protest*, 5th and enlarged ed. (London: Committee of the British National Protest: L. Upcott Gill and son, 1913), p. 35.

25 Ibid., p. 53.

26 Ibid., p. 47.

27 Ibid., p. 54.

28 Manuel Ferreira da Rocha, ‘Parte Oficial, Secretaria Geral do Governo da Provincia de Macau’. *Boletim Oficial do Governo da Província de Macau* (17 March 1916).

29 *Anuário de Macau. Ano de 1927* (Macao: Imprensa Nacional), p. 57.

30 Eudore de Colomban and Jacinto José do Nascimento Moura, *Resumo da História de Macau* (Macao, Tip. do Orfanato, 1927), p. 134. The original text, which is shown as a caption in the photo reads, ‘O Governador Dr. R. Rodrigues em 1923, conferenciando em Macau, com o Consul em Cantão Dr. F. Horta, com o Ministro das Finanças Liau-Chung-Hoi e o Secretário dos Estrangeiros (C.-C-Vu) do Govêrno de San-Iat-Sin’.

31 Ibid. Moura wrote ‘Em 1923, o Governador Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues, igualmente, esteve prestes a ver assinada a delimitação pelo grande caudilho da República chinesa, Dr. San-Iat-Sin. Porém essas negociações não puderam ter solução, devido à existência de dois governos na China.’

32 General Gomes da Costa, *O Corpo de Exército Português na Grande Guerra A Batalha do Lys, 9 de Abril de 1918* (Porto: Renascenca Portuguesa), pp. 17, 33, 41

33 Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.

34 Rosa Duque, *O Combate*, 1 May 1924, p. 1.

35 Sum Choi, ‘Our Desk: Rodrigo Rodrigues rules Macau?’, <http://www.macaudailytimes.com.mo/opinion/40580-our-desk-rodrigo-rodrigues-rules-macau.html>, 19 June 2012.

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1 Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995), p. 521.

2 P. Manuel Teixeira, *Toponímia de Macau* (Macao: Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1997), vol. II, p. 157.

3 P. Manuel Teixeira, *Imprensa Periódica Portuguesa no Extremo Oriente* (Macao: Notícias de Macau, 1995), p. 210.

4 João Guedes, *Laboratório Constitucional* (Macao: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1995), pp. 191-192.

5 Zhang Zuolin 张作霖 drove Soviet-backed Feng Yuxiang 冯玉祥 from Beijing in April 1926 (Van Dorn, *Twenty Years of the Chinese Republic, Two Decades of Progress*, New York: A. A. Knopf, 1932, p. 21). It was the following year in April 1927 that he sacked the Soviet embassy, seizing and executing Li Dazhao 李大钊 on 28 April 1927.

6 Howard Lyon Boorman, Richard C. Howard, and Janet Krompart, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), vol. 5, p. 2. Boorman spells his name ‘Bluecher’.

Clandestinity and Control

The Macao Congress of the Indochina Communist Party (27-31 March, 1935)

GEOFFREY C. GUNN*

Undoubtedly clandestine or semi-secret organisations have a long history in Macao if we think of proto-Republicans and Masonics in the age of Portuguese monarchy, guilds and triads in the Chinese tradition, Chinese reformists and revolutionaries including the early Kuomintang (KMT) and the subject of this paper, underground communists, not especially Chinese or local, but Vietnamese. Just as clandestinity might be defined as the quality or state of secrecy or furtiveness in evading control or surveillance in order to accomplish sometimes illicit goals, so late colonial Macao provided such a liminal space. Control in colonial spheres was obviously about neutralising anti-colonial activities but in Macao, as the Macao Conference (14-26 June 1934) and subsequent Congress (27-31 March 1935) of the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) revealed, controls seemed to have broken down. Either the Portuguese authorities in Macao were outfoxed by the Vietnamese communist conspirators against French rule in Indochina, or just hands-off lest Macao’s relationship with the authorities in Canton (Guangzhou) be

compromised, or even secretly sympathetic to their broad goals

Apparently unknown to the Portuguese authorities, at least not entering Portuguese archival sources, Vietnamese communists chose Macao to host the landmark first national conference of the newly-formed ICP bringing to the colony a veritable Who’s Who of first generation Vietnamese and ethnic minority communist leaders. Yet, notwithstanding the clandestine character of the underground organisation, codes of secrecy, and use of aliases, etc., they were compromised and penetrated, not by the Salazarist authorities but, apparently unknown to them, by the French. Certainly it is a mystery that the motley collection of Vietnamese and ethnic minority delegates sojourning over a relatively long period of time in the Portuguese colony, even setting up a printing operation, remained undetected. Or, could it have been that the Portuguese authorities turned a blind eye to the foreigners, well knowing that their arrests would entail a long and complex legal-extradition process, as with the earlier Sung Man Cho/Ho Chi Minh case in the British colony, only settled in the plaintiff’s favour in January 1933 after a 20-month legal contest reaching to the Privy Council in London.

This article, accordingly, seeks to offer some home truths on clandestine organisations in Macao, the transient connection between Vietnam and Macao as signalled by the gathering of Vietnamese communist conference delegates, the Macao Congress itself, and the future. First, it discusses the clandestinity trope with respect to Macao, at least as the other side of

colonial control. Second, it tracks the Indochina-Macao connection highlighting the occasional presence in Macao of Vietnamese anti-colonial nationalists. Third, it situates Macao within the broader Macao-Hong Kong-Canton triangle with respect to late 1920s-early 1930s radicalism. Fourth, it describes with some wonderment how the actual Macao Conference and its sequel, the Macao Congress, ever happened despite colonial controls. Fifth, the paper concludes with some remarks upon the importance of the Macao Conference/Congress in the broader sweep of history including the respective fortunes and fates of the attendees, otherwise slipping out of the grasp of the colonial authorities.

I. THE CLANDESTINITY (AND CONTROL) TROPE

Just as clandestinity might be defined as the quality or state of secrecy or furtiveness in evading control or surveillance in order to accomplish sometimes illicit goals, so late colonial Macao, itself a political anomaly, provided such a hypothetical space. A range of group and organisations in late colonial Macao always occupied a liminal space depending upon political conjuncture. The interwar period which this essay addresses also coincides with more seismic social and political changes taking place in China, also touching Macao. But firmly under the *ditadura* of António de Oliveira Salazar, enemies of the state were also forced into the underground, where they were not only subjected to the full weight of the regime, which included incarceration in the penal system, but also deported, as was the case with criminals from Macao to the utterly remote Southeast Asian colony of Timor. To be sure, communism and leftist political groups were anathema to the New State (Estado Novo) and fell under the strict control of the political police and censorship regime. Yet in this profoundly Chinese grounded society other actors vied and sometimes clashed over economic spoils—pirates, triads, and gangsters—certainly also embedded in social tradition. These were also clandestine worlds—it could hardly be otherwise—as mostly their activities were illegal, albeit still thriving on the margins of society. Doubtless, as well, much ambiguity and slippage existed between the laws, corrupt officialdom of whatever nationality, and practice.

A number of narrative histories on Macao have also acknowledged the clandestinity trope at various stages in Macao’s modern history. No doubt such activities could be defined by their ‘pre-modern’ as opposed to ‘modern’ faces, as with the case of traditional Chinese secret society activities, criminal activities, and the role of Triads, etc., but in Macao we are also reminded of their longevity, at least their ability to morph into new forms.

For example, Bertil Lintner, in *Blood Brothers: Crime, Business and Politics in Asia* (2003), offers a chapter on Macao’s role as a platform for money-laundering, and business-government links, whether colonial or mainland Chinese. According to one review, by placing recent developments within their historical context, Lintner ‘enables us to understand the diplomatic skill of those real arbiters of local politics, the magnates Stanley Ho and Henry Fok’ (Fabre 2004).

Following the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, Macao also emerged as a refuge and base for such reformists as Kang Yuwei 康有为 who arrived in the Portuguese colony in November 1886, followed by Liang Qichao 梁启超 who launched the newspaper *Zhi Xin Bao* 知新报 (The Reformer China) (Wu Zhilang, 1999, p. 284). But in the case of the Qing official Jing Yuanshan 经元善, who fled to Macao in February 1900, the Portuguese were placed in a bind, especially as the Qing sought his arrest and extradition for embezzlement in line with the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Amity and Commerce of December 1887. But backed by the pro-reform ‘Royalist Association’ in Macao, and standing down a Qing appeal to the High Court in Lisbon, the Portuguese declared Jing Yuanshun a ‘political offender’, offering him the right to seek political exile (Fei Chengkang, 1996, pp. 320-321). Obviously an important precedent had been established for future would-be exiles and political refugees. What should be generally understood about extradition law, however, was its Eurocentric character or, at least evolution through European practice dating back to the 13th century and, apparently, lacking analogous East Asian precedents.¹

Moving on to the modern period, the public activities of Sun Yat Sen 孙逸仙 in Macao are well-known, although the clandestine networks of his support organisation also offer a mirror on his activities. Certain of his Masonic interlocutors in Macao also maintained a semi-secret brotherhood, although

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Professor Emérito da Universidade de Nagasaki, publicou livros sobre a Indochina (Laos, Camboja e Vietname), bem como sobre Macau (Encountering Macau, A Portuguese City-State on the Periphery of China, 1557-1999, Westview Press, 1996). Historical Dictionary of East Timor (Scarecrow/Rowman & Littlefield, 2011) e History Without Borders: The Making of an East-Southeast Asian Region, 1000-1800 (University of Hong Kong Press, 2011) são as suas obras recentes.

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not necessarily conspiratorial. But Sun Yat Sen also revealed a penchant for harnessing traditional Chinese underground organisational activities as with the Tong Meng Hui 同盟会 (DeKorn, 1934), a branch of which was set up in Macao in 1909. As an organisation dedicated to the overthrow of the Qing government, the Macao-based Tong Meng Hui obviously did not advertise its existence to the Portuguese authorities. Even so, the later KMT undoubtedly kept up a semi-clandestine existence in Macao, although this appears to me to be a less well-researched topic (cf. Fei Chengkang, 1996, pp. 328-330; Chan, 2013).

Similarly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and, in its wake, the ICP, also adopted a full gamut of Leninist strategies to disguise their presence. Aside from cell structures, secrecy and code language, members also adopted pseudonyms and some even cross-dressed (as with one celebrated Vietnamese women youth delegate boarding ship from Saigon to Canton). On his part, Ho Chi Minh also dressed ‘up’ in the guise of a rich traveling merchant, such as during his clandestine visit

Entrance gate of Quoc-Hoc High School, Hue, central Vietnam, through which passed such eminent Vietnamese revolutionaries as Ho Chi Minh (expelled) and Ha Huy Tap (graduated).



to Shanghai in February 1933 following release from prison in Hong Kong. Other Vietnamese anti-colonial nationalists, as with the aristocratic Prince Cuong De (as discussed below) sometimes dressed down as ‘coolies’ to evade detection.

The war years in Macao were also emblematic of the clandestinity trope and not only a reference to wartime Macao’s ‘Casablanca in the Orient’ image and indeed role, as with the activities of foreign agents and consuls. Only decades after the events, we learn of the underground role of the CCP inside Macao during these years in league with the heroic actions of the West River guerrillas (cf. *Macao during the Sino-Japanese War*, 2001).

Portuguese scholar Moisés Silva Fernandes (2006) has also alluded to Macao as a ‘*centro de espionagem*’ or spy centre through the 1950s and 1960s, as with the role of agents of Beijing in infiltrating the territory especially via the Nam Kwong enterprise. More recently, Washington has charged a local Macao bank with dealing with North Korea, alongside other money laundering activities, just as North Korea has upheld a discreet, if not clandestine post-war presence in Macao at least until recent times. More generally, in her landmark text on the negotiations leading to the retrocession of Macao to Chinese sovereignty in 1999, Carmen Amado Mendes (2013, p. 9) alludes to the ‘ambiguity’ of Macao under Portuguese administration, a status only partly resolved in the late 19th century. There is no dearth of examples illustrating a liminal Macao space in this sense.

With respect to the Macao conference/congress of the ICP, we wonder just how arriving Vietnamese communist agents secreted themselves in Macao? We wonder as to their local networks and reception? In other words who were their local contacts and who covered up for them in Macao? We also wonder as to their guise or camouflage, allowing them to melt into local Macao society. Did they dress up, say as wealthy merchants, or dress down? What kind of travel documents did they use? Real or forged? We also wonder as to their language skills.

CENSORSHIP AND CONTROL UNDER THE *DITADURA*

Compounding the difficulties of the Vietnamese nationalists and communists was the question of colonial controls, always tight in Macao but ratcheting up under the impressively anti-communist Salazar regime. Writing of the birth of Salazar’s New State

between July 1930 and April 1933, Douglas Wheeler (1978, p. 251) writes that with the strengthening of the secret police, known as PIDE after 1945, the state structure was almost complete, just as the New State imposed order by means of ‘censorship, police terror and more subtle devices’. Nevertheless, he declaims, it was unable to totally suppress neither the opposition nor the memories of the earlier positive parts of the Republican experience. By implication not all Portuguese embraced the New State, just as dissent frequently surfaced on the part of socialists and liberals, for example (albeit with numbers deported to the colonies and with others languishing in penitentiaries). Still there was rule of law alongside a dictatorial system. Notably, and in contrast to its colonial counterparts, Portugal eschewed the death penalty, possibly making places like Macao a pole of attraction for would-be conspirators trapped in a life-and-death struggle.

Repression in the African colonies was of course even less subtle. Colonies such as Timor were not only used as dumping grounds for metropolitan political *deportados* but significant numbers of local Macao Chinese and others in Macao were deported to the half-island colony in the 1931-1937 period, a practice continuing into the 1950s. The record is not altogether clear in the case of Macao but British colonial practice during the late 1920s and 1930s also saw deportations of suspected Chinese communists to China under Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi 蒋介石).

Control of anti-colonial left-wing forces was a shared feature across British, French, and Dutch colonies and it would be surprising if Portugal stood outside of this kind of intra-colonial cooperation. In fact, as taken up below, the French authorities in Indochina would more than once lean upon their Portuguese counterparts to arrest and deport Indochinese political activists and alleged criminals.

But special policing was also brought into play in Macao where the Portuguese were separated by language and traditions from local cultures. To this end, dedicated institutions were also brought into play, as with the Repartição Técnica do Expediente Sinico, an elite government department founded in 1885 bringing together specialists in Chinese language and politics to monitor local and mainland Chinese affairs. At a time prior to the establishment of a Portuguese consulate in Canton, the Expediente Sinico handled all official Portuguese correspondence passing between Macao,

Canton and Beijing. In liaison with the Comissário de Polícia (Police Commissioner), the Expediente Sinico also engaged in the surveillance of all political movements involving the Chinese community, press censorship, and surveillance of subversive activities (Wu Zhiliang, 1999, p. 286; *Ditema* 2013, p. 1249).

II. MACAO AND THE FRENCH INDOCHINA CONNECTION

We know that the Vietnamese recognised Macao as a convenient place of exile from French persecution going back to the early decades of the last century. To wit, on 3 February, 1915, Joost van Vollenhoven, the Governor General of Indochina alerted Macao Governor Carlos da Maia (10 June, 1914-5 September, 1916) that a certain number of ‘Annamite’ (the standard French colonial term for Vietnamese) criminals had taken refuge in Macao. As stated, he had forwarded documentation to the French consul in Hong Kong and sought their arrest and extradition. Nevertheless, in a reference to the near universal practice by anti-colonial Vietnamese of adopting pseudonyms, he conceded, ‘It is difficult to establish the names they are going by presently in Macao and I seek to avoid giving erroneous indications’. Implicated in acts of violence in Indochina, he alerted, these ‘*dangereux malfaiteurs de droit*’, should be treated as ‘common assassins, pillards and counterfeiters’ (AHM MO/AH/AC/SA/01/05084).

Given the true identities of the so-called Vietnamese ‘criminals’ believed to have arrived in Macao, the description was highly inaccurate, even misleading and deceptive. Notably, on 3 October, 1915, French Consul Gaston Ernest Liebert in Hong Kong not only alerted Governor Carlos da Maia as to the presence in Macao of ‘Annamite criminals’, but named them, albeit without background information. Deemed ‘French subjects’, these were Cuong De and Phan Boi Chau, along with the latter’s traveling companion named Ha-Truong (Truong-Hong). The trio were understood to have entered Macao between 8-10 September. Following up on the Governor General’s call for the arrest and extradition of the ‘Annamite criminals’, as they were termed, the French consul pointed to Article III of the Treaty of 13 July, 1854 between Portugal and France relating to the extradition of ‘common law criminals’. He also drew

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attention to the arrest warrants issued by the Procurator of the Republic of France in Indochina for Cuong De and Phan Boi Chau, specifically for complicity in assassination (article 59 of the French penal code), and for bomb outrages committed in Hanoi on 26 April, 1913 leading to the death of two French officials, and the wounding of several Europeans and natives. The two named individuals were also condemned *en contumaces* (judged in the absence of the indicted) for the crimes in question by the Hanoi Criminal Commission sitting on 29 August, 1913. Still, as the French authorities well understood, the identification of the suspects in Macao remained a problem. French Consul Liebert offered to forward photographs and descriptions to the Macao authorities. Writing of (unknown) Ha Truong, alias Trong Hong, he allowed that ‘these people constantly change their names’, making it difficult to establish true identity (AHMMO/AH/AC/SA/01/05084).

What van Vollenhoven failed to mention was the stature of the concerned individuals in the broader context of the anti-colonial movement in French Indochina, kicked off by news of Japan’s historic naval victory over imperial Russia at Tsushima in May 1905. Scion of the royal house of Annam, Prince Cuong De (1882-1951) was an inveterate opponent of French rule in Indochina, albeit working with Japan. Taking the lead of literati nationalist, Phan Boi Chau (1867-1940), Cuong De joined the former’s Dong Du or Look East movement of Vietnamese nationalists, variously seeking inspiration and assistance from Japan and China for the expulsion of France from their country. However, in 1909, both had been expelled from Japan under French pressure. Accordingly, both were constantly on the move from Thailand to southern China and, at the same time, rallying support from amongst the scattered émigré Vietnamese communities. On his part, Phan Boi Chau entered into close contact with Chinese nationalists, while modelling his anti-colonial movement upon the Chinese KMT. Briefly, he was in contact with Sun Yat Sen (Tran My-Van, 2005). By 1912, there were at least 1,000 Vietnamese political émigrés traveling by land and maritime routes to Thailand and southern China and Japan. Some 60 were understood to reside in Hong Kong or Kowloon and with 100 active in Canton, not to mention other Chinese towns and cities (See Goscha, 1998, p. 60).

As recounted by Tran My-Van (2005, p. 82), Cuong De had been briefly arrested and detained in

Hong Kong at the end of May 1913 prior to release on bail and with the possible intervention of a ‘third party’. Tran finds this misadventure all the more incredible, as during his visit to Canton, French Governor General Albert Sarraut met with Governor Lung Chi-kuang (Long Jiguang 龙济光) to negotiate—obviously without success—extradition of key revolutionaries, specifically Phan Boi Chau and Cuong De.

In 1915 Cuong De managed to return to Japan following a sojourn in Europe (September 1913-April 1914). In the interim, he travelled to Beijing seeking support for the anti-French cause from the President of the Republic of China, Yuan Shikai 袁世凯. Disappointed at only gaining conditional support, he departed Beijing on 5 May, 1915 arriving in Japan later in the month. More generally, Tran My Van’s (2005) chronology does not tie down the presence of the two revolutionaries in Macao or Hong Kong at the date of Liebert’s letter, neither disallowing their visit nor offering firm confirmation.

Answering back to Liebert on 8 October, 1915, Governor Carlos da Maia duly noted the existence of the Portuguese-French extradition treaty. He also noted that extradition was a matter that would involve the two concerned ministries of foreign affairs, namely Portugal and France. The following day he sent a note to the Portuguese consul in Hanoi requesting him to supply more information on the individuals and the crimes they had allegedly committed. A long time passed before the Consul replied (3 November) revealing that he learned nothing new. He sought further advice before making a direct approach to incoming Governor General Ernest Roume, van Vassailley’s successor. In the event, as the Serviço da Policia Macao made it known to Governor da Maia on 14 February, 1916, they had been alerted (AHM MO/AH/AC/SA/01/05084). With that communication the file came to a close.

Obviously, between 3 October, 1915 and 14 February, 1916, the Vietnamese exiles would not have stood still. It also appears that Governor da Maia, well known as a friend of Sun Yat Sen, temporised in this case. Recall as well, that upon taking office on 10 June, 1914, Governor da Maia rejected the Yuan Shikai regime’s demands to extradite Sun Yat Sen partisans who had taken refuge in the Portuguese colony, an action saluted by Sun Yat Sen in his letter of 12 June, 1916 within the month of Yuan’s death (Chan 2013, p. 103).

Governor da Maia’s response was also prudent, as a little investigation would undoubtedly have revealed that the ‘common criminals’ alluded to in the original dispatch from Hanoi, were actually Vietnamese nationalists of considerable calibre. As mentioned, both figures inspired the Look East movement to Tokyo, just as both figures would be integral to the history of Vietnamese (non-communist) nationalism over the coming decades. In this light, it is also unlikely that the two wanted figures would have been traveling together. Still, both were masters of disguise, given to using pseudonyms, code telegrams and other subterfuges, just as they were constantly on the move. If we take Consul Liebert seriously, they undoubtedly passed through Macao during this period moving on to even safer ground in southern China, outside of the reach of colonial police forces.

A national hero in Vietnam today as pioneer anti-colonial nationalist, Phan Boi Chau was eventually hunted down and arrested in the French concession in Shanghai in 1926. Sentenced to death, but commuted, he spent the rest of his life under house arrest in Hue, albeit still a powerful voice in favour of independence and in secret communication with the movement. On his part, Prince Cuong De who played the Japan card and was used by the militarists, accordingly, never returned to his native land, dying in Tokyo in 1951, virtually written out of Vietnamese nationalist history.

More generally during this period, the British and French authorities together entered into close cooperation in sharing information on trouble makers, rebels, and especially the rising threat of Bolshevism. Specifically, Macao was kept apprised of the Vietnamese nationalist movement, dramatically as with the bomb attempt against Governor Marcial Merlin at the Victoria Hotel in Shameen (Shamien) Canton in June 1924, especially as the aggrieved governor who narrowly escaped with his life cancelled a planned official visit to Macao (AHM MO/AH/AC/SA/09375).

Meantime, in the wake of a highly destructive and unprecedented riot engaging Chinese and Vietnamese in the port of Haiphong in 1927, the French authorities were alerted to a vaguely conspiratorial—possibly KMT-linked—centre in Macao which had written letters in support of Chinese interests in French Indochina. French ships were also boycotted by indignant Chinese stevedores in Hong Kong (AOM SLOTFOM III 39). Resident Portuguese citizens in Haiphong, certain of

them merchants, were also affected by these events. Meantime, the French authorities kept up a voluminous correspondence with the colonial authorities in Hong Kong and Macao through the 1930s as to political risks, emanating from these port cities.

Travel was not exactly borderless in that age but maritime traffic by junk connected Macao with the nearby French treaty port-enclave of Guangzhouwan and the Gulf of Tonkin ports. Steamer traffic likewise connected all the colonial ports with the China coast, making for a fairly intense movement of individuals, whether immigrants, returnees, traders or others. Specifically Guangzhouwan was identified in French official notices as a place of refuge for Portuguese ‘criminals’. To that end, negotiations were entered into as to the extradition of these ‘refugees’ and ‘criminals’ in, respectively, Portuguese and French territory (AHM MO/AH/AC/SA/01/05483 07/08/1916 – 03/20/1917), although there is no evidence as to that occurring. In any case, at this point in time, anti-French Vietnamese rebels were looking East to Japan and China. Vietnamese arriving in southern China in the late 1920s generally received a favourable reception, and there is no reason to believe that contact established with left-wing circles in Canton did not extend to Macao.

III. THE ORIGINS OF THE LEFT WING IN MACAO

Undoubtedly it is true, as Fei Chengkang (1996, p. 331) asserts, that the rise of Canton as a base for the ‘Great Revolution’ of 1924-1927, eclipsed the importance of Macao as ‘a place of secret activities’ on the part of Chinese reformists and revolutionaries. Nevertheless, we have reason to argue that Macao continued to play an important role as base and refuge for progressive political activists through the years of repression under Chiang Kai-shek, not to mention through to the war years.

We are better informed as to the origins of the CCP in the British colony, especially owing to research by such authors as, Chan Lau Kit-Ching, *From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921-1936* (1999). Christine Loh (2010) in *Underground Front* also offers a pioneering examination of the role played by the CCP in Hong Kong since the creation of the Party in 1921. To be sure, as she

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exposes, the CCP has not only operated in Hong Kong since the 1920s but to this day remains underground, its presence both unregistered and unacknowledged. Cindy Yik-yi Chu (2010), by contrast, focuses on the United Front policy of the CCP in Hong Kong during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945. There are no analogous published studies on these themes with respect to Macao.

The war years in Macao were also emblematic of the clandestinity trope and not only a reference to wartime Macao’s ‘Casablanca in the Orient’ image and indeed role, as with the activities of foreign agents and consuls.

The first references to communist activities in Macao emerge in 1922, five years after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. According to Moisés Silva Fernandes (Nunes, 2012), there were strikes and serious incidents that forced the intervention of the local Chinese, and were also guided by ‘a lot of violence from the Portuguese side’. When, on 29 May, 1922, military police in Macao killed and wounded dozens of local people, strikes broke out leading to the dispatch of a delegation to Guangzhou to present a petition to the revolutionary government (meeting Sun Yat Sen on 2 June). While not all the details of this event are fully understood, one thing is certain: ‘The situation only improved when the local Chinese elite intervened in the issue of Macao’ (cf. Wu Zhiliang, 1996, pp. 287-288). In any case, the great Canton-Hong Kong strike-boycott of June 1925 to October 1926 alerted the Portuguese authorities in Macao as to the global nature of Bolshevism and its threats to order. As the head of the Repartição de Expediente Sinico signalled on 6 September, 1926, China was in a ‘quasi-chaotic state’. Owing to the ‘extortionate’ actions of the strikers, European commerce in the country was near impossible.

‘Bolshevism knows no nationality or borders’, the report continued. ‘One part operates in England in support of another part operating in China’ (AHM MO/AH/AC/SA/10856 Repartição de Expediente Sinico, 10 September, 1926). But, Macao prudently played a reactive role watching sometimes heavy-handed British actions in Hong Kong with trepidation. The short-lived communist-backed Canton Uprising (Canton Commune) of December 1927 was undoubtedly registered in Macao just as its crushing by warlord armies no doubt brought relief to the Portuguese, French, and British authorities alike. Starting in April 1927 Chiang Kai-shek had already commenced purging communists from the KMT. French concern was also focused upon Canton from where, between 1925-1927, Ho Chi Minh launched his Thanh Nien or youth networks connecting up with Indochina in 1926. Young Vietnamese were enrolling in the Huangpo (Whampoa) military academy, where Ho Chi Minh served as an adviser on peasant questions to Comintern apparatchik Mikhail Markovich Borodin. In the event, the ‘White terror’ unleashed by Chiang Kai Shek, scattered the Vietnamese community in Canton and with Ho Chi Minh fleeing to the Soviet Union. Back in Hong Kong in 1930, Ho Chi Minh would also chair the inaugural meeting of a united Vietnamese Communist Party, pending its transformation into the ICP. In particular, the British authorities sought to choke Bolshevik activities in its colonial sphere. Commencing with the arrest in Singapore of roving Comintern agent Ducroix (Serge Lefranc) and others on 1 June, 1931, on 15 June the British authorities in Shanghai arrested Ducroix’s controller Comintern agent Noulens (Yakov Rudnik), in turn leading to further arrests at 186 Tam Lung Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong on 6 July, 1931 sweeping up Ho Chi Minh/Sung Man Cho and his female secretary, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai (as described below).(Duncanson, 1974; Gunn, 1990) Macao was not untouched by the attraction of Bolshevism. According to a Macao police report of 1931, communist activities at that time were ‘widespread through all centres in the Far East, not sparing the colony of Macao’. As observed, the communist underground in Macao propagated through the press, through schools, and through the agency of school teachers. However, in September of that year, the Macao Commissioner of Police, Major José Guerreiro de Andrade, boasted to the Governor (Joaquim

Anselmo de Mata Oliveira, March 1931-June 1932) that, as a result of arrests, confessions, and deportations, his force had achieved an ‘*exterminio de acção comunista de Macao*’, or extermination of communism in Macao. Communist meetings were broken up with communist elements arrested and deported. Individuals among them confessed as to their proselyting activities with a view to converting Macao people to their cause. ‘Macao had secret party organization and its affiliates intended for different purposes’. But with the leadership and associates arrested and deported, press materials, etc., were ‘totally seized’. Those not apprehended made their exit from the colony. Meantime, a special section of the Macao police was set up aimed at the elimination of communism and to verifying the facts concerning communist organisation in the colony. A photographic record of suspects was also created. As explained, this action not only terminated their propaganda but also put an end to a special section of the party concerned with external relations. As stated, Macao was then free from these elements bringing ‘tranquillity’ to the population. The role of communist agents in Macao communicating with the major centres of communism in the Far East was declared over (AHM AH/AC/P-13569 micro A1182 ‘Exterminio de accão comunista de Macao’, Colonia de Macau, Direcção Serviço de Administração Civil, 22/09/1931). While we do not doubt the methods employed by the Salazarist police to ‘exterminate’ would-be communist networks inside Macao (namely arrests and deportations), they cannot have been entirely successful, because ‘sleeper’ cells obviously continued. The role of the celebrated General Ye Ting falls into this pattern. According to an officialised account, between 1935-1937, Ye Ting 叶挺, a former KMT stalwart, met several times with CCP representatives in Macao, namely Pan Hannian 潘汉年, Zhang Yunyi 张云逸 and others, before exiting Macao in 1937 and going on to play a lead role in military affairs in the New Fourth Army following the ‘July 7th incident’ of 1937. By this year, many patriotic Macao youth would volunteer for service in the resistance war against Japanese aggression (*Macau during the Sino-Japanese War*, 2001). Residing at 76, Rua Almirante Costa Cabral, his presence in Macao might have been more than just clandestine. Doubtless, as with Ye Ting, many in Macao who shared a background with the KMT also shared a patriotic sense of indignation at the Japanese aggression.

IV. THE MACAO CONFERENCE OF THE ICP (14-26 JUNE, 1934) With the arrest of Ho Chi Minh/Sung Man Cho in Hong Kong in June 1931 and his eventual release in January 1933 and journey to the Soviet Union, local initiative passed into the hands of a small group of Moscow or ‘Stalin School’ graduates who, under the noses of the authorities, began to assemble in the Portuguese colony. Coming to the attention of the French *Sûreté* or special police, the Macao Conference of the ICP, bringing together top ranking members of the newly created ICP, was convened between 14-26 June, 1934. As explained below, the Macao conference would be a preliminary to the all-important Macao Congress of the ICP, eventually held in March 1935. We recall that this high-level gathering of Bolsheviks in Macao was less than three years after Macao Police Commissioner Andrade boasted that he had ‘exterminated’ the communists. The ‘White Terror’ had taken its toll upon the CCP in Guangzhou and elsewhere and the Long March was underway. By this stage, António José Bernandes de Miranda (June 1932-April 1937) had taken up governorship of the Portuguese colony. We do not know how the arriving delegates crossed the border into Macao or even the nature of their travel documents. Undoubtedly they crossed from Hong Kong or Canton by the maritime route. Some of them coming from Bangkok or Saigon would have arrived in Hong Kong by scheduled shipping lines. Passports of the age tended to be single page documents, as with Ho Chi Minh’s Republic of China passport issued in the name of Sung Man Cho during his brief visit to the British colony of Singapore on 28 April, 1930. Legitimate documentation was also provided to French dependents by the French Consulate in Hong Kong, as with Vietnamese from the French colony of Cochinchina (present day southern Vietnam). Five figures in particular stand out at the Macao gathering, roving China-based Comintern apparatchik, Le Hong Phong, a future ICP secretary-general (1935-1936), the Moscow-trained Ha Huy Tap, another future secretary (1936-1938), Thailand-based Tran Van Chan (about whom little is known) and, undoubtedly, the most notorious of them all, Tran Van Giau, the individual who briefly seized power in Saigon in August

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1945 on behalf of the southern Viet Minh just prior to the Japanese surrender. The fifth in this circle was the female delegate, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai.

Following Tran Phu, first ICP secretary general (1930-1931), murdered by the French on 6 April, 1931, Le Hong Phong was the second to hold this office (1935-1936). As such, he headed the office of General Secretary of the Overseas Executive Committee of the ICP (Overseas Leadership Committee), following the almost complete domestic repression of the communist movement inside Vietnam. Born in Nghe An, central Vietnam, in 1924-25 he made his way to Canton, joined the Whampoa military academy, met up with Ho Chi Minh, and in February 1926 joined the CCP. Moving on to Moscow, he also joined the Red Army as a pilot.

Another joining this circle, as mentioned, was Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, confident of both Ho Chi Minh and Le Hong Phong and, ambiguously, wife and/or mistress of one of them (AOM 3 SLOTFOM/54 NP 34, 2tri 1938). Real name Nguyen Thin Bay, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai (Co Duy), was born in Vinh Yen in Nghe An, north-central Vietnam in 1910. In 1930, she joined the ICP as a head of propaganda. She then moved to Hong Kong, as described, serving as secretary to Ho Chi Minh in the Eastern branch office. Arrested in Hong Kong, but also released prior to Ho Chi Minh, she could then reconnect with Le Hong Phong and the Macao Conference. As official Vietnamese histories record, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai married Le Hong Phong. Even so, according to Duiker (2000, p. 225), she also entered a possible ‘marriage’ with Ho Chi Minh prior to their incarceration in Hong Kong’s Victoria prison.

As French police sources confirm, the reorganisation of the ICP in southern Indochina in this period owed greatly to Tran Van Giau. Given his importance in this narrative, as much his idiosyncratic style and personality, it would be appropriate to review his biography. Born (1911) in Long An, south of Saigon, to a well-to-do family, Giau was a graduate of Lycée Chasseloup Laubat in Saigon (as indeed was the future King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia) and, moving to France, attended school in Toulouse (although unlikely to have graduated from university as some reports contend). In 1929 he joined the PCF but, following his participation in demonstrations in front of the Elysée in Paris, was repatriated to Vietnam

in 1931. He then made his way to Moscow where he graduated from the University of the Toilers of the East. Having acquired the necessary training, along with the Comintern’s blessing, he was ordered to return to Vietnam. Arrested by the French authorities in Saigon on 14 October, 1934 on a charge of carrying false papers, he successfully appealed against a five-year sentence and was released.

As context, it should be acknowledged that the new born ICP network which lent its support to the rebellious peasants of the marginal Nghe-Tinh (Nghe An-Ha Tinh) provinces of north-central Vietnam in 1930-31, was subject to a sweeping repression which saw tens of thousands of suspects detained by the colonial authorities and with important sections of the leadership either killed or imprisoned. Needless to say, the surviving ICP leadership went underground in Vietnam or sought to link up with their comrades on the outside, in Thailand or in southern China, especially Canton.

First to arrive in Macao was Ha Huy Tap, born in Ha Tinh in 1906, and educated in the prestigious Quoc Hoc (National) school in Hue. Having abandoned a teaching career, he entered the communist underground, becoming a comrade-in-arms of Ho Chi Minh in the Thanh Nien (Youth) circle in Canton. Following studies in Moscow, he returned to Vietnam in 1933. Known for his theoretical writings and interventions, he would emerge in the wake of the Macao Congress as third General Secretary of the ICP (July 1936-March 1938) operating back inside Vietnam.

Next to arrive in Macao was Tran Van Chan (Tang) and Nguyen Van Than, both coming from Bangkok. With even greater secrecy, Le Hong Phong arrived from China, where he was acting on the behest of the Comintern. Vy Nam Son was then acting as Le Hong Phong’s liaison officer and was likely already positioned in Macao. Arriving in Macao from Saigon on 15 December, 1934, Tran Van Giau could not have been present at the conference (AOM 3SLOTFOM/54 NP 34, 2tri 1938). Still we do not know how these Vietnamese slipped across borders. To our knowledge not one was apprehended.

At issue was the creation of an ‘ICP external office’ along with a ‘Leadership Committee’, vital given the Party losses incurred at French police hands inside Indochina following the premature Nghe-Tinh rebellion in 1931-1932 and its suppression.

With its proximity to Vietnam, ease of travel to China and, alongside British Hong Kong, apparently lax police controls, the Portuguese colony provided perfect cover for the Vietnamese delegates. Well, at least they thought so, as the French had planted their agents inside Macao and/or had thoroughly penetrated the semi-secret Leninist Party organisation. As the Sûreté recorded, the Macao Bureau were so brazen that they were ‘not even bothered’ by arrests of members of the CCP leadership committee conducted in Shanghai in late 1934 as well as repressive actions effected between 19-21 February, 1935 (AOM 3 SLOTFOM/54 NP 34, 2tri 1938). This is true and by this date, the ICP ran parallel operations even if they were joined at the hip by the Comintern.

Although compromised by French agents, it is not the same as saying that the French authorities could actually interfere in Portuguese jurisdiction. Certainly the French consul in Hong Kong was *au fait* with the gathering of Vietnamese communists in Macao and undoubtedly in contact through agents and spies. It remains mysterious then as to why the French did not invoke the 1854 extradition Treaty with Portugal, as was raised in correspondence with Governor da Maia in 1915. Surely this group of conspirators had overstayed their visas, if at all they carried official identity papers. On their part, the Portuguese authorities must have been informed as to the long drawn out judicial proceedings then involving Ho Chi Minh/Sung Man Cho, leading to his faked death and release from a British prison, suggesting that the extradition route was legally problematical when it touched political cases.

Notwithstanding the coming and going of a variety of ethnic delegates and members under the noses of the authorities, Macao continued to serve as a secure and even primary external base for the ICP for at least the following twelve months. Thereafter, the focus of activities drifted back to Indochina. In any case, from May 1936, as explained, the Macao base would become redundant with the advent of the Popular Front government when the ‘legal’ ICP gained a new status at home.

Originally conceived in Moscow, the Macao Conference was convened between 14-26 June, 1934. With his links with the PCF, the CCP, and the Comintern, ICP General Secretary Le Hong Phong was undoubtedly the prime mover. In the course of the conference, Le Hong Phong was confirmed as

president of the ‘Leadership Committee’ and vested with control over the ICP organisation in northern Vietnam. Discussions between Le Hong Phong and Tran Van Chan centred on the need to dispatch an agent from Thailand to north-central Vietnam via Laos. Similarly, Nguyen Van Dut (Sevan) was charged with organising Party activities in southern Vietnam. A French-educated student activist, expelled back to Vietnam, Nguyen Van Dut, had also spent time in Moscow.

While we do not doubt the methods employed by the Salazarist police to ‘exterminate’ would-be communist networks inside Macao (namely arrests and deportations), they cannot have been entirely successful, because ‘sleeper’ cells obviously continued.

In terms of personnel, Nguyen Van Tham was ordered to stay in Macao as liaison officer to replace Vy Nam Son, while Hu Huy Tap was confirmed as a member. To summarise, by November 1934, the Macao Leadership Committee comprised the following members; Ha Huy Tap; Nguyen Hau (Manh Van Lieu), and Nguyen Huu Can (Phi Van), with Nguyen Van Tham and Vy Nam Son serving as liaison officers and, as mentioned, Tran Van Chan, Nguyen Van Dut, and Hoang Van Mau named as delegates for Laos, north-central Vietnam, and southern Vietnam, respectively (AOM 3 SLOTFOM/54 NP 34, 2tri 1938).

MACAO AS A COMMUNIST PUBLISHING CENTRE:
TAP CHI BON-SO-VIC

As also endorsed by the conference, the Comintern’s *quoc-ngu* or Vietnamese language *Tap chi Bon-so-vic* (Revue Bolchevik) emerged as the Macao-based Leadership Bureau’s primary propaganda organ

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in its dealings with Party organisations in southern Vietnam. Between June 1934 and March 1935, eleven editions of *Tap chi Bon-so-vic* were published in Macao by the Leadership Bureau. To this end, the Macao Bureau edited, translated, printed, and circulated their own version of the publication especially crafted for a Vietnamese audience. At least one copy was sent to the FCP in Paris for forwarding to the Comintern while militants in Longzhou (in Guangxi on the border with Vietnam), Thailand, and southern Vietnam, received between one and four copies each, for local distribution and reproduction (AOM 3 SLOTFOM/54 NP 34, 2tri 1938). Such an enterprise raises many questions as to local support, not the least paper supplies, printing equipment, financing and, crucially, secrecy.

Obviously, such activity did not come cheap and fund-raising also became a preoccupation of the Macao Bureau. The first tranche of funds was supplied by the Comintern and delivered by Le Hong Phong. As a French source estimated, between June-December 1934, the Macao Bureau had collected at least 80,000 francs, some of it by foul means, namely through robbery in Hong Kong. But the money was also put to good use. Notably, when Tran Van Giau returned to Saigon on 7 January, 1935, he was provided with 300 dollars. The same month, the Macao Bureau set up in newly furnished premises in Macao handsomely funded to the tune of 500 dollars (AOM 3 SLOTFOM/54 NP 34, 2tri 1938). Unfortunately the address of the premises are not revealed. Praia Grande? Or can we surmise a location in the Porto Interior bazaar quarter or along the teeming waterfront, bound to offer anonymity among the ruck of sailors, coolies, travellers and transients disembarking from steamers or local waterborne craft?

As the French report summarised, ‘the activities of the Macao Bureau above all concerns the editing of *Tap chi Bon-so-vic*, preparing model pamphlets to be distributed throughout all parts of Indochina, undertaking criticism of various Party sections, and preparing for the first Party Congress’. Additionally, the Macao Bureau was vested with the selection and recruitment of suitable candidates to be sent to the Stalin School in Moscow. Namely, in early 1934, Nguyen Van Tham was sent to Longzhou to meet two Stalin School returnees from Moscow. He was also instructed to escort to Macao the ethnic Tho (Tai) minority, Hoang Van Mau (Hong Dinh Giong), also

known by the French as the ‘Stalin of Cao Bang’ for his pioneering communist activities in this highland zone of northeast Vietnam, Hoang was duly conferred by Le Hong Phong with leadership of communist propaganda in northern Vietnam upon arrival in Macao on September 26, 1934 (AOM 3 SLOTFOM/54 NP 34, 2tri 1938). It is important to note that the ethnic Tho/Tay dominated Cao Bang region would re-emerge in 1941-45 as the future Viet Minh stronghold or cradle of the August Revolution of 1945 leading to the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This was no accident, as the ground had been well prepared, reaching back to the 1930s.

As closely monitored by the Sûreté, the Macao Bureau was also involved in the organisation and dispatch of a group of representatives to Moscow to attend the VIIth Congress of the Comintern. On 18 October, 1934, Le Hong Phong received a telegram (leading us to wonder if this was received from the Macao post office without being unmasked?) from Ha Huy Tap in the name of the superior echelon of the party (Comintern) to proceed immediately to Shanghai with Hoang Van Mau [(Ngon)] (representing minority people), along with Nguyen Thi (Minh) Khai (Co Duy) (representing women). The three left Hong Kong on 19 October and the arrival in Shanghai of the ‘Macao group’ was confirmed by Ha Huy Tap who returned alone to the Portuguese administered territory on 10 November (AOM 3 SLOTFOM/54 NP 34, 2tri 1938). We know from other sources that the three delegates duly arrived in Moscow. This left Ha Huy Tap as the frontrunner in planning for the upcoming Congress, which he also dominated.

ARRIVAL IN MACAO OF TRAN VAN GIAU

Arriving in Macao from Saigon on 15 December, 1934 in the company of a countryman, one Gia, Tran Van Giau also looked ahead to the upcoming Congress. But, as an intellectual rival, he also came under suspicion on the part of Ha Huy Tap as to being a French agent, even believed to have been seen off by the Sûreté from Saigon. Personality issues also came into play (Duiker, 2000, p. 220). While such a claim was not proven, the atmosphere among the Vietnamese communists in Macao in the lead up to the Congress was apparently poisoned by the—correct—assumption that the delegates were under surveillance and that their ranks had been infiltrated. Adding to Ha Huy Tap’s

paranoia was the defection of a Vietnamese cook who made off with a substantial tranche of ICP funds (cf. Duiker, 2000, pp. 219-220)

In any case, Tran Van Giau apprised the Leadership Bureau of the situation in southern Vietnam. Notably, he critiqued the ICP ‘Federal Committee of Southern Indochina’, for errors of doctrine on the part of the local leaders. He drew up an agenda of urgent tasks and also explained to the Macao Bureau the importance and convenience of liaison with the FCP via French ships arriving and departing from Saigon. As the Sûreté summarised, ‘It is not necessary to underline the importance for communist propaganda in Indochina of the sojourn in Macao by Tran Van Giau’. Out of his visit, links were established (for the first time) between ICP fractions in the south and the north of Vietnam (AOM 3SLOTFOM/54 NP 34, 2tri 1938).

This was an important revelation, even a historical moment in the history of the ICP. It is also an identity issue, as the *Sûreté* analyst seemed to bewail. Undoubtedly, for the first time, the delegates from southern, central and northern Vietnam, including ethnic minorities representatives from the north, bonded in Macao as ‘Vietnamese’ although, ambiguously under Comintern orders, they also embraced ‘French Indochina’ as the domain of their struggle.

THE MACAO CONGRESS OF MARCH 1935

Convened by the Leadership Committee, the Macao or First National Congress of the ICP, was held in the Portuguese colony between 27-31 March, 1935. Taking place in an unidentified hotel—Hotel Ribeira?, Bela Vista?, Hotel Central?, Grand Hotel?—15 delegates were in attendance although in the absence of the two most important members, Ho Chi Minh, then in Moscow, and Le Hong Phong who was attending the VIIth Comintern Congress along with Nguyen Thi Minh Khai and other delegates. Neither did the Comintern send a delegate to Macao as anticipated. In his absence, Le Hong Phong was confirmed as ICP General Secretary with a brief to reconstitute the party networks. The Congress timetable had also been pushed forward. According to Duiker (2000, pp. 219-220), initially scheduled to take place in Ha Huy Tap’s three-room apartment in Macao (with one room reserved for the Comintern delegate), the Congress was delayed owing to Tap’s fears of provocateurs (Ho Chi Minh)

and *Sûreté* informants (Tran Van Giau) within the party. Seeking to please the Stalinist line in Moscow, Tap also targeted Ho Chi Minh—then in Moscow at a time when he was particularly vulnerable to purge—for his alleged nationalist excesses and lukewarm proletarian internationalism, and with *Tap chi Bon-so-vic* serving as Tap’s principle mouthpiece to launch attacks upon rivals and antagonists.

The Macao Congress also coincided with an extreme leftist period in the history of both the Vietnamese and Chinese communist movements. Notably, the Congress manifesto placed great stress upon ‘armed struggle’ (Harrison, 1989, p. 66). A central committee was elected, confirming Ha Huy Tap’s status as general secretary of a nine-man central committee to be relocated to Saigon. Attended by ethnic minority delegates, the Macao Congress also offered the first major discussion on minority issues in Indochina on the part of the party (cf. Gunn, 1988). As Duiker (2000, p. 221) points out, women were also represented with the presence of Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, as suggested, Ho Chi Minh’s ‘love interest’ and former secretary in the southern bureau in Hong Kong. While the Macao Congress ushered in an ultra-leftist period in the history of the ICP, its resolutions were almost immediately overridden by developments in Moscow at the VIIth Comintern Congress reflecting realities associated with the rise of Nazism in Europe and Japanese militarism in the East.

It is certainly mysterious that Sûreté spies virtually penetrated the inner circle of the ICP in Macao, collecting a full set of documents, allowing them to be translated and analysed. It is also noteworthy that (Charles André) Yolle, a senior *Sûreté* official with his base in Hanoi, visited the Portuguese colony on 15 September, 1934, three months after the Macao Conference of the ICP. This comes to light in the form of a letter addressed to Governor (Miranda) of Macao from the Governor General (Robin) of French Indochina thanking the former for Yolle’s reception and looking forward to ‘the most sincere collaboration’ (AHM MO/AH/MS/SA/01/25343 Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Gouverneur Macao, Saigon, 26 September, 1934). Yet, the sincere collaboration did not amount to much as the Congress proceeded anyway. Did the Portuguese turn a blind eye to what was French business and/or was it part of their risk calculus not to meddle in something also touching Chinese domestic politics? Or were they simply inefficient?

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V. IMPORTANCE OF THE MACAO CONFERENCE/CONGRESS IN THE BROADER SWEEP OF HISTORY

Insofaras the Vietnamese were compromised by other Vietnamese who evidently infiltrated their Congress, a number of other questions are raised. Who were these individuals? Why didn’t the Portuguese authorities act upon French prompts (as with the special mission to Macao by *Sûreté* agent Yolle in 1934), or indeed why is the Portuguese record on these activities apparently blank? Or, with the example of Governor Carlos da Maia in the 1910s, did Governor Miranda turn a blind eye to these activists who, after all, were focused upon French Indochina and not especially broader Portuguese interests in the region? Many of these questions remain unanswered, simply because of the issue of secrecy, both governmental and on the part of the conspirators.

Simply, Macao Police Commissioner Andrade and/or his successor missed the chance of a lifetime, namely to arrest *flagrante delicto* the entire Overseas Leadership Committee of the ICP, in other words the top rank, highest level leadership echelon of the communist movement in French Indochina including the Second and Third General Secretaries of the ICP (vital, given that domestic leadership had been eliminated after 1931). True, they missed Ho Chi Minh, but back in Moscow he was under a cloud and narrowly risked purge himself. Having missed their chance, certain of this leadership would move on to seminal roles in the future Vietnamese revolution in August 1945 and the aftermath (in the case of Tran Van Giau). Perhaps, after all, in making a deal with visiting *Sûreté* agent Yolle, the Portuguese advised him that arrest and extradition would not work, perhaps allowing the French agents to do their work of infiltration so as to better collect intelligence. Or, then again, they may have fobbed him off. Not implausibly, the authorities in Canton were advised of these strategies, indeed, may have had their own interests in this case.

To summarise, with his return from Moscow Tran Van Giau emerged as the dominant communist personality in southern Indochina. Following his return from the ICP conference in Macao, Giau also confronted the problem of bringing isolated and renegade communist opposition forces in Cambodia and southern Vietnam into closer liaison with the

regional bureau of the ICP in Saigon under his leadership.

Although out of the picture with his arrest in mid-1935, he would again emerge from the shadows as the Viet Minh supremo in the south, following the Japanese surrender in August 1945. In December 1940, he would lead the southern-based party into staging an armed uprising in the Mekong Delta during the opening months of Vichy French rule only to suffer its crushing with major loss of life and property and with Giau imprisoned.

It should be understood that a mere ten years on from the events surrounding the Macao Conference/Congress, the communists would not only see the French knocked out of Indochina by the Japanese but would, in turn, seize power in Hanoi in a virtual power vacuum created by the surrendering Japanese. Released from prison by the Japanese, Tran Van Giau would rebuild the southern ICP/Viet Minh showing its hand again at the moment of the Japanese surrender in urban Saigon, albeit forced back by the arriving British and French to the countryside. Giau’s adventurism in 1940, and failure in August 1945, brought him into conflict with the party centre now dominated by Ho Chi Minh. Relegated to the sidelines following a stint in Bangkok as head of the Viet Minh embassy, in later life he turned his hand to being party historian.

Third General Secretary of the ICP, the ultra-leftist Ha Huy Tap, was executed at Hoc Mon on the rural outskirts of Saigon on 28 August, 1941, having participated in Giau’s premature armed uprising in the Mekong Delta.

Le Hong Phong, as mentioned, confirmed as second General Secretary of the ICP at the first Party Congress in Macao, was arrested by the French in February 1940 in Saigon and died in September 1942 at the age of 40 in Pulo Condore (Con Son) penitentiary.

As mentioned, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai was one of the delegates to attend the VIIth Congress of the Comintern International in Moscow with Le Hong Phong (whom she married). Her name does not appear in *Sûreté* reports on either the Macao Conference or Congress, yet there is a supposition that she visited Macao (Duiker, 2000, p. 221). Arrested in 1940 upon return to Vietnam, she was sentenced to death and executed by firing squad at Hoc Mon on 26 August, 1941. Her sister Nguyen Thi Minh Thai became the first wife of future general and renowned North

Vietnamese military strategist, Vo Nguyen Giap. Her daughter with Le Hong Phong, named Le Hong Minh, also adopted a revolutionary career.

The French had much to lament, just as the Vietnamese had much to celebrate. At least a core of the Macao Conference/Congress attendees are commemorated as national heroes in Vietnam today as with Le Hong Phong, whose name is lent to the most prestigious boys’ High Schools as with the former Petrus Ký High School in Saigon a.k.a. Ho Chi Minh City. On her part, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai is celebrated in street names and prestigious girls’ schools, as with the former Collège de Jeunes Filles Indigènes, also in Saigon. Ha Huy Tap lends his name to a street on the

outskirts of Saigon, District 7, but also in Danang, Dalat, and other towns. As with Ho Chi Minh, his name is boldly inscribed in the list of six revolutionary alumni who studied at the still prestigious Quoc Hoc or National School in Hue, the former imperial capital. In 2001, as honorary President of the Association of Vietnamese Historians (and having sold his villa in District 3, Saigon), Tran Van Giau, set up an annual award for historical writing (on Saigon) with a donation of 1,000 taels of gold. Giau passed away in December 2010 at 100 years of age. Tens of thousands attended his state funeral; while special postage stamps issued in Vietnam depict him as the People’s Teacher and Labour Hero. **RC**

NOTES

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| 1 | To wit, a case from English history and literature comes to mind. When in 1164, the Archbishop of Canterbury fled England for Flanders, King Henry II pressed King Louis VII of France for his extradition, rejected on the ground that ‘he had not fled because of having committed a crime but because he feared violence’ (Eliot, <i>Murder in the Cathedral</i> , p. 148). |
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Macao's Identity, Chinese and Other Groups A Decade After the Return to China

JEAN A. BERLIE*

INTRODUCTION

How to define Macao's identity? It has its people, language (Chinese Cantonese and *Putonghua*, Portuguese and English), religion (Catholic and Chinese 'religion'), architecture, local economy, social and legal institutions.

Is the way of life a legal concept? 'Nevertheless it is the way of life at the legal institutional level which protects a particular culture'.

'We can directly trace the formation of Macao to its demographic composition, from which the 'way of life' has arisen. Chinese from different parts of China, Africans, Indians, Malays, Portuguese along with other Europeans and other peoples and nationalities have come to play parts in the Macao way of life'.¹

Can we say that the 'Chinese of Macao' constitutes the only identity in the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR)? Certainly not—there are many other identities in Macao, including the Brazilians, Burmese, Chinese, Europeans, Filipinos,

Indians, Indonesians, Japanese, Nepali, Portuguese, Thais, Timorese, US citizens, Vietnamese, and others. Between 1970 and 1985, Fernand Braudel argued that *The Identity of France* is diversity. Is it also possible to say that diversity characterises Macao identity? Contrarily, I will try to demonstrate that 'Chineseness' is the main cultural trait.

However, within the Chinese of Macao there is a complexity of subgroups; but their 'Chineseness' is reproduced in the intimacies of daily life'.² In fact as we have to define 'identity' and 'identities', I will simply quote:

Too often identification and recognition characterise identities which are 'precarious and unsettled, and may require constant analysis and deconstruction'.³ This may lead to continued uncertainty. Contrarily, we want to transform a complex concept into a simple one; it is not an easy task.

My last book was entitled *The Chinese of Macau*, but it does not mean that other groups do not exist in the MSAR. Permanent residents are defined as the central legal identity and Chinese constitute the majority group. However, the socio-cultural harmony of the MSAR is mainly dependent of the 'real' majority concerning 'harmony', 'the Chinese of Macao'.

'We are Chinese' proves something very serious. Out of the interviewees who responded to my questionnaires, the large majority clearly affirmed their Chineseness. The percentage of answers 'Chinese' and 'Chinese of Macao' is superior to the simple identity

'Macao'. On the basis of one hundred households surveyed, 65 per cent asserted their 'Chineseness'. I found that 46 per cent were registered as 'Chinese of Macao' and 19 per cent Chinese only. Michael Degolyer found 51 per cent in Hong Kong defining themselves as 'Chinese' divided into Hong Kong Chinese (27 per cent), Chinese (22 per cent) and overseas Chinese (2 per cent).⁴ For the Hong Kong SAR, 44 per cent defined themselves 'Hong Kong persons', my research found 38 per cent declaring simply 'Macao' as their own identity.

WAY OF LIFE AND IDENTITY, LEGAL IDENTITY

HISTORY

The study of history is essential. It is Macao's particular history which makes its 'way of life'. A community living in a named location has its own history which differs from other communities. Contrary to Hong Kong, occupied by Japan between 1942 and 1945, Macao remained in peace. The mainlanders and other overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia came to Macao at different periods related to the different history of China, Vietnam, Indonesia and Burma (now Myanmar). Conflicts in Southeast Asia between 1945 and 1980 have created an immigration flux toward Macao. Except for the particular period of the Cultural Revolution (in China, 1966 to 1976), the mainlanders entered Macao mainly in the 1980s and after.

Is it true that each community must have a particular way of life? Is there a paradigmatic way of life, so that we might group things together? When it comes to details, each way of life is of course different. The Basic Law is the essential legislative text of the MSAR recognised by China and Portugal. To the surprise of many lawyers, the expression 'way of life' appears in the provisions of the Basic Law (Chap.1, Art. 5), which reads: 'Way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years'.

The Basic Law created the framework of a legal system, but it is not in itself the whole of the legal system—it is ordinary law that provides the details, and fills up the various institutions. Social change plays an important role. Macao's economy is one of the most open in the world since 2002. 'The previous capitalist system... unchanged for 50 years' (I-5). The *pataca*

currency and 90 per cent of the economy, gaming, are also part of this way of life.

In modern times the legislative power is a component part of the sovereignty of a country. Law does not emerge out of nothing. Legislators make laws and write the texts, but it is the interests and the practice behind them that determine the meanings of those texts.⁵

THEORY AND WAY OF LIFE IN MACAO

Macao Way of Life is an essential element of the Basic Law, a legal mini-Constitution, according to Xiao Weiyun 肖蔚云. The expression 'way of life' refers to 'the means and mode of living. It includes the habits, customs, mores and preferences in entertainment. In order to maintain the capitalist system already existing in Macao, its proper way of life shall be maintained'.⁶

Another point is theory. The complexity of the concept 'identity' imposes preliminary studies to start with. For example, Bourdieu's *habitus*,⁷ which is based on a series of particular facts and cultural traits. In social sciences it uses a mathematical framework. It gives a possibility to reduce the data and compress the information.

Could we relate the way of life and Marcel Mauss and Pierre Bourdieu's *habitus* or 'aspects of culture... habits, skills, styles, tastes of a specific group'?⁸ This concept (*habitus*) could be a particular cultural marker of the lifestyle, values and expectation of a particular social group, the Chinese of Macao.



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‘Habitus is created through a **social rather than individual** process leading to patterns that are enduring’ explains the Basic Law and ‘One Country Two Systems’.⁹ It is part of the ‘enduring’ historical character and identity of Macao. China’s cadres in charge of the MSAR cannot consider the individual identity of the Chinese of Macao but have the advantage of knowing well the MSAR’s society and particularly the ‘Chinese of Macao’, and thus can upgrade harmony in this Special Administrative Region of China. However, Macao is different from Hong Kong and its integration to the mainland is smoother.

The study of the Basic Law by Tong Io Cheng has demonstrated the importance of the Basic Law for the identity of the Chinese of Macao.¹⁰ At present, even for ethnic Chinese, it is not easy anymore to become a permanent resident in the MSAR. The Basic Law protects, even more than in the past, the way of life of the Chinese of Macao. At present, it is extremely difficult for non-Chinese—even for Portuguese—to become a permanent resident.

LEGAL IDENTITY

Legal identity, multifaceted issue, is an important element of inclusive development and is part of a larger reform agenda. It concerns society, education, land and business registration, utility connections and travel documents... become increasingly relevant to people’s day-to-day life. It seems interesting to note that the complex question of identity was not completely studied by Lévi-Strauss.¹¹

There is an essential aspect of identity, the ‘legal identity’. Of course, ‘way of life’ in the Basic Law is not only social but also economic. In the MSAR, society and economy have to be in harmony. Starting in 2009, Macao SAR sticks to the present system of election of the Chief Executive through the 300-member Chief Executive Election Committee. This election is part of the Basic Law, but not really a ‘way of life’. Basic Law is the Guarantor of the Macao Way of Life. However, speaking Cantonese is clearly a part of the way of life.

The Chief Executive of the MSAR must have twenty years of residence in the MSAR to be elected and nobody contest this fact in 2013.¹² So, it needs many years for a Chinese from the mainland or an overseas Chinese to become a ‘real Chinese of Macao’.

The identity of Macao is complex, it needs a sophisticated methodology. We simply start with the language.

LANGUAGE

Languages constitute a fundamental core of overall identity. In Macao the *de facto* situation in 2000 was the pre-eminence given to the simple term ‘Chinese language’, which seemed, for the Chinese of Macao, to mean ‘Cantonese’.¹³

Some Chinese may have forgotten that Chinese *and* Portuguese are the official languages of the MSAR. The Chinese of Macao are affected by the forces of both globalisation and ‘mainlandisation’, and we understand the importance of *Putonghua* and sinicisation.¹⁴ It seems that Cantonese is slowly losing its dominance, but it is still the identity-language of Macao. Already in neighbouring Hong Kong, *Putonghua* and English are gaining a larger audience than previously.

Traditional written Chinese characters continue to dominate in the MSAR, and it remains to be seen in what manner, in 2049, Macao will finally begin to use simplified characters, already used on the mainland and in Singapore. The modernity and success of Singapore will be recognised one day in Macao and Hong Kong SAR. The Basic Law is inflexible, so the traditional characters will stay up to 2049 as a part of Macao’s ‘way of life’ defined in Basic Law.

The Macao SAR has its own Basic Law. However, in 1995, Article 19 of the Law on Education on the mainland insisted on the common Chinese written language and on the supremacy of the national language, *Putonghua*. Consequently we believe also in the importance of the Chinese phonetic alphabet, *pinyin*; and consider that it will be imposed slowly, even in Macao.

Portuguese has been spoken in Macao for almost five hundred years, but—challenged by English—has lost its former leading international position. English is currently the language of communication between Chinese and non-Chinese in the MSAR, not in exactly the same way as in Hong Kong; but the Chinese of Macao are making progress in English. In the MSAR, however, it is more difficult than it is in Hong Kong to find Chinese above the age of 40 who are proficient in English.

The government of the MSAR has always placed great importance on cultural affairs, but that does not automatically promote ‘culture’. In 2010 and 2011, for instance, significant changes were put into effect. The Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture, Cheong U, is the head of the Committee of Cultural Industries (or ‘Cultural Industry Committee’, CIC), which also includes the president of the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau (IACM), the heads of the Macao Polytechnic Institute, and other institutes. In fact a harmonious alliance of Confucianism and tolerance continues to prevail, despite the drastic change in the culture, economy and society of the MSAR since the year 2000. Confucian (work) dynamism ‘correlates positively with economic growth’.¹⁵

However, in the field of culture, there are examples of new cultural development; for example, Macao is encouraging local film culture.¹⁶ The Macao Foundation has recently generously invested in a successful film called ‘The Youth of Xinghai’. Elsewhere, the President of the Macao Foundation, Dr Wu

Zhiliang, asked the CIC to increase contributions to local associations, arguing that they are essential for both local culture and the links with Guangdong and Fujian provinces.¹⁷

IDENTITY OF THE CHINESE IN MACAO

WHO ARE THE CHINESE OF MACAO?

Just before New Year 2012 the director of the daily newspaper *Hoje Macau*, Carlos Morais, said he felt that ‘Macao has lost its identity’.¹⁸ From a Portuguese viewpoint, I might agree, but what do the Chinese of Macao think? These Chinese strongly defend, among other cultural traits, their Cantonese language. Who are the Chinese of Macao? There are five main types of Chinese in Macao who could claim to be really from there and who speak Cantonese:

The *Bendiren* 本地人 {*Bundeijan* in Cantonese (C)}, from Guangdong Province, are mainly Han Chinese born in Macao speaking Cantonese.¹⁹ The other categories are the Fukienese, mainly Hokkien;

The pagoda of the rocks, Macao. Engraving by G. Maurand from a drawing by Doré, 1860.



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the Chaozhou (Teochew) and the Hakkas (Kejia in *Putonghua*); and the Fishermen Tanka. These Fishermen migrated *en masse* to Zhuhai in 2000, although some families are currently remaining in Macao. The Hakkas constitute some 2% of the population.

Hao Zhidong points out national, political and economic identity.²⁰ I insist on social and cultural identity and on the paradigm of complexity more than diversity.²¹ Macao Chinese constitute a group of people with complex biological, social and economic linkage.

Language and family are, among other criteria, two main markers to understand Macao Chinese identity. Identity has of course numerous meanings or constructions of meaning, depending on actors and situations, and a dramatic social change occurred after 20 December, 1999, when the long expected return of Macao to China took place.

We are compelled to ask basic questions and find the facts to relate Macao to the rest of China, to Hong Kong and to Southeast Asia, to the Lusophone world and to the global world of the 21st century. We have looked carefully at the surprising fact that, on average, more Chinese are crossing the border of Zhuhai/Macao everyday than those who are crossing the Shenzhen/Hong Kong border. The influence of the mainland is great and undeniable. In late 2001, ex-President Jiang Zemin and later President Hu were the architects of China joining and being a powerful member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In 2011, from the micro-viewpoint of Macao, under the leadership of President Hu Jintao, it is still useful to look at the macro-modernisation of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s and compare it with mainland China and Macao in the current century.. All is now linked to the concept of globalisation. We will see how this globalisation plays a role in the MSAR. Does this concept influence the identity of Macao Chinese? It is too early to answer to this question in the introduction.

We based this work mainly on ‘classical’ research, but research on identity requires a multi-disciplinary approach. Our methodological checklist is the following: observing, listening, interviewing and questioning. That could be discussed, but I firmly believe that the ethnonym ‘Chinese-of-Macao, although difficult to define, does exist. I will also try to find a link between identity, the place of origin, associations and Tong’s legal and cultural concept of

‘way of life’, which is mentioned in the Macao Basic Law. In fact, the identity ‘Chinese of Macao’ has to begin with an explanation on the relationship between the Macanese and the Chinese of Macao.

HOW CAN WE DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CHINESE OF MACAO HAVE THEIR OWN IDENTITY? HOW CAN WE DEFINE THIS PARTICULAR CHINESE GROUP AND ITS CULTURE?

We start with the simple identity of the Macanese who are really from Macao clearly developed by Renelde da Silva and Alexandra Rangel. The Macanese were born in Macao but have not been considered to be Chinese by either the Portuguese or the Chinese, so it may seem strange to put them forward when studying the Chinese in Macao. The Macanese are the sons and daughters of many vivid cultures. Their identity is Portuguese and they have mixed cultural origin. Their fluency in Portuguese is real and has nothing to do with recent statistics, which reveal that 41% of the civil servants of Macao have some knowledge of Portuguese.²²

The account of Francisco da Roza’s in the 1950s explains the excellent cultural links between the Macanese and the Chinese.²³ During the post-1950 period a large number of Chinese as well as Macanese were refugees in camps in Macao. The massive Chinese immigration during that period is confirmed by Paul Pun of Caritas who has an extensive knowledge of the evolution of social services in Macao.

For the Museum of Macao ‘identity and history’ and ‘Chinese and Macanese’ are the most important.²⁴ Many Macanese have Chinese blood, and all of them are called *Tusheng* 土生, ‘sons of the land’, sons of Macao.

I attended, from beginning to end, the last Macanese Encountering Event, on November 28, 2010, preceded over by the Chief Executive Fernando Chui Sai On, his predecessor Executive Edmund Ho, General Rocha Vieira, and the Consul General of Portugal for Macao and Hong Kong Manuel Cansado de Carvalho. Chui recognised that ‘the Macanese are an inseparable element of Macao’.

Sinicisation, influenced by *Putonghua*, the national language, does not dent this particular ‘way of life’ in Macao and Cantonese remains the main language in the MSAR. A counter-example is given by CCTV 13, which broadcasts exclusively in *Putonghua*,

and combines its programs with Macao Television; this implements sinicisation. Some Macao Chinese may not watch these programs, but we are in the 21st century, *Putonghua* is more global than Cantonese, and this type of globalisation could be positive for the MSAR.

Ethnic relations in Macao have never been bad, thanks to both Confucian philosophy and Portuguese tolerance, as well as to the ‘bamboo-identity of the Macanese and, over the centuries, the good will of the Chinese of Macao. The Macanese are flexible and resilient as bamboo. The diplomacy of former Imperial provincial mandarins responsible for Xiangshan (now Zhongshan), and much later, from 1980 until today, the diplomatic cadres of Beijing—and of Guangdong Province—have also played a key role in maintaining good ethnic relations.

As a result of the ‘Indic administration’ system and Malacca mentioned by Wade, Macao was very early influenced by Southeast Asia. Macanese heterogeneity was originally a result of Goan²⁵ forebears, who represented a greater influx than any other Indians, or Malaccans, and only later included Chinese (see below the life story of a ‘Portugalised’ Chinese of Macao, Leão). The late Ho Tin, another Macao Chinese of great culture and one of the rare grand entrepreneurs of the Sino-Portuguese territory, said: ‘*Ruguo meiyou Tusheng, jiu meiyou Aomen*’ 如果没有土生就没有澳门 (The Macanese play a key role in defining Macao).²⁶ Before the handover in 1999, some Macanese had become Chinese citizens. However, the posthumous book on cinema in Macao by the late Henrique de Senna Fernandes (1923-2010)—presented at the Macanese meeting in December 2010—explained the distinctive hybrid culture of Macao, a bridge between East and West. Hao himself quoted Henrique’s daughter who stated rightly that **without Macanese ‘Macao would lose its characteristics’**.²⁷

To show the importance of the Chinese of Macao in contemporary history, I mention Roque (Rocky) Chui, a fluent Portuguese speaker who, together with Dr. Ho Yin, negotiated with mainland China at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1967, during a very difficult period of the history of China and Macao. The representative of the Governor of Macao, Carlos d’Assumpção, returned from Beijing without success in reaching an agreement with the PRC. Later, Ho Yin and Roque Chui calmly managed to convey a message of peace and respect necessary to restart good

relations between the giant, China, and Macao. This shows the importance of ‘Sino-Portuguese bilingual legal language in Macao society’ developed by Tong Io Cheng in *Isaidat Law Review*. This long adaptation to both cultures, Chinese and European, is part of the identity of Macao Chinese even if many of them do not speak Portuguese.

CANTONESE, HOKKIEN, CHAOZHOU (TEOCHEW) AND OTHERS

Identity is a serious question. Identities have national, political and cultural aspects. It is also true that the term ‘identity’, like ‘religion’, has no equivalent in Chinese. *Shenfen* 身份 is closer to ‘social status’, and *rentong* 认同 refers probably to the acceptance an approved culture. The Chinese of Macao have multiple origins and are consequently complex, but finally are ‘themselves in relation to others’, as are we all.²⁸

Macao is a multicultural melting pot, with a long history, a meeting point of Chinese, Europeans, Indians, Southeast Asians and others, so Macao Chinese are different from other Chinese. They managed to resist 450 years of Portuguese acculturation without any ‘clash’ and without changing the bases of their ‘Chineseness’.

Wang Gungwu 王赓武 writes about Greater China;²⁹ I simply examine Macao as a microcosm of China.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, it was difficult for Chinese to enter in Macao’s walled city, and in the beginning it was not possible for them to stay ‘*intramuras*’ overnight. However, Macao did attract Chinese merchants, interpreters and labourers. Some Chinese, in particular refugees and orphans, were converted to Christianity over the centuries due to famines or other calamities in the mainland. The Chinese Bazaar, at the centre of the walled city, was a commercial gathering place which gave to the territory an ancient name *Oumungaai*, ‘the Market of Macao’ (*Aomen jie* 澳门街). The Chinese villages within Portuguese Macao territory included Wangxia or Mongha (C), Longtian, Shalitou or Patane and Barra or Mazu Pagoda district among others.³⁰ Shalitou probably took its name from the old maritime pier where sand pear fruits might have been unloaded.³¹ Patane probably refers to Patani in South Thailand, a port of call for sailing ships coming to Macao from Europe and the Middle East, but this etymology is uncertain.

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The definition of the concept ‘identity’ in Chinese is difficult. Between the three following definitions of ‘identity’, we chose the third one which is the closest Chinese term:³²

Tongyixing 同一性, which more or less refers to ‘identity and unity’, is usually used to define ‘Chineseness’ more than ‘identity’.

Xiangtong 相同 mean ‘identical’, not ‘identity’.

Shenfen is the best translation, but is not perfect. It refers to ‘social status’, and appears on the government-issued ID card, or *shenfenzheng* 身份证, which includes data about official residence and status, as well as official ethnic (‘nationality’) identity.

Identity is complex in Macao. In 2010, in *Juridikum*, Tong mentioned during the Qing Dynasty a case of exception for the ‘Chinese residents who turned into Christians’ to whom Portuguese Law was applied. At present, the Chinese Law is applied to the Portuguese who have a Chinese passport.

On 28 February 2011, when it was opened on Taipa Island, outside, the new Immigration Center used Chinese characters as a priority. The staff was polite, but foreigners had to read the characters 外国人 to understand *waiguoren*, meaning ‘foreigners’, and follow the correct line. Few foreigners were present that day, mostly some Filipinas without knowledge of written Chinese. However, the façade of the building respects the Basic Law in relation to Portuguese; the new building has the Portuguese word ‘imigração’ (immigration) side by side with its Chinese equivalent.

The law of Macao is in Portuguese. Portuguese has consequently its own linguistic power. The Chinese translation of the law of the MSAR is not so reliable and Basic Law is the key law in Chinese and in Portuguese. The Basic Law is a reliable legal basis in the MSAR. So, the Executive Board of the Consultative Council for the Basic Law, headed by the former Chief Executive, is an essential body of the MSAR.

Can we say: ‘We do not dwell in a country, we dwell inside a language? At homeland this is it’.³³ *Putonghua* is not yet the dominant language in Macao, but Cantonese currently has less influence than in the year 2000. However, this language remains very useful for Cantonese speakers born in Macao, for many other Chinese who speak Cantonese, for a certain number of Macanese and for very rare Indonesian and Filipinos, who constantly speak Cantonese in Macao. Cantonese

residents in the MSAR are very proud of their mother tongue.

Research on identity requires a multi-disciplinary approach involving social sciences, including geography, linguistics and the study of religion. For example, Catholicism is a *sine qua non* identity marker of the Macanese minority, or *Tusheng*. Currently, a duality exists within the post-1999 structure of Macanese identity, but rare are the Macanese equally interested in both Portuguese and Chinese cultures.

The Macanese are often defined as ‘flexible’ in society. The Chinese are dominant and the Macanese perfectly adapted to the Portuguese culture first, but at present in MSAR follow the Chinese traditions more than before. Following the handover in 2000, Macanese and Chinese inter-marriages are more frequent. However, for the late first Macanese wife of Dr Stanley Ho, Clementina Leitão, it was a courageous decision in 1942 to marry a Chinese and not a Portuguese.

DIFFERENT CHINESE COMPONENTS OF MACAO CHINESE IDENTITY

1. *Gwongdungjan* (Cantonese) the majority of them are *Bundeijan* (C) meaning from Macao,
2. *Fukginjan* (C) including Hokkien or Hokhlo people, a key Fukienese group,
3. The Chaozhou or *Ciuzaujan* (C) linguistically related to the Hokkiens,
4. The Hakkas,
5. The Fishermen Tanka or *Tengaaajan* (C),
6. Other Chinese: Shanghainese or *Soenghoijan* (C), Hunanese and Chinese from other provinces,
7. The overseas Chinese (from Indonesia, Myanmar-Burma, Thailand, Vietnam...).

Before the handover, in December 1999, the population of Macao was adjusted partly because mainlanders from Guangdong and other provinces who had also another main residence in Macao could not be registered in both Census reports of the mainland and Macao. My estimated population of Macao in 1999 was 490,000 which came from intensive research at that time.³⁴ The official population of Macao was 513,000 in 2006, 538,000 in 2007, 542,000 in 2009 and 552,000 at the end of 2011.³⁵

In 1999 half of the legal immigrants came from Guangdong Province 2,408 against a total of 4,984. In 2007 and 2009 these percentages increased respectively

TABLE 1. Responses by generation of 100 interviewees from 100 selected households extracted from the household data: *Oumunjan* (Macao person), *Oumundak Zunggwokjan* (Chinese of Macao) and *Zunggwokjan* (Chinese)

	‘Macao’	‘Chinese of Macao’	‘Chinese’
Age 30 or below	19	23	6
Age 31 to 59	13	13	7
Age 60 or above	6	10	6
% overall	38	46	19

to 75% and 66%, 1,514 out of 2,221 and 2,099 out of a total of 3,121 immigrants.³⁶

In 1999, 2,206 legal immigrants came from Fujian (45% of the total); in 2007, 223 (10%) and in 2009, 339 (11% of the total of legal migrants). This confirms the importance of the Fukienese in the MSAR.

Other provinces and regions are less important concerning the migration to Macao. From Hunan, 108 migrants came to Macao in 1999 (2%), 101 in 2007 (5%) and 117 in 2009 (3%). From Guangxi, 68 came in 1999, 77 in 2007 and 131 in 2009 (4%). From Shanghai, 37 immigrants entered in Macao in 1999 and 25 in 2009 (less than 1%).

Wong Hon Keong (Huang Hanqiang 黄汉强) at the University of Macao gave a forecasted population of one million for 2021 to be reached before that date because the increasing economic development and the new closer relationship of Hengqin Island with the MSAR. The law in Hengqin will be the law of the PRC, except in the enclave of the University of Macao where the law of the MSAR prevails. Macao Chinese answering to my questionnaires, in 2011 constitute a large majority; however, the percentage of Cantonese will probably decrease in the future. Chinese of all provinces also want to be part of a dynamic new MSAR. So, the Macao Chinese are a ‘social barometer’ of the current and future social change in the MSAR.

To look at the origin of the visitors who come on an individual visit scheme gives an idea of the identity of the Chinese of Macao. The provinces most represented are: **Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang and Hunan. Shanghai and Beijing** are also significant

for Macao in the number of individuals visiting the MSAR. From Guangdong in particular in the year from July 2010 to the end of June 2011, more than 4 million entered Macao individually. Exactly 4,103,174 individuals compared to a total of more than 7 million visitors from Guangdong province.

The Fukienese on an individual basis are less numerous coming to the MSAR during the same one year period July 2010 to the end of June 2011: 114,314 against 755,153 visitors in groups.³⁷ Among other individual visitors on a one year basis in 2010-2011 are 320,000 Shanghainese, 189,000 from Beijing, 177,000 from Zhejiang and much less from Tianjin, Chongqing and Hunan.

The most remarkable figures are those of the Guangdong province showing that the Cantonese identity of Macao is for the moment secured by a high number of Cantonese entering the MSAR. In second place come the Fukienese. (Table 1)

The number of youth having a Portuguese passport is large, and consequently many of them answer ‘Macao’ instead of any other response. Remembering that those below 30 years of age are over-represented, out of the total of my interviewees we find that: 48% responded with ‘Macao’ (instead of 38% found in Table 1 which is a more balanced table for youth below 30 years of age, middle-age below 59 and elders of 60 years and more), 32%, with ‘Chinese of Macao’ (instead of 46% in Table 1) and 20% (instead of 19% in Table 1) simply with ‘Chinese’.

Note that 38+46+19=103. This total is greater than 100% because three respondents gave two answers instead of one, for example ‘Macao’ and

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‘Chinese of Macao’ instead of simply ‘Macao’. This is the case of the household No. 39 concerning these two answers (see the table for 100 respondents and households in Appendix). The others who gave two answers instead of one are numbered No. 20 and No. 111. Strangely two interviewees among these three cases were not born in Macao but gave also the Macao identity, we have not checked if they have a Portuguese passport.

These Chinese in my survey—the majority born in Macao—also have come from Hong Kong, Guangdong Province, Southeast Asia, Europe and even further from South America. An association in Macao, the *Aomen Guiqiao Zhonghui* 澳门归侨总会, is composed of overseas Chinese from more than twenty different countries. In my questionnaires, 12% of the respondents had family links in Southeast Asia and 41% had a brother, a sister or other kin in Hong Kong.

In fact, history and culture strengthen Cantonese identity, the dominant identity in the MSAR.

IMPORTANCE OF THE CANTONESE RESIDENTS IN THE MSAR

There is an evident acculturation of Cantonese in Macao, that linguistically and socially takes place, not through English as in Singapore and Hong Kong, but more through *Putonghua*. I discovered an increasing lack of knowledge of many kinship terms in Cantonese among informants born in Macao who are very fluent in their mother tongue. The new media orientation toward *Putonghua* in Guangzhou in 2010 has evidently influenced the MSAR. However, thanks to their literature and the rich Cantonese opera {*yueju* 粵劇, *yyut kek* (C)} we believe in the resilience of the Cantonese language, until the integration of Macao into Guangdong Province in 2049. Cantonese opera is a key cultural marker of Cantonese culture. The importance of Cantonese, the beauty of the costumes and the majesty of the performances play a part in the attraction of Cantonese opera among Macao Chinese. On Guia Hill, one of the favourite music programs the daily strollers listen to from their portable radio is Cantonese opera.

The Cantonese resilience is part of an essential mapping among the ‘totality of Chinese ethnicities in all their subtleties.’³⁸ The promotion of Cantonese is really a basis of Macao identity.

HOKKIEN FROM FUJIAN PROVINCE, THE SECOND GROUP OF MACAO CHINESE

It is evident that Macao Chinese from the Province of Fujian represent an important part of the population of the MSAR—some 20% of a population of 552,000 permanent residents. All of them could speak Cantonese correctly. During the 1950s, in Taiwan, the Hokkien language became less important. However, the Hokkiens and their dialect, *Minnanhua* 闽南话, have a huge cultural impact nowadays, in particular in the MSAR. *Minnanhua* is also known as Hokhlo 福佬, which is said to have originated from Heluo 河洛语, spoken in Henan Province. The main goddess of Macao, Mazu 妈祖, is primarily a Hokkien deity. The dynamism of the Hokkien community and of *Minnanhua* speakers was demonstrated at the ‘Singing Competition at the Forum’, in February 2011. The Forum was full and the audience enthusiastic. Deputy Chan Meng Kam, president of the Fukienese Association, and the Executive Member of the Government, Leong Heng Teng, were present at the Forum for this cultural event.

The Hokkien population most probably migrated from Henan, Middle China, to Fujian. In the Chinese term *Heluo* 河洛, *He* 河 refers to the River Huang He 黄河 and *Luo* 洛 refers to the Luoshui 洛水 a branch of the Huang He, the great river of North China.

To develop the economy and/or for political reasons, China is trying to reinforce the link among Hokkien speakers from Fujian, Macao and Taiwan. In my survey 16% spoke their own language, the dialect of the Hokkiens, *Oklo oe* (*Minnanhua* in *Putonghua*). ‘Hokkiens’ belong to an essential ‘ethno-linguistic’ group.³⁹ There are some 40 million Hokkien speakers in the world. Among the Hokkien speakers in Macao, Xiamen and Putian dialects are dominant. The Hokkiens thus constitute the second most important group in the MSAR, after the dominant Cantonese.

Following my enquiry among other Hokkiens around the Fujian Association—near the border of Zhuhai—I found that all are proud to use their mother tongue, but—elsewhere in town—the majority of them use Cantonese and prefer to use this language as a cultural marker. However, the Cantonese of MSAR and HKSAR may detect the provincial origin of non-Cantonese. The success of the Hokkien entrepreneur and re-elected Deputy of the Legislative Assembly,

Chan Meng Kam (Chen Ming Jin), plays a role in the development of the Hokkien community. The electoral success in September 2013 was a consequence of the dynamism of the Chinese of Macao having their origin in Fujian Province. The following example shows another significant socio-linguistic attitude at the grassroots level.

In 1975, Lim left Xiamen and entered Macao with his wife and eldest son. He did not graduate from secondary school. He understands Hokkien of course, but he became a Macao Chinese. His main language of communication is Cantonese, which now characterises his identity. He never returned to Xiamen, except once for the funeral of his father. Sometimes he even denies a good knowledge of his mother tongue, *Xiamenhua*, a branch of *Minnanhua*.

Consequently, identity is complex in the MSAR. The identity of the Chinese of Macao does exist. Georg Noack notes that:

Globalisation... widespread availability of international media and consumer goods has led to rapid societal change during the last twenty years and... conflicts between desires to catch up with a perceived global modernity and fears of losing one’s own identity, culture and values.⁴⁰

The mainlanders who became Macao Chinese and the following life stories illustrate the constraints of globalisation and other phenomena concerning the fears of losing one’s own identity.

The Chinese of Macao are not all from Guangdong and Fujian provinces. All the following categories may, taken together, constitute 30% of the population of the MSAR in 2011; this percentage will probably increase over the years.

These non-Cantonese and non-Fukienese Chinese of Macao may be the Chaozhou, linguistically related to the Hokkiens, the Hakkas, Shanghainese, and Hunanese, from other provinces of China and overseas Chinese, mainly from Southeast Asia. It should be mentioned that some Chinese permanent residents of the HKSAR can be permanent residents of the MSAR too. In general, they are initially from Hong Kong and they become permanent residents in Macao because they work there or because their family moved to Macao.

At present, the Chaozhou (Teochew) community is proportionally less important in Macao (4% of the Chinese community) than in Hong Kong, where some

8% of the whole Chinese population belongs to this group. They are not classified among the Cantonese even if they speak Cantonese fluently. The sea-oriented culture of the Chaozhou is a consequence of the lack of good roads in eastern Guangdong Province, as late as the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) and during the Republican Era. The Teochew have been sea-traders and travellers, and so are present in Southeast Asia, in particular in Thailand, and also in Macao. The current president of the Macao Chaozhou Association is Hoi Sai Iun (Xu Shi Yuan 许世元). He is also President of the General Association of Trade, President of the Charitable Association Tung Sin Tong and Vice-President of the Kiang Wu Association and Hospital. He received the Grand Lotus decoration of the MSAR for his achievements and for his successful development of association life in Macao.

In 2012, on 23 December, in Guangzhou, Leong Heng Teng, an influential Member of the Executive Council of MSAR, was the crucial member of an important delegation of the MSAR to the ‘Hengqin Island’ meeting in Guangzhou with the cadres of the Province of Guangdong. On 17 October, the cadres of Hengqin Island based in Zhuhai went to Macao International and Investment Fair to present the last evolution of this important bilateral development of the relation between Guangdong Province and the MSAR.

ASSOCIATIONS ARE CREATING LINKS IN THE MSAR AND ON THE MAINLAND

In 1867, Sampaio recognised in advance the key role of Chinese commercial associations in Macao.⁴¹ Guangdong and Fujian Provinces are the most important in creating a link with the mainland. Associations also help to develop the service economy which is lacking in the MSAR. Associations can actively and positively boost society, as an essential part of the binomial expression ‘society and economy’, promoted by this work, as basic to cultural and economic development.

What Deng Xiaoping said in 1961—‘Rise up and develop well Hainan Island, what one wills one can do’—could be applied to the MSAR.⁴²

Forty-five per cent of the Chinese of Macao who answered my questionnaires were members of at least one Association—usually one related to their place of origin, which is a fundamental identification for them.

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EDUCATION IS A PRIORITY TO UPGRADE MACAO'S IDENTITY

In Macao, dramatic changes occurred several times in recent history: after World War II, during the Cultural Revolution, following the handover of the former Portuguese colony to China and during the period 2000-2010. In 2011, the next great change is the planned transfer of the University of Macao to Hengqin Island, which will accelerate the general development of education in the MSAR. However, although the Province of Guangdong is playing a key role, even more important is the role of the mainland, which is essential for the MSAR.

To develop society and the economy, education and health are two priorities for the Chinese of Macao. The Sin Meng Association's 善明会 Survey points out the importance of education policy, with health institutions as second in importance.⁴³ It is certain that the happiness or 'subjective well-being' of Macao is quite high and things are changing in the MSAR.

It is not easy. The relocation of the University of Macao to Hengqin Island is a challenge not only for Tertiary Education Services (GAES) but for many sectors of the government. In 2013, an important part of the faculties of the main university of Macao will have to move to Hengqin Island. The countdown has already started.

Lao Chi Ngai of Hong Kong's Association of Economic Sciences has called for a necessary increased investment in education and vocational training.⁴⁴ The Sin Meng Association found that 79.6 per cent (2010) and 78.7 per cent (2011) considered seriously the problems of young people.⁴⁵ Culture and education are essential to try to solve these problems and upgrade local identity.

In comparison with Hong Kong, young people in Macao are traditionally not interested in questions of policy relating to the future of society. In 2011, some limited social movements occurred in Macao before the Chinese New Year. However, the Chinese of Macao are much less interested in the so-called 'democratisation of society' than are the 'Hongkongese'. It seems that in the MSAR, there is a tendency among those with higher levels of education to emphasise their Macao identity. Overall, half of my interviewees put 'Macao' ahead of the other two identities suggested ('Chinese of Macao' and 'Chinese'). The identity of the younger generation is more a 'Macao' identity than simply a 'Chinese' identity.

Young people and new legislation for the development of primary and secondary education are each essential.⁴⁶ Both primary and secondary education sectors, headed by the Director, Sou Chio Fai, have praised the extension of free education in the MSAR to fifteen years of schooling, as voted in 2007.⁴⁷ It will be useful to place the responsibility for schools and colleges at different levels, but it is not easy to implement this complex type of collective and individual responsibility. Ms Ho Teng Iat is sure that, after the handover, more women in Macao have access to tertiary education. Although Macao still needs to upgrade its education, a comparison with the situation twenty years ago shows a stark difference. In comparison with the situation in the Portuguese-speaking land of East Timor, Macao can be proud of its achievements, and Macao, with its use of English and *Putonghua*, will have powerful international languages.

CONCLUSION: GLOBALISATION AND IDENTITY

Macao's identity, although sometimes influenced by Hong Kong SAR, remains unique. As I pointed out in the conclusion of my book *Macao 2000*, the Basic Law is always 'an essential legal, political and diplomatic marker, but it also represents a complex social and economic synthesis of uncertainties and bright expectations'. Following the return to China and as well at present, the question of identity continue to be on the agenda of the MSAR, in parallel with the need to develop a competitive spirit in this new century of globalisation.

The main reason for the socio-economic development is the gaming industry. In the current period of world crisis, it is certain that there are risks involved in the fact that Macao has a single industry. In December 2011, Xi Jinping, the future president, stressed with President Hu that diversification was necessary. Again, mid-March 2013, just after being officially elected by the National People's Congress, the Chief Executive Chui was also asked to do his best. Already, in the 1990s, the diversification of the economy of Macao was a task on the agenda of Governor Rocha Vieira with his best links to the Lusophone World. Diversification is almost a dream for Macao. It is, however, a fact that gaming was financially successful in 2011 and 2012.

Why is globalisation crucial for the Chinese of Macao? These *Oumunjan* (Macao persons) are rather 'family-centric' but their Chineseness is confirmed in my survey. The Chinese of Macao and mainlanders have a long history, so they are well prepared to resist all sorts of coercion. In the MSAR and also in the Hong Kong SAR, young people tend to consider themselves localised; however, their identity seems more flexible in Macao than in Hong Kong. 'Hongkongers' are more proud of their origin. Yet again, the Chinese of Macao do not like to travel too much. But the Macanese and all other Chinese, mainlanders and overseas Chinese in particular in Southeast Asia, are certainly more 'globalised' today than they were in the 1960s and much more 'global' than the Chinese of Macao. Portuguese was useful but the Chinese of Macao had no will to study other languages than Cantonese. At that time it was difficult for the Chinese of Macao to find a local job in Macao, so many Chinese of Macao did not travel. They had no money to travel and had no education to find solutions and even no will to go abroad.

In 2011, Macao is in competition with Las Vegas and indirectly also with Singapore. Globalisation is 'truly a myth', but it is a powerful discourse.⁴⁸ However, let us hope that globalisation does not really mean the homogenisation of our world. The small autonomous region, Macao, is a kaleidoscope of sub-groups and minorities. 'We have to radically question an economic vision which particularises everything' and does not care enough about society.

'McDonaldisation' is common in New York City and Macao. Like mobile phones and the web, McDonald's is part of a global social phenomenon, globalisation. In the MSAR, many McDonald's restaurants are open twenty-four hours a day.

However, the mainland and the MSAR are in constant transformation. In 1981, 75 per cent of the five million 'tourists' who entered Macao were Hong Kong residents. Nowadays mainlanders are the most numerous visitors, more than 50 per cent of the total; visitors from Hong Kong are now fewer than 30 per cent. In 1996 Macao welcomed eight million visitors. This number of visitor arrivals is not impressive compared to the 25 million 'tourists' who entered the MSAR in 2010.⁴⁹ In 2011, mainlanders were the majority (some 58 per cent) of the 28 million visitor-entries in Macao, as confirmed by

official statistics. However, in 2012 almost 30 million entries were mentioned by the Government of MSAR Statistics and Census Service. In 2013, for the Chinese New Year in seven days almost a million for the first time managed to travel the main border *Guanjia*. It is necessary to encourage mutual aid and co-operation among the leaders of the administrative region and also from among the people themselves to cope with this mass of tourism. In reality, it is difficult to keep its own identity in such a rapid social change. So, we cannot say that the Chinese of Macao who have relatively good jobs in the casino industry will be exempt from the perturbations of the 'globalised' world and we have to be careful to mention the concept *psyche* of the Chinese. However, such a global view needs a serious consideration of the local viewpoint for the harmony of the essential identity of the Chinese in Macao. Their 'Chineseness' was confirmed by Cathryn Clayton (2009), an anthropologist who taught at the University of Macao, and by my own work.

The Macao SAR is not as big as the Hong Kong SAR and civil society is not strong despite the dedication of scholars such as Bill Chou, so the Cantonese language must be protected to keep the identity of Macao alive. It may be subject to discussion, but sinicisation brings unity, modernisation and progress, but also some constraints for the Chinese of Macao. They now have to use more *Putonghua* and English. The Hongkongese are more able to protect their rights than the Chinese of Macao. In the last twenty years, around 50 per cent of the population of Macao, formerly from the mainland, became resident in the MSAR. It would be utopian to try to promote Macao too strongly, as its current territory of only 29.9 square kilometres obviously limits its possibilities.⁵⁰ However, Macao's market 'has not yet reached its maturity stage in recruiting talent online'.⁵¹

Because of the rapid social and economic changes in the MSAR, it remains important to study and restudy the uniqueness of Macao's identity and the local Cantonese culture, traditions and way of life. Creativity remains a key element in the cultural development of the Chinese of Macao as well as other Chinese in the MSAR. The gaming economy and the Chinese of Macao will continue to be essential for the present and future research in society and economy to define Macao's identity and its dynamism. **RC**

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ABBREVIATIONS

ARB: *Aomen Ribao* (Macao Daily News, in Chinese)
C: Cantonese
CIC: Cultural Industry Committee
DSEC: Documentation and Information Centre of the Statistics and Census Service
HKSAR: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
IACM: Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau

IMM: International Institute of Macao
JTM: *Jornal Tribuna de Macau*
MSAR: Macao Special Administrative Region
MDT: *Macao Daily Times*
MOP: *Meio Oficial de Pagamento*, the currency of Macao
PRC: People's Republic of China

NOTES

1 Similar attempts to define Macao can be found in R. D. Cremer (ed.), *Macao City of Commerce and Culture. Continuity and Change* (Hong Kong: API Press, 1991), in which specialists in different sectors are invited to address the case of Macao. See the chapter written by Tong Io Cheng, ‘The Basic Law and the Chinese of Macau’, p. 67.

2 Cathryn H. Clayton, *Sovereignty at the Edge: Macau and the Question of Chineseness*, p. 303.

3 Stephen Frosh and Lisa Baraitser, ‘Goodbye to Identity?’, p. 168

4 Michael E. Degolyer, ‘Identity in the Politics of Transition: The Case of HK, Asia’s World City’, p. 28

5 Tong Io Cheng, ‘The Basic Law and the Chinese of Macau’, pp. 67-68.

6 Quoted by Tong Io Cheng (Berlie, *The Chinese of Macau a Decade after the Handover*, p. 67); Xiao Weiyun 肖蔚云, ‘Conferência Sobre a Lei Básica de Macau’, p. 55.

7 Bourdieu’s Habitus, 2012.

8 Noack, *Local Traditions, Global Modernities: Dress. Identity and the Creation of Public Self-Images in Contemporary Urban Myanmar*, p. 186.

9 ‘Habitus’, 2012.

10 Tong Io Cheng, ‘The Basic Law and the Chinese of Macau’, pp. 67-77.

11 *L’Identité: Séminaire interdisciplinaire dirigé par Claude Lévi-Strauss, professeur au Collège de France* (Paris: Grasset, 1977).

12 *The Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China*, Chap. 4, Art. 46.

13 *The Basic Law*, Chap. I, Art. 9. <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbj/zjzg/tyfls/tyfl/2626/t15467.htm>. Consulted 12 June 2011.

14 Hao Zhidong, *Macao History and Society*, p. 198.

15 Michael Minkov, *Cultural Differences in a Globalising World* (Bingley, UK: Emerald, 2011), p. 69.

16 Interview of Fernando Eloy with the *Jornal Tribuna de Macau*, 1 August 2011, pp. 8-9.

17 *Macao Daily Times*, 30 December 2010, p. 7.

18 *Hoje Macau*, 21 December 2011, p. 31.

19 *Putonghua*, Mandarin Chinese is transliterated in *pinyin* and Cantonese in Jyutping from the Linguistic Society of Hong Kong. This improvement concerning Cantonese romanisation started in 1993. Here, some mistakes may exist. The family names in particular have complex transcription. Romanisation of the names in Cantonese in Macao and Hong Kong may also sometimes differ. For Cantonese language a (C) sometimes follows the transliteration of the word.

20 Hao Zhidong, *Macao History and Society*, p. 207.

21 Alex Mucchielli, *L’ Identité* (Identity) (Paris: PUF, 2007), p. 5. For ‘diversity’ see Hervé Lebras, and Emmanuel Todd, *L’Invention de la*

France. Atlas anthropologique et politique, pp. 9, 11, 25. The concept of ‘way of life’ is also essential.

22 *Jornal Tribuna de Macau*, 28 November 2011, p. 7.

23 Francisco Antonio da Roza, ‘Journeys’ (Story of a Life lived in Macao and Shanghai in the 1950s), see António M. Pacheco J. da Silva, *The Portuguese Community in Shanghai : A Pictorial History* (Macao: Conselho das Comunidades Macaenses/Instituto Internacional de Macau, 2012).

24 *A Museum in an Historical Site* (sic...), Macau Museum, 1999, pp. 9-10.

25 The Association of Goa is very active in Macao. The majority of its members are Catholic and Hindu. On Saturday 10 December, 2011, the Association named ‘Nucleo de Animação Cultural de Goa, Damão e Diu’ met in Coloane for the Christmas party. The President is Sharoz D. Pernencar and the board has five members.

26 Interview with Gary Ngai, 17 February 2011.

27 Hao Zhidong, *Macao History and Society*, pp. 206-207.

28 Cathryn H. Clayton, *Sovereignty at the Edge: Macau and the Question of Chineseness*, pp. 9, 264; Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

29 Wang Gungwu, *The Chineseness of China* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991).

30 Li Fulin 李福麟, *Aomen Sigeban Shiji* 澳门四个半世纪 (Macao: Four Centuries and a Half), Macau, 1995, p. 17; C. C. Choi, ‘Settlements on Chinese Families’, in *Macao City of Commerce and Culture. Continuity and Change*, edited by R. D. Cremer, pp. 61-63, 77.

31 Paul Spooner, interviews with the author in February 2011.

32 *French-Chinese Dictionary* (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1983).

33 Emil Cioran, *Aveux et Anathèmes* (Confessions and Anathema) (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), p. 21.

34 J. A. Berlie (ed.), *Macao 2000*.

35 *Macao’s Demographic Statistics 2009* (Macao: DSEC, 2010), p. 6.

36 *Yearbook of Statistics 2009* (Macao: DSEC, 2010), p. 77.

37 *Tourism Indicators* no. 5 (Macao: DSEC, May 2011), pp. 1-2.

38 Gregory E. Guldin, ‘Hong Kong Ethnicity of Folk Models and Change’, in *Hong Kong. The Anthropology of a Chinese Metropolis*, edited by Grant Evans and Maria Tam (Richmond Surrey: Curzon, 1997), p. 38.

39 Ibid., p. 50.

40 Georg Noack, *Local Traditions, Global Modernities: Dress, Identity and the Creation of Public Self-Images in Contemporary Urban Myanmar*.

41 Manuel de Castro Sampaio, *Os Chins de Macau* (The Chinese of Macao), chap. XII.

42 *Dahui Zai Aomen* 大会在澳门 (Grand Meeting in Macao). Hainan: Hainan Baoping (5th International Federation of Hainan Associations and Macau Hainan Provincial Association), c. 1992, p. 13.

43 *Happiness Survey*, 2011, p. 28. Some laymen and scholars express doubts about the measurability of happiness. The World Health Organization, however, shows that societies with less happy people tend to have more health problem (Michael Minkov, *Cultural Differences in a Globalising World*, p. 80).

44 *Macao Daily Times*, 20 January 2011.

45 *Happiness Survey*, 2011, p. 28.

46 *Jornal Tribuna de Macau*, 4 January 2011, p. 13.

47 *Ponto Final*, 22 February 2011, p. 6.

48 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Le mythe de la “mondialisation” et l’Etat social européen’, in *Contre-Feux* (Paris: Liber, 1998), pp. 39, 46.

49 *Tourism Indicators* no. 6 (Macao: DSEC, 2011), p. 1.

50 *Environmental Statistics 2010* (Macao: DSEC, May 2011). www.dsec.gov.mo. Consulted 16 May 2011.

51 <http://calvinayrwayre.com/2011/07/13/casino/macau-needs-more-workers/> July 15 2011.

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
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Fig. 1: Cantino planisphere (1502). Biblioteca Estense, Modena, Italy.



The Conflict and Merging Between Eastern and Western Cultures from the Perspective of the Christian Art in Macao

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INTRODUCTION

Macao—a place with an area of less than three square kilometers, located on the coast of the South China Sea, is part of Xiangshan County, Guangdong province (now Zhongshan City). Although Macao is a tiny place, it plays an extremely important role in ‘The Influence of Western Paintings on Chinese Paintings’ as well as Sino-western cultural exchanges in the modern history of China.

Since the ‘Age of Discovery’ of the 16th century, more and more westerners, driven by great economic interests, came to Macao. Macao thus became a platform for east-west exchanges. Meanwhile, Christianity was introduced into Macao as well. Actually at the very beginning, western art was introduced into China

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through the Christian art, which has its special form of expression and language. The process from input to localisation to output of Macao's art can also be considered the process of contact, conflict, and merging between Eastern and Western Art. (Fig. 1)

THE JESUITS' JOURNEY TO THE EAST

The first missionary setting foot in China was one of the founders of the Jesuits—Franciscus Xavier (1506-1552). Unfortunately, Xavier was not able to enter the mainland of China because of his poor physical and spiritual condition after such a long journey to China. He died in 1552 on the Shangchuan Island, only 30 kilometers away from Guangzhou. (Fig. 2) Only one year later the Portuguese began to trade and settle in Macao. On 23 January 1576, the Diocese of Macao was established according to the order of Pope Gregory XIII. Macao thus became the missionary base for Christianity in the Far East.

Fig. 2: The Miracles of St. Francis Xavier by Peter Paul Rubens, c. 1617-1618. Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna, Austria.



THE FIRST PERSON INITIATING ART EDUCATION IN MACAO—GIOVANNI NICOLAO

Giovanni Nicolao (1560-1626), a Jesuit Italian painter, was born in 1560 in Nola—a small town in Naples of Italy. On 7 August 1582, Nicolao, together with Matteo Ricci, Francesco Pasio, and a total of eight people arrived in Macao.

Nicolao's coming to Macao is a milestone for the development of western art in Macao. He changed the situation where the Christian art in Macao had been dependent upon importation from foreigners. The first oil painting work that Nicolao created for the church after he came to Macao is the 'Portrait of Jesus Christ'. This was also the first oil painting created by a westerner in China. Moreover, in February 1583, Nicolao established an art studio in Macao, which can be considered the beginning of western art education in Macao. Lots of Macao local artists were educated there. Although soon he went to Nagasaki in Japan to teach western painting there, he brought the students back to Macao, after the Persecution of Christians in Japan in 1614, to continue to live and paint.

Nicolao was a pioneer and played an important role in spreading western paintings in Asia. He copied and created lots of religious paintings after coming to Macao, thus propelling the prosperity of Macao's art as well as the introduction of 'The Influence of Western Paintings on Chinese Paintings' into China. Some of his students became very well-known, such as Jacques Niva, Emanuel Pereira, François de Lagoa, Mancio Taichiku, Pedro Chicuan, Tadeu, etc. (Wu, 2009).

THE FIRST OIL PAINTING BY A CHINESE: PORTRAIT OF MATTEO RICCI

Emmanuele Yu Wen-Hui, also known as 'Emanuel Pereira' is a Macao Chinese painter. He was born in Macao in 1575. He studied painting with Giovanni Nicolao and showed great interest and talent.

The 'Portrait of Matteo Ricci' (Fig. 3) was as far as we know the first oil painting by a Chinese. It was finished by Emmanuele Yu Wen-Hui on Matteo Ricci's deathbed in Beijing in May, 1610 (Ricci, 2010).

This painting had a great significance in the trend of 'the influence of western paintings on Chinese paintings.' It vividly depicted the costumes, the manner,



Fig. 3: Portrait of Matteo Ricci by Emmanuele Yu Wen-Hui, 1610. Chiesa del Gesu, Rome, Italy.

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and the expression of Matteo Ricci—a Jesuit pioneer in China. Above all, it also reflected Ricci's confusion, longing for change, adaptation, finally developing his particular missionary ideas of 'acculturation' after he came to China in the late Ming Dynasty at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries. Meanwhile, the application of western painting techniques on Chinese paintings shows that the Chinese painter was both influenced by the western painting style of the late Renaissance and the Chinese portrait painting of the Ming Dynasty.

THE RUINS OF ST. PAUL'S CATHEDRAL: A COMBINATION OF EAST AND WEST

The next case of Christian art in Macao can be demonstrated by the most famous landmark of Macao—the Ruins of St. Paul's cathedral, also known as 'Da San Ba'. Since it has a special historic and cultural background, it attracts both tourists and scholars from all over the world to visit and study it.

It was firstly built in 1580 and was destroyed by fire three times. Today's Ruins of St. Paul was designed and rebuilt in 1602 by an Italian Jesuit priest, Spinola, together with some Japanese craftsmen, and finally completed in 1637.

The Ruins of St. Paul is 23.46 meters in height and 23 meters in width. It adopted both the early baroque style of mannerism as well as the Renaissance symmetrical style (Xing, 2006). The Ruins of St. Paul consists of five levels. Each level with different statues and contents has its different symbolic meanings. The five levels show respectively from the top to the bottom: the Trinity, the Crucifix, the Immaculate Conception, the saints, and the mortal world.

The richness of contents and diversity of architectural style of the Ruins of St. Paul are unique among all baroque churches. Moreover, it is not difficult for us to find out different ways of expressing the theme between the East and the West. For instance, the decoration of western churches focuses on people from the Bible. However in the Ruins of St. Paul, we actually can figure out lots of narrative plots from the Bible which demonstrate its symbolic meanings. For instance, on the fourth level of the Crucifixion of Jesus, each instrument of torture represents a crucial moment from the arrest till the Crucifixion of Jesus. Furthermore, the traditional Christian symbolic icons have been adjusted to be more easily understood and

accepted by Chinese people. Lots of Chinese elements have been added. The Christian saints have eastern-like faces. Some floral patterns as well as the appearance of Chinese characters on the Ruins of St. Paul all demonstrate such a great merging between the East and the West. The Ruins of St. Paul reveals the stories of the Bible through the icons, each of which contains rich symbolic meanings.

THE FRESCO IN THE GUIA CHAPEL OF MACAO

The Guia chapel, also known as the Our Lady of the Snow Palace, is an old chapel built in the 17th century. It is so far the only completely preserved old chapel in Macao (Dai 2009). The unique fresco style inside the chapel is also a magnificent example of the perfect integration between the western Christian art and traditional Chinese art. (Fig. 4)

The Guia chapel was built around 1622. It was originally named after the legend of 'Our Lady of the Snow' who is regarded as the god of navigation, that is, to protect the Portuguese maritime trade (Chen, 2006).

The content of the fresco is still based on the images and stories of the Bible, such as: angels playing the trumpet, the Virgin Mary and her Child, John the Baptist, the Jesuits' logo, pigeons, lion column bases, star aniseed, eight concentric ellipses with flame, Cherubim, the sun and the moon patterns, two-headed eagles, Chinese flowers, geometrical figures, auspicious clouds, rocks and so on. Both Chinese and western images can be found on the frescos. For instance, the pigeon symbolising the Holy Spirit is definitely a western image. The various potted plants and rocks are images from traditional Chinese landscape paintings. Angels and two-headed eagles are the products of western cultures, while the Chinese unicorn which looks like a Chinese lion is a typical Chinese image.

In addition to the content of the fresco, the painting techniques can also be one of the highlights of the integration between two cultures. The mural of the Guia chapel was originally a fresco, but the secco techniques were also adopted in some parts. Therefore it is a combination of fresco and secco paintings (Dai 2009). In addition to the special materials it has adopted, the use of colors is also special. The main colors of the fresco are red, brown, black, and green. Some parts use blue and white. The red pigments used

actually come from the Chinese cinnabar and red lead. Other pigments are from Europe. Besides the use of Western painting techniques, the fresco mostly adopts traditional Chinese line drawing techniques. The Western composition with brush stroke outlines makes all lines calm, soft, and interesting so as to be accepted and loved by the Chinese people. All the lines, the techniques, and the images form a very typical style by adopting different cultural elements.

CONCLUSION

Four-hundred-and-fifty years ago, due to Macao's unique geographical position and historical background, it became the frontier of the conflict and

merging between Eastern and Western cultures and arts, and thus reached its first climax of 'The Influence of Western Paintings on Chinese Paintings'—the introduction of Christian art into China. The exchange of different civilisations is essential for human cultural development. Travel and communication were two of the main ways to fulfill such a purpose at that time.

First, the Western art works which were introduced into Macao in the 16th century were mostly based on the theme of Christianity. Whether regarding the theme and the characters of painting, they were either Christian icons or Bible stories. Therefore, Chinese modern art was influenced by the West through religious paintings at the beginning. The Christian art in Macao carries symbolic features

Fig. 4: Fresco in the Guia chapel, detail. Early 17th century.



of the Western Christian art, which can be seen in the interpretation of Macao art works. Second, Macao’s Christian art is not a simple copy. It has integrated its unique Chinese cultural elements into it. The merging and conflict of two cultures form Macao’s unique culture—coexistence of different cultures. Furthermore, the Christian art in Macao has a diverse cultural characteristic. It is not only influenced by Western Christian art, but also influenced by other Asian cultures, such as Japan and India. All in all,

Macao’s early fine arts are a unique work of art with the integration of Chinese culture and painting features on the basis of Christian art as the main themes and forms and symbolic style of the Western Christian art. Macao’s early fine arts play an important role in the communication and integration between Chinese and Western cultures through the absorption and creation of Christian works of art. This phenomenon plays a positive role in establishing the city image as well as the cultural orientation of Macao today. **RC**

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The French as Architectural Trendsetters in Canton, 1767-1820

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From fashion to philosophy, the French influence in the 18th century was widespread. Paris was the cultural capital of Europe; French painting and architecture exerted an influence well beyond France’s borders; and French was the language of the upper class in such diverse locations as Sweden and Russia.

It is therefore not surprising to discover that from the late 1760s to the 1830s, this influence also extended to the international trading community at Canton. Here, in what was already a thriving commercial district situated on the riverfront just southwest of the Canton city walls, Europeans and (after 1784) Americans, as well as Armenians and Parsees, were housed in buildings known as hong 行. These hong are also sometimes referred to as ‘factories’ or ‘foreign factories’; the word derives from a former usage of the word ‘factor,’ meaning ‘business agent’.

Plans dating from the first half of the 19th century show that the hong were built on a north-south axis and were rectangular in shape.¹ The length was several times the width; a French resident described the French hong as being 130-150 *pieds* (41.6-48

metres) long and about 50-60 *pieds* (16-19.2 metres) wide.² The short sides of the buildings faced north and south, while the long sides faced east and west. The Chinese considered the front of the building to be the north side, which faced Thirteen Hong Street, while the international community considered the south side, which faced the river, to be the front.

The hong were not unique to the international community; they were an already extant building type that served as business premises for the Chinese merchants who owned them. A number of the hong, however, were rented out to (and later, sometimes owned by) the various nations coming to Canton to trade.³

The owners of the hong belonged to that select group of Chinese traders known as hong merchants. According to 19th-century American merchant William Wood, it was the buildings themselves that gave this group their name.

The hong merchants derive their title from their warehouses, which are long ranges of buildings, with a wide avenue, or passage, from one extremity to the other; these in Chinese are called *Hung*, and by corruption *Hong*.⁴

As the volume of international trade with China increased during the 18th century, so did the number of merchants and ship’s officers involved in that trade. The hong provided accommodations as well as office space and warehouse space, thereby fulfilling a triple function for members of the international community. While some of the hong remained in use wholly by

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local merchants, others were rented out, in part or in entirety, to the various nations, and later to individuals, coming to Canton to trade.⁵

But a hong was far more than just a useful building, especially during the third quarter of the 18th century. That period was marked by keen competition among the various European nations trading with China, and one of the ways that this rivalry came to be manifested was in the hong. As the most visible symbol of a nation’s presence at Canton, the hong became the face of that nation—and the outward expression of its success in the highly competitive Canton trade.

It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that paintings created by Cantonese artists and presenting views of the hong were in high demand by members of the international community, who purchased the paintings as souvenirs of their time in China. Such paintings show not only what the hong looked like, but also enable us to follow the evolution of their façades. Backed up by written descriptions and other information provided by traders of the era, they show that Cantonese artists paid considerable attention to changes taking place on the riverfront, which they rendered, sometimes in considerable detail, in their portrayals of the hong.

The earliest renovations that can be documented, whether in writing or in painting, date from the late 1760s, when several nations carried out alterations to their building’s façade. This façade, or front, was the south elevation of the building, that is, the side facing the river, which the international community (though not the Chinese) regarded as the principal side.

Renovations were often functional in nature, such as when rooms were added to provide additional needed space. But they quickly became an arena for competition—not merely keeping up with rival nations, but of surpassing them. The French almost immediately became a model to emulate.

The French carried out the first documented renovations on their hong in 1767, seventeen years after they began renting it from the hong merchant Tinkoa.⁶ The renovations immediately set their hong apart visually from its neighbors. But it did not remain unique for long. Within a year and a half, similar renovations were underway on the Swedish hong, which was adjacent to the French on the east.

Thus began a trend that lasted for approximately half a century. By 1772, three hong showed a south

elevation that resembled that of the French. Three more showed a strong French influence in the upper storey alone. By 1822, when a major fire swept through the area and all of the buildings were destroyed, no fewer than eight of the hong bore a south elevation influenced by the French.

A closer examination of the renovations, however, shows that the French were not only trendsetters; they were also agents—we might call them go-betweens—who married features of Cantonese vernacular architecture to those of European origin in their transformation of their hong’s façade.

THE HONG AS AN EXAMPLE OF LOCAL CANTONESE BUILDING TRADITIONS

Descriptions of the hong as they looked prior to renovation, in accounts written by members of the 18th- and early 19th-century international trading community, suggest that the hong not only exemplified Cantonese vernacular architecture, but also retained a number of local features for several decades.

Many of these features were climate-related and were intended to minimise the effects of the hot sun and high humidity of South China. The building’s exterior, for example, was plain and unadorned. To lessen the build-up of heat in the walls and the interior, the surface of the exterior was light-colored, and often whitewashed. There were few windows. The main entry was through a door on the north side of the building, which did not receive direct sunlight.

The building’s interior was composed of a series of built and open spaces that were laid out on a single axis, and included a feature known as a skywell (*tian jing* 天井). Open to the sky and accessible only from within the building or from above, the skywell was a type of atrium or interior courtyard. Most importantly, it allowed light and air to enter, and provided ventilation. Although skywells were used in other parts of the country, it was a particularly important consideration in the sultry climate of South China, for not only did it contribute to comfort, but it also helped to stave off mould. This was an important consideration, for mould and damp could spell disaster for a merchant’s inventory.

Building materials consisted primarily of brick and stone, while tiles were used for the roof. Stone

was used for the foundations, and brick and flagstone to pave both the ground floor and the yard; these were measures against damp. These materials were also used in a type of dwelling known as the ‘bamboo tube,’ which may have been related in structure and layout to the hong. Typical of urban Guangzhou, the bamboo-tube type is believed to have appeared there in the early 19th century as a response to crowding and increased land prices.⁷

Such, then, were the characteristics of the building on which the French carried out a series of renovations in 1767. The French had been renting that particular hong since 1750.⁸ Their landlord, the hong merchant Tinkoa, apparently did not object to the renovations, perhaps because they did not alter the core structure of the building, or perhaps because the French bore a significant portion of the cost of renovations.

But there might also have been a third reason, one that until now has not been recognised: that Tinkoa regarded the renovations as a variant of local architectural traditions, to which he had little, if any, reason to object.

The renovations that set the French on their path as architectural trendsetters may be readily identified in paintings of the hong. As has already been noted, the Cantonese artists who executed them seem to have kept very much up-to-date on changes occurring on

the riverfront, for their paintings record such details as renovations to individual buildings and the presence—or absence—of national flags, which flew outside the respective hong. Details of this type could easily change from one year to the next.⁹

Though precise written details about the French renovations in 1767 have yet to surface, a scene dated to 1769-1770 on a porcelain punchbowl from Peabody Essex Museum in Salem, Massachusetts, gives us an idea of what those initial renovations of 1767 included.¹⁰ The bowl shows a centrally-placed front door, flanked on both sides by three tall, narrow windows whose proportions echo the tall, narrow shape of the door. Surmounting the door is a pediment. The pediment appears to be practical as well as decorative, for it would have offered protection from sun and rain to persons about to enter the building.

The upper storey features a balcony edged by a balustrade. The roof of the balcony is supported by four columns without capitals. With the exception of the turned forms of the balusters (the short spindles supporting the balcony railing), the entire elevation is rectilinear in nature. Only the curves of the balusters soften the severity of the design.

Not shown on the punch bowl but most likely in place in 1767, and certainly by 1770, is the upper storey’s veranda.¹¹ The veranda was a long, narrow rectangular space covered by a roof, and was built out

Plate 1. *View of the Hong*, 1773. Courtesy Martyn Gregory Gallery, London.



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along the entire length of the façade on the hong’s upper floor.

Its most visually striking feature was its arcade. The arcade was composed of seven arched openings; their lower part included a balustrade. [Plate 1] In addition to marking the outer edge of the veranda, the arcade also formed an open-work screen through which light and air could pass to the space immediately behind it—that is, the veranda itself.

Thus the veranda offered shelter from the sun, allowed air to circulate, and provided a space where people could walk or stand. A member of the French community described it as an open terrace for strolls that was situated above the [front] door of the hong and from which one could view all the movement on the river, a very pleasant view in a country where nearly all communications were carried out via the water.¹²

EMULATING THE FRENCH

The first emulators of the French were the Swedes, whose hong (Building #11) was adjacent to that of the French and which the Swedes remodeled just a year or two later, in 1768-1769. The same punch bowl shows the French influence in both the vocabulary of motifs—the roofed balcony, the columns, and the balustrade—as well as in the placement of these features. On the ground floor, the centrally placed door is flanked on each side by symmetrically placed windows. As in the French hong, the windows are noticeably taller than they are wide. The upper storey features a veranda with an arcade.

A letter written in 1769 by one of the Swedish traders at Canton indicates that the renovations included the addition of a *collonade* [*kolonnad*].¹³ By ‘colonnade,’ the letter-writer undoubtedly meant ‘arcade,’ as a drawing by Capt. Ekeberg dated to 1770 suggests. According to the Swedish Academy, the first mention of a more specific word for ‘arcade,’ *pelargång*, did not occur until 1765, just three to four years before the feature was added to the hong. As this new term would have taken some while to come into common use, the writer may not have been familiar with it, whereas *kolonnad* had been in use since at least 1712.¹⁴

The differences between the Swedish and French hong are minor: the Swedish hong has two

windows on each side of the front door instead of three, and five arches in the arcade instead of seven. Pilasters are used instead of columns (though there is some similarity in the fact that the columns, like the pilasters, are engaged, not free-standing). And instead of a single pilaster to flank, and thus emphasise, the central arcade, the Swedish hong makes use of a pair of pilasters.

The most significant difference between the two hong, in fact, occurred not in the windows or arcade, but in the addition of five rooms to the upper floor.

The first few years of hong renovations show that the chief characteristics that would be emulated were already present by 1770. These characteristics would continue to appear on façades influenced by the French during the half-century from 1767 to 1822, and included:

- (a) The concentration of renovations on the exterior of the south elevation of the hong, with no apparent alteration to the building’s interior structure;
- (b) A sensitivity to considerations of climate;
- (c) A preference for symmetrical design, exhibited in the central placement of windows (fenestration), doors and arches;
- (d) A fondness for tall, narrow elements in windows and arches, as expressed in a width-to-height ratio of approximately 1:4 or 1:3;
- (e) A basic vocabulary of forms, or elements, consisting of the following:

Ground floor:

- Single, centrally-placed entrance
- Pediment surmounting the front door
- Rectangular windows

Upper storey:

- Veranda with an arcade and balustrade
- Use of an uneven number of arches in the arcade
- Use of strongly defined columns or pilasters in the arcade.

ORIGINS OF THE RENOVATION FEATURES:
WHERE DID THEY COME FROM?

Until now, the sources of the features added during renovations have been presumed to be of Western origin, and their incorporation in the hong has been considered a form of Westernisation. However,



Plate 2: *View of the Hong*, 1781. Courtesy Martyn Gregory Gallery, London.

little, if any, attention has been given to the possible influence of Cantonese vernacular architecture.

The Western sources lie primarily in the Baroque, the style that was dominant in Europe in the 17th and early 18th centuries. In France, it is closely associated with the centralisation of power under a strong monarch, and is especially linked to the reign of Louis XIV (personal reign 1661-1715). In architecture, it is characterised by a sense of grandeur, monumentality, or great size, and symmetry. Pediments as well as Corinthian columns and pilasters, placed in symmetrical fashion, are typical elements of the style, which continued to be influential even after the death of Louis XIV.

While Western-inspired features became increasingly more evident in the years approaching the end of the 18th century, yet it is possible, especially in the early years of hong renovation, that the renovations

represented local as well as imported sources of inspiration. As Dutch records show, repairs and renovations to the hong were carried out by carpenters, bricklayers, masons and other craftsmen hired locally.¹⁵ In the 1760s and 1770s especially, when renovation was still a new phenomenon, the builders and artisans brought a knowledge of local styles and practices to their work, even as they were acquiring familiarity with Western architectural features. Gradually, the local influence waned, and European designs became more prevalent.

This is not to say that European features were entirely absent in the beginning. Certain features, such as the pediment or the style of the windows, were of Western inspiration. So were some of the materials used in making them; glass, for example, had to be imported from Europe.

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ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF EMULATION OF THE FRENCH

A 1781 painting shows the hong as they looked in 1781. [Plate 2] The features of the French hong are familiar from earlier paintings: the front door, for example, is flanked by three windows on each side. Like the door, the windows are tall and narrow, with a height-to-width ratio of close to 4:1. On the upper floor, seven arches constitute an arcade.

The central arch is slightly wider than the other six, and it is the only arch that has a keystone. The arches are separated from each other by Corinthian columns, the most elaborate of the three orders of columns. The components of the balusters are rounded, echoing the rounded form of the arches and contrasting with the more severe straight lines of the windows, doors, and other vertical elements. Symmetry is widely apparent in the three windows

on each side of the door, which in turn are echoed by the three arches on each side of the central arch of the arcade above. Symmetry may also be seen in the balusters (five balusters per bay, except for the central arch, which has six) and their turned components (seven per baluster, ranging in size from small to large, and arranged in a pattern: medium, small, large, large, large, small, medium).

The Swedish hong (Building #11), which is located in between the French (Building #10) and Old English (Building #12) hong, clearly owes a debt to the French. The centred front door is flanked on each side by tall, narrow windows with a height-to-width ratio of approximately 3 to 1, including the semicircular blind fanlight above the window. On the upper floor, an uneven number of arches run the length of the elevation, and the central arch is slightly wider than the others. The balusters of the balustrade are almost identical in shape to those of the French. Through

Plate 3: *View of the Hong*s, 1796. Courtesy Martyn Gregory Gallery, London.



Plate 4: *View of the Hong*s, 1820. Courtesy Martyn Gregory Gallery, London.

the archways, one can see the paned windows of the building's exterior wall.

The Swedes have also made variations that echo the renovations of the French while yet distinguishing their hong from the French building. The doorway, for example, is crowned not by a pediment but by a fanlight, and is flanked by two rusticated pilasters that jut out just slightly from the wall surface. On the upper floor, there are only five arches, not seven, and every arch has a keystone. The arches are flanked not by engaged columns but by pilasters, and the central arch is flanked not by one pilaster, but by two. As in the French hong, however, these, too, are topped by Corinthian capitals. Each bay of the balustrade contains six, not five, balusters.

Elements of French inspiration may also be seen in the Old English hong, which is on the east (the viewer's right) side of the Swedish hong. The upper storey is very similar to the French-inspired Swedish upper storey. The arcade is composed of five arches, with

the central one slightly wider than the other four. The ground floor is somewhat less similar in the detailing, though like the Swedish hong, it features two windows on each side of the front door.

By 1796, the number of hong's showing a strong French influence in their façades had increased from three (Buildings #10, 11, and 12) to seven (Buildings #3, 4, 7, and 17 as well as #10, 11, and 12). [Plate 3] In this 1796 view of the hong's, we see in Buildings #7 and #17 the familiar central doorway flanked by two or three windows on each side, and the upper storey arcade with balustrade. Buildings #3 and #4 show a similar elevation, but they lack the balustrade.

Three additional hong's—Buildings #1, 9 and 13—exhibit a modified version of the French. Although the ground-floor door and windows, and their symmetrical placement, are reminiscent of the French, the building is lower in height and more squat in its proportions, an impression that is emphasised by the treatment of the upper storey and by the dimensions

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of the windows, which are almost square. Instead of the veranda with its fenestrated arcade, there is a roofed balcony with a simple balustrade. Four columns support the roof. In the absence of an arcade, the exterior wall of the building, and the windows set into it, are clearly visible. Symmetry is still a factor, as evidenced, for example, by the alignment of the upper storey’s windows with those of the ground floor.

In 1806, the Danes remodeled their hong for the fourth time, as documented in considerable detail in the Danish records.¹⁶ The changes were significant. Previously, the building had belonged to the open-balcony model, but in 1806, the roofed open-air balcony was replaced by a French-style arcade and balustrade, thus displaying a clear French influence in the upper storey. The ground-floor changes were also considerable, though their resemblance to the French was confined largely to the symmetry of their placement, for the ratio of height to width is less dramatic; the windows appear to be almost square in shape; and like the door that they flank, each displays a fantail.

By 1820, almost fifteen years later, no fewer than eight hongs bore façades that testified to the French influence, showing elements and layout that had been associated with the French for half a century: Buildings #1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 17. [Plate 4].¹⁷

A closer look at the painting reveals that individual variations are generally slight. With the exception of the number of windows and arches, the most noticeable variation occurs in proportions and treatment of the ground-floor windows. In Building #1, for example, the windows are only slightly taller than they are wide; the ratio of height-to width appears to be approximately 5:1, rather than the nearly 4:1 of the French hong. Furthermore, the windows are topped by an element that resembles not a fantail but a lintel.

The role of the French as trendsetters in architectural renovations carried out by the international trading community showed itself not only in a number of hongs on the Canton riverfront but also over an extended period of time. Beginning with the renovations to their own hong in 1767, the French served as a model for over 50 years, well into the first half of the 1800s. Whereas the British influence was confined largely to the Dutch hong, as many as six or seven hongs emulated the French.

This may seem surprising, especially since the French role in the Canton trade has often been overlooked in favor of the Dutch and the English. Yet as one of the two most powerful countries in Europe during the 18th century, the significance of France in the political and trade history of that period cannot be overlooked.

Furthermore, the French stylistic influence continued even after the French moved out of the style-setting hong (Building #10). In the autumn of 1782, for example, the Imperialists took over the French hong. They had been co-leasing it from the French since 1779, and when the French moved out in the fall of 1782 in an effort to cut costs, the Imperialists took over the building.¹⁸ They retained it as it was. Another example may be found in the Danes when they remodeled in 1806. Almost 25 years had passed since the French last occupied the trendsetting hong. Yet in the Danes’ 1806 renovation, they abandoned the open-style balcony that they had had for decades and replaced it with a French-style veranda and arcade. Thus the French stylistic influence remained, even when the French moved elsewhere.

The influence of the French on the hong façades at Canton raises another question: Does the role of the French in the Canton trade itself also need to be reassessed? **RC**

4 William Wood, *Sketches of China: with illustrations from original drawings*. Philadelphia: Carey & Lea, 1830, p. 221.

5 Ibid., p. 68.

6 Aix-en-Provence, Archives nationales d’outre-mer (ANOM), C.1.12: f° 117 verso.

7 Works on the vernacular architecture of Guangzhou and Guangdong by architectural historians and cultural geographers such as Wu Qingzhou 吴庆洲, Lu Yuanding 陆元鼎, and Ronald G. Knapp describe the features of local Cantonese and South Chinese building traditions. See especially Wu Qingzhou, ‘Guangzhou’, in *Encyclopedia of Vernacular Architecture of the World*, edited by Paul Oliver, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, vol. 2, p. 900; he includes the bamboo tube. For practices common to South China in general, see Ronald G. Knapp, *China’s Vernacular Architecture*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989; and Ronald G. Knapp, *The Chinese House*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. See also Johnathan A. Farris, ‘Dwelling on the Edge of Empire’, Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 2004, and Lu Yuanding, ‘Guangdong minju’ 广东民居, in *Jianzhu xuebao* 建筑学报 (Architectural Journal), 1981, 157, pp. 29-40.

8 Aix-en-Provence, ANOM, C.1.12: f° 117 verso.

9 Paul A. Van Dyke and Maria Mok have done extensive research to date the hongs. ‘Dating the Canton Factories 1765-1822’. Paper given at ICAS 8 (International Convention of Asia Scholars), 25 June 2013.

10 Unless otherwise specified, the dates given in reference to paintings in this paper are those assigned by Paul A. Van Dyke and Maria Mok in ‘Dating the Canton Factories, 1765-1822’, a paper that was presented at the ICAS 8 (International Convention of Asia Scholars) conference in Macao on 25 June 2013.

11 The 1770 date is taken from the dating of the Ekeberg drawing in Carl Gustav Ekeberg, *Capitaine Carl Gustav Ekebergs Ostindiska Resa, Åren 1770 och 1771*, Stockholm: Henr. Foug, 1773; facsimile reprint, Stockholm: Rediviva, 1970.

12 Archives des Affaires Étrangères (AAE), La Courneuve, France: 8 MD Asie 17, f° 402: ‘Au-dessus de cette porte il y avoit une terrasse découverte en forme de galerie pour la promenade et de laquelle on découvrait tout le mouvement de la rivière, vue très agréable dans un pays surtout où presque toutes les communications se font par eau’.

13 Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm, Sweden. Grill records, NM: F17. Letter dated 4 February 1769 from John Chambers in Canton to Joh. Abr. Grill in Gothenburg, p. T1_01335-7.

14 Lisa Hellman, email message to author, 3 June 2013.

15 See Van Dyke, Paul, ‘Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690-1845’, (Ph.D. dissertation), p. 214, Table 11: Expenses to Repair the Dutch Factory in 1789. From: ARA: VOC 4444, ‘Onkosten op Koopmanschappen’.

16 Paul A. Van Dyke and Maria Mok, ‘Dating the Canton Factories, 1765-1822.’ Paper given at ICAS 8 (International Convention of Asia Scholars), 25 June 2013.

17 Though financial difficulties and the French Revolution had significantly decreased French participation in the Canton Trade, the nation’s architectural influence was nevertheless still visible in the 1820s. The hong that exerted such an influence had not been occupied by the French since 1782-1783, when financial difficulties had obliged them to move to a smaller building (first #7, and later #4).

18 This is based on conversations with Paul Van Dyke and on examinations of the sources and paintings.

NOTES

1 See sketch in William C. Hunter, *The ‘Fan-Kwae’ at Canton before treaty days, 1825-1844*. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench & Company, 1882, following p. 24.

2 Archives des Affaires Étrangères (AAE), La Courneuve, France: 8 MD Asie 17. f° 335: ‘130 à 150 pieds de long sur environ 50 à 60 de large’. 1 *pied* = 0.32 m, or 1.06 feet.

3 For further discussion of ownership of hong buildings by members of the international trading community, see Paul Van Dyke, ‘Rooms for Rent: Inn Keepers and the *foreignization* of the Canton Factories 1760-1822’. Unpublished paper presented at conference ‘Private Merchants of the Canton Trade 1700-1842’, Sun Yat-sen University, 16 November 2013.



The Image of Woman as a Reflection of Change in China

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Due to the Confucian prohibition against exciting the emotions, images of women were not a frequent subject of artistic expression in China.¹ Narrative and landscape subjects dominated with few exceptions.² Such attitudes continued until the late Qing dynasty when women, as in the West, became the object of men's gaze: beautifully posed, wearing delicate garments with their tiny feet peeking out beneath their long robes.³ For example, Wu Jiayou's 吴嘉猷 *Women in the Twelve Months*, done in 1890 and now in the Shanghai Museum, which portrays women in their private quarters at their leisure, each portrait a calendrical illustration.⁴ When in the early 20th century Chinese artists traveled to Europe to train in Western art, they returned home to employ new techniques. Many like Lin Fengmian 林风眠 (1900-1991) represented feminine beauty—sometimes in public, but more often in private surroundings, often nude or wearing diaphanous garments, they sat in a pastel hued boudoir.⁵ In addition there is the

exceptional female artist Pan Yuliang 潘玉良 (1895-1977) who returned to Paris after her first foray abroad, where she largely made self-portraits.⁶ Things changed considerably under the Communist regime, when due to widespread illiteracy the pictorial arts became a primary propaganda tool to educate the population. Mao's determination to harness the productive potential of women to build a new society, expressed in his dictum 'Women hold up half of the sky', led to the

Figure 1. Wu Jiayou's *Women in the Twelve Months*, 1890. Album of twelve leaves, in ink and colour on silk; each leaf 27.2 x 33.2 cm. Shanghai Museum. After Julia F. Andrews and Kuiyi Shen, *A Century of Crises*. New York: Guggenheim Museum, 1998, pl. 2.



Figure 2. Lin Fengmian, *Nude* c. 1955. Ink on paper 32.5 x 32 cm. Private Collection. After Josef Hejzlar, *Chinese Watercolors*. London: Octopus Books Ltd., 1978, pl. 87.

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presence of women in propagandist art, though they rarely appear in pictures of the founding of the nation or other such policy-making scenarios.⁷ In the 1950s when artists were sent to travel the country to learn from the people and to record the various highlights of the provincial areas, artists like Ye Qianyu 叶浅予 (1907-1995) depicted minority women in their native costumes as emblems of the ethnic diversity of China. See for example, Ye's *Miao Dancing Girls*, and *Girl with an Ear of Corn*, done before 1955.⁸ It is evident

that Ye also had a knowledge of western style drawing and perspective, which he fused with Chinese brush technique and brilliant colours.

By the 1960s one important change in the Communist artistic agenda was the increased frequency with which women were presented as active members of society. *How Bright and Brave They Look*, a painting by Zhang Jinfeng, is an illustration of a line of a poem by Mao Zedong 毛泽东, 'How bright and brave they look' which illustrates the incentive to mobilise women.

Figure 3 Yen Yungsheng, *United to Win Still Greater Victories*, 1974. Poster. After *Graphic Art by Workers in Shanghai, Yangchuan and Luta*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976, p. 71.



How bright and brave they look shouldering five foot rifles,
On the parade ground lit up by the first gleams of day
China's daughters have high-aspiring minds
They love their battle array, not silks and satins.⁹

The gouache shows young girls wearing garments made from the variegated floral patterns manufactured in communes, practising throwing grenades in a snowy landscape. In the near mid-ground are their rifles, shooting targets and a red flag that flutters in the chilly winter breeze. Though examples are plentiful, I shall mention but three more: one 1974 poster of *United to Win Still Greater Victories*, by Yen Yungsheng, a staff member of the Kanqingze Branch of the People's Bank.¹⁰ Women, as evinced by the image, have been integrated into the national movement: the smiling red-cheeked picture of youth, health and vitality holds a copy of Mao's red book in one hand, and in the other the hand of a steel worker, who in turn holds the hand of a soldier; behind the trinity are a crowd of workers and red flags. The second example by Zhou Xiaoyu and the Shanghai Workers similarly stresses the role of women in modern life. In *Good with the Pen and the Gun* two young women occupy the foreground in large scale: they are leaving the factory after work, one holds a rifle, the other holds a rolled up piece of paper.¹¹ In the background, other comrades proceed to target practice or carry buckets of paste and brushes, having just mounted the big character posters on walls in the background, which attract the attention of workers. Mention should also be made of a young woman bringing food to her co-workers in a cold and bleak landscape. The composition closely adopts Edvard Munch's (1863-1944) *Scream*, of 1893.¹² Such a borrowing must be intentional, using not only the composition and theme, but also the woodblock technique: the alienation and angst of the capitalist society illustrated by the Norwegian Expressionist is now transformed: it is inclement weather that she must heroically endure to deliver lunch pails to her comrades.

The role of women forged during the Cultural Revolution remains important in subsequent art. In the aftermath of the late 1970s, Western art again was the inspiration for a series of images. Now women optimistically represent the possibility of artistic rebirth and freedom of expression. Examples include

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Figure 4. Qi Zhilong, *Untitled*, 1998. Oil on canvas, 199 x 61 cm. After *Mahjong Contemporary Art from the Sigg Collection*, edited by Matthias Frehner and Bernhard Fibicher. Bern: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2005, pp. 150-151.

Wang Hai's 王亥 *Spring* 1978,¹³ and Ye Yushan 叶毓山, Huang Caizhi, and Xiang Jinguui's cast aluminum sculpture for the Yangzhi Bridge, in Chongqing,¹⁴ He Duoling's 何多苓 *Spring Breezes Have Arrived* of 1980,¹⁵ as well as the later work by Zhang Qun 张群 and Meng Luding 孟禄丁, *A New Era — Revelation from Adam and Eve*, dated 1985.¹⁶ In this regard, mention should also be made of the recreation of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen in 1989. But other artists employed the image of women as a symbol to obliquely criticise the failures of modern society, using ethnic images of women to represent the alienation of the minorities and by extension the failure of state policies as suggested in Ai Xuan's 艾轩 (b. 1947) *Winter or Wasteland*,¹⁷ or Wang Yidong's 王沂东 (b. 1955) *Shandong Peasant Girl* of 1983.¹⁸

In the 1990s artists trained in the western curriculum and to a lesser extent in *guo hua* or Chinese technique explored several new styles and formats in the arts. The subject of women underwent a number of

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different transformations, some by female artists, and others by males. Far too much art has been produced to discuss more than a few aspects of the works made after 1990. Among the extremely numerous artists who feature women as a subject, only those who treat it as a dominant aspect of their work will be considered. These include the two themes outlined above—idealised images of women as an object of desire, and

images of women used to express personal opinions. Representative of the first group is the most popular artist in China, Xie Chuyu 谢楚余 (b. 1962) his idealised and erotic portrayals of women, commercial in intent, are ubiquitous.¹⁹ He alone will serve to illustrate this category. As for the second group, the number of artists is also considerable. I have chosen seven to briefly mention here. First is Qi Zhilong 祁志龙 (b. 1962)

Figure 5. Liu Jianhua, *Obsessive Memories*, 2003. Porcelain, 25 figures, dimensions variable. After *Mahjong Contemporary Art from the Sigg Collection*, edited by Matthias Frehner and Bernhard Fibicher. Bern: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2005, p. 257.



whose entire oeuvre seems to be dedicated to portraits of the heads of beautiful modern ladies dressed in a soldier's uniform from the Cultural Revolution.²⁰ Aspects of contemporary style are evident in these renderings, despite the faithful recreation of the costume, hairstyle and other details. Qi's works evoke nostalgia for a time that was simpler, when the iron rice bowl and other social programs were available to the masses, and greater equity and camaraderie prevailed. Feng Zhengjie's 奉正杰 (b. 1968) paintings are more contemporary in appearance but also rely on bust portraits. Almond-shaped eyes, whose pupils directed to the outer periphery suggest the figure is seeing things out of focus, are characteristic of his women. The brilliant palette of neon colors conveys the artificiality and commoditisation of society; in this way Feng criticises the new dependence on Western ideas of lifestyle and beauty.²¹ Liu Jianhua 刘建华 (b. 1962) has turned to the traditional medium of porcelain and the early 20th century ideals of beauty, but his women have no arms or heads.²² Through the dismemberment and decapitation of the slender and elegant women, Liu alludes to the pollution of the natural environment. Wei Dong's 魏东 (b. 1968) corpulent beauties dressed in a variety of costumes, some partially naked, represent the corruption and licentiousness of the new capitalist society.²³ Compositions crowded by these figures convey the selfishness and lasciviousness of the urban elite, and, like a Christian medieval painter, such objects as over-ripe peaches, hunting dogs, and a sacrificed lamb take on metaphorical meanings. Zhong Biao 钟飙 (b. 1968), who avowedly seeks to catch the evanescent character of urban life, paints chic and sexy young women, perched in precarious postures on the roof tops of sky scrapers. They embody the danger, and the rootless and unstable character of modern life.²⁴

Photographers also employ women to illustrate the troubles of contemporary society. Yang Yong (b. 1975) explores the theme of alienation by showing young women alone, in harsh or unnatural light, in places of transit—airports, highways, garages or in hotel rooms which allude to the sex trade and momentary affection.²⁵ In contrast the photographer Wang Fen (b. 1961) makes urban landscapes that include a wall on which a young girl is perched. We see her from behind and the view she beholds. Each work in this series, which is entitled *On the Wall*, provides a different

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Figure 6. Lin Tianmiao, *Gazing Back - procreating (outdoor)*, 2009. Polyurea, automotive paint, television recordings (author's photo).

city view—Haikou, Guangzhou, Shenzhen. The artist explained that these modern cities are undifferentiated, there is no local culture, just the uniform spread of global modernism, and the teenager, like the new world citizen, is perched uncertainly and disillusioned.²⁶ A few older artists have taken on specific social problems featuring young women. The photographer Xu Yong 徐勇 (b. 1954) focuses on female prostitutes in his latest works. He has found that despite the all too apparent problems of making a living as a sex worker, prostitutes now come from all walks of life—college educated teachers and such like, because they can earn far more money by these activities, and thereby achieve a kind of economic freedom and power.²⁷ The highly political team of the Gao Brothers exposes the hypocrisy of the police in their victimisation of teenage sex workers in their paintings and sculptures. In addition they created a hybrid icon based on a big-breasted image of Minnie Mouse with the head of Mao to represent the evils of his administration.²⁸

Looking at these works, it seems clear that the function of the image of women in Chinese art has substantially changed since it first became the embodiment of desire at the end of the 19th century, if not somewhat earlier, when Confucian proscription against the sensual portray of women weakened. By the mid-20th century the image of women reflected the artistic agenda determined by the state to demonstrate the success of their social policies. Later male artists use the female figure to express more personal feelings—first to express optimism for the future and then to represent disappointment in the numerous problems associated with the rapid march to

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Figure 7. He Chengyao, *99 Needles* 2002 C Print of performance. Li Yongsheng photographer artists Collection, Alpesh Kantilal Patel, ‘Women’, *Yishu*, vol. 12 (2013) no. 2, pp. 60- 67; see p. 62.

capitalism—the destruction of nature, native culture and ethical responsibilities.

Women in China’s contemporary society are still limited by patriarchal values established under

Confucianism. Though they did indeed once hold up the sky, their role in society seems diminished; few women have achieved ascendance in business or politics, and their numbers are decreasing, thanks to the policy of selective abortion. Their situation is reflected in the limited role they play in the art world—whether exhibiting in the upper echelons of museums and galleries or in running the various art institutions.²⁹ Perhaps it is this marginality and their fragility that inspires the male artists discussed above to use women as an image to express their hopes, dreams and disappointments.

POSTSCRIPT

An inquiry into the portrayal of women by women reveals more down to earth renderings of the female body, in comparison to the uniformly glamorous images made by male artists. These also reveal female artists engagement in the struggle of self-investigation through the means of the self-portrait. Here are naked Cui Xiuwen 崔岫闻 escaping her cocoon of toilet paper, or working with an alter ego engaged in a number of social problems;³⁰ a menopausal Lin Tianmiao 林天苗 recreating her middle age form in a number of media; Chen Lingyang 陈羚羊 photographing images of her biological menstrual processes or portrayins herself rolled in a ball perched above the roofs of skyscrapers in a nocturnal urban view entitled *Twenty-fifth hour*, the mythical time when she says she can only be herself; Yu Hong 喻红 chronological documentation of her life from childhood to pregnancy; He Chengyao 何成瑶 whose performances are based on recreating her mother’s suffering by re-enacting painful acts on her own body,³¹ to mention a few salient examples. **RC**

University Press, 1996); and ‘The Representation of Women in Medieval China: Recent Archaeological Evidence’, *T’ang Studies*, vol. 17 (1999), pp. 213-271. Again, in the late Ming women were depicted as objects of desire, see Irving Yucheng Lo, ‘Daughters of the Muses in China’, in *Views of the Jade Terrace: Chinese Women Artists 1300-1912*, edited by Marsha Weidner et al. (Indianapolis: Indianapolis Museum of Art, 1989), pp. 41-52 for the role of courtesans as inspiration; for a discussion of female artists in the Ming dynasty see Ellen Johnston Liang, ‘Wives, Daughters, and Lovers: Three Ming Dynasty Women Painters’, pp. 41-53 in the same volume. Artists such as Tang Yin 唐寅 and other Zhe schools painters of the Ming focused on female representations, see Richard Barnhart, et al., *Three Thousand Years of Chinese Painting* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997) see pp. 208-209, p. 224.

- For the allure of the foot in ancient and modern China see, Patricia Karetzky, *Femininity in Contemporary Women’s Work from China, Korea and the USA: If the Shoe Fits . . .* (UK: KT Press ebook, 2013).
- Wu Jiayou d. 1893 in Julia F. Andrews and Kuiyi Shen, *A Century of Crises* (New York: Guggenheim Museum, 1998, pl. 21. These are four leaves from an album of twelve, in ink and colors on silk 27.2 x 33.2. See also <http://arts.cultural-china.com/en/77Arts7214.html>. A native of Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, Wu Jiayou was good at portraying characters, and achieved fame in Shanghai by painting for the *Dian shi zhai hua bao* 点石斋画报 (Dian Shi Zhai Illustrated Newspaper), which featured society items and current affairs. See also <http://huntingtonarchive.osu.edu/Exhibitions/5000years/indx/in/inchinptg2.html>.
- See the artist’s website Linfengmian.net for ample examples of beautiful women in boudoirs, <http://www.linfengmian.net/art/index.htm?detectflash=false&>.
- Michael Sullivan, *Art and Artists of Twentieth Century China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 203; see also http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/photo/2006-11/14/content_732470.htm.
- For example they are absent from *Mao Zedong’s Declaring the People’s Republic from Tiananmen Square* by Dong Xiwen 董希文, see Sullivan 1996: pl. 28 in contrast to Luo Gongliu’s 罗工柳, *Tunnel Warfare*, 1951, Sullivan 1996: pl 30 or Bai Tianxue’s 白天雪, *Learning to Sing Revolutionary Songs*, 1950; Sullivan 1996: pl. 32.
- <http://arts.cultural-china.com/en/77Arts4108.html>. Ye Qianyu (1907-1995) was a well-known cartoonist in China. In 1954, a prominent artist, he appointed head of the Chinese Painting Department at the Central Academy of Fine Arts. In 1981, he was appointed Vice President of the Research Institute of Chinese Painting, and elected as Vice Chairman of Chinese Artists’ Association, Member of Standing Committee of Chinese Federation of Literary and Art Circles, and member of the National Committee of CPPCC. Many of his works were published such as *A Supplementary Biography of Mr. Wang, Unofficial History of Xiao Chen Staying in Beijing, Traveling Sketch, Collection of Qianyu Sketches*, etc. His representative works include *Indian Dancing Gesture, Autumn of Summer River, The Great Unification of Chinese Nations, Summer, First-class Wool and the Liberation of Beijing*, etc. See also Joan L. Cohen, *The New Chinese Painting 1949-1986* (New York: Harry Abrams, 1987), pp. 94-95 describes how he was abused by red guards.

- Ross Terrill, *Mao’s Biography* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 326.
- See *Graphic Art by Workers in Shanghai, Yangchuan and Luta* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), p. 71.
- Ibid., p. 10.
- <http://www.edvard-munch.com/gallery/anxiety/index.htm>.
- For Wang Hai’s *Spring* 1978 see Sullivan 1996: fig 21.7, p. 221.
- For Ye Yushan, Huang Caizhi, and Xiang Jingui’s cast aluminum sculpture for the Yangzhi Bridge, in Chongqing, see Sullivan 1996: fig 16.15, p. 168.
- He Duoling *Spring Breezes Have Arrived*, done in 1980, see Sullivan 1996: fig. 22.10, p. 237.
- Zhang Qun and Meng Luding, *A New Era—Revelation from Adam and Eve*, dated 1985 see Sullivan 1996: fig. 24.4, p. 257.
- For Ai Xuan’s *Stranger* done in 1984, see Sullivan 1996: pl. 76.
- For Wang Yidong’s *Shandong Peasant Girl* of 1983, see Sullivan 1996: pl. 72
- Xie Chuyu see <http://artist.artmuseum.com.cn/hisArtistWorksList.htm?artistId=460>; so popular are his images, he had to copyright his works.
- Richard Vine, *New China New Art* (Munich: Prestel, 2011), p. 26.
- Ibid., p. 27. For Feng Zhengjie work, see also feng_zhengjie http://www.saatchi-gallery.co.uk/artists/feng_zhengjie.htm.
- Ibid., p. 50. For Liu Jianhua’s work, see also Liu Jianhua <http://www.culturebase.net/artist.php?1487>.
- Ibid., p. 203. For Wei Dong’s work, see also <http://www.artnet.com/artwork/425969260/119094/wei-dong-the-pastoral-song.html>.
- Ibid., p. 202. For Zhong Biao’s work, see also <http://www.artscenechina.com/chineseart/artists/zhongbiao.htm>.
- Ibid., p. 138. For Yang Yong’s work, see also http://www.frieze.com/issue/review/yang_yong/.
- Majong: Contemporary Chinese Art from the Sigg Collection*, edited by Bernhard Fibicher and Matthias Frehner (Bern: Kunstmuseum and Hatje Cantz, 2005), p. 230: ‘The heart of a teenage girl is also divided by a wall. In a phase of psychic and physical change she is full of curiosity, yearnings and desires but at the same time these impulses are typically unfocused. Against a background of monotony in Chinese cities in a state of drastic change and thereby looking at their characters, the pale outline of the girl riding on the wall and looking at the world suggests disappointment, unfocusedness, and a fluctuation between hope and uncertainty’.
- Patricia Karetzky, ‘Xu Yong’s This Face’, *Yishu*, vol. 10, no. 6 (2011), pp. 59-66.
- Patricia Karetzky, ‘The Gao Brothers: All the World’s a Stage’, *Yishu*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2007), pp. 61-67.
- Xu Yong, ‘Walking Out of the Abyss: My Feminist Critique’. In *Chinese Contemporary Art Primary Documents*, edited by Wu Hong, (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2010), p. 193; see also Tao Yong Bai 陶咏白, ‘Toward a Female Initiative’, in *Contemporary Chinese Art: Primary Documents*, edited by Hu Wung (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2010), pp. 194-195.
- Patricia Karetzky, ‘Cui Xiuwen, Walking on Broken Glass’, *Yishu*, vol. 9, no. 3 (2010), pp. 18-33.
- Alpesh Kantilal Patel, ‘Women’, *Yishu*, vol. 12 (2013) no. 2, pp. 60- 67; see p. 62.

NOTES

1 See Laurence Sickman and Alexander Soper, *The Art and Architecture of China* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 53 for a description of the Confucian aversion to employing inappropriate subjects for artistic depiction. See *The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender* edited by Chenyang Li (Chicago: Open Court, 2000) for a discussion of the limited role of women

outside the home. For a discussion of proper Confucian narrative themes in China, see Julia K. Murray, *Mirror of Morality: Chinese Narrative Illustration of Confucian Ideology* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007).

2 In the Tang Dynasty, when women enjoyed unprecedented visibility, see Patricia Karetzky, *Arts of the Tang Dynasty* (New York: Oxford

Contesting the Levels of Il / legality of Urban Art Images in China

MINNA VALJAKKA*

The possibility to create large, skillful pieces or murals without official intervention in public is becoming increasingly appealing to many creators of urban art images who wish to interact more with citizens or earn their livelihood from creative actions in China. In addition, some creators of these images are actively promoting a more tolerant attitude towards this unavoidable form of contemporary visual culture in co-operation with associations and institutions. Creators take part in projects and events that aim, for instance, to raise social awareness, strengthen the community, educate youth or raise funds for charity and beautify the scenery. Accordingly, the perception that urban art is merely illegal vandalism that aims to destroy the public space is utterly outdated, although unauthorised activities are an inevitable part of the scene. Even more importantly, as this article will show, the understanding of what constitutes a legal or illegal creative action is not always unequivocal.

With this article I aim to continue to compensate for the lack of academic interest in this compelling phenomenon of visual culture. Intriguingly, scholarly publications examining the urban art scenes in China

remain rare. Besides three academic articles focusing on Zhang Dali's early activities in Beijing (Wu, 2000, Marinelli, 2004, 2009), the only study that introduces the contemporary scene in Hong Kong in relation to the usage of public space was just recently published (Chang and Kao, 2012).¹ Although these studies provide valuable insights on Beijing and Hong Kong, numerous important issues and contributors to the scenes there, as well as other Chinese cities, remain unexplored. Because of the ephemeral characteristics of the phenomenon and the lack of systematic documentation of the scenes, a comprehensive historical overview of the process of contesting the il/legality of urban art images is still beyond the scope of this paper. Since 2006 when I gradually started to examine the scenes in China, I have encountered numerous examples that indicate the ongoing negotiation process of il/legality in various cities of China.² Here, however, I wish to focus on the most recent cases in order to provide new information on developments.

URBAN ART IMAGES

Before entering into a detailed discussion of the il/legality of urban art images, I find it necessary to elaborate on the main concepts and the approach used in this research. It is a well-known fact that there is *no* consensus on what graffiti or street art is—and there never will be. These two popular concepts are contested among the creators themselves, the researchers of the scenes, city officials and the representatives of various institutions. The understanding of the phenomenon is further obscured by the fact that 'graffiti' is used to denote anything and everything scribbled, written,

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drawn, smudged or incised on any surface—starting even from cave paintings or religious paintings (see e.g., Stewart, 1989, pp. 15-147; Plesch, 2002, Ganz, 2004, p. 8).

It is worth pointing out that the strictest old-school definition of graffiti implies mainly the form developed in New York in the 1970s and 1980s: writing alphabetic letters with spray paint or marker pens and primarily on *trains*.³ Following this hardcore definition, there is practically no graffiti in China today, because ‘bombing’ trains remains rare. In reality, however, a great variety of unauthorised writings, drawings and posters are an inevitable part of the public scene. Furthermore, the term ‘graffiti’ appears in Chinese laws and regulations concerning, for instance, city appearance, touristic sites or airports. In Chinese, the wording used in legislation is usually *tuxie* 涂写 and *kehua* 刻画.⁴ Interestingly, though, a huge variety of urban art images are created in the public space of Chinese cities, addressed by the creators and media mainly with varying concepts of ‘graffiti’ (*tuyal/toungaa* 涂鸦/塗鴉), ‘graffiti art’ (*tuya yishul/toungaa ngai seot* 涂鸦艺术/塗鴉藝術) and ‘street art’ (*jietou yishul/gaaitau ngai seot* 街头艺术/街頭藝術), but not *tuxie* or *kehua*.

From interviews with the creators of urban art images in mainland China, Macao and Hong Kong during the past years, it has become evident that the notions of ‘graffiti’ and ‘street art’ vary greatly from one creator to another. Some consider graffiti a form of street art, while others think that street art focuses on art happenings on the street and *excludes* graffiti. For many, the concepts are interchangeable, while a few prefer not to use them anymore and suggest their works be seen as spray painting, stencil art, sticker art, mural painting, art or urban art and so forth. Besides the concepts, the formats and intentions are also continuously being contested. The more traditional old-school representatives usually insist on the value of tagging and/or using letters and/or Chinese characters as the main component of the piece. Nonetheless, clearly a growing number of creators wish to explore the usage of pictures and various new materials and techniques as their peers in Euro-American scenes have been doing since the 1990s. For instance, in Hong Kong, severe disagreements on the forms of ‘graffiti’ and ‘street art’ have divided the scene, roughly speaking, into five groups: first, ‘graffiti writers’, who are closest to the old-school definitions; second, ‘graffiti artists’, who

primarily, but not only, use spray paint and writing but wish to emphasise the artistic process and give more value to pictures; third, to ‘street artists’, who primarily use formats other than spray paints; fourth, those who are fine with any of these three identities; and last, those who do not consider themselves part of these three groups but would prefer to use other concepts, such as ‘spray painter’, ‘mural artist’, ‘mural painter’ or ‘artist’. Some creators change their primary media during their period of activity or even use a variety of formats and/or mixed techniques, such as spray painted posters. Consequently, they find it challenging to identify with the two major concepts, ‘graffiti’ or ‘street art’.

Deriving from the complexity of the contemporary scene in Chinese cities, I consider it far too limiting to examine the phenomenon only through the concepts of ‘graffiti’ or ‘street art’, because it would inevitably exclude some creators. Using both concepts, as some researchers do, is naturally better than employing one of them. To label *all* creators with only one identity as ‘graffiti writers/artists’ or ‘street artists’ would always be a severe insult for some. For instance, including the Hongkongese Start From Zero, who insist on being defined as street artists, in a publication focusing on graffiti and graffiti writers *per se*, does not demonstrate a deeper understanding of the scene or respect for the perceptions of the creators. As a result, I find it far more beneficial to use the broader concepts of ‘urban art images’ and ‘the creators of urban art images’, which allow me to explore more open-mindedly what is happening in these cities today without any limitations of format, content, style, language or visual elements employed in the works.⁵ The aim is not to confuse the scenes any further but instead to allow the possibility of varying notions to exist and new formats to emerge inside these two ‘umbrella’ concepts. So far, my approach has gained positive feedback from the creators themselves, who also criticise the ambiguous usage of the two major concepts and urge the use of more distinguished definitions.

My approach can be criticised as being too broad and including any creative action happening in urban space. However, I define *urban art images* as creative action that leaves a visible imprint, even a short-lived one, on public urban space. Other artistic activities, such as performance art, acrobatics, and music performances on the streets, are not included in this research. Inspired by James Elkins’ suggestion

of a trichotomy of an image as writing, notation and picture (Elkins, 1999, pp. 82-89), I regard urban art images as reproductions that can include *writing* (in any language), *pictures* and *three-dimensional objects*—or any combination of these—as the most appropriate approach to the complex scenes today. The reproductions can be legal or illegal, commissioned or voluntarily made, resulting from private or collective actions. To focus only on spray painted illegal examples would provide an incomplete perception to the scenes in which the same creators are actually engaging in both legal and illegal activities and, furthermore, exploring the usage of stickers, posters and other formats with growing intensity. Despite this broad approach in terms of formats and intentions, the majority of urban art images today can be regarded primarily as unofficial but not necessarily anti-institutional. In my research, the primary focus lies on creations made in public space.⁶ What is even more essential is the creative imprint, which is valued in terms of style, aesthetics and originality. Even if a surface filled with tags might not always be aesthetically appealing, the choosing of the name and the way of writing is always done in terms of style and originality.

As is evident from the choice of concepts, I also encourage for more open-minded methodological and theoretical approaches. Instead of focusing on sociological aspects, as the majority of the previous studies on the Euro-American scene have done (see e.g. Ferrel, 1993; Austin, 2001; MacDonald, 2001; Rahn, 2002), I insist that research of this visual phenomenon must include the analysis of visual features too. This approach has already been initiated by Jack Stewart, whose proposal to use two concepts has not gained popularity. He suggested the separation of ‘traditional graffiti’, denoting primarily anonymous writings without aesthetic intentions, and ‘modern graffiti’, which has developed since the end of the 1960s in the United States based on stylistic and aesthetic evaluation (Stewart, 1989, pp. 148-191, 493).⁷

Although crucial for examining urban art scenes, the acknowledgement of the visual features and establishment of new concepts has only recently been further developed (see e.g. Schacter, 2008). Lisa Gottlieb’s (2008) approach, which modifies Erwin Panofsky’s model of iconographical analysis for defining the styles of graffiti art, is a promising method. However, her approach focuses on the styles

used in alphabetic letters. Further research is needed to decide whether this approach is applicable to other contemporary forms of graffiti and street art that are not based on letters. Gottlieb’s work is, nonetheless, valuable because she emphasises the importance of visual analysis for any further research as well as the understanding that graffiti art is primarily expressing the self-identity of the creator. Similarly to Gottlieb, Anna Waclawek (2011) has based on her research on visual analysis. Her groundbreaking study provides an in-depth introduction to the development of the phenomenon. However, Waclawek represents the approach that divides the scene into two trends, graffiti and street art/post-graffiti art, although she also notes that there are various terms used for the new formats, namely neo-graffiti, urban painting and graffiti knitting (Waclawek, 201, pp. 28-31, 70-72). Also paying attention to the content of the works created on the streets, Tsan-Kuo Chang and Chung-Linn Kao (2012) provide an illuminating starting point for the historical development of the scene in Hong Kong.

Although I chose to employ different concepts, I agree with Stewart, Gottlieb, Waclawek, and Chang and Kao that it is essential to acknowledge the importance of the visual features of the works, such as contents, styles, compositions, colours and materials. Furthermore, I argue that it is equally crucial to pay attention to the languages, the ethnicity of the creators and the site-responsivity of the images. As I have clarified elsewhere (Valjakka, 2011, 2012), the scenes must be approached through the socio-cultural and political context of the city/country in question so that we can better understand the multifaceted layers and features of this phenomenon. As indicated by John Clark, when a visual system is transferred from one culture to another, even the forms of the visual system can be transformed for other purposes (Clark, 1998, pp. 35-37). Based on my findings, it is evident that formats and intentions of urban art images are not necessarily following their predecessors in the Euro-American scene. The contextually related approach is also essential because references to other forms of popular culture, such as cartoons, films, music and design clearly co-exist with social and political issues in the urban art images. Consequently, they fulfill Irit Rogoff’s suggestion that the multilayered meanings of the images are constructed in an intertextual sphere in which images interact with sounds and spatial delineation (Rogoff, 2002, p. 24).

Fig. 1.White squares at Harcourt Road, Hong Kong, 5 March 2013. Photographed by / Copyright by Minna Valjakka.



THE RELEVANCE OF FORMAT,
CONTENT AND BEHAVIOUR TO THE
UNDERSTANDING OF SEMI-IL/LEGALITY

The understanding of the levels of illegality can be challenged by the creators of urban art images through four main variables, namely the format and the content of the works, the behaviour and the choice of the site. Often these four variables are interdependent and have an impact on each other. Preconditions for a site and time, for instance, vary according to the format implied: to create a multi-coloured piece could take hours while creating a throw-up or putting up a sticker or a poster can be handled in a matter of seconds or minutes. Nonetheless, I start the discussion by focusing on the issues of *format*, by which I denote the materials and techniques, and the *content* of the work, including the composition, style and visual elements, in relation to forms of *behaviour*. The selection of the *site* is a complex process that can be divided into two main trends: initiated by the creators themselves or by some other actors of the scene. Because the choices of sites in terms of semi-il/legal approaches require more detailed discussion based roughly on this dichotomy of agency, I will elaborate this intriguing issue in two subchapters in the latter part of this article.

One way for creators to explore the understanding of il/legality is to use new formats that imitate or employ the official and legal images. Intriguing examples that challenge our perceptions are to be found on the streets of Hong Kong: although clearly illegal creations, these urban art images imitate the legal over-paintings done by the city officials to cover illegal urban art images (Fig. 1). The difference between the legal and illegal creation is hard to distinguish for an average citizen, which is exactly the point aimed at by the creator. In this example, however, it is relatively easy to see that the composition of the white squares and the position on the wall in relation to other compositions were deliberately designed to be aesthetically appealing. Closer examination *in situ* also revealed that there were no previous markings, stickers or paintings underneath the white paint and that these squares were painted following the outer lines of the rocks. The squares are deliberately painted to challenge the passer-by's ability to see and understand what is happening on the wall.

Similar irony towards official manifestations is to be found in stickers posted on the streets of Hong Kong

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Fig. 2. An official sticker, Hong Kong, 3 March 2013. Photographed by / Copyright by Minna Valjakka.

since autumn 2012 by a local graffiti artist who wishes to remain anonymous. The official bilingual sticker, which can be found in public spaces in Hong Kong, cautions against creating graffiti and putting up any kind of notices. The version created by the graffiti artist is identifiable by the wordplay both in English and in Chinese. In the English reworking, two words are changed, which consequently transfers the sentence from denial to a suggestion: *Know graffiti, Post Ur Bill*. In Chinese, a slightly more complex pun is achieved by changing only the first character from *yan* 嚴 to *bu* 不. The official version strictly forbids graffiti while the new version has two meanings: graffiti is not prohibited and one cannot refrain from doing graffiti (Figs. 2 and 3).

The third, far more visible but intriguingly unnoticed new format is a creative modification of banners that advertise the representatives of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and are draped on the railings around the streets of Hong Kong. In an interview on 10 March 2013, the local graffiti artist, who prefers to stay unnamed, explained how he has during the past two years borrowed the banners for visual recreation. In his studio, he re-paints the banners partially with spray paints. Originally, he chose colours matching the original design and painted the banners only partially, but gradually he has shifted to more visible elements that almost fill the whole banner. For this latest set, created in March 2013, the graffiti artist chose to refer to a popular mobile game, *Angry Birds*, because he wanted to emphasise his dissatisfaction with three issues: the inability of people to pay attention to the details in their everyday surroundings, the current political system in Hong Kong and the growing occupation of public space for political advertisement through the banners. The graffiti artist wishes to question the usage of the public space and who can employ it for which purposes. Why are graffiti and street art regarded as vandalism while the political banners and other forms of advertisement are not? After all, these ‘accepted’ forms are filling up public space, which originally belonged to people. And they are not making it any more appealing



Fig. 3. A sticker by graffiti artist, Hong Kong, 18 February 2013. Photographed by / Copyright by Minna Valjakka.

to the people—quite the contrary. After the banners have dried, the graffiti artist sets them up around Hong Kong on busy streets during the daytime—and no one usually pays any attention to him. Passers-by tend to assume he is authorised to hang the banners because they do not acknowledge the content. Furthermore, the banners can remain untouched for several months before they are removed by the cleaners of the area in question (anonymous graffiti artist, Hong Kong, interview, 10 March 2013). The indifference to the political banners is understandable in a city filled with visual advertisement and messages, but it also indicates how little an average busy citizen in Hong Kong actually *looks* at the images encountered. On the morning of 21 March 2013, I was allowed to observe the putting up of the newest set of three banners close to the Yau Ma Tei metro station (Fig. 4). As could have been expected, the presence of two cameras caught attention from passers-by but still no one intervened—even if the visual recreation of the banners was unnoticeable. However, this time the banners were removed surprisingly quickly, already during the first week of April.

As this example shows, besides the format and the content of the work, the behaviour of the creator of the images has an impact on people’s understanding of the il/legality of the action. The simplest way for a creator to contest the limits of illegality is to act openly during the day time in public space. Although the risk of being caught is relatively high, the openness is the key factor that may deceive possible officials and passers-by to consider the action legal. As in the case of the banners, if the creator were to put them up in the darkest hours of the night, the act itself would look suspicious.

A step further in testing the limits of illegality in public space through formats is to employ temporary surfaces, such as cardboard or cardboard boxes. Using removable surfaces for spray painting in public space contests the notion of illegality because the action is not vandalism that would destroy permanent structures. Nonetheless, the possible unauthorised use of public space along with the smell of the spray paints and

potential littering produced during the creation process can cause complaints from the public and interference by officials. This too, depends on the sites chosen for creation.

A relatively new format employing temporary surfaces is to spray paint on cellophane, which can be wrapped around supporting structures. For a documentary film project, Hong Kong spray painter Forget About It and French mural artist Sautel Cago were eager to test this format. The experiment contested the norms of creative actions allowed in public space at Ma Wan Tung Wan beach, Hong Kong on 26 February 2013 (Fig. 5).⁸ As the artists began on the first art work, the official responsible for the beach came to inquire whether the project was a commercial or private one. For a commercial project, official permissions would have been required. The official warned the artists that

if more people arrived at the beach wanting to relax, he might need to ask them to stop and leave. During the afternoon more visitors came to the beach, but the feedback from them and the cleaners of the beach was only positive. People stopped to admire the creation process, the colors and the composition of the work. Because of the off-season timing and remote location, this experiment was possible and successful. In addition, the fact that the cellophane was not wrapped around any trees or lampposts but was on a removable frame, and that the artists covered the sand to protect it from the paint, had a positive impact on citizens and officials alike. In this project, the interaction of the format, behaviour and site made the project successful. Whether the cellograffing could be used in any other space, time and framing in Hong Kong or other Chinese cities remains an open question.

Fig. 4. Three banners by graffiti artist, Yau Ma Tei, Hong Kong, 21 March 2013. Photographed by / Copyright by Minna Valjakka.



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Besides these two-dimensional formats that depend primarily on vertical surfaces, the public is also challenged to encounter three-dimensional, removable art works on the streets. An illuminating example is the large humanlike dolls created by Graphic Airlines (GAL) for a street art exhibition organised in Babú Gallery in Shenzhen in May 2008. The dolls, the ‘fat face’ (*aafei* 阿肥) and the ‘old man’ (*maa lat lou* 麻甩佬), represent two specific types of Hong Kong people, a well-fed lady trying to lose weight and a typical old

man in his singlet. The preparation of the dolls, filled with cotton padding, was a laborious project requiring almost a month. Before sending the dolls to Shenzhen, GAL decided to explore people’s reactions to them on the streets of Hong Kong. On 11 May 2008, they went around the city placing the dolls in varying locations for at least a half hour at a time and observed the responses of the passers-by while photographer Rraay Lai took photographs (Graphic Airlines, artists, Hong Kong, interview, 21 March 2013).

The interaction varied according to the location. For instance, at the busy street corner at Causeway Bay, people were annoyed by the dolls blocking the street, while in the Lan Kwai Fong area at the Central the attitude was far more relaxed. People stopped to examine the dolls and pose for photographs with them (Figs. 6 and 7). The photograph the artists liked most was taken in front of the Sogo department store at Causeway Bay, the flagship of commercialism. With huge advertisements filling the space and with

Fig. 5. Cellograffing, Ma Wan Tung Wan beach, Hong Kong, 26 February 2013. Photographed by / Copyright by Minna Valjakka.

Fig. 6. The Fat Face and Old Man by Graphic Airlines, Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, 11 May 2008. Photographed by / Copyright by Rraay Lai.

Fig. 7. The Fat Face and Old Man by Graphic Airlines, Lan Kwai Fong, Hong Kong, 11 May 2008. Photographed by / Copyright by Rraay Lai.



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a collection of national flags reflecting the aim for internationality, the site correlates with the idea of the figures themselves: continuous growth in terms of all kinds of statistics—the economy, consumption and greed. Despite varying feelings among the onlookers indicated mainly by their behaviour and facial expressions, no one intervened or asked the artists to explain their actions. According to the artists, apparently nobody considered the project illegal or contacted the officials to inform them about it. In this case, the format of the works, the fact that they did not leave any permanent marks on the streets and the

conduct of the action openly during daytime caused people to tolerate and even be amused by the project.

RECREATING SITES
FOR URBAN ART IMAGES

The sites employed for urban art images have a significant impact on contesting the understanding of the creation process in terms of il/legality. As already implied, the selection of the site can be initiated by the creator(s) of the urban art images or other actors of the scene. In the ongoing negotiation processes, the status

of a specific site can change, even from illegal to legal, following the changing perceptions of the creators, citizens and officials. Because of the limitations of space, I restrict my discussion to examples that most clearly illustrate the variety of agency, intentions and purposes in relation to semi-il/legal sites.⁹

A majority of the sites for urban art images are established by the creators themselves. The choice of the location is defined primarily in terms of location (accessibility and visibility), popularity, the acknowledged social, cultural or commercial value of the site, the atmosphere of the site, and physical features

(size and quality of the wall/surface and openness of the space). For the interrelation of site and the notions of il/legality, it is most important to take into account the acknowledged social, cultural or commercial values of the site. Attacking valuable historical sites, official premises or the stores of worldwide brands is considered far more illegal than creating urban art images at demolition sites.

Consequently, it is not surprising that abandoned buildings can be taken over by the creators of urban art images. Because the value of the buildings is decreased along with their physical disintegration, they gradually become semi-illegal sites for urban art images to emerge. Basically, the creative action itself and even entering the locked-up site are illegal, but the guards might choose not to care about the creation process. If they do, the creators are usually just asked to leave the premises. The severity of the response depends primarily on the activity of the guards and whether something else has happened at the site. For example, creating pieces in an abandoned school building in Hong Kong became much more carefully scrutinised after someone tried to steal a ping-pong table from the premises (Aaron Lam, photographer, Hong Kong, interview, 18 March 2013). Sites of these kinds are usually rather short-lived, like the abandoned factory building in Yau Tong in Hong Kong, which was a popular site during spring 2012 but is now already demolished. Another quite well-known and longer-term site in Hong Kong is the former studios of Asian Television Ltd (ATV) at Sai Kung. Three floors and the rooftop provide an intriguing gallery of urban art images created by locals and visitors from around the globe (Fig. 8).

Instead of demolition sites, the creators also look for walls in the more open public areas in the cities. Roughly speaking, creative actions are usually more accepted on the outskirts than in the city centre. But this too, depends on the city in question. The most famous semi-legal walls where creating urban art images is—or has been—tolerated in mainland China and in Hong Kong are the 798 art district (798 艺术区) in Beijing, Moganshan Road (莫干山路) in Shanghai, the longest wall of fame close by the Honghu West Road (洪湖西路) in Shenzhen and the Mong Kok Alley



Fig. 8. The ATV studios, Sai Kung, Hong Kong, 9 March 2013. Photographed by / Copyright by Minna Valjakka.

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Fig. 9. Shenzhen, 25 March 2013. Photographed by / Copyright by Minna Valjakka.

close to Argyle Street in Hong Kong.¹⁰ I define these sites as semi-legal, because being at the site itself is not illegal, as it is at the abandoned premises. More importantly, creating on these walls has usually been allowed to happen without official intervention or consequences.

The level of surveillance and toleration is naturally always subject to change, as was the case with the 798 art district in Beijing during the summer of 2008 before the Olympic Games. Since the deliberate modification of the art area into an international tourist site by the city officials, creation of urban art images is no longer allowed to the same extent. Although the attitude was somewhat relaxed in summer 2009 when I visited the area, it has since become more scrutinised. Similarly, the status of the one of the most popular sites in Hong Kong, namely the Mong Kok Alley, has recently changed. The narrow alley used to be a safe place to create, even in daylight, since the first piece created by the Dutch graffiti writer Dofi in 2000. During the past two years, however, creators have been chased away or even detained, which has contributed to the declining popularity of the site (Dofi, graffiti writer, Hong Kong, interview, 15 March 2013). Instead, the

wall at Yuen Long, started by a piece by Fuck Da Cops crew (FDC) in 2007, has become the site to paint in peace (KDG, graffiti writer, Hong Kong, interview, 25 March 2013). Nonetheless, in 2013 local citizens have started to inform the police if they come across creators in action on this site.

One of the most popular, longest and oldest sites still available is the wall of fame in Shenzhen, where creators from China and abroad have been tolerated since 2002/2003. In summer 2011, however, city officials planted flower bushes and trees close to the wall to prevent creative actions (Touch, graffiti writer, Shenzhen, email, 28 March 2013). Because of the plants it is difficult to paint or take good photographs at the most popular parts of the wall. In addition, some creators have recently been chased away from this well-known site. Whether the attitude of Shenzhen officials is changing can, however, be debated, because creating urban art images is clearly allowed in some other sites in the city. Since 2010 an area close to IKEA has regained popularity (Touch, graffiti writer, Shenzhen, email, 28 March 2013). For example, on Sunday 23 March 2013, after the Meeting of Styles organised at the Shenzhen Polytechnic, around 30 to 40 creators gathered to

paint on these walls for the whole day. Despite dozens of people walking by, no one intervened or alerted the officials. Some even stopped to admire and take photographs (Fig. 9).

Another viable semi-legal site is Moganshan Road in Shanghai. Although in 2011 it was rumoured even in the press that the wall at Moganshan Road 'where graffiti art was tolerated' would be demolished (Shanghai Daily, 2 August 2011), so far nothing has changed. Moganshan Road is an illuminating example of a semi-legal site initiated by the creators and gradually accepted by citizens and officials alike to exist as a place to create without consequences. Like the walls in Shenzhen, Moganshan Road is an illuminating example of the semi-legal sites where a more relaxed atmosphere enables larger, more skilful pieces to be created.

An interesting example of how the status of the site can gradually become officially accepted because of the negotiation process is the small park along the Rua dos Mercadores (*Jingde gungyun* 营地公园) in Macao. This site is often mentioned as 'the legal wall' in China among creators, although it is not mentioned on the international website *Legal Walls*.¹¹ Interestingly,

for the whole of China, only the previously discussed semi-legal Mong Kok Alley, the status of which is already changing to illegal, is marked on the map, along with the Pantone Graffiti workshop, which provides a variety of classes and workshops using the walls of the rooftop with the permission of the house management (Pantone, graffiti artist, Hong Kong, interview, 18 February 2013).¹² Other semi-legal or legal walls are still missing from this list.

The development of the park into a space to create urban art started in 16 September 2006, when an event to commemorate the French artist Niki de Saint Phalle (1930-2012) was organised in the park. The art works created on the walls of the buildings circling the park had to follow the style of Niki. After the successful event, local graffiti artist Pibg from the crew GANTZ 5 started to negotiate with the officials for open an empty area for creative actions (Pibg, graffiti artist, Macao, interview, 22 March 2013). The second event, Muse Graffiti Zone, was organised in the park by the Macao Museum of Art from 24 May-5 June 2008. According to the information provided by the Museum, the event was organised 'for promoting the exhibition "Plato in the Land of Confucius: Greek Art from the Louvre"' and '[t]he museum wanted to bring art to the community in a fun way by transforming the empty construction site at Rua dos Mercadores, no. 22-26 into a temporary recreation area to display 3D installations and graffiti paintings on the walls with the theme of Ancient Greek civilisation as well as Olympics re-interpreted in a contemporary style. "Graffiti Jam" session by artists from mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao was held at the opening of this activity,' which was also open to the public (Macao Museum of Art, email, 2 April 2013).

Although no official agreement or announcement has been made by the city officials about the status of the park, since the Muse Graffiti Zone the site has come to be considered as a legal site to paint without risks of consequences, while creating on other walls in Macao is considered illegal. Still today, a growing number of pieces continue to be created at the site, even during the daytime (Pibg, graffiti artist, Macao, interview, 22 March 2013). Despite the fact that the site is considered legal by the creators themselves and creative actions are tolerated by the citizens visiting the park as well as by officials, whether the site can be defined as legal is questionable. After all, there is no official written

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approval. As such, the status of the park is similar to other semi-legal sites in Chinese cities where urban art images are tolerated without legal consequences but no official agreement or announcement has been made (Fig.10).

PROVIDING LEGAL SITES:
BEAUTIFICATION, MARKETING,
EDUCATION AND CRIME PREVENTION

Although the sites for urban art images are primarily initiated by the creators themselves, new actors are also actively engaged in the process of negotiating the il/legality of creative actions in public space. The premises provided by private citizens, entrepreneurs, associations or even city officials are almost without exception acknowledged as legal sites because the

creative action is usually done with the permission of the owner or management of the building.

A gradually growing form of legal walls are provided by private citizens aiming to beautify their own or rented property and asking creators to paint the walls of the houses or rooftops. The initiative for these actions can be taken by the creators, the property owners, or the occupants. A recent example that indicates how the project can grow to include a whole village is from the Lam Tei village on the outskirts of Hong Kong.

An artist living in the village, Lina Wong, explained in an interview at the mural opening on 3 March 2013 how she had become fascinated by some urban art images she had seen and had decided to ask for the outer walls of her house to be painted too by local spray painter Forget About It and French mural

artist Sautel Cago. Gradually other villagers became interested in this beautifying process and asked for their walls to be modified too. Some requested specific themes, such as a dragon or an elephant. With spray paints provided by the head of the village, the project developed into a creative process lasting for weeks and engaging the small children of the village in the creation process. Only one villager complained about the smell of the spray paint, and another even called the police to investigate the actions, while all the other villagers were obviously very satisfied with the project and the outcomes. The police visited the village twice to interview the villagers and the artists but in both cases saw no reason to accuse the artists of anything and allowed them to continue. Consequently, it can be argued that this project was officially declared legal. Even more importantly, the project lifted the atmosphere in the village and provided a valuable chance for the children to engage in creativity (Fig. 11).

Besides private homes, a growing variety of commercial enterprises, from private entrepreneurs to multinational companies, are seeking creators to enliven the outer or interior of their establishments or to participate in special events advertising their products. Without a question, the motivations for the use of urban art images for commercial purposes are primarily aimed at attracting the attention of possible customers. Examples I have found are far too numerous to be listed here, and therefore I have decided to limit the discussion to one example that illustrates how even commissioned works can challenge the boundaries of il/legality.

In an interview on 9 February 2013, head chef Austin Fry explained that he wants the Brickhouse at Lan Kwai Fong to be part of the interactive community and a place where creative people feel at home. The interior of the establishment is decorated by young local and international artists and, in addition, monthly art exhibitions are organised there. On 6 February 2013, British illustrator/artist Mark Goss, graffiti writer 2TEK from Auckland and local graffiti writer Xeme joined forces to enliven the narrow alley leading to the restaurant with four pieces representing different styles and themes in addition to slogans and pictures bearing reference to the Mexican restaurant. According to Fry (interview, Hong Kong, 9 February 2013), the feedback from customers and from the community was completely positive during the first couple of days.



Fig. 11. Lam Tei village, Hong Kong, 3 March 2013. Photographed by / Copyright by Minna Valjakka.

Technically speaking, the project is only partially legal because the restaurant owns just a very small section of the walls painted, and the majority of the walls are owned by other establishments whose consent Fry did not seek in advance. If anyone felt disturbed by the images, Fry has said he would immediately clean the walls. He does not want to upset anyone. Quite the opposite: he wishes to inspire more creativity in the community, as long as it is tasteful and in line with the atmosphere of the restaurant (Austin Fry, Hong Kong, interview, 9 February 2013).

Another legal form of collaboration, besides the urban art images commissioned by private citizens, entrepreneurs and companies, is provided by the representatives of governmental offices, youth associations, rehabilitation centres, schools and universities. A growing number of institutions in Hong Kong have been developing projects that could encourage creativity and add colour to the



Fig. 10. Park along the Rua dos Mercadores, Macao, 22 March 2013. Photographed by / Copyright by Minna Valjakka.

monochrome public space in co-operation with the creators of urban art images. One of the earliest youth associations to organise graffiti classes and walls to paint on was the Warehouse Teenage Club in Aberdeen, Hong Kong. In an interview on 16 March 2013, the program manager Ellen Tang, who has been developing the graffiti program, elaborated how the Warehouse has provided classes every year since 2002 for youngsters to learn the basic skills and history of graffiti. Besides classes organised at the Warehouse, the organisation actively seeks collaborations with other institutions in Hong Kong to promote the acceptance of graffiti in part of the community, to provide possibilities for teenagers to develop their skills and self-esteem and to find venues for them to paint through two crews, Paint Da Wall (PDW) and Graffiti Art Association (GAS),¹³ working in collaboration with the Warehouse. The two main forms of institutional co-operation are to accept

commissioned works and to arrange workshops and classes in local schools. The third form of improving the status of graffiti is to organise exhibitions.

Graffiti lessons, workshops and events are not rare in Hong Kong. Consequently, the competition is getting tough. Even before establishing the graffiti centre, 塗鴉 TEEN HOME, in 2011, the Aberdeen Kai-fong Welfare Association (AKA) organised graffiti lessons in one of their service centres in Aberdeen. The space for graffiti became possible, when one of the management board members of AKA, an owner of a factory, offered one unit of 5000 sq. ft. for organising the graffiti centre from 2011 to 2014. For two years, the centre has actively hold workshops and classes (Nora Yee-mei Ng, Senior Manageress, AKA, Hong Kong, email, 8 April 2013). Although providing a great length of walls to be painted, this association has the same issue with the accessibility and visibility as the Warehouse: average citizens do not get to see the urban art images unless they make an appointment and visit the premises. Usually, however, in these

premises the creators can quite freely decide on the content, styles and visual elements employed for the images—except for certain limitations of ‘good taste’, meaning that for instance, pornographic references are not allowed.

A somewhat more structured creating process can be seen in the lessons and workshops organised as part of the art education programs, as was the case in SKH Lam Woo Memorial Secondary School at Kwai Chung, Hong Kong. The art teacher, Ms. Choi Sui Fan, explained in an interview on the last day of the workshop, 6 February 2013, how she had come up with the idea to organise a graffiti workshop of eight sessions held by spray painter Timothy Ng. During the workshop the white wall by the school’s sports ground was painted with the motto of the school: ‘The truth will make you free’ (Fig. 12). First, the students had to design sketches of the words based on information provided about graffiti and spray painting. Second, the teachers evaluated the sketches and chose the best ones to be painted on the wall in teams. Both teachers

and students were noticeably thrilled by the project and the possibility to learn new creative techniques. While interviewing the participants of this project, the feedback was unanimously positive. Ms. Choi and the students were extremely satisfied with the project and hoped that they could continue with similar workshops to beautify the school facilities even more.

The previous examples already indicate how creating urban art images can legally be employed for educational purposes that enable teenagers or children to learn creative skills and gain self-confidence. A step further in this category are the projects, which employ urban art images— perhaps somewhat surprisingly— even for rehabilitation and crime prevention. One of the earliest examples is the Tuen Mun police station, which in 2008 contacted Ellen Tang at Warehouse and requested creators to paint all the outer walls of the main police station. At the beginning the local Paint Da Walls (PDW) crew was in charge of the project, but because the work was processing rather slowly, after a few weeks the person responsible for the project, graffiti

Fig. 12. SKH Lam Woo Memorial Secondary School, Kwai Chung, Hong Kong, 6 February 2013. Photographed by / Copyright by Minna Valjakka.



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Fig. 13. Tuen Mun Police Station, Hong Kong, 29 March 2013. Photographed by / Copyright by Minna Valjakka.

artist UnCle, decided to invite other local creators, such as KS, Jams, Devil and Fuck Da Cops (FDC) as well as from the GANTZ 5 crew from Macao to join. Altogether 13 creators participated in the project over two months. The police had set up three main themes for the main walls, namely celebration of the Beijing Olympics, crime prevention and anti-drugs activities. (UnCle, graffiti artist, Hong Kong, email 30 March 2013). Despite the scrutinised creation process, both UnCle and the other local crew, FDC, managed to paint their own names on the walls of the station (UnCle, graffiti artist, Hong Kong, email 30 March 2013; KDG, graffiti writer, Hong Kong, interview 25 March 2013). FDC used a very abstract design, but nonetheless putting their crew name on the police station added a somewhat ironic twist to the project.

Despite the length of walls to be painted legally, the project was not very satisfactory to the creators. Besides limitations in creation process, they did not actually get compensated, except for travelling expenses and for the spray paints. In addition, the graffiti artist responsible for the project was harshly criticised by his peers, especially by the representatives of the old-school, who considered that creating a commissioned work for a police station was the ultimate form of selling out the ideals of graffiti.

In 2011, the police station contacted Ellen Tang again to get the front wall repainted. This time only three people took on the task, and the creation process was even more limited as the police required specific concepts

and figures that had to be included in the works, such as a person in handcuffs and a sign saying that the shop had surveillance cameras (Fig. 13). Although this time the creators did get better compensation, the commission was not very rewarding due to the strict limitations. A slightly more satisfying project was requested by a sub-police station at Castle Peak Divisional Police Station in Tuen Mun in 2010. This time Roves, a Hong Kong graffiti writer, co-operated with Hugs Centre,¹⁴ and held a ten-lesson workshop for twelve 15-year-olds. As a result, according to the wishes of the station, a long art work including 'cute figures' and specific words and slogans, such as 'to steal', 'to kidnap', 'to avoid narcotics', was created (Roves, graffiti writer, Hong Kong, interview, 29 March 2013).

An even more profound case of employing urban art for crime prevention is illustrated by the *One Love* project organised by the Society of Rehabilitation and Crime Prevention (SRACP), Hong Kong, in co-operation with the Hong Kong Federation of Women Lawyers and Sky City Church. The project consisted of two parts: an urban art exhibition by two French artists, Kongo and Ceet, and a workshop held in the TeenGuard Valley Crime Prevention Education Centre in Shatin on 12 May 2012. The project was started in February 2012 by an initiative from Kongo to one of the board members.

In the workshop, a group of around 20 to 30 youngsters, about half of which were ex-offenders or drug abusers and the rest youngsters from the neighbourhood, were taught the basics of sketching and handling the spray paint. Besides Ceet, who had the main responsibility of the workshop, two local graffiti artists, UnCle and Moe also participated, but Kongo was taken ill. The result from the day was a piece created on a temporary, ten-meter wall with the slogan of the project, *One Love* (Fig. 14). During the creation process the youngsters had a chance to mingle and feel accepted by each other, which is a valuable process for ex-offenders. Maybe even more importantly, according to Joey Chan, while learning to spray paint, the ex-offenders learned from Ceet that making a mistake in painting is nothing too serious and can be fixed with another layer of the paint. Talking with her after the event, the ex-offenders drew parallels to their own lives. Without a question, the whole project had showed them how urban art, as other forms of art, can be used as a treatment in a rehabilitation process. It allowed the

youngsters to discover their own talents and potentials (Gloria Yuen, Planning & Development Manager of the Head Office, and Joey Chan, Project Manager of the TeenGuard Valley Crime Prevention Education Center, Hong Kong, interview, 27 March 2013).

The other part of the project, the urban art exhibition, allowed the agency to raise funds for charity by selling the works and to get positive attention for the whole project. Overall, the organisers and collaborators did not find any contradiction in using urban art, which is commonly regarded as illegal, for rehabilitation and crime prevention. For them it was a beneficial method to encourage the ex-offenders to find their abilities for self-expression. Even more importantly, the workshop really gave the ex-offenders a chance for gaining self-esteem and self-respect. For the organisers, the aim was to focus on the positive sides of urban art and show that there is no reason to discriminate against this specific form of art (Yuen and Chan, interview, 27 March 2013).

THE LEVELS OF TOLERANCE TOWARDS URBAN ART IMAGES

The discussed examples represent only a very small sampling of the urban art images created in the public space of Chinese cities today. Nevertheless, they illustrate how the understanding of the levels of il/legality of urban art images in public space is challenged by the creators through employment of format, content and behaviour. From examples that challenge the observation abilities of average citizens, to the three-dimensional works that explore the attitudes towards the use of space, to spray painting on temporary surfaces, these cases demonstrate how great a variety of formats, contents and behaviour are involved in this ongoing negotiation process. The examples focusing on the importance of the site for the process also illustrate the varying forms of agency and intentions related to arbitration and tolerance.

Although the number of commissioned works, workshops and events might be growing in one specific

Fig. 14. *One Love*, TeenGuard Valley Crime Prevention Education Centre, Shatin, Hong Kong, 12 May 2012. Copyright by The Society of Rehabilitation and Crime Prevention, Hong Kong.



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city, such as Hong Kong, it does not necessarily imply that the illegal urban art images would be more accepted by the citizens or the officials. Quite the opposite trend is actually visible because the surveillance on the semi-legal and semi-illegal sites is strengthening. Also, in Macao, the existence of one site where urban art images are allowed to be created has not changed the attitude towards creative actions as a whole. In mainland Chinese cities, however, the situations seem somewhat more relaxed. Based on the experiences and perceptions of the creators of urban art images themselves, in Hong Kong the use of public space is far more regulated than in the mainland Chinese cities. Therefore, the creators living in Hong Kong actually travel quite often to Shenzhen or other mainland Chinese cities to create large, multi-coloured pieces.

As implied throughout the article, the evaluation criteria for legal and semi-il/legal works vary among the creators. Although creating unauthorised urban art images continues to be a highly appreciated form of creative action, including the aspirations to tag police stations and other official premises, the clear majority of the creators are also involved in legal, commissioned works in China. Opinions about going commercial, ‘crossing-over’, vary among creators from acceptance to harsh criticism, although almost everyone does—or at least hopes for—it today in order to make a living. Occasionally, the most ‘hard-core graffiti writers’ avoid admitting their legal/commercial activities to keep up appearances.

One reason for the growing number of legal activities is the essential difference between the original Euro-American scene, and the contemporary scene in China. Since the emerging of urban art images in China, the clear majority of the creators are involved in creative industries as graphic designers, designers,

illustrators, artists or art students. As a result, many of them are interested in creating more skillfully demanding and complex works with pictorial elements. As mentioned earlier, to create these kinds of urban art images basically requires sites with more tolerance from the public. Contrary to the original evaluation criteria that emphasises the illegality and bombing the city or trains for fame, these creators are also aiming for another kind of fame—as professionals in creative industries. Nonetheless, these two forms, legal and illegal, are interrelated in many ways in the reality of these creators, and what has become crucial is to find a balance between the two forms, suitable for one’s own purposes.

A growing number of private citizens, commercial enterprises and educational institutions are responding to this intention by providing legal sites for urban art images. As discussed above, the creation process at legal sites is usually somewhat limited in terms of the access, visibility or the content. The commissioned urban art image, however, may limit the creation process even further by setting a specific theme, colours and/or style to be created. Obviously, the appreciation of the commissioned works varies among the creators themselves. If the restrictions are too tight, the creator might refuse to co-operate with the commissioner because artistic freedom in relation to a certain level of self-expression is a core value for many creators. However, during the past ten years there has emerged a growing interest and appreciation towards, at least, authorised urban art images in these cities. Whether there will be more semi-legal or legal sites remains to be seen, too. The development of these mediation processes, as well as which formats, contents, forms of behaviour and sites will be tolerated in future in the Chinese cities will be worth further research. **RC**

NOTES

1 For a more detailed discussion on popular publications and the few bachelor’s and master’s theses written in Chinese, see Minna Valjakka, ‘Graffiti in China—Chinese Graffiti?’, pp. 61–62.

2 For my previous discussion on the interrelation of contemporary art and contemporary graffiti in Beijing and Shanghai, including examples of commissioned works even by city officials in Beijing, see Valjakka, 2011.

3 For an introduction to this early format in New York see Martha Cooper and Henry Chalfant, *Subway Art* and the revised edition of the book by the same authors with new materials published in 2009.

4 Information based on surveys conducted with the English word ‘graffiti’ and Chinese words ‘涂鸦’ and ‘涂写’ in the Peking University law database (www.pkulaw.cn), China Law Info database (www.

chinalawinfo.com), HKSAR law database (<http://www.legislation.gov.hk/index.htm>) and Macao legislation available online (<http://en.io.gov.mo/Legis/default.aspx>). For State Council regulations concerning cities in mainland China, especially article 17, see http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2011/content_1860772.htm. Accessed on 20 March 2013.

5 Compare with my previous attempt to explore the scenes in Beijing and Shanghai through the concept of contemporary graffiti images in Minna Valjakka, ‘Graffiti in China—Chinese Graffiti?’. This article aims to provide a more elaborated theoretical and methodological approach that is more suitable for examination of the varying scenes in Asian cities.

6 I am aware that the concept of public space is problematic and can also be contested. I use it broadly to mean places that are not restricted to the private use of a citizen or family, but are accessible to a larger audience, at least in some ways, such as schools, companies, restaurants, etc.

7 For more detailed discussion on Stewart’s approach and the challenges of employing it in the Chinese scenes, see Valjakka 2011. Another

early attempt to define a new concept based on the format, namely ‘TTP graffiti’ (Tags, Throw-ups, Pieces), was made by Staffan Jacobson, *Den Spraymålade Bilden*, 1996.

8 I was personally observing this experiment in order to document it. However, I did not initiate the experiment, nor was I involved in the creation process itself.

9 More detailed discussion focusing on the sites and their varying levels of il/legality was provided in the conference presentation ‘(Semi-)legal manifestations of urban art in Chinese cities.’

10 Also other art areas in Beijing have been popular sites for creating urban art images. See Valjakka, 2011.

11 Available online <http://www.legal-walls.net/>. Accessed 27 February 2013.

12 See the webpage of Pantone Graffiti Workshop <http://pantonegraffiti.com/>. Accessed 5 March 2013.

13 GAS crew, however, has not been very active since 2006 (Ellen Tang, Hong Kong, interview, 16 March 2013).

14 See the webpage of the centre <http://www.hugs.org.hk/>. Accessed 29 March 2013.

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Another problem of Anderson’s argument is that being a foreign import, print capitalism in East Asia was mediated through the cultural networks in the region. It was not a direct transferring of technology from Europe (the centre) to East Asia (the periphery), but a circuitous, multifarious ‘travel’ among European and East Asian cities.⁴ This ‘travel’—involving a fluid dialogue between what was global and what was local—was particularly apparent during what Douglas Reynolds calls ‘the golden decade’ (1898-1912) of Sino-Japanese relations. The period was ‘golden’ not only because it was in sharp contrast to what happened later when the two countries went to war in the 1930s and 1940s. More importantly, it was ‘golden’ because China and Japan were closely tied in a network of cultural and technology sharing to build an ‘East Asian modernity.’ Underlying this cultural and technological network was the belief that East Asia (encompassing China, Japan, and Korea) was a region with a unique culture that could achieve modernity equal to, and yet different from, Europe and America.⁵ A major characteristic of this network was that it attempted to mimic the Western model on the one hand, and to assert the Asian uniqueness on the other.

What Reed and Reynolds have shown is that print capitalism in East Asia was more than a technological advancement—i.e., the replacement of an old technology by a new technology, or the displacement of the traditional and family-based production by modern, industrial, and machine-based production. Instead, East Asian print capitalism was facilitated by a creative mixing of foreign and local cultures, and was disseminated through a regional web of knowledge circulation. More significantly, East Asian print capitalism was tied to (and in some cases, a result of) the expansion of the reader market where the demands for printed texts increased by leaps and bounds due to social and political changes.

To elucidate the complexity of technology transfer in early 20th-century East Asia, this essay focuses on two Chinese presses in Shanghai: The Press for the Association for the Preservation of National Learning (*Guoxue baocunhui yinshua suo* 国粹保存会 1905-1911) and the Commercial Press (*Shangwu yinshuguan* 商务印书馆 1897-present). In the early 20th century, the former made profits by reprinting ancient books and artworks, and the latter became the largest textbook publisher in the country. In both

cases, the Western mechanised printing technology allowed the publishers to produce large numbers of books, journals, and texts at a lightning speed. Together, they demonstrate the broad range of audience that the modern Chinese presses served as the Chinese society became more fluid and diverse at the end of the imperial period. Above all, they show the importance of the East Asian web of knowledge circulation when both presses relied on Japanese technology to improve the quality of reproducing texts.

TIME GAP IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Until the late 19th century, printing in China was done mainly by making impressions on papers from wood blocks. Known as xylography, the method of wood-block printing satisfied the need for printing thousands of Chinese characters at a low cost. Requiring no fixed cost of building and maintaining heavy machines, wood-block printers were able to print as many copies as they liked after they carved a wood block. In addition, they could bring along the carved blocks when they travelled from city to city to look for employers.⁶ Thus, the economy and flexibility of wood-block printing created a decentralised printing industry that suited the loose structure of the Chinese imperial system that was based on lineages, clans, and villages. More significantly, the low cost and the low technique of wood-block printing helped to make printing more a job of untrained labourers than that of skilled workers in Europe.⁷

While wood-block printing was the preferred method of printing in late imperial China, other printing technologies (including semi-mechanised printing based on movable-type fonts) were available in China for a long time. Yet, despite the availability of other printing technologies, the Chinese publishers still preferred to use wood-block printing because of its low cost and flexibility. Even after the Western mechanised printing technology was introduced into China by the missionaries in the early 19th century, it took a long time for the new printing technology to spread. Thus, in China, the availability of a new mechanised technology did not automatically lead to a revolution in printing. Rather, it was after a bigger demand for printed materials had been developed, a more efficient (albeit, more costly) printing technology was adopted.⁸ This time gap in technology transfer was also expressed

in spatial terms. The Western technology first took foothold in foreign concessions on China’s coast, and then it spread from the coast to the hinterland as the reader market expanded inland.⁹

The time gap in China between the availability of Western mechanised printing technology and its widespread use was partly due to how the technology was transferred. When the missionaries first introduced Western mechanised printing into China, they used it to print the Bible and other religious texts. Limited to the evangelical purposes, the mechanised printing technology was practiced mainly in missionary presses, such as the London Missionary Society Press. Although some ‘foreign experts’ (such as John Fryer, Alexander Wylie and Young J. Allen) also helped to introduce the mechanised printing technology when they worked in the translation bureaus of the Qing government, their main work was confined to translating texts rather than printing texts. It was when the Chinese workers in missionary presses opened their own printing shops in coastal cities in the late 19th century, that the mechanised printing technology began to spread. And when there were clear market demands for efficient and high-quality printing, particularly after the founding of the national school system in 1905, Chinese businessmen began to invest heavily in upgrading printing technology. Some of them bought defunct missionary presses; some formed partnerships with Japanese publishers to gain access to advanced printing technologies.

MECHANISED PRINTING AND THE NEW EDUCATED ELITE

A prime example of this circuitous adoption of Western printing technology was the Press for the Association for the Preservation of National Learning. The press was located on the Fourth Avenue (*simalu*) in the Anglo-American Concession in Shanghai. By the end of the 19th century, Shanghai had become the hub of domestic and foreign trade. It was the terminus of the trade and transport along the Yangzi River as well as the centre of international commerce and communication between China and the world. Despite perpetual conflicts among residents of different races, the foreign concessions in Shanghai provided a lively environment where advanced foreign technology was introduced, corporate finance was

readily available, and skilled workers were abundant.¹⁰ With these advantages, Shanghai quickly became the capital of the burgeoning Chinese print capitalism. By Xiong Yuezhi’s 熊月之 counting, there were 514 newspapers published in Shanghai from 1850 to 1911, almost one-third of the total number of newspapers published in the entire country.¹¹ Among the newspapers published in Shanghai was the foreign-owned *Wanguo gongbao* 万国公报 (Globe Magazine) which enjoyed, at its height in 1898, a circulation of 38,400 copies.¹²

In the early 20th century, the Fourth Avenue in Shanghai was known to the locals as the ‘culture street’ (*wenhua jie* 文化街) because of hundreds of retailer outlets, trade associations, stationers, calligraphers, painters, printing presses, and shops selling traditional ‘four treasures’ of scholars (brushes, ink, inkstones, and paper). Due to its location, the Press for the Association for the Preservation of National Essence was a hub for writers, artists, calligraphers, painters, and printing press owners. It was part of the public realm of professionals that was developing in various Chinese urban cities.¹³

Formed by workers previously working in missionary presses, the press provided the main source of income to the Association for the Preservation of National Learning. The list of publications of the press was long. It included the *Guocui xuebao* 国粹学报 (Journal of National Essence), the *Shenzhou guoguang ji* 神州国光集 (Cathay Art Book), the *Guocui congshu* 国粹丛书 (Collected Works of National Essence), the *Fengyu lou congshu* 风雨楼丛书 (Collected Works of the Pavilion of Wind and Rain), and history and geography textbooks. From 1905 to 1911, the press had published altogether fifteen volumes of the *Shenzhou guoguang ji*, hundreds of titles of reprinted writings, and several sets of textbooks for seven provinces.

As the list of publications shows, some publications of the press were clearly for profit. For example, the *Shenzhou guoguang ji* and the *Guocui congshu* were aimed at wealthy and cultured customers who could afford to pay the high prices for refined and exotic works.¹⁴ This was particularly true of the *Shenzhou guoguang ji*, which contained photo-reproductions of large-size art works printed with the most advanced collotype printing technology imported from Japan. In a 1909 advertisement in

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the *Guocui xuebao*, it was stated that, printed with the new collotype technology from Japan, the photo-reproduction in the *Shenzhou guoguang ji* was so ‘close to real’ (*bizhen* 逼真) that those who brought it would feel like they possessed the original art work.¹⁵ Partly selling commercial products and partly preserving ancient art work, the *Shenzhou guoguang ji* catered to genteel customers who wanted to own a piece of art. As for the *Fengyu lou congshu*, it contained reprints of major literary and historical writings of authors from the 11th to the 19th centuries. Most of the reprints were rare editions, banned books, or newly discovered manuscripts, intended to satisfy the bibliophilic interest of the genteel class.


But, as the list of publications also shows, not all of the publications of the press were for profit. From 1905 to 1907, the press published textbooks for seven provinces, including subjects like history, geography, literature, ethics, and classical studies.¹⁶ Considering the fact that there were only eighteen administrative provinces in Qing China, the press published textbooks practically covering more than one-third of the country. More importantly, the press published textbooks immediately after the Manchu government issued the plan for building a national school system in 1904. Despite its anti-Manchu standpoint, the press showed strong support of the late Qing educational reform, viewing it as part of building a modern Chinese nation. And for a short while, the press was a major player in the textbook market, competing with the Commercial Press in supplying textbooks to the new school system.

The crown jewel of the press was the publication of the *Guocui xuebao*. In six years, from 1905 to 1911, the press used the mechanised printing technology to print hundreds of copies of the journal monthly. Combining classical scholarship with art connoisseurship, the *Guocui xuebao* stood out with its high quality of printing and its clear reproduction of art works and artefacts. More importantly, the journal was founded to win the support of the young literati who were disillusioned by the abolition of the civil service examinations in 1905. For more than a millennium, the civil service examinations bestowed power to successful candidates to rule the country, and established a body of knowledge and a cluster of texts to define the membership of the learned community. Because of the central role that the

civil service examinations had played in defining the membership and self-identity of the educated elite, the abolition of the examinations in 1905 triggered a profound soul-searching among the educated elite. For those who had passed the examinations, they needed to find ways to keep their elite status in the new political and social environment. For those who were yet to pass the examinations, they needed to make sure that the time and effort they had spent in preparing for the examinations would not be wasted. The *Guocui xuebao* was aimed at the educated elite who were perplexed and frustrated by the abolition of the examinations.

The journal published three different types of writing. First were short essays. They were written in argumentative style intended to persuade readers to adopt a certain perspective. Usually the theme was the moral responsibility of the learned community to save the Chinese race, to defend the Chinese nation, and to preserve the Chinese culture. Occasionally, the writings offered rebuttal to current viewpoints, such as the ‘uselessness’ (*wuyong* 无用) of classical learning and the adoption of Esperanto or *shijie yu* 世界语 in China. Second were long articles: these writings were longer and full of detail, sometimes so long that they had to be serialised for months. Historically and textually grounded, the long articles offered new accounts of historical events and new interpretations of philosophical writings to support the arguments in the short essays. Third were poems and excerpts: the writings were short but artistic, intending to suit the aesthetic taste of the educated elite. They were often written by established cultural figures. To show that the journal was neutral to academic debates, the journal included writings of both the Old Script School scholars (e.g., Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 and Liu Shiwei 刘师培) and the New Script School scholars (e.g., Liao Ping 廖平 and Wang Kaiyun 王闿运).

Every issue of the journal was accompanied by visual illustrations (such as paintings, drawings, and calligraphy) that were reprinted with the most advanced printing technology from Japan. The visual art in the journal was not just for illustrations, but for two important purposes. One purpose was to prove that the journal had the full support of the academic and art circles. For instance, in February of 1908 the editors published a series of calligraphy and paintings by established scholars to celebrate the third year



The title page (left) and the back cover page (right) of *Guocui xuebao* 11 (1908). On the back cover page, readers were urged to subscribe to the journal.

anniversary of the journal. Another purpose was to include art into the discourse of the nation so that ‘national art’ (*guohua* 国画) would be an expression of the nation. In the final two years of the journal, from 1909 to 1911, the editors went even further to promote art and literature. They rearranged the sections in the journal such that that it included special sections on art and the history of aesthetics.

The contributors of the *Guocui xuebao* came from two different groups of scholars. The first group were scholars in their late 20s and early 30s, including the two chief editors and the major contributors. By age, they belonged to the lower-level educated elite who were competing to pass the civil service examinations. Others, such as the chief editor Huang Jie, failed the recent 1902 metropolitan examination, and were deeply frustrated by the examination system. For these young

scholars, the abolition of the examination provided them with the opportunity to examine the problems of the imperial system. And writing for the journal gave them the chance to become cultural leaders in the new social and political environment.

As a whole, the success of the Press for the Society of National Glory demonstrates the close relation between technology transfer and social change. Aiming at the literati who supported a revolution against the Manchu dynasty, the press was among the first to adopt Western mechanised printing technology to mass produce books, journals and copies of paintings. Located in the foreign concessions in Shanghai, the press was able to make a profit from reprinting ancient texts and traditional Chinese printings to finance the publication of a high-quality academic journal. Its success indicates the importance

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of the reader market that pushed the use of modern printing technology.

COMMERCIAL PRESS AND THE SINO-JAPANESE COLLABORATION

Much older than the Press for the Association for the Preservation of National Essence, the Commercial Press was founded in 1897 by four former workers of missionary presses. Small in size at the beginning, the Commercial Press served the Protestant community in Shanghai by printing fliers and notices.¹⁷ Later, the press expanded in size and in its printing capacity by incorporating a defunct Japanese press in Shanghai, *Guangwen shuguan* 光文书馆 (the Press for Expanding Knowledge). Taking advantage of the demand for ‘Western learning’ after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the press made a name by printing English dictionaries and English grammar books. It also made profits in reprinting popular classical and historical texts. As with the Press for the Association for the Preservation of National Essence, the Commercial Press stood out because of its access to mechanised printing. At short notice, it could print thousands of copies of a text with stunning clarity and efficiency.¹⁸

The Commercial Press was transformed from a small and peripheral press into a giant printing house at the turn of the 20th century. From 1901 to 1914, the Commercial Press formed a partnership with Kinkodo 金港堂, a major textbook publisher in Japan. During the fourteen-year partnership with Kinkodo, the Commercial Press adopted advanced printing technology and a modern management style. First, it was turned into a corporate company with hundreds of small investors but governed by a board of directors. In so doing, it possessed more financial resources to purchase advanced printing machines from Europe and Japan.¹⁹ Second, the press followed in the footsteps of Kinkodo in developing a specialty in printing school textbooks. It brought Japanese specialists and craftsmen to Shanghai to build one of the biggest production units in the country to publish textbooks.²⁰

The press’s decision to specialise in printing textbooks came at the most opportune time. In 1905, just four years after forming a partnership with Kinkodo, the Qing government announced the abolition of the civil service examinations and


the founding of a national school system. With a strong editorial board and a superb team of printing technicians, the Commercial Press quickly monopolised the textbook markets, ensuring the press with a constant flow of income. With its success in printing textbooks, the Commercial Press overshadowed other presses after the 1911 Revolution.²¹

The success in the partnership between the Commercial Press and Kinkodo demonstrates the circuitous route that European technology took in transferring to East Asia. As the most advanced nation in East Asia at the turn of the 20th century, Japan was the hub for disseminating and reinventing Western technologies. With respect to printing technology, Kinkodo brought to China the colour printing, photo reproduction, and collotype printing. In addition to printing technology, Kinkodo brought to China new management techniques that reshaped the Commercial Press into a modern company. Yet, there was liability of international collaboration as well. As the Chinese became increasingly anti-imperialist and anti-Japan after the 1911 Revolution, the Commercial Press had difficulty in continuing its partnership with Kinkodo. After several unsuccessful attempts, the board of directors of the Commercial Press finally gathered enough capital to buy off the shares of Kinkodo in 1914, and ended the fourteen years of commercial and technological partnership with the Japanese company.²² Still, by all accounts, the Commercial Press would not have developed into the largest press in 20th-century China had it not formed a partnership with Kinkodo for fourteen years.

TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Certainly printing thousands of copies of books, journals, and textbooks every month, the two presses directly benefited from the new technology of mechanised printing and the sprawling nation-wide distribution networks. But, to a great extent, the success of the two presses was directly linked to the abolition of the civil service examinations in 1905. In their own ways, the two journals targeted educated individuals who were both perplexed and enticed by the founding of the national school system. Replacing the civil service examinations that had defined the literati culture for centuries, the national school system provided modern professional training to tens of

thousands of young students, thereby creating a huge market for textbooks and supplementary readings.²³ By targeting their cultural products at students of the national school system, the two presses produced what Joan Judge calls the ‘middle realm’ in modern Chinese society—i.e., journalists, editors, columnists, academicians, and school teachers who became the new leaders of political discourse.²⁴ As such, the two presses exemplified a momentous change in early 20th-century Chinese society where the old literati

(who served the imperial dynasty) gave way to a new generation of intellectuals (who competed in the cultural market).²⁵ 

Author’s note: This paper is drawn from my research on early 20th-century Chinese modernity. For a more detail discussion of the role of print capitalism in shaping the social and cultural landscape of modern China, see my book *Revolution as Restoration: Guocui xuebao and China’s Path to Modernity, 1905-1911*, especially Chapters 1 and 2.

NOTES

1	Benedict Anderson, <i>Imagined Communities</i> , revised edition, p. 36.	12	Ibid., pp. 685-686.
2	Ibid., pp. 9-24.	13	Christopher A. Reed, <i>Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1934</i> , pp. 16-18, 188-199; Li Renyuan, <i>Wanqing de xingshi chuanbo meiti</i> , pp. 213-224.
3	Christopher A. Reed, <i>Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1934</i> , pp. 12-22.	14	For the publication of <i>Cathay Art Book</i> , see the advertisements for <i>Cathay Art Book</i> in <i>Guocui xuebao</i> 国粹学报 41-70 (1908-1910). For some of the titles of reprinted texts, see the advertisements for the first volume of <i>Guocui congshu</i> 国粹丛书 in <i>Guocui xuebao</i> 27 (1907) and the first volume of <i>Fengyu lou congshu</i> 风雨楼丛书 in <i>Guocui xuebao</i> 69 (1910).
4	Regarding the ‘travel theory’ of knowledge transfer in East Asia, see Lydian H. Liu, <i>Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China 1900-1937</i> , pp. 1-44.	15	See the advertisement for <i>Cathay Art Book</i> in <i>Guocui xuebao</i> 52 (1909).
5	Douglas R. Reynolds, <i>China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan</i> , pp. 1-14, 111-126.	16	For the publication of school textbooks, see the advertisement in <i>Guocui xuebao</i> 28 (1907).
6	Cynthia J. Brokaw, ‘Introduction: On the History of the Books in China’, in <i>Printing and Book Culture in Late Imperial China</i> , edited by Cynthia J. Brokaw and Kai-wing Chow, pp. 8-9.	17	Li Jiaju 李家驹, <i>Shangwu yinshuguan yu jindai zhishi wenhua de chuanbo</i> 商务印书馆与近代知识文化的传播 (The Commercial Press and the Dissemination of Modern Knowledge and Culture), pp. 27-34.
7	Cynthia J. Brokaw, <i>Printing and Books Culture</i> , pp. 9-10. For the rise of a new type of cultural businessmen due to the expansion of the print market in late imperial China, see Kai-wing Chow, <i>Publishing, Culture, and Power in Early Modern China</i> , pp. 1-18, 241-251.	18	Ibid., pp. 43-44.
8	Joan Judge, <i>Print and Culture: ‘Shibao’ and the Culture of Reform in Late Qing China</i> , pp. 17-31.	19	Ibid., pp. 50-60.
9	For a study of the spatial differences in technological transfer, see Li Renyuan 李仁渊, <i>Wanqing de xingshi chuanbo meiti yu zhishi fengzi: Yi baokan chuban wei zhongxin de taolun</i> 晚清的新式传播媒体与知识份子：以报刊出版为中心的讨论 (The Modern Mass Media in Late Qing and the Intellectuals: A Study of the Publishing of Newspaper), pp. 213-287.	20	Ibid., pp. 38-39, 54-60.
10	For a discussion of the cultural changes in Shanghai and their impact on the lower Yangzi region, see Xiong Yuezhi 熊月之, ‘Yanjiang chengshi yu xixue zhuanbo’ 沿江城市与西学转播 (Cities along the Yangze River and the Dissemination of Western Learning), in <i>Changjiang yuanjiang chengshi yu Zhongguo jindaihua</i> 长江沿江城市与中国近代化 (Cities along the Yangtze River and Chinese Modernization), edited by Zhang Zhongli 张仲礼, Xiong Yuezhi 熊月之, and Shen Zuwei 沈祖炜, pp. 653-707.	21	Ibid., pp. 54-60; Li Renyuan, <i>Wanqing de xingshi chuanbo meiti</i> , pp. 281-284.
11	Ibid., p. 683.	22	Li Jiaju, <i>Shangwu yinshuguan</i> , pp. 50-51.
		23	For a discussion of how the founding of the national school system impacted the print market, see the chapters by Peter Zarrow, May-bo Chang, and Tze-ki Hon in <i>The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China</i> , edited by Tze-ki Hon and Robert J. Culp, pp. 21-105.
		24	Joan Judge, <i>Print and Culture: ‘Shibao’ and the Culture of Reform in Late Qing China</i> , pp. 17-31.
		25	For a discussion of this change from literati to intellectuals, see Xu Jilin 许纪霖, <i>20 shiji Zhongguo zhishi fenzi shilun</i> 20 世纪中国知识分子史论 (A Study of the History of the 20 th Century Chinese Intellectuals), pp. 1-4.

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Faith and Charity
The Christian Disaster Management
in South China

JOSEPH TSE-HEI LEE*

一段虹霓出海隅，八风如战雨倾衢。
楼头绿树连根拔，陌上青秧贴水枯。
正拟望秋差有庾，那思卒岁更无襦。
推窗一望天初霁，早有排年说晚租。

A rainbow rises from the sea,
Wind blows from all directions like the heavy rain pouring in the battlefield.
The big green tree in front of the house is uprooted,
Grain crops and water in the fields completely dry up.

People have little left in the granaries by autumn,
People cannot afford to buy clothing by the end of the year.
When opening the window and seeing the blue sky after the typhoon,
People talk about delaying tax payment under the *lijia* system.
(Puning shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 普宁市地方志编纂委员会 [Committee of the Puning District Gazetteer],
comp. *Puning xianzhi* 普宁县志 [Puning District Gazetteer].
Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1995, p. 540.
Author's translation)

Late imperial scholar-official Li Zhi 李质 captured lucidly the destructive power of a typhoon in the Chaozhou-speaking region of northeast Guangdong Province (Fig. 1). The severity of typhoon seasons badly affected coastal areas and implored district authorities to relieve stricken communities. However, when the Qing dynasty collapsed in October 1911 and a modern nation-state was not yet established, it fell on the shoulders of non-state actors to undertake disaster relief efforts. This was particularly true for the Chaozhou-speaking Christians in Shantou during the early 20th century (Lee, 2003).

This article examines how Chaozhou Baptists and Presbyterians employed socio-religious resources to cope with the devastating effects of a typhoon on 2 August 1922 (*baer fengzai* 八二风灾). The typhoon lifted a vast mass of seawater and hurled it on cities and villages along the coast, sweeping away countless people, animals, and fishing boats. Farther inland, violent winds flattened buildings and huts and caused more casualties. There was utter devastation, including entire settlements being washed away, paddy fields becoming strewn with corpses and dead animals, and survivors sleeping in the rough outdoors.

The disaster galvanised foreign missionaries, native Christians, local merchants, municipal officials, and village elders into action. The relief operation was a large-scale, multi-layered organisational task, and differed from that of traditional chambers of commerce, temples, and lineages. Seeking help from treaty-port communities in China and from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, the Chaozhou

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Fig. 1. Map of Chaozhou, designed by Pui-Shan Lee.

Christians activated their global church networks to gather managerial, capital, medical, and labor resources for fundraising and post-disaster reconstruction—resources that the Shantou municipality did not possess. The operation mobilised Western medical and ministerial missionaries, Chinese medical staff, mission schoolteachers and students, and local congregants to assist stricken communities. Its success highlights the remarkable organisational capacity of Christian missions and native churches.

Much has been written about faith-based disaster management in China and it pivoted on two major issues. The first issue was the need to make charity an inherent part of religious teachings. In times of crisis, increased interactions between religious proselytisers and the needy led to new opportunities for faith-based philanthropy, and many religious groups engaged in disaster relief as a means of teaching the faithful about unique ethical values over the mundane concerns of health and wealth (Yang, ed., 2008). Prasenjit Duara (2004, pp. 104) refers to numerous redemptive

societies, which, ‘armed with a strong this-worldly orientation and rhetoric of worldly redemption’, encouraged their members to do good works in this life and to contribute to state-building in Manchukuo. Similarly, James Brooks Jessup (2010; 2012) looks at the Shanghaiese Buddhist household leaders whose welfare enterprises helped fellow Chinese to endure the hardship of Japanese military rule. As a religious act, charity entailed a proactive and participatory approach to addressing natural and wartime disasters.

The second issue concerned the transfer of relief efforts from government authorities to non-state actors. The disintegration of state institutions prompted various faith-based communities to step in to provide aid in late imperial China (Antony and Leonard eds., 2002, pp. 1-26). During the devastating famine of 1876-1879, Timothy Richard of the English Baptist Missionary Society administered emergency relief in the famine-stricken provinces of Shandong and Shanxi (Bohr, 1972). Whalen Lai (1992) and Andrea Janku (2004) reveal a competitive edge to the Buddhist and

Christian relief efforts. Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley (2008) draws attention to the Jiangnan literati who competed with Protestant missionaries in the post-famine reconstruction and called for a reformist agenda in governance. Because of their efficacy in reaching out to refugees, these non-state actors replaced the dysfunctional officials as new ‘shepherds and saviors of the people’ (Janku, 2007, p. 286).

Following this line of reasoning, the Christian disaster management in Chaozhou transformed traditional faith-based charity from a mere religious act to modern philanthropy with its active pursuit of coordinated responses to unpredictable crises. In this increasingly autonomous managerial public sphere, the Chaozhou churches acted as a quasi-state agency that channeled aid from afar and implemented recovery programs to rehabilitate the affected regions.

THE TYPHOON OF 2 AUGUST

On 2 August, 1922, the wind burst furiously from the ocean for hours, and at midnight it brought a tidal wave that lashed across the coast of Chaozhou. Everyone was frightened by the violent winds. When the tidal wave hit the Baptist mission compound in Rocky Corner opposite the harbour of Shantou, American missionary Abbie G. Sanderson (6 August 1922) had to save herself:

The only thing visible was a wall of seawater which appeared to be volleying full speed into our front yard. Talk about surf—and breakers—there they were, at our very door! I have no words to tell the thrill of horror and yet of fascination that gripped me as I stood watching that surge of water beating towards us. In reality it was much lower than it had been in the night; nevertheless the impression was that of an onrushing flood that must swallow us up the next moment.... The terrific tidal wave had rolled on past us up into the fields in back of the house, carrying broken shutters, parts of boats that washed ashore, and all the planks and crossbeams of our lower veranda!

The timing of the storm caught everyone off guard. Several patients inside the American mission hospital drowned, and the shores were lined with the wrecks of fishing boats. Communication between Rocky Corner and Shantou was cut off because boatmen and sedan-chair carriers ‘were all busy cleaning up

their own houses or carrying coffins’ (Sanderson, 6 August 1922). The settlements of Small Rocky Corner (Xiaoqueshi 小礮石) and Centipede Field (Wutian 蜈田), adjacent to the Baptist mission compound, suffered heavy loss of life, and the missionaries heard ‘the wailing at all hours of day and night’ (Sanderson, 6 August 1922) (Fig. 2).

The situation in Shantou was disastrous. Several thousand bodies were found from the ruins and refugees were everywhere (Sanderson, 6 August 6, 1922). Seventh-day Adventist missionary F.E. Bates (1922) saw ‘piles of wreckage’ in two large and prosperous villages west of Shantou. The six-foot seawall in Ox-Field Sea collapsed and thousand acres of the reclaimed land were flooded by several feet of ‘the saltiest seawater’. It would take at least two years to restore the fertility of these farmlands. The bund in Shantou was littered with ‘boats, docking facilities, wharves, gangways, bamboo and log rafts, and broken-down houses’ (Bates, 1922). The French Catholic Mission, a block from the bund and two blocks next to the English Presbyterian Mission headquarters, was badly damaged. One of the nuns, Marie du Rosaire, was caught in the tidal current. She caught a drifting bed and was lucky to be rescued by other Catholics. As she described the disaster:

Swatow alone has 50,000 dead—either lost or drowned. At every moment of the day or night the stretcher-bearers pass in front of the [Catholic] bishopric with their dead. At first they had coffins; but now the bodies are simply put in matting. They have been picking them up now for five days. The Chinese are very respectful of their dead and will not let anyone go without burial. The way the Chinese have taken this disaster is truly remarkable. They don’t seem to be crushed. They collect the debris from their houses and their little bamboo huts as though it were something quite ordinary. (Mahoney, 1996, pp. 35-36)

Shantou came out of the typhoon a devastated city. The bund was buried under a mass of broken tiles and debris, oil oozed out of broken jars, warehouses were smashed up, and boxes of goods were scattered round. ‘The trees that remained were either broken and withered as if there had been a great fire, or bereft of leaves and branches pitifully extending a few giant mutilated stumps towards the sky’ (Our Sisters in Other Lands, January, 1923). English Presbyterian missionary

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T.W. Douglas James (1922) explained the reasons for such destruction:

Swatow is in many parts barely above high water level and probably no part is more than ten feet over that level. The result was that the tide had swept in using junks, sampans and everything that could float as battering rams and with the help of the wind had knocked down boundary walls, telegraph and telephone and electric light poles, broken in doors and windows on the ground floor of the houses and go-downs and on its retreat had swept out most of the contents.... The Bund presented an indescribable scene of wreckage. All the pontoons were washed from their moorings and sunk right at the edge of the bund. A dreadful air hung over the place from the rotting vegetation, dead fish, chickens, pigs, cows and human beings that lay everywhere, some floating on the water, some piled on the bund and some buried under walls. Three inches of slime was over everything and in all the houses. All the wells in Swatow and to within a hundred feet of the A.C.C. [Presbyterian-run Anglo-Chinese College] had been rendered unusable by the mud and salt water....The A.C.C. has suffered very severely...most of the roof beams have been blown off too....The Industrial school which is just behind has two parts blown right away, upper storey as well as roof. One of the remarkable things about the effect of the wind is that the leaves have been combed right off the trees. Even the bamboos which yield to the wind have been stripped bare and the whole place has taken on the appearance of winter.

This was an image of utter destruction. Rotten bodies polluted the drinking water and created a health crisis. All buildings were damaged beyond recognition. It was a miracle that the city did not fall into anarchy. The poor suffered the most. Many coolies, labourers, and hawkers in the city's hutments were killed. One hundred and thirty-nine dead bodies were found in Yongtai Street (永泰街), and 55 in Yonghe Street (永和街). The hut dwellers refused to evacuate in order to protect their belongings, but they were swept away by the tidal wave. The heaviest casualties were in Haiqi Street (海墘街), where 269 residents were killed and 125 stores were destroyed (Wang, comp., 1994, pp.

24-35). The devastation posed new challenges for a fragile government struggling with warlord conflicts and economic woes. Because it was beyond the Shantou municipality to deal with the aftermath without outside aid, the chamber of commerce, different Christian denominations, and charitable bodies formed the Shantou Relief Organisation to assess damages, raise funds, and bury the deceased.

For survivors, collecting dead bodies and keeping them away from drinking water was of top priority. The chamber of commerce hired several hundred coolies and rickshaw pullers to remove the dead and clean the streets. Many dead were buried under collapsed buildings and some bodies were decaying under the hot sun. A temporary morgue had 300 bodies to be identified and buried, and the unidentified bodies were buried in large trenches using lime powder (Bates, 1922). A Presbyterian missionary reported,

The first duty was to collect the dead, and this was chiefly in the hands of the Charitable Guild connected with the Temple near us. There were not enough coffins to bury the dead and thousands were interred in gunny bags. In a Temple on the Bund, 1,000 human bodies were piled at one time awaiting burial. Six days after the disaster, the local Chamber of Commerce issued an official statement, in which it was reported that 28,000 bodies had been recovered. An entire theatrical company was killed in a theatre, and in one village of 10,000 inhabitants there are 25 survivors. (Our Sisters in Other Lands, January 1923)

The coastal settlements took the brunt of the storm. The storm caused a huge surge upstream and pushed seawater inland. When the wave came at midnight, the mud walls melted and it was too dark for people to climb to the roofs. Only a handful of people survived, and the survivors wept so hard that their eyes got sore and required medical treatment (Our Sisters in Other Lands, January, 1923). Many fishing communities around Double Island (妈屿岛) lost seven-tenths of their population, including a Presbyterian preacher with his wife and seven children (James, 1922). In the Presbyterian congregation in White Water Lake (Baishuihu 白水湖), officially known as Yihu 奕湖, Xie Yuanlian 谢沅莲, the second daughter of preacher Xie Zehong 谢泽鸿, was killed (Xie, 15 March, 1983). The plain of Chenghai and Raoping districts was badly

hit. According to Baptist missionary Fannie Northcott (1922),

Before the typhoon, this plain was more or less densely populated by fishermen and a few farmers, who lived in groups of villages. It is very level—no hills or any elevations of any kind for a distance of about forty square miles. Because the land was level, large numbers of villages were exposed to the tidal wave. When it washed in over the plain, it carried on its course, houses and humans across the plain inland, in some instances 5, 7, or 9 miles; then to be thrown up on the side of a hill, or to be left floating on a roof beam. In one village we visited ... the two women survivors, pointed to a distant range of hills about 9 miles away, and said, 'We were floated over to those hills'. Two days and two nights, they walked or crawled or waded back to their village only to find it in ruins; not one wall of one house standing. Of a village of over

500 inhabitants, there were two women and 65 men left! When the wave receded, it carried out to sea, hundreds of bodies, the exact number will never be known. Of course all their household goods were washed away at the same time. All but a few tens of men were drowned, and they have gone other places to look for work. Their fields are soaked with salt water and their houses down; boats washed away, women and children drowned, and they go away from the fearful sorrow of all.

The typhoon crippled the agricultural and fishing economy. When the fields were flooded with seawater, farmers lost a season of crops and needed to spend months using freshwater to flush the salt out of the fields. Many families lost their livestock and suffered months of hunger, and Presbyterian evangelist Wang



Fig. 2. The destruction of houses in Rocky Corner (Queshi), Shantou after the typhoon of 2 August 1922.

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Chaoying saw drowned pigs as large as water buffalos (Interviews with Wang Ruifang and Wang Jianyuan, 1 and 2 August 2009). When the boats were gone, fishermen had to go elsewhere to look for work. Northcott (1922) continued,

In another place (i.e., Hongguo 鸿沟), where before the typhoon, there was a village of nearly 600 inhabitants, now there are 48 men and one woman. No children; no women; every cow, pig and chicken washed away. While we were talking with the men, one of them said with tears in his eyes, ‘It is so lonely now; so quiet and so lonely at night that we cannot sleep’. And looking around on the masses of fallen walls which at one time had been a village; a few lonely men wandering around here and there among the ruins, we could almost appreciate what they were suffering.

Many men stayed alive by grasping bamboo trees, but few women and children were strong enough to hold onto the trees until daybreak. With such losses came a dehumanising process that deeply affected the survivors and produced social and cultural scars. One aspect was survivor’s guilt, as the men felt alone and hopeless without their family members around. They blamed themselves for their failure to rescue relatives from the wave. Among the ruins, they found themselves trapped in a vanishing world. The typhoon took away their social and moral orientation, the source of their livelihoods, and their attachment to longstanding social ties and emotional identities. The survivors were reluctant to accept the shock of family and community breakup, the loss of farmlands, orchards, and fishing boats, the destruction of ancestral tombs, and the difficulty of living alone. Talking among themselves about ‘this world’ and ‘the other world’, they wondered whether the departed were better off than the living (Northcott, 1922).

Equally tragic were the tales of how the sick and the elderly perished in the sweeping water (Sanderson, 17 September, 1922). Magistrate Chen Yuan 陈沅 of Raoping district recalled,

When the tidal wave came, the most vulnerable died tragically: some parents who carried several children were forced to let go the daughters and babies to save themselves from drowning. Some mothers carried the babies with them and floated in the water, but the husbands took away the babies in order to save their wives.

Some elderly parents could not swim and their sons did not abandon them, and they were all drowned. Some parents could not hold too many children together and they griped the children’s hair and little arms, but when they reached the high grounds, the younger ones had already died. Some elderly parents did not want to burden their adult children and they drowned themselves in order to save the family line. There were couples tied themselves together with strings but they were drowned. After the disaster, some people could not bear the deaths of their loved ones and they committed suicide. (Wang, comp., 1994, p. 42)

Such stories were depressing and everyone suffered in agony. Once the floodwater receded, Chen Yuan found ‘rotten corpses, puppets, broken boats, bamboos, furniture and coffins’ in the water and ‘fallen trees, tied straw bales, bamboos, coffins, ancestral tablets, torn mats, books, furniture and dead animals’ on the ground (Wang, comp., 1994, p. 42). The survivors could not identify the bodies for proper burials, and the shore was full of mass graves as Margaret Dryburgh (1923) saw ‘a pathetic group of sand-covered mounds in a stretch of sand—a witness to the terrible tolls of lives taken by the waves’.

There were, however, stories of miraculous survival. Some reports were apocryphal—they were distorted from being passed from one person to another, and acquired additional meanings with each retelling. Two of these narratives provided grim hope for the survivors. The first story recalled the rescue of a woman from Hongguo, who attended the Presbyterian girls’ school in Shantou. When the wave swept her village, she and her younger brother grasped a large beam of the roof. They held onto the beam and drifted at sea for 50 kilometres from her home. When they were saved by the Presbyterian fishermen from Cheh Na village on Haishan Island, they were taken to the chapel. Because that woman was engaged to a young Christian at Cheh Na, the preacher sent for the young man’s family to take the woman and her brother back to Hongguo (Northcott, 1922).

The second story concerned a pregnant woman in Jieyang district. She gave birth to a son on the morning of 2 August. When the wave came at night, she caught the baby in the dark and wrapped him in a sheet. When she un-wrapped him, she was shocked to

find that she had grabbed a tiny pig instead of her son. ‘Trembling and sobbing, she stepped down, and in the water which had risen high above the bed boards, she searched until she stumbled against him. She picked him up and climbed to safety once more’. Miraculously, the baby survived (Sanderson, 17 September 1922).

Everyone along the coast faced death on 2 August. A Presbyterian family of 21 people was trapped during the typhoon. They changed into white garments—the Chinese funeral clothes—and prayed together. When the house collapsed, they were swept away by the wave (Our Sisters in Other Lands, January, 1923). This courageous family relied on their faith to overcome the unbearable pain of dying together and to prepare for life after death. Baptist missionary George W. Lewis (19 August 1922) inspected the damage for the Shantou Relief Organisation:

I passed the Iam-tsau [Yanzao] and saw Chia-chiu and other badly damaged villages up there. It also still seems to me like a nightmare. Many of the houses on the seafront whose walls were fully above the average of pounded walls as indicated by the broken parts—fully up to proportion in lime—yet these walls lay flat... The water marks indicated on the seafront that the water must have been upwards of twenty feet deep, and must have been driven in with great violence... People were drowned in twenty feet deep water and then crushed into the crumbling walls of the houses.

Because of the violent wind and the tidal wave, fishing boats became uncontrolled weapons of destruction that crushed into mud houses and killed people (Lewis, 19 August, 1922). Although the Christians were little prepared for it, the mission headquarters in Shantou and the numerous native churches were the only viable institutions after the disaster and bore the burden of relief work. Missionaries, preachers, Biblewomen, medical staff, mission schoolteachers, and students became relief workers on the spot.

THE TRANSNATIONAL CHRISTIAN FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGNS

After the floodwater receded, the Christian missionary enterprises undertook the daunting task of disaster relief operations. Whenever the missionaries and their Chinese co-workers inspected a village, they

contacted the surviving headmen and compiled a list of recipients’ names. Then they erected a bamboo shelter as a temporary relief center. The recipients’ reactions were mixed, as Margaret Dryburgh (1923) reported: ‘Human nature is very much the same everywhere, and some [refugees] were delighted with what they got, others were rather supercilious; some indignantly enquired why they had been left out, while others looked disappointed, but seemed to understand that we could give only to those whose names had been handed in to us’. It was indeed hard to satisfy the needs of everyone.

The medical mission showed the practical side of Christianity. The sick received free treatment. Almost every kind of diseases spread in the villages. Eye disease topped the list and was caused by ‘salt water, the glare of the sun in their homeless condition, and weeping’ (Brander, October 1923). Skin disease, dysentery, typhoid fever and malaria were everywhere. Children were malnourished and suffered from intestinal troubles. When the cold weather set in, the elderly died from bronchial troubles and pneumonia. The medical team relieved the survivors’ sufferings and was most welcomed by the poor. ‘The old coolie who carried our baskets of medicine each day, poor though he was and depending on his daily wage to provide food for himself, wife and family, offered to carry our baskets day by day, for much less than he could earn doing other work. The boatmen on the ferries and on the boats were glad to take us from place to place, and very often would not take any money’ (Northcott, 1922). The outpouring of kindness gave the refugees a glimpse of hope. A wealthy non-Christian household loaned their home to the medical missionaries because the village chapel was destroyed. The generosity earned the respect of the missionaries and helped the family access more medical supplies (Northcott, 1922).

In Shantou, Chaozhou Christians partnered with the larger society to work towards economic recovery. Post-disaster recovery was more than a bricks-and-mortar restoration project. Christians devoted much effort to ensuring the economic wellbeing of the refugees. The first step was to combine the transnational, regional, and local mechanisms of fundraising and resource distribution. The English Presbyterians created a committee to administrate ‘the funds raised by British and Chinese merchants in Hong Kong, and granted by the Hong Kong Government’

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(James, 2 October 1923). Then they worked with the Foreign Missions Committee of the Presbyterian Church of England in London to launch an aggressive advertisement campaign to solicit disaster relief funds.

In September 1922, the Presbyterian missionaries sent stories of victims and survivors to London, and in October, the Foreign Missions Committee and the Women’s Missionary Association circulated an appeal entitled ‘Swatow Typhoon, 1922’, urging churches in England and Scotland to give generously for the displaced refugees. The leaflet cited the remarks of Captain MacWhirr about a typhoon in the South China Sea from Joseph Conrad’s fiction, *Typhoon*, in which Conrad depicted the horrors of a typhoon as ‘a faint burst of lightning [quivering all around the sky]’, ‘the storm with a senseless, destructive fury [looting the ship]’, and ‘the running wall of water [crushing the ship]’. Many people in England and Scotland knew nothing about Shantou. Neither did they see any typhoons, so common in tropical and subtropical Asia. The heavy losses of human lives and properties, the sensational stories about local Chinese helping each other, and the photos of collapsed churches and devastated villages were aimed at arousing public sympathy. Although such representations seemed patronising to the Chinese victims, these images exerted powerful influence on the British donors. An anonymous donor gave £1,000 to the Foreign Missions Committee for post-disaster reconstruction (Swatow Mission Council, 16 November, 1922). The fundraising campaign succeeded in strengthening ‘the bond of mutual affection and sympathy’ between the Chaozhou Presbyterians and their patrons in Britain (Swatow Mission Council, 29 December 1922).

The American Baptist missionaries conducted their own transnational fundraising campaign and presented an image of utter destruction to donors in the United States:

Can you imagine what it could be to go to bed peacefully at night, and in the morning to have nothing left of your house but flattened bits of broken wall; to find all your clothing and furniture and everything else washed away, your pigs, cows and sheep drowned, your crops ruined, and all your family gone, leaving you dazed and hopeless in the face of such calamity? There are thousands of people who had just this experience. (Sanderson, 4 November 1922)

However, on many occasions the Board of American Baptist Mission Committee in New York misappropriated the funds sent by generous donors for typhoon survivors (Sanderson, 8 October 1922). Compared with the English Presbyterians, the Baptist missionaries had little control over their transnational resources and were at the mercy of the home board for support.

THE YANZAO CASE OF CHRISTIAN REBUILDING EFFORTS

An important component of the Christian disaster management was to build a mechanism that engaged local Chinese in post-disaster reconstruction, injected cash into the rural economy, and promoted individual and community decision-making. The recovery efforts focused on three types of services: providing clothing, giving medical and economic aid, and empowering typhoon survivors. The missionaries frequently referred to the Yanzao Presbyterian church as the success of the post-disaster reconstruction.

Founded in 1849, the Yanzao church was the oldest Presbyterian congregation in the Chaozhou-speaking region. Before 1949, it was the largest rural church in Chaozhou and its congregants, mostly members of the dominant Lin lineage, benefited from conversion. The typhoon shaped the collective memory of Yanzao Presbyterians (Lee, forthcoming). On 2 August 1922, the Yanzao church lost 119 members, including 50 baptised adults, 35 children, and 34 unbaptised adherents. The figure represented one-fourth of the total 476 deaths in the village. Deacons Lin Junjie 林俊杰, Lin Xingyong 林性涌, and Liao Yuna 廖愈纳 were killed. Church elder Chen Shunsan 陈顺胜, who lived in a three-storey house around the fish pond outside the church, lost 18 relatives. His wife, a member of the Presbyterian Xie lineage in White Water Village, perished too. His third son, Chen Lingzhi 陈令芝, survived because he was in charge of the family business in Hong Kong at the time. Lingzhi returned and helped his father rebuild the home. The tidal wave also left 60 orphans and large numbers of injured congregants (Wei, 1949, pp. 5-6).

The spirits of the surviving Christians were not defeated, however. Church elder Chen Sinsan and ordained minister Guo Jingyun 郭景云 devoted much attention to the relief work (James, 2 October 1923).

Lin Zhangchong 林章宠 organised the survivors and village defense forces to rescue people and survey the damages. Many Yanzao sojourners contributed to the disaster relief. Lin Zhangzao 林章造, Lin Fang 林芳, and Lin Chongshan 林重三, who pastored churches elsewhere, mobilised their congregations to support the suffering brothers and sisters in Yanzao. Lin Shoutian 林受天, Lin Wenhe 林文和, and Chen Yiting 陈益廷, merchants and elders of the Bethel Church in Shantou, channeled resources to their home village. Lin Shangdao 林性道, son of Lin Zhangzao, ran a successful pharmacy in Chao’an and immediately sent medical supplies to Yanzao.

There was also a strong religious component in the relief operation. Liu Zerong 刘泽荣, an ordained pastor and a tutor at the Presbyterian seminary in Shantou, ‘spent weekend after weekend in visiting the area, making careful investigation, and seizing the extraordinary opportunity which he discovered for preaching’ (James, 2 October 1923). He visited victims’ families in Yanzao and nearby villages. The disaster eliminated pre-existing inter-village tensions and created a social bonding between Christians and non-Christians. As T.W. Douglas James (2 October 1923) observed:

Just as at Iam-tsau [Yanzao] ancient village feuds which had long separated that village from its neighbor and reacted unfavorably on Christian preaching were swept away, and so many new hearers came to Church as to fill up in numbers the gap which the disaster had caused in membership, so the work of this and of the Women’s Committee opened up new opportunities, and at a subsidiary relief station in this district it has been possible to organize regular Christian work. All expenditure of money on directly evangelistic work has been separate from relief funds, and met by evangelistic societies.

With the support of the English Presbyterians, Liu Zerong reaped the fruits of evangelisation and founded a new church in the neighboring village of Nanshengbu (南生埔). In the summer of 1923, Patrick J. Maclagan visited ‘the stricken congregation’ of Yanzao on behalf of the London-based Foreign Mission Committee of the Presbyterian Church of England. That visit was of high symbolic significance because ‘the Church at home in the person of the Convener should stand at the salute

before those heaps of stones that had been Christian homes, and where Christian families had perished’ (James, 2 October 1923). In China, where ancestry was so much honored, ‘there could have been no more significant act than the visit to the grave on the slopes of the Lotus Hill of the first Christian of the Hoklo Church’ (James, 2 October 1923). The high-profile visit renewed the historic ties between Chinese Christians and their missionary patrons, and also conveyed a clear message that the English Presbyterians would always stand by the ‘Hoklo Church’ in good and bad times. The transnational Christian networks stood the test of time and remained unbreakable.

Chen Chunsheng (1997) asserts that after the typhoon many emigrant villages in Chenghai district turned to their relatives in Southeast Asia for help. The wealthy emigrants of Zhanglin market paid for all of the local relief efforts and set up the Biansheng Hospital to cater to the sick. Li Longqian (2006, p. 313) points out that the Chaozhou Eight Districts’ Chambers of Commerce in Hong Kong sent large amounts of rice to Shantou. But what distinguished the Yanzao church from these organisations were the faith-based charity networks. Through extensive religious ties, the Yanzao congregants called for financial assistance not only from their missionary patrons in Shantou and fellow Christians in unaffected areas, but also from churches in Southeast Asia and Britain. The Chaozhou migrants in Hong Kong, Siam, and British Malaya supported an orphanage to discourage the kidnapping and sale of children by starving refugees. Any children who had lost their fathers were admitted as orphans because patriarchs were considered to be the pillar of a household economy, and the mothers would be given work at the Shantou Gospel Hospital or at missionaries’ homes. The orphans were taught vocational skills and studied with other children at the Presbyterian Zhishang Elementary School (Interviews with Wang Ruifang and Wang Jianyuan, 1 and 2 August 2009). The Presbyterian Mission gave \$3 a month to each household willing to support an orphan.

Concerned with long-term community recovery, the missionaries recognised the need to empower the refugees and make them responsible for reconstruction. They organised church leaders to work with representatives of nearby villages to clear the debris and bury the dead. They employed a large number of workers to reconstruct a dike in Yanzao, and paid

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them in rice and cash. They bought water buffaloes for farmers, and offered grants and loans to fishermen to rebuild their boats (James, 2 October 1923). They also provided temporary shelters made of new bamboo poles and mats, oversaw the building of houses, and gave out ‘literally bushels and gallons of medicine’ (Sanderson, 4 November 1922). These capacity-building measures enabled survivors to acquire the necessary skills and resources for community survival. Thus, the transnational church networks constituted an invisible maritime highway that channeled overseas resources for the Yanzao Presbyterians to keep alive their Christian homeland. This explained why many Chaozhou Christians were always orientated towards the overseas churches in Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America.

CONCLUSION

The Christian disaster management in early 20th century Chaozhou manifested hybrid values and worldviews. The missionaries and church leaders characterised their charity through the language of Christian benevolence and Western efficiency. The relief efforts exhibited the Christians’ embrace of social activism and the longstanding Chinese values that informed the compassion of local officials, community elites, and relief workers. For the Chaozhou people in August 1922, the Christian disaster relief was made up of small stories of humble survivors whose lives were badly affected by the typhoon. This article has uncovered some of these stories, and there are still many more from Chaozhou and beyond that require a closer analysis.

On the whole, the Christian relief operation was decentralised and flexible, involving large numbers of Chinese and foreigners. The overheads were low because most of the work was done by volunteers, its bureaucracy was minimal, and its services were provided without ideological constraints. Local preachers continued their usual church duties, especially looking after the sick and ministering to the needs of the dead or dying.

Equally remarkable was the collaboration between local churches and the larger Chinese society. The missionaries and church leaders positioned themselves as efficient relief workers. They acquired widespread contacts and prestige among the municipal officials

and local merchants. They relied on extensive church networks to reach out to the victims and exerted some influence in areas where the authorities failed to operate (Band, 1948, p. 351). The local officials, merchants, and village leaders never saw the Christian charity as a threat to their power. They regarded the Christians as irreplaceable partners in handling the aftermaths of natural disasters. As a result, the Christians safeguarded the interests of local society without undermining the influence of traditional power holders. This partnership between Christians and local elites was a common phenomenon throughout the early Republican era (Dunch, 2001; Carter, 2002; Wang, 2007; McElroy, 1996). As R.G. Tiedemann (2004; 2005) argues, in areas affected by natural disasters, the Church played a vital role in providing food relief and medical assistance throughout the late Qing and early Republican eras, and this form of Christian aid was appreciated by ordinary people.

Added to this success was the juxtaposition of transnational and local church networks. The Chaozhou Christians succeeded in using international and regional church ties to organise a global fundraising campaign. The total amount of aid given by Christians in Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America made up a large portion of relief expenses. Therefore, the Chaozhou Christians belonged to more than one social circle. Horizontally, they developed an extensive network of support among their peers across the region, and vertically they cultivated a patron-client relationship with international churches. This type of church ties was a form of social capital that allowed local Christians to access outside resources in times of crisis. The resilience of such faith-based networks was essential for the empowerment of Christian communities in the turbulent period of modern China. **RC**

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
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Timorese Chinese and Chinese in East Timor

JEAN A. BERLIE

INTRODUCTION

During the Ming Dynasty and later, Chinese traders interested in sandalwood arrived on Timor Island, that is, many years before the first Hakka 客家 (*Kejia*) who did not start to come, from Macao and Guangdong Province till the 17th century. The great majority of Chinese in East Timor before independence in 2002 were Hakka.

Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong Provinces are numerous in South East Asia. In 1830, one million Chinese were residents of South East Asia, i.e. 3 per cent of the population. In the 1930s they had grown to three million, but represented a significantly smaller percentage. At present, overseas Chinese are probably 2 per cent of the total resident population of Southeast Asia.

Chinese in Southeast Asia (percentage of population): 1) 6 million in Malaysia (34 per cent); 2) 6 million in Indonesia (3 per cent); 3) 6 million in Thailand (14 per cent); 4) 4.1 million in Singapore (76 per cent); 5) 1 million in Vietnam (2 per cent); 6)

600,000 in the Philippines (1 per cent); 7) 300,000 in Cambodia (4 per cent); 8) 25,000 in Laos (0.8 per cent). These numbers do not always reflect the full extent of Chinese presence. Partially assimilated Chinese are often not counted as Chinese. (CSEA).

This article studies the Hakka of Timor Island and tries to understand why recently many Chinese came to East Timor to develop their entrepreneurial talent. I place in parallel the slow economic development of a new country, and East Timor’s attraction for Chinese entrepreneurs and specialists. Currently, there are Chinese residing in East Timor who work as computer, factory and supermarket entrepreneurs, and as cell phones sellers and repairers, who want to take a calculated risk: travel ‘global’ in the new world of the 21st century.

After the Independence of East Timor in 2002, the Embassy of China became one of the most active diplomatic representations in the country, and coordinated the construction of the Palace of the President of East Timor.

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Since 2002, the influence of China in East Timor has been remarkable and multifaceted. Standing between Asia and the Pacific, the geopolitical position of East Timor attracts the interest of many countries. A newly independent country, it has around fifteen years of gas and oil off-shore reserves. Its national currency, the US dollar, is backed by the USA and its own central bank. In 2001 and mainly in the post-2008 years, East Timor attracted many Chinese, both from China, and overseas, who established many small enterprises and few industries. Chinese businessmen have been particularly helpful in developing this new country, where 37 per cent of its population lives on less than one US\$ a day.¹ It is surprising for a country with only 1.1 million inhabitants to have a current annual budget exceeding two billion US\$.

HISTORY

In the 14th century, Chinese on the Island of Timor were among the first merchants interested in the sandalwood trade (Gunn 1999: 54-56). Many years earlier, many Hakka Chinese had arrived from Macao and settled in the Portuguese Colony of Timor. Around 1515, colonisation started in the Western part of the Island, in Lifau, Oecussi. East Timorese were always faithful to Portugal; this is the intriguing reason for the existence of this enclave in the western part of the island, which would be taken over by the Dutch, part of NTT Indonesia c. 1947.

In the Audian suburb, the Chinese Cemetery of Dili (*Cina Rate* in Tetum), demonstrates the long history of the Hakka Chinese in East Timor. Magnificent tombs in this cemetery attest to the long economic prosperity of the Timorese Chinese community.

In 1769, Dili replaced Oecussi as the capital of Portugese Timor. Subsequently, Hakka Chinese from Guangdong Province moved to Dili, mainly between 1760 and 1940. However, Dili became a city in 1864, evidence that important Chinese immigration took place in the Eastern part of Timor Island during the 19th century and before World War II.

Before 1975 Portuguese Timor lacked direct communication with the outside world; Goa (returned to India in 1967) and Macao had played an important role during the previous five centuries. The Portuguese Governor of Macao eventually came to control Timor

for a period during the early 20th century. The political relationship between China and Macao influenced the Portuguese Colony of Timor. During the 1960s, Felipe Barata, the Governor of Timor from 1959 to 1963, recognised the beneficial influence of the Chinese Timorese community (Barata 1961). Its helpful presence has continued up to the present.

During the Cultural Revolution, in 1967, 40,000 pro-Taiwan Chinese departed from Macao, and the majority of the Chinese of Timor became pro-mainland (CSoc). Then in 1975, before and after the Indonesian occupation, many Timorese Chinese left East Timor. Between 1975 and 1999, Chinese influence was less important, although some Indonesian Chinese businessmen were present. However, Jakarta did not accept Chinese political influence in East Timor during that time.

In 1999, in the centre of Dili, as in Macao where the Chinese God of War is popular, the *Guandi* Pagoda stood as conclusive proof of widespread acceptance of the Chinese in Timor Island. In the month of September, the militiamen burned many buildings all over the country, but spared this pagoda and another one in Liquica.

Also in 1999, the United Nations, under the name UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor), assumed control for the governing of East Timor. Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysian Chinese established service enterprises and other types of companies in partnership with Australian entrepreneurs. Around 2006, Resende Hotel and Hello Mister, two non-Chinese buildings were torched.

On 20 May 2002, East Timor became independent. Slowly many mainland and overseas Chinese entrepreneurs came to Dili, the capital.

IDENTITY

The ‘Hakka-speaking Timorese-Chinese’ identify themselves as Timorese Chinese or simply ‘Timorese’ (Wise 2006: 149-150). The last term identifies these Chinese as sons-of-their land, East Timor, but to be Hakka is a source of pride for them.

The importance of the local god (*tu shen* 土神) in this Chinese Cemetery of Dili is remarkable and reflects the integration of the Timorese Hakka with their native country, East Timor. The family name Lay 黎 (Li in

Putonghua) is common among Chinese Timorese. So it is not surprising that this name is also common in this cemetery.

The Hakka diet in East Timor is ‘a combination of Chinese and Portuguese food’ (Ibid., p. 150). It is interesting to note that among the Chinese of Macao the importance of Portuguese bread as a daily food has diminished between 1999 and 2013. However, in East Timor Portuguese bread is still a staple food.

Many Timorese Chinese who left Timor Island in 1975 did not return to their land before 2000. They established rich and powerful Timorese Chinese associations in Australia, in particular in Sydney and Victoria (维省帝汶华人联谊会 *weisheng diwen huaren lianyihui*). Since 2000 many have travelled back from Australia to Dili. Some of them, well educated, currently have companies and enterprises in both East Timor and Australia.

EDUCATION

Timorese Chinese are proficient in Tetum and often speak one of the 14 languages of East Timor and Portuguese. Chinese *Mestiços* are numerous; some of them speak Chinese. Chinese Timorese businessmen and traders spoke Portuguese before 1976 and at present English and sometimes *Bahasa Indonesia*.

In the 1970s, the Chinese School of Dili had eight Chinese teachers in the unique Chinese Secondary School including 100 students. In other 12 Chinese primary schools all over the island, including Liquica in the Southwest and Los Palos in the East, 1000 students were registered (CS). These Chinese schools were partly closed with the departure of the pro-Taiwan Chinese in the 1970s and have not restarted yet.

Up to the 1980s the Chinese School of Dili was active. In 2000, during the slow re-opening of education following the departure of Indonesian troops in 1999, this school was one of the first to have students, but it was not a Chinese school anymore.

In recent years, the Embassy of China has coordinate the attribution of scholarships for Timorese students to join Chinese universities. This effort to develop higher education cannot be compared to Cuba which trained hundreds of Timorese in Cuba and East Timor who are now medical doctors in their own country.

ECONOMY

The Portuguese colonial administration recognised the beneficial influence of the Chinese. Just after World War II, without Timorese Chinese it was impossible to distribute the Portuguese aid in clothes and other essential items to reconstruct the island after its occupation by Japan (1942-1945).

Chinese culture and business tradition rely on relationship and associations. The main Chinese Business Association in the capital Dili is called *Zhonghua Shanghui* 中华商会.

The first known Chinese tycoon in the mid-20th century up to 1975 is the founder of the Company Lay, Lay San Ying, born in Manatuto (CT). He was associated with the famous tycoon of Macao, Dr Stanley Ho, for the construction of the Hotel Makhota, the main hotel of Dili restructured and improved under the current name, Hotel Timor. In 2000, the late Lay’s family rebuilt this company and opened a new hotel in Dili. The remarkable point is that starting in the 1960s before the late Lay, no other Timorese businessmen at that time went far away to Africa, Mozambique for example, and to Timor’s closer regions, in particular Hong Kong, Macao, and Australia to develop business and trade. The company Lay had the monopoly for all construction in Timor. This monopoly is at present shared between many Timorese, Chinese and Australian companies.

Since the independence of the country, Timorese Chinese, mainland Chinese and Chinese from Indonesia have become an essential part of the economic development of East Timor. There are all sort of small businesses concerning mobile phones and their maintenance in the hands of mainland Chinese using Timorese staff. Chinese hotels, cyber cafés and many Chinese retail companies are common in Dili. Other Chinese companies are also involved in construction and even the production of construction materials, such as sand. For many decades Timorese Chinese have been running grocery and bakery business, which are essential for daily life. In the 2000s, Chinese owned supermarkets, restaurants and hotels. However, the departure of the United Nations in December 2012 will reduce the economy by around 25 per cent.

An economic case study: Mainlanders and Southeast Asian overseas Chinese in East Timor, Weng Enterprise in Dili, Beduku 北都古.

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The Chinese enterprise Weng shi qiyejituan gongsi 翁氏企业集团公司 from Fuzhou and Fuqing city in Fujian demonstrates a high degree of entrepreneurship which was exported to Dili. It sells washed sand (0.1-0.5 mm), gravel (0.5-0.8 mm heavy-duty adjustable gravel and lumber), powder, aggregate, crushed stone and other construction materials. The price for these materials in East Timor is US\$ 18 per ton, less than half of the Australian construction material. There are few companies, such as the Timorese owned company called EDS, able to rival Weng concerning construction materials.

In a remote part of Dili, surrounded by hills on the sandy bank of the River Comoro, this grinding mill and aggregate production company started to operate in 2009 in a no man’s land and began its operation at the end of 2011. The declared investment is one million US\$. Most of the construction materials used to produce the construction materials are collected along the Comoro River (Mota Comoro in Tetum). The company is located after the main bridge on the Comoro on a small tributary of the main Comoro Road just before the Agriculture Ministry which runs southward up to its dead-end, at the foot of a forested hill.

This company has recruited 30 fully-trained and well-paid Timorese workers. Four Chinese staff ran this company during my research. A Chinese secretary was in charge of the registration of all the trucks going outside to deliver construction materials.

The company owns crawler excavators, digging machines, a huge grinding machine, carpet-conveyors, diesel track machines and trucks to transport the sand and aggregates to construction companies. Sand and gravel are processed and washed according to modern technology for construction materials.

Another interesting company is called Kmanek. Its manager, a Chaozhou of Singapore, invested five million US\$ between 2001 and 2012. His company is one of the most successful and popular supermarkets. The mother company of this supermarket is a trading company of Singapore. The planned departure of the United Nations UNMIT at the end of 2012 will probably reduce the activities of this prosperous company.

The following dream of Timorese farmers was developed by the Chinese Company of Singapore, Kmanek Co.

‘Linking farmers to markets via the private sector involvement seems to be an effective model for improving farmers’ income. Participating in the initiative reduced the risks faced by farmers in terms of having a clear market for their produce. This model removes the burden on individual farmers of finding the market for their product themselves...’ to reach markets directly. Under this model, farmers can concentrate on increasing production (Correia, c. 2010).

In 2010 and 2011, the construction of a greenhouse and an investment of quality seeds to Timorese peasants, was studied by the author in Aileu and in surrounding villages. The vegetables produced were sold with success during two years by Kmanek Company. However, the intensive plantation of capsicum (a too large production) which was valued four times the price of tomatoes—not correctly reported to the Chinese company by the Timorese—ruined the project. A drastic disease of tomato plants finally forced to a stop this exemplary cooperation between this dynamic Chinese company and Timorese farmers. In 2012, it is hoped that the investment of new stores to better manage the stocks of the company will help to secure a better management scheme.

Timorese Chinese and other mainland or overseas Chinese in East Timor are a prosperous community, but their hard work and business capacity is sometimes forgotten by the Timorese. However, Timorese Chinese are well integrated in the Timorese society and it is only recently, with the departure of the United Nations, that a certain economic decline leads sometimes to more criticism: ‘Organize yourselves, meet and speak together, otherwise the Chinese will rise above you... commerce... industry... if we do not have money then we will feel ashamed’ (CM).

CONCLUSION

Chinese influence on the Island of Timor has a long history. The independence of East Timor in 2002 is a key event.

It is surprising that Chinese in East Timor, after so many years in the country, currently have difficulty integrating with the Timorese, who are now more than ever over-confident and nationalistic. The overseas Chinese, as compared to the local Chinese, are less interested in learning the numerous languages of East


Timor, or even the main languages which are Tetum, the national language, Portuguese, an official language, and *Bahasa Indonesia*. This is the consequence of an education system developed during the Portuguese colonial period and the post-colonial Indonesian rule of 1976 to 1999 with the creation of a university in Dili, for the first time ever in 1981.

The Hakka of East Timor speak many of the languages of East Timor and have a very good relationship with the Timorese. English—the second language of many Chinese mainlanders going overseas—is not yet used in the whole country. Fortunately the Timorese youth want to study English; but there is a noticeable lack of English teachers in the country, despite the efforts of too-few Australian teachers. The country is limited by its Constitution, which gives priority to two official languages, Tetum (used in primary schools) and Portuguese. So it is surprising to see an article claiming—without any serious analysis—that the presence of ‘too many Chinese businessmen are the cause of the Timorese unemployment’.² Unemployment is certainly critical

CHRONOLOGY

- Oldest remains in Timor of *Homo sapiens* 20,000 years old
- Mid-14th century, sandalwood trade suggested between Timor and China
- C. 1515: Portuguese occupied Oecussi
- 1653: Dutch in Kupang. Hakka Chinese in the Island of Timor
- 1769: Dili Portuguese colonial capital
- 1859: Portuguese-Dutch treaty
- 7 December 1975: Indonesian occupation
- In mid-1999: President B.J. Habibie announces UN-administered referendum
- 30 August 1999: 80% votes for independence

among youth in the country. However, this Timorese unemployment has nothing to do with the Chinese, who are exemplary entrepreneurs, and fill the gap in rare service companies, running internet cafés, supermarkets, and shops with inexpensive products useful for the local economy. The departure of the United Nations in December 2012 was a blow to the local economy, and will probably affect the integration of the Chinese in East Timor. But the Timorese Chinese will adapt themselves easily.

The Chinese interest, which in 14th century East Timor had been the sandalwood trade, had by the 21st century become local business development. Chinese trade networks are currently powerful in the capital Dili. Being Timorese, Timorese Chinese are extremely useful. Overseas Chinese and mainlanders in Timor are becoming linked to a more global type of business. East Timor is not yet global and needs the hard-working overseas Chinese. China itself is an economic giant in Southeast Asia, and its deep interest in geopolitics motivates Chinese to take interest in this region. 

- 22 March 2002: Constitution
- 20 May 2002 Independence: Mari Alkatiri Prime Minister and Xanana Gusmao President
- 26 June 2006: PM Alkatiri resigned
- May 2007: Ramos-Horta elected President
- August 2007: Xanana elected PM
- 2012: General Matan Ruak elected President and PM Xanana, re-elected
- 5th Constitutional Government of East Timor, 6 August 2012: Minister for Transportation and Telecommunication: Pedro Lay and Minister of Tourism Francisco Kalbuadi Lay (both Hakka Timorese Chinese) (GET).

NOTES

1	Source: Non Governmental Organization Lao Hamutuk, Dili, April 2012.	2	‘Negosiantes Chineza nakonu, hamosu dezempregu’ (Chinese businessmen are ‘rich’, we are jobless), <i>Suana Timor Lorosae</i> , 4 April 2012, p. 3.
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RESUMOS

ICAS 8 e a Ascensão da Ásia
Esta introdução destaca a importância teórica da Ásia na promoção de um entendimento mais pluralista e menos hegemónico da humanidade. Discute a perspectiva e os obstáculos no processo e sublinha o papel do ICAS 8 em tal empenho.
[Autor: Tak-Wing Ngo, pp. 6-11]

A Ásia está em Ascensão. Mas qual a Direcção? Reflexões sobre um Discurso Emergente
O artigo aborda uma série de questões levantadas pelo discurso da “Ásia em ascensão”, e oferece reflexões críticas não só sobre a ascensão da Ásia, mas também sobre o discurso da “ascensão”. Inicia-se com o reconhecimento de que o desenvolvimento trouxe transformações significativas a muitas sociedades asiáticas, nas relações inter-estatais em toda a Ásia e, no mapa geopolítico do mundo. A publicidade sobre “a ascensão da Ásia”, no entanto, camufla problemas não menos urgentes de desenvolvimento desigual dentro e entre as sociedades, a marginalidade política efectiva ou marginalização de significativas populações, a transferência de recursos materiais e intelectuais a favor das transacções globais em detrimento das necessidades locais, a destruição ambiental, a pressão sobre os recursos, os conflitos étnicos, a desorientação cultural, a incoerência e o crítico conflito inter-estatal. Estes problemas são amplamente reconhecidos, mas frequentemente varridos para debaixo do tapete como distorções do passado, com a promessa de resolução imanente uma vez a crise actual terminada e as rugas sanadas. O autor sugere, inversamente, que eles são produto da incorporação dentro do sistema capitalista global, ou que foram exacerbados por ele, e as suas complicações não são apenas nacionais ou “asiáticas”, mas globais. Apesar dos benefícios imediatos reconhecidos, o desenvolvimento através da incorporação no capitalismo global neoliberal lançou essas sociedades em caminhos que não são mais sustentáveis na “Ásia” do que noutras partes.
[Autor: Arif Dirlik, pp. 12-31]

A Internacional e o Projecto do Porto de Macau de 1922-1927
A cidade de Macau, o governador Artur Tamagnini Barbosa e o seu irmão João, em conjunto com o general Gomes da Costa e o Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues, desempenharam o papel de maior relevância nos movimentos políticos globais jamais relatado. Era um papel que claramente ligava a mudança revolucionária em Portugal à evolução de Macau e Sul da China. O general Gomes da Costa e o Dr. Rodrigues representavam extremos opostos do ponto de vista político português, quando ambos foram destacados para Macau de 1922-1924. Rodrigues veio como governador; Gomes da Costa como chefe de uma missão militar para o Extremo Oriente. Rodrigues chegou para facilitar a construção do projecto do Porto Exterior de Macau, quando simultaneamente Sun Yat Sen construía o KMT e dava corpo ao Exército Revolucionário em Cantão com a assistência do Comintern. O general Gomes da Costa voltaria a Portugal em Maio de 1924 e, dentro de 24, meses liderava o lendário golpe de 28 de Maio de 1926 que iria derrubar a Primeira República Portuguesa e inaugurar 48 anos de um regime de partido único, sob Salazar. Este artigo explana a razão pela qual dois adversários políticos foram simultaneamente enviados para Macau. Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues, adepto de longa data do Partido Democrático esquerdista de Afonso Costa, era chefe do sistema penal Português quando o novo governo republicano implementou uma campanha anti-clerical e anti-monárquica viciosa na sequência do golpe de estado de Outubro de 1910. Após o golpe militar do general Gomes em Maio de 1926, Rodrigues ficaria afastado de qualquer cargo no governo, e com o advento de Salazar em 1928, nunca mais exerceria um cargo governamental. No entanto, continuaria a publicar artigos de opinião na imprensa de Macau em língua portuguesa até à sua morte, em 1960.
[Autor: Paul Spooner, pp. 32-43]

Clandestinidade e Controle: O Congresso de Macau do Partido Comunista da Indochina (27-31 de Março, 1935)
Sem dúvida, as organizações clandestinas têm uma longa história em Macau, se pensarmos em proto-republicanos e maçónicos na era da monarquia, associações e tríades na tradição chinesa, e o tema deste artigo, os comunistas ocultos, não chineses, mas vietnamitas. Assim como a clandestinidade pode ser definida como a qualidade ou estado de sigilo ou furtividade do controle ou vigilância, a fim de alcançar as metas, por vezes ilícitas, a derradeira Macau colonial oferecia um espaço liminar. Aparentemente desconhecidos das autoridades portuguesas, os comunistas vietnamitas escolheram este local para realizar a primeira conferência nacional do recém-formado Partido Comunista da Indochina e trazer a Macau um verdadeiro “quem é quem” da primeira geração dos líderes comunistas vietnamitas e das minorias étnicas. No entanto, não obstante o carácter clandestino da organização, os códigos de sigilo, uso de pseudónimos, etc, foram comprometidos e penetrados, não pelas autoridades salazaristas mas pelos franceses. Este artigo visa oferecer algumas verdades sobre clandestinidade como um tropo, as organizações clandestinas no final da Macau colonial, a ligação transitória entre o Vietname e Macau como sinalizado pelo encontro de delegados da conferência, a questão ainda contemporânea de extradição de casos políticos e o Congresso do Partido Comunista da Indochina em si.
[Autor: Geoffrey C. Gunn , pp. 44-57]

Identidade de Macau, os Chineses e Outros Grupos. Uma Década Após o Retorno à China
A identidade é um conceito chave no século XXI. A Região Administrativa Especial de Macau (RAEM) tem uma identidade única. Com base numa longa pesquisa entre 1995 e 2012, a definição da identidade dos chineses de Macau e outros residentes da RAEM

RESUMOS

é um modelo para que se compreenda uma realidade social e económica complexa baseada em 500 anos de história. Os chineses de Macau falam Cantonês, um facto social inevitável. Na RAEM, para lidar com a complexa realidade do Cantonês, Mandarim e dos “caracteres chineses tradicionais” na Lei Básica (I-9) temos apenas duas palavras: “Língua Chinesa”. No entanto, não podemos negar a importância do Cantonês. A Lei Básica de Macau é uma lei constitucional e, em particular, o seu “modo de vida” é a base da identidade “legal” (I-5). O Cantonês é parte integrante. A moderna ópera Cantonense constitui outra “matriz”. Em Março de 2013, o grupo de ópera cantonense Jiangmen esteve a Macau. O Português, como língua oficial, tenta encontrar um espaço linguístico entre o Inglês e o Mandarim, tendo como suporte o Brasil e o mundo lusófono. Ambas as línguas, Portuguesa e Chinesa, são oficiais. No entanto, excepto durante as cerimónias oficiais “não-chinesas” ou, por exemplo, para se conseguir um emprego ou tirar um diploma universitário, o Português não é realmente promovido na RAEM. O conceito da RAEM de “chinesice” domina a identidade, mas a Lei Básica é o direito constitucional de Macau. Há, de facto, algumas diferenças culturais, no entanto, 5.000 anos de história atestam que ser “Chinês” significa algo ligado a identidade, sociedade e cultura. Antes de qualquer outro traço cultural, os chineses residentes na RAEM têm uma identidade atribuída pela “língua chinesa”. O “modo de vida” da Lei Básica (I- 5), a economia e os residentes permanentes, fazem parte do quadro “legal” da RAEM. No entanto, a mudança social desempenha um papel importante. [Autor: Jean A. Berlie, pp. 58-71]

Conflito e Fusão entre as Culturas Orientais e Ocidentais na Perspectiva da Arte Sacra em Macau

Este artigo tenta aprofundar o fenómeno do intercâmbio das artes sino-ocidentais devido à introdução da arte sacra em Macau durante os séculos XVI e XVII, a partir de diferentes perspectivas

e abordagens, e centra-se no impacto e importância da integração das diferentes nações e culturas. A arte ocidental foi introduzida na China através da arte sacra, com a sua forma especial de expressão e linguagem. O processo desde a introdução, à localização e saída da arte em Macau, também pode ser considerado um processo de contacto, conflito e fusão entre a Arte Oriental e Ocidental. A arte sacra em Macau não só herda a tradição da arte sacra ocidental como também combina as características da cultura e pintura chinesas, sendo entretanto influenciada por outras culturas asiáticas. Os primórdios das artes plásticas em Macau desempenham um papel importante na comunicação e integração das culturas chinesa e ocidental através da absorção e criação de obras de arte sacra. [Autor: Lan Wang, pp. 72-78]

Os Francesas e as Novas Tendências Arquitectónicas em Cantão, 1767-1820

No século XVIII, a França exerceu uma influência cultural que se espalhou muito além das fronteiras do país. Com início no final dos anos 1760, essa influência estendeu-se a um trecho da frente ribeirinha de Cantão (Guangzhou). Na que já era uma agitada área comercial fora dos muros da cidade, vários edifícios foram alugados (e, por vezes mais tarde, adquiridos) por membros da comunidade de comércio internacional, incluindo os funcionários das várias empresas europeias das Índias Orientais. Os edifícios, propriedade de um grupo de comerciantes chineses conhecidos como mercadores *hong*, albergavam não só escritórios e espaço de armazenamento, mas também acomodações. Mas os *hong* eram muito mais do que apenas edifícios de conveniência. Sendo o símbolo mais visível da presença de uma nação em Cantão, tornou-se o rosto dessa nação na China e a sua fachada a expressão externa do sucesso nacional no comércio de Cantão, altamente competitivo.No final dos anos 1760, os franceses realizaram a primeira de uma série de reformas nas fachadas dos seus *hong*. As reformas, que

inicialmente tornaram os *hong* visualmente distintos, logo foram sendo emuladas por uma série de outras nações. Os franceses não foram apenas líderes no estilo, mas também actuaram como intermediários na arquitectura, especialmente nos primeiros anos, por seus restauros que combinavam elementos da arquitetura vernacular cantonense com os de origem europeia. [Autora: Susan E. Schopp, pp. 79-87]

A Imagem da Mulher como Reflexo da Mudança na China

A imagem da mulher na arte chinesa mudou substancialmente desde que se tornou a personificação do desejo, no final do século XIX, ou um pouco mais cedo, quando a proscrição confucionista contra o retrato sensual das mulheres enfraqueceu. Em meados do século XX, a imagem da mulher reflectia o roteiro artístico determinado pelo estado para demonstrar o sucesso das suas políticas sociais. Mais tarde, artistas masculinos utilizavam a figura feminina para expressar sentimentos pessoais: inicialmente para expressar optimismo no futuro e, seguidamente, para representar decepção quanto aos inúmeros problemas associados com o rápido avanço para o capitalismo, destruição da natureza, da cultura nativa e responsabilidades éticas. As mulheres na sociedade contemporânea da China ainda são limitadas por valores patriarcais estabelecidos pelo confucionismo. Poucas mulheres têm ascendido nos negócios ou na política, e a população feminina está a diminuir, graças à prática do aborto selectivo. A sua situação reflecte-se também no papel limitado que desempenham no mundo da arte – quer exibindo em museus e galerias ou gerindo instituições de arte. Talvez seja essa marginalidade e fragilidade que inspira os artistas masculinos a utilizar a imagem de mulheres para expressar as suas esperanças, sonhos e desilusões. Ao averiguar a representação das mulheres executada por mulheres artistas descortina-se uma posição mais realista do corpo feminino, em comparação com as imagens uniformemente glamorosas feitas por artistas masculinos. Também revela

o envolvimento das artistas na luta pela auto-investigação através do auto-retrato. [Autora: Patricia Eichenbaum Karetzky, pp. 88-95]

Contestando os Níveis de Il / legalidade das Imagens de Arte Urbana na China

Um número crescente de pessoas em todo o mundo considera a cidade como uma enorme tela e tem por objectivo animar o cenário monocromático. Desde meados da década de 1990 este fenómeno visual, em constante mudança, deixou gradualmente a sua marca nas paredes das grandes cidades chinesas. Embora a criação ilegal constitua o valor fundamental para a maioria dos criadores de imagens de arte urbana na China – especialmente para os representantes da “velha escola de graffiti”, as percepções de ilegalidade são claramente contestadas através de uma variedade de actividades legais e semi-il/legais por parte dos criadores, cidadãos e também funcionários. Através de um número seleccionado de exemplos recentes de Pequim, Xangai, Hong Kong, Macau e Shenzhen, examino neste artigo como os níveis de imagens de arte urbana legais, semi-legais, semi-clandestinas e ilegais dependem da interacção de quatro variáveis, ou seja, o formato e o conteúdo das imagens de arte urbana, o comportamento do criador e o local físico em questão. Com base em períodos de intenso trabalho de campo desde 2006, que me permitiram documentar as cenas com milhares de fotografias, observar pessoalmente eventos e actividades e dar-lhes seguimento através de reuniões repetidas e entrevistas aprofundadas com vários actores da cena de arte urbana, o objectivo é esclarecer o tipo de impacto que estas quatro variáveis têm neste complexo processo de negociação de il/legalidade. [Autora: Minna Valjakka, pp. 96-117]

Tecnologia de Impressão e Transferência de Conhecimento: O Elo Cultural de Poder na Ásia Oriental no Início do Século XX

Um recente estudo mostrou que o capitalismo editorial na Ásia Oriental, no início do século XX, foi facilitado

por uma mistura criativa de culturas estrangeiras e locais disseminou-se através de um teia regional de circulação do conhecimento. Mais significativamente, o capitalismo editorial na Ásia Oriental esteve ligado (e, em alguns casos, foi resultado de) à expansão do mercado leitor, onde as exigências de textos impressos aumentaram rapidamente, devido às mudanças sociais e políticas. Para esclarecer a complexidade da transferência de tecnologia no início do século XX na Ásia Oriental, este ensaio centra-se em duas imprensas chinesas de Xangai: a da Associação para a Preservação da Aprendizagem Nacional (*Guoxue baocunhui yinshua suo*, 1905-1911) e a Commercial Press (*Shangwu yinshuguan*, 1897-até ao presente). No início do século XX, a primeira tirava o seu lucro da reimpressão de livros e obras de arte antigas, e a segunda tornou-se a maior editora de livros didácticos no país. Em ambos os casos, a tecnologia de impressão mecanizada do Ocidente permitiu-lhes produzir um grande número de livros, revistas e textos à velocidade da luz. Juntas, demonstram a vasta audiência que a moderna imprensa chinesa serviu à medida que a sociedade chinesa se tornava mais fluida e diversificada no final do período imperial. Acima de tudo, mostram a importância da teia de circulação de conhecimentos da Ásia Oriental, quando ambas as contaram com tecnologia japonesa para melhorar a qualidade dos textos reproduzidos. [Autor: Tze -ki Hon, pp. 118-126]

Fé e Caridade: A Gestão Cristã dos Desastres no Sul da China

Um bom exemplo da força de uma comunidade é a sua capacidade para lidar com crises. Isso foi particularmente verdadeiro para os cristãos falantes de Chaozhou, do nordeste da província de Guangdong, na década de 1920. Este artigo examina como os Chaozhou Baptistas e Presbiterianos se socorreram dos recursos sócio-religiosos para lidar com os efeitos devastadores de um tufão em 2 de Agosto de 1922. A gestão cristã de desastres constituiu uma operação de grande escala, de multi-camadas que

mobilizou um grande número de missionários estrangeiros, líderes religiosos, professores nativos da missão, alunos e fiéis locais para reconstruir as comunidades atingidas e preencher o vazio institucional deixado por um Estado fraco no início da era republicana. [Autor: Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, pp. 127-138]

Chineses Timorenses e Chineses em Timor-Leste

No século XIV, nas regiões costeiras da ilha de Timor, os chineses estavam entre os primeiros interessados em negociar o rico sândalo. Em Díli, mais de cinco séculos depois, o Pagode Guandi e o Cemitério Chinês (*Cina Rate* em tétum) – no subúrbio de Audian – são lembranças históricas da presença dos chineses Hakka em Timor-Leste. Para atestar a evolução da educação em Chinês basta mencionar que, na década de 1980, a Escola Secundária Chinesa de Díli estava activa. Esta escola pública é famosa porque é actualmente uma importante mesa de voto em Díli; no entanto, a língua chinesa deixou de lá ser ensinada. Este artigo apresenta brevemente a minha pesquisa sobre os chineses Hakka de Timor-Leste, principalmente da província de Guangdong, e outros chineses Han que vieram mais tarde, após 2000. Explica por que tantos chineses se fixaram em Timor- Leste (nome oficial Timor Lorosae) para desenvolver o seu talento empreendedor. [Autor: Jean A. Berlie, pp. 139-144]

ABSTRACTS

ABSTRACTS

ICAS 8 and the Rise of Asia

This introduction highlights the theoretical significance of Asia in advancing a more pluralistic and less hegemonic understanding of humanity. It discusses the prospect and obstacles in the process, and underlines the role of ICAS 8 in such endeavour. [Author: Tak-Wing Ngo, pp. 6-11]

Asia is Rising—But Where is it Going? Thoughts on an Emergent Discourse

The article addresses a number of questions thrown up by the discourse of ‘Asia rising’, and offers critical reflections not only on the rise of Asia but also the discourse of ‘the rise’. It begins with the recognition that development has brought about significant transformation in a number of Asian societies, in inter-state relations across Asia, and in the geopolitical map of the world. The hype over ‘the rise of Asia’, however, disguises no less urgent problems of unequal development within and between societies, effective political marginality or marginalisation of significant populations, transfer of material and intellectual resources away from local needs to global transactions, environmental destruction, pressure on resources, ethnic conflict, cultural disorientation and incoherence and critical inter-state conflict. These problems are widely recognised but more often than not swept under the rug as distortions left over from the past, with the promise of immanent resolution once the current crisis is over and the wrinkles have been ironed away. The author suggests to the contrary that they are products of incorporation within the global capitalist system, or have been exacerbated by it, and their entanglements are not just national or ‘Asian’ but global. Despite immediate benefits it has brought, development through incorporation in neoliberal global capitalism has launched these societies on paths that are no more sustainable in ‘Asia’ than elsewhere. [Author: Arif Dirlik, pp. 12-31]

The International and the Macao Harbour Project of 1922-1927

The city of Macao, its Governor Artur Tamagnini Barbosa and his brother João, along with General Gomes da Costa and Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues, were playing a much larger role in global political movements than has heretofore been reported. This was a role that clearly linked revolutionary change in Portugal to developments in Macao and in South China. General Gomes da Costa and Dr. Rodrigues represented opposite ends of the Portuguese political perspective when they were both assigned to Macao from 1922 to 1924. Rodrigues came as Governor; Gomes da Costa came as head of a military mission to the Far East. Rodrigues arrived to facilitate the construction of Macao’s Outer Harbour project at the same time Sun Yat Sen was building the KMT and the Revolutionary army in Canton with the assistance of the Comintern. General Gomes da Costa would return to Portugal in May 1924 and within 24 months would lead the legendary coup of 28 May 1926 that would overthrow the 1st Portuguese Republic and usher in 48 years of single party rule under Salazar. This paper explores why these two political adversaries were sent to Macao in the same year. Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues, a long-term scion of the leftist Democratic Party of Afonso Costa, had been head of the Portuguese penal system as the new Republican government implemented a vicious anti-clerical and anti-monarchist campaign following its October 1910 coup d’état. After the military coup by General Gomes in May 1926, Rodrigues would be sidelined from any government post, and with the advent of Salazar in 1928 would never again hold governmental office. He would, however, continue to publish opinions and articles in the Portuguese language press of Macao until his death in the early 1960s. [Author: Paul B. Spooner, pp. 32-43]

Clandestinity and Control: The Macao Congress of the Indochina Communist Party (27-31 March 1935)

Undoubtedly clandestine organisations have a long history in Macao if we think of proto-Republicans and Masonics in the age of monarchy, guilds and triads in the Chinese tradition, and the subject of this paper, underground communists, not even Chinese, but Vietnamese. Just as clandestinity might be defined as the quality or state of secrecy or furtiveness in evading control or surveillance in order to accomplish sometimes illicit goals, so late colonial Macao offered a liminal space. Apparently unknown to the Portuguese authorities, Vietnamese communists chose this location to host the landmark first national conference of the newly-formed Indochinese Communist Party bringing to Macao a veritable Who’s Who of first generation Vietnamese and ethnic minority communist leaders. Yet, notwithstanding the clandestine character of the underground organisation, codes of secrecy, use of aliases, etc., they were compromised and penetrated, not by the Salazarist authorities but by the French. This article, accordingly, seeks to offer some home truths on clandestinity as a trope, clandestine organisations in late colonial Macao, the transient connection between Vietnam and Macao as signalled by the gathering of conference delegates, the still contemporary question of extradition of political cases, and the Macao Congress of the Indochina Communist Party itself. [Author: Geoffrey C. Gunn, pp. 44-57]

Macao’s Identity, Chinese and Other Groups. A Decade after the Return to China

Identity is a key concept in the 21st century. The Macao Special Administration of China (MSAR) has a unique identity. Based on long research between 1995 and 2012, the definition of the identity of Macao Chinese and other MSAR’s residents is a model to make understandable a complex social and economic reality based on 500 years’

history. Macao Chinese speak Cantonese, an unavoidable social fact. In the MSAR, to deal with the complex reality of Cantonese, *Putonghua* and the traditional ‘Chinese characters’ we have only two words ‘Chinese language’ in the Basic Law (I-9). However, we cannot deny the importance of Cantonese. This Basic Law of Macao is a constitutional law and in particular its ‘way of life’ is the basis of the ‘legal’ identity (I-5). Cantonese is a part of it. The fashionable Cantonese opera constitutes another ‘matrix’. In March 2013 the Jiangmen Cantonese Opera Troupe went to Macao. Portuguese, an official language, tries to find a linguistic space between English and Putonghua, Brazil and the Lusophone world supports it. Both Portuguese and Chinese are official languages. However, except during non-Chinese official ceremonies and, for example, to get a job or a university degree, Portuguese is not really promoted in the MSAR. The MSAR concept of ‘Chineseness’ dominates the identity, but the Basic Law is the constitutional law of Macao. There are indeed some cultural differences, but following 5,000 years of history to be ‘Chinese’ means something concerning identity, society and culture. Before any other cultural trait, the Chinese residents in the MSAR have an identity given by the ‘Chinese language’. The ‘way of life’ of the Basic Law (I-5), the economy and permanent residents, are part of the ‘legal’ framework of the MSAR. However, social change plays an important role [Author: Jean A. Berlie, pp. 58-71]

The Conflict and Merging between Eastern and Western Cultures from the Perspective of the Christian Art in Macao

This article attempts to elaborate the Sino-Western Fine Arts exchanges phenomenon due to the introduction of Christian art into Macao during the 16-17th century from different perspectives and approaches, and focuses on the impact and significance of the integration of different nations and cultures. At the very beginning, western art was introduced into China through the Christian art, which has

its special form of expression and language. The process from input to localisation to output of Macao’s art can also be considered the process of contact, conflict, and merging between Eastern and Western Art. The Christian art in Macao not only inherits the tradition of Western Christian art, but also combines the features of Chinese culture and painting, and meanwhile is influenced by other Asian cultures. Macao’s early fine arts play an important role in the communication and integration between Chinese and Western cultures through the absorption and creation of Christian works of art. [Author: Lan Wang, pp. 72-78]

The French as Architectural Trendsetters in Canton, 1767-1820

In the 18th century, France exerted a cultural influence that spread well beyond the nation’s borders. Beginning in the late 1760s, this influence also extended to a stretch of riverfront at Canton (Guangzhou). Here, in what was already a thriving commercial district outside the city walls, a number of buildings were rented out to (and sometimes later owned by) members of the international trading community, including employees of the various European East India companies. The buildings, which were owned by a group of Chinese traders known as hong merchants, provided not only office and warehouse space, but also accommodations. But the hong was far more than just a useful building. As the most visible symbol of a nation’s presence at Canton, it became the face of that nation in China—and its façade an outward expression of national success in the highly competitive Canton trade. In the late 1760s, the French carried out the first of a series of renovations to the façade of their hong. The renovations, which initially made their hong visually distinctive, were soon being emulated by a number of other nations. Yet not only were the French style leaders; they also served as architectural go-betweens, especially in the early years, for their renovations combined elements

of Cantonese vernacular architecture with those of European origin. [Author: Susan E. Schopp, pp. 79-87]

The Image of Woman as a Reflection of Change in China

The image of women in Chinese art has substantially changed since it first became the embodiment of desire at the end of the 19th century, if not somewhat earlier, when the Confucian proscription against the sensual portrayal of women weakened. By the mid-20th century the image of women reflected the artistic agenda determined by the state to demonstrate the success of their social policies. Later male artists used the female figure to express more personal feelings; first to express optimism for the future and then to represent disappointment in the numerous problems associated with the rapid march to capitalism, the destruction of nature, and native culture and ethical responsibilities. Women in China’s contemporary society are still limited by patriarchal values established under Confucianism. Few women have achieved ascendance in business or politics, and the female population is decreasing, thanks to the practice of selective abortion. Their situation is reflected in the limited role they play in the art world—whether exhibiting in the upper echelons of museums and galleries or in running the various art institutions. Perhaps it is this marginality and their fragility that inspires the male artists to use women as an image to express their hopes, dreams and disappointments. An inquiry into the portrayal of women by women reveals more down to earth renderings of the female body, in comparison to the uniformly glamorous images made by male artists. These also reveal female artists’ engagement in the struggle of self-investigation through the means of the self-portrait. [Author: Patricia Eichenbaum Karetzky, pp. 88-95]

Contesting the Levels of Il/legality of Urban Art Images in China

A growing number of people around the globe regard a city as a huge canvas and aim to enliven the monochromic scenery.

RESUMOS

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Since the mid-1990s this continuously changing visual phenomenon has gradually left its mark on the walls of major Chinese cities. Although illegal creation is still the core value for the majority of the creators of urban art images in China—especially for the representatives of ‘old school graffiti’—the perceptions of illegality are clearly contested through a variety of legal and semi-il/legal activities by the creators, citizens and officials alike. Through a selected number of recent examples from Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Macao and Shenzhen, I examine in this article how the levels of legal, semi-legal, semi-illegal and illegal urban art images depend on the interaction of four variables, namely the format and the content of the urban art images, the behaviour of the creator and the physical site in question. Based on intensive fieldwork periods since 2006, which have enabled me to document the scenes with thousands of photographs, observe events and activities in person and follow them up through repeated meetings and in-depth interviews with various actors of the urban art scene, the aim is to elucidate what kind of impact these four variables have in this complex negotiation process of il/legality.
[Author: Minna Valjakka, pp. 96-117]

Printing Technology and the Transfer of Knowledge: The Cultural Nexus of Power in Early 20th-century East Asia
Recent scholarship has shown that East Asian print capitalism in the early 20th century was facilitated by a creative mixing of foreign and local cultures, and was disseminated through a regional web of knowledge circulation. More significantly, East Asian print capitalism was tied to (and in some cases, a result of) the expansion of the reader market where the demands for printed texts increased by leaps and bounds due to social and political changes. To elucidate the complexity of technology transfer in early 20th-century East Asia, this essay focuses on two Chinese presses in Shanghai: The Press for the Association

for the Preservation of National Learning (*Guoxue baocunhui yinshua suo* 1905-1911) and the Commercial Press (*Shangwu yinshuguan* 1897-present). In the early 20th century, the former made profit by reprinting ancient books and artworks, and the latter became the largest textbook publisher in the country. In both cases, the Western mechanised printing technology allowed the publishers to produce large numbers of books, journals, and texts at lightning speed. Together, they demonstrated the broad range of audience that the modern Chinese presses served as the Chinese society became more fluid and diverse at the end of the imperial period. Above all, they showed the importance of the East Asian web of knowledge circulation when both presses relied on Japanese technology to improve the quality of reproducing texts.
[Author: Tze-ki Hon, pp. 118-126]

Faith and Charity: The Christian Disaster Management in South China
A good measure of a community’s strength is its ability to handle crises. This was particularly true for the Chaozhou-speaking Christians in northeast Guangdong Province during the 1920s. This article examines how Chaozhou Baptists and Presbyterians employed socio-religious resources to cope with the devastating effects of a typhoon on 2 August 1922. The Christian disaster management was a large-scale, multi-layered operation that mobilised large numbers of foreign missionaries, native church leaders, mission schoolteachers and students, and local congregants to rebuild stricken communities and to fill the institutional void left by a weak state in the early Republican era.
[Author: Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, pp. 127-138]

Timorese Chinese and Chinese in East Timor
In the 14th century, in coastal regions of the Island of Timor, Chinese were among the first who were interested in trading the rich sandalwood from Timor. In Dili, more than five centuries later, the Guandi Pagoda and the Chinese

Cemetery (*Cina Rate* in Tetum)—in the Audian suburb—stand as historical reminders of the key presence of Hakka Chinese in East Timor. To attest to the evolution of education in Chinese it is enough to mention that in the 1980s the Chinese Secondary School of Dili was active. This public school is famous because it is currently an important voting station in Dili; however, the Chinese language is not taught there anymore. This article presents briefly my research on the Hakka Chinese of East Timor—mainly from Eastern Guangdong Province—and other Han Chinese who came later after the year 2000. It will explain why so many Chinese came to East Timor (official name Timor Lorosae) to develop their entrepreneurial talent.
[Author: Jean A. Berlie, pp. 139-144]

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
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