

Portuguese Daman under Pressure The Mughal Threat (1572-1605)

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Ceded by the sovereign of Gujarat, the fortress of Daman, possessed by the Abyssinian forces which were settled there, was conquered by Portuguese troops in 1559, commanded by Constantino de Bragança. Aggregated with its surroundings to the *Estado da Índia*, it would be part of the territory later known as *Província do Norte* (Northern Province).

Placed at the entrance of the Gulf of Cambay, its importance arose not only from the fact that its territories were rather rich in timber and provisions, but also for serving as a means of protection to the rich land of Bassein, which was economically much more important than Daman. This fortress had an important and strategic role controlling the maritime trade networks of the region. For these reasons, and from the very beginning, it was a strategic area from the military point of view, and that is why the Portuguese paid special attention to the military organisation of this fortress as well as to the improvement of its defensive systems.

After the fortress of Daman was conquered, and due to the great instability caused by the constant attacks launched by Abexin forces, the Portuguese fortified Daman with a significant contingent of

troops composed of 500 infantry soldiers (many of them musketeers) and 150 cavalry soldiers. Because of their high price, the horses were bought by the Crown, locally or in Ormuz, and delivered to noblemen with delayed pays who had the economic capacity to keep them.¹ In the beginning, and due to the great danger then weighing on the lands of Daman, only a few of those Portuguese noblemen accepted to rent their villages under the regime of *prazos*.² Then the Governor had to rent the greatest part of those lands and villages to the *casados*,³ these having the obligation of possessing horses to fight. He also rented some lands to Christian Abexins, but then only under the obligation of owning muskets.⁴ In addition to these forces, the Portuguese also created small military contingents that were mostly filled with local soldiers, some of them being natives from Goa, in order to provide the garrisons of forts and 'fences of stakes' (*tranqueiras*) of the *tanadarias*.⁵

Simultaneously, the fortification of Daman was done by surrounding it with 'large and deep moats, and with palisades or fences of stakes made of wood and shrubs with thorns and also poisonous.'⁶ In the *tanadarias* the existing forts were reinforced with scaffolding and watch-boxes and, as well as in Tarapore, of wild palm trees stuck in the ground very close together and lined inside with bamboo mats.⁷ These were the means used to resist both the attacks from Ahmadnagar forces and the incursions and

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HISTORIOGRAFIA


plunderings of, among others, the Abexins, Chouteas and Coles. They were also meant to defend themselves from the attacks of pirates, who were very dangerous to the population and its sea trade. That is why all those forts and fences of stakes were built near the main rivers very close to the coast and even in their mouths. Furthermore, such a location enabled help to be sent by sea to their garrisons much faster and more efficiently in case of attack. This is the main reason why the fort of Balsar, north of Daman, which had been conquered and garrisoned, had to be abandoned: being placed too much to the interior of Daman's lands, any support was difficult to provide.⁸

Some years later, as a result of some quietness in that area (there were only a few incursions of Cambay captains after Sultan Mahamud's death), the military structure of Daman tended to become similar to that of Bassein. Its lands were rented to Portuguese *prazeiros* who were obliged to live in the fortress and own a certain number of horses and weapons which should vary according to the profits of their lands. Of the 226 men, 150 of them were bound to sustain Arabian horses, 37 to sustain native horses, and 39 were bound 'to serve with their muskets.'⁹ The fortress garrison of Daman totalled about one hundred men, a number which would remain almost unchanged during the whole period, testifying to its efficiency.¹⁰ In the composition of these military forces, the corps of bombardiers, formed by a commander (*condestável*) and twelve artillery men who manoeuvred the artillery, stood out for its importance. The garrison also had a corps of the captain's guard with thirty soldiers, and a corps of men of arms directly depending on him, forty in number, mainly from his lineage or close to him. The small crew of the *galveta*¹¹ was also important; this

boat with small oars was permanently stationed there and had the mission of giving support to the fortress and of keeping it connected to the neighbouring fortresses.¹²

Concerning the garrisons of the small forts and fences of stakes of the *tanadarias* of Sangens, Tarapor, Danu and Quelme-Maim, their structure was patterned, each of them consisting of twenty-seven men, seven of whom were Portuguese (one captain and six soldiers). Those military forces, given their small dimensions, were supported by four hundred soldiers, with the obligation to guard and defend the forts and the lands of Daman.¹³

The defence of Daman depended on the joint action of a series of quite different military structures, composed of Portuguese soldiers, *prazeiros*, who formed the main branch of the cavalry, and Indian soldiers, mainly in charge of keeping vigilance on the *passos*¹⁴ and inland. Besides those military corps, Daman was supported by the fleets operating in the area or sent by other fortresses, namely Bassein, Chaul and Goa. That fact enabled a considerable increase in the number of soldiers in action, thus avoiding the rising of conflicts. Therefore, in August 1572, when it became known in Goa that the conquest of the kingdom of Cambay by the Akbar army was eminent, is not surprising that Viceroy D. António de Noronha sent a strong fleet to Daman. Knowing 'it was necessary to secure the fortresses of the *Província do Norte*,' he quickly sent Jorge de Moura as captain of a fleet of seven oar ships, with instructions 'not to antagonise the Akbar into warfare, but only to show him the strength of the Portuguese naval power. At the same time, Jorge de Moura should secretly prevent the passage of supplies to Cambay.'¹⁵



HISTORIOGRAPHY



The fortress of Daman. From *O Livro de Plantaforma das Fortalezas da Índia da Biblioteca da Fortaleza de S. Julião da Barra*. Facsimile of the original, previously unpublished 17th century manuscript, edited by Rui Carita. Lisbon: Ministério da Defesa Nacional/Edições Inapa, 1999.

Two months later, since the captain of Daman had asked for reinforcements, alleging that 'the city was without walls and it was necessary to help it, so that the Mughals could not cause any harm if they were tempted to do so,' a new fleet of two galleys and seven *fustas*¹⁶ was sent from Goa. This new fleet had on board military reinforcements and workers, namely carpenters and masons, for the beginning of the construction of the walls.¹⁷ According to Couto, in order to face the imminent attack by the Akbar army, Daman's captain, D. Luís de Almeida, hastened to fortify the city the best and fastest he could.¹⁸ According to Friar João dos Santos, the author of the sketched plan of the fortress may have been the nephew of the Archbishop of Braga, Friar D. Bartolomeu dos Mártires, who had learnt the arts of fortification in Flanders.¹⁹ These data reinforce the idea previously asserted by Walter Rossa

and reported in *Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas*²⁰ that the sketch of the plan and the starting of the works could not have been assigned to João Baptista Cairato, the Italian architect who would later perform the functions of chief engineer (*engenheiro-mór*) in India between 1583 and 1596. According to Walter Rossa, the works in Daman's wall fortress started at the beginning of 1570.²¹

Since the situation became worse due to the threats of the Mughals, whose military commanders had ordered that Daman should be emptied, the Governor D. António de Noronha armed a very strong fleet composed of five galleons, eight small galleys and seventy-six *fustas*, with 3000 soldiers on board. After his arrival in Bassein, knowing that the Mughal troops were near Daman, Noronha went quickly to its defence, sending some military corps by land.²² After landing

HISTORIOGRAFIA

in Daman and realising that the defensive perimeter of the fortress was totally unprotected, 'because the city walls were no more than some refuse stuck entangled with trees and poisonous bushes, and the bulwarks were made in the same fashion,' the Governor ordered some artillery guns to be placed so as to sweep the fields ahead. This measure resulted in a considerable reinforcement of the fortress.²³

Considering the correlation of forces, and the fact that Akbar was not interested in opening a new front of conflict just at the moment when Muzzaffar Shah III abdicated power, leaving the situation of the Sultanate of Guzerate somewhat uncertain, the emperor preferred to open friendly negotiations with the Portuguese. Thus, he sent an ambassador to negotiate a truce with D. António de Noronha. From these negotiations resulted an imperial edict (*farman*) to the officers of the Empire, dated 18 March 1573, which imposed the rules for good neighbourly relations with the Portuguese and also recognised their ownership of Daman.²⁴ In exchange, the Portuguese should allow, in a pragmatic way, the sermon (*khutbah*) to be read in the name of Akbar in all the mosques of Diu, and his currency could be freely used.²⁵ They also granted the Emperor the right of sending, yearly, to Mecca a ship free of duties.²⁶

Therefore, the establishment of commercial and diplomatic relationships resulted from bilateral interests. The Mughals were interested in letting Surratt continue to be supplied with silver coinage and with merchandise, and the traffic of the pilgrimage (*Hajj*) to be normally processed. For their part, the Portuguese were interested in imposing the policy of *cartazes*²⁷ on the navigation in that eastern area and in continuing to export Gujarati textiles through Goa. This procedure allowed them to keep the sea trade to and from the Gulf of Cambay and to collect in their customs taxes the profits from that commerce.

However, in spite of these approaches, strengthened by the presence of the Jesuits in the Mughal Court, the relationships between the two sides was marked by a permanent sense of conflict and fear on the Portuguese side caused by the presence of such a powerful sovereign so close to the borders of Daman. In fact, occasional eruptions of violence, such as the one that occurred in 1581-1582 mainly as a consequence of problems related with freedom of navigation, contributed to the acceleration of the

fortification of Daman. By this time, the authorities had destined the amount of 80,000 *pardaus*²⁸ yearly to the fortification works of the fortress. Those conflicts gave rise to some changes in its military organisation, mainly in what concerned the corps of soldiers responsible for the defence of the whole area surrounding the fortress. These men, numbering four hundred,²⁹ would be substituted by local infantry troops (*peões da terra*), commanded by their *naiques*³⁰—this situation being kept through the years. These troops were not only much less costly, since the *prazeiros* were obliged to pay half of the cost, but also they ensured a more effective defence of the lands.³¹

Yet the attacks of 1582 on Daman (caused by the ceding of Bulsar to the Portuguese by the aunt of Akbar, on the eve of her departure to *Hajj*) made by the Mughal forces of Qutb ud-Din Khan, Shihab ud-Din Khan and Qilij Khan Andijani, would prove that the Portuguese forces, in combination with the reinforcing fleets sent by other fortresses of the *Estado da Índia*, were able to hold back the most serious military offensive action against the city in spite of the great weakness of the fortress, whose walls were opened in several places.³² For this achievement the Portuguese artillery made a decisive contribution that forced the Mughal captains to turn their attacks on the *tanadarias* of Daman, especially the one of Tarapor, which was plundered because of its riches.³³

Notwithstanding the fact that for the following years no significant attacks were registered from the Mughal forces against the fortress of Daman or its *tanadarias*, it is a fact that the permanent pressure by the armies of Akbar on the Sultanate of Ahmadnagar and other local kingdoms, such as the Sarcetas or the Coles, caused the political and military situation all around Daman to be marked by great instability. In fact, not only did the military forces of those neighbouring kingdoms frequently invade and plunder Daman's *tanadarias*, but also the Mughal cavalry itself chased those forces and attacked them in their own territories.³⁴

It is easy to understand the growing concern of the Portuguese authorities to send contingents of soldiers to winter there³⁵ and to force the *prazeiros* of Daman to fulfil their military duties and to remain in the fortress under the legal penalty of losing 'their rents and all the revenues they owned in those lands and villages.'³⁶ Similarly, they made a significant effort to

HISTORIOGRAPHY

accelerate the works of the fortification of Daman and its *tanadarias*, as they had done in Tarapor. The latter, having been one of the most sacrificed throughout the years, was surrounded by defensive walls and bulwarks. This was an expensive work paid for by the Portuguese Crown and the residents.

In the case of Daman, the procedure of its fortification was, from the very beginning, a matter of Crown concern. As previously stated, the payment for the works was the responsibility of the Crown and the Municipality, each of them contributing 80,000 *pardaus*, to which a turnover tax of 1% was added while the works were underway. However, as it was a crucial work involving very high costs, the Portuguese Crown would further grant the city of Daman the incomes of a voyage to China, which resulted in enormous profits. However, the use of these profits caused a lot of conflicts between the Municipality and the Jesuits, who were, from 1590, in charge of the administration of the building of the fortress.³⁷ These disputes were probably one of the main reasons why, in 1605, the wall was not yet finished.³⁸


As a matter of fact, at that time the city's attorney informed the viceroy that Daman continued to be a fortress in great danger from the Mughals even though 'closed around with stones, in some places being very low which should be raised as soon as possible.'³⁹ The fear of an eventual attack from the 'concealed enemy' was then greater than ever before because, once having definitively suffocated resistance in Gujarat and conquered Sind in the decade 1590, the West was not any more a preoccupation to Akbar. This fact gave him the opportunity to concentrate on the Deccan, where he had been leading a war of attrition against the Sultanate of Ahmadnagar, which ended in 1600 by the conquest of the fort of Ahmadnagar followed in January 1601 by Asirgah, having met only the opposition of the Abexin Malik Ambar.⁴⁰

The defence of Daman from the Mughal enemy did not rely exclusively on military means. The authorities of the *Estado da Índia* developed, mainly from the decade of 1580, an important diplomatic activity which worked based on data provided by an extensive network of secret agents and of individuals living either in the areas under Akbar's domination, or in the sultanates of Ahmadnagar and Bijapur, or even in the small neighbouring kingdoms. In fact, from the intense correspondence between the Portuguese Crown

and the Municipality of Goa, one can understand how important this activity was in trying to throw those sovereigns against the Mughals and to attract them to the Portuguese orbit in order to avoid dispersing Portuguese troops on several fronts.⁴¹

The conduct of these matters was always made with maximum prudence by the Portuguese authorities so that the troops of Akbar would not turn against them, which, if it happened, would be disastrous for the Portuguese fortresses bordering Akbar's dominions, especially Daman. The King of Portugal instructed Viceroy Matias de Albuquerque at all costs and with

Viceroy Matias de Albuquerque (1591-1597).



HISTORIOGRAFIA

a maximum of discretion to promote the coalition of the principal kingdoms of Deccan, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur against the Mughals, thus allowing a decrease of the pressure on Daman. He also instructed him to continue to make efforts to approach Akbar, chiefly through the presence of Jesuits in the Mughal Court, even though by that time it was surely known by the Portuguese authorities that 'the hopes taken on his conversion are faked and uncertain'.⁴²

Referring to the action developed by Matias de Albuquerque, we know that during his term he

Viceroy D. Francisco da Gama (1597-1600 and 1622-1628).



sent several ambassadors to the kings neighbouring Daman to urge them to form 'an alliance against the Mughals'.⁴³ These possibly contributed to the coalition of the forces of Ahmadnagar, Golconda and Bijapur, which in January 1597 fought against the Mughals in Sonepate. However, the defeat of the coalition at the hands of Akbar's armies and the destruction of a strong contingent of troops from Bijapur commanded by Suhail Khan Habashi led to the start of negotiations between Sultan Ibrahim of Bijapur and the Mughals and put an end to any chances for a future alliance.

Even so, such happenings did not discourage his successor, D. Francisco da Gama, from trying to foment and feed any and all type of opposition to the forces of Akbar. This was done with all precautions, and he also paid special attention to maritime affairs in consequence of the rumours circulating from the end of 1597 mentioning that Akbar was preparing to build five hundred oar ships.⁴⁴ These rumours, which surged after the sending of a Mughal embassy to the Shah of Persia that had not succeed as expected, alarmed the Portuguese authorities, who immediately tried to enquire into its veracity. D. Francisco da Gama hastened to inform the Portuguese monarch that the rumours had no foundation, this being the reason why he would fear only 'the land enterprises of Akbar'.⁴⁵

One can conclude by saying that the fortress of Daman and the territories under its jurisdiction were, during the period under analysis, submitted to pressure resulting from the Mughal threat manifested in some cases by the direct military interventions on the fortress and its *tanadarias* and in other cases by indirect actions deriving from the expansion of the Empire of Akbar, which culminated with the conquest of Ahmadnagar. With Daman being situated in a broad area under permanent threat, it seems clear that the efficiency of the Portuguese answer to these problems was based on multiple factors: in the successive transformations and adaptations of their military structures; in the combination of their activities with those of successive fleets of assistance; and, no less important, as a result of diplomatic actions undertaken most ably in all those interventions. **RC**

HISTORIOGRAPHY

NOTES

- 1 Diogo do Couto, *Da Ásia de [...], dos feitos, que os Portuguezes fizeram no descubrimento e conquista dos mares, e terras do Oriente. Década VII*, book VI, chapter VI. Lisbon: Livraria S. Carlos, 1975, pp. 51-52.
- 2 Set of villages and agricultural land donated by the Portuguese Crown to a *prazeiro*, usually for a period of three generation lifetime. From those lands the *prazeiro* collected an income tax and he was obliged to fight with a variable number of horses according to the value of the *prazo*. The *prazos* system appears to combine the portuguese law and the Indo-Muslim institutions. About this subject see Luís Filipe dos Reis Thomaz, 'Estrutura política e administrativa do Estado da Índia no século XVI'. In *II Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa. Actas*, edited by Luís de Albuquerque and Inácio Guerreiro. Lisbon: Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical / Centro de Estudos e Cartografia Antiga, 1985, pp. 513-540.
- 3 Former Portuguese soldiers who married local women leaving the army.
- 4 Diogo do Couto, *Década VII*, book VI, chapter VI, pp. 42-43.
- 5 Military and administrative district for collection of taxes.
- 6 Ibid., p. 40.
- 7 Ibid., book VIII, chapter VI, p. 208.
- 8 That was, in fact, the reason evoked by the Capitão of Daman, D. Diogo de Noronha to oppose to its occupation. However, his opinion was dismissed by the viceroy D. Constantino. Ibid., book VI, chapter VII, p. 46.
- 9 *Regimentos das Fortalezas da Índia*, edited by Panduronga Sacarama Sinai Pissurlencar. Bastorá-Goa: Tipografia Rangel, 1951, p. 407.
- 10 The only change was at the level of the number of criados and parentes that could accompany the captain in the fortress. This number changed from 40 to 50 in 1588.
- 11 Small rowing and sailing vessel common in Daman.
- 12 See Table 1.
- 13 See Table 2.
- 14 Border areas of easier access to foreign armies.
- 15 Diogo do Couto, *Década IX*, chapter XIII, p. 67.
- 16 Ship long, narrow, shallow draft, right edge and bow with spur. It had a mast and a highly variable number of oars.
- 17 Ibid., pp. 67-69.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 According Friar João dos Santos that portuguese architect reached Índia in 1558 with the Viceroy D. Constantino de Bragança. In *Etiópia Oriental e Vária História das Cousas Notáveis do Oriente*, edited by Manuel Lobato and Maria do Carmo Guerreiro Vieira. Lisbon: Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses (CNCDP), 1999, book III, chapter IV, p. 254.
- 20 See *Livro das Cidades, e Fortalezas, que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas partes da Índia, e das Capitánias, e mais Cargos, que nelas ha, e da Importância delles*, edited by Francisco Mendes da Luz, *Stvdia*, no. 6. Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1960, pp. 41-42.
- 21 Walter Rossa, *Cidades Indo-Portuguesas. Contribuição para o Estudo do Urbanismo Português no Hindustão Ocidental*. Lisbon: CNCDP, 1997, pp. 77-80.
- 22 Diogo do Couto, *Década IX*, chapter XIII, pp. 72-74.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
- 24 The entire text was recently published by Jorge Manuel Flores and António de Saldanha, *The Firangis in the Mughal Chancellery (1572-1604)*. New Delhi: Portuguese Embassy, 2003, pp. 65-66.
- 25 Ibid., pp. 20 and 61-64.
- 26 Diogo do Couto, *Década IX*, chapter XIII, pp. 79-82.
- 27 Laissez-passer issued by the Portuguese to control the navigation of eastern ships in the Indian Ocean.
- 28 Ancient coin of Portuguese India, worth about 300 réis. See *Livro do Orçamento do rendimento de todas as fortalezas do Estado da Índia... Anno de 1581*. In Artur Teodoro de Matos, *O Estado da Índia nos Anos de 1581-1588. Estrutura Administrativa e Económica. Alguns Elementos para o Seu Estudo*. Ponta Delgada: Universidade dos Açores, 1982, pp. 93-95.
- 29 See Table 1.
- 30 Captains of local foot soldiers.
- 31 Artur Teodoro de Matos, 'O Orçamento do Estado da Índia de 1588'. *Povos e Culturas*, no. 8, Lisbon, 2003, pp. 316-317.
- 32 M. N. Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1976, pp. 57-60; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'O "Inimigo encuberto": A expansão mogol no Decão e o Estado da Índia, c. 1600'. *Povos e Culturas*, no. 5, Lisbon, 1996, pp. 132-134.
- 33 Diogo do Couto, *Década X*, book II, chapter VI, p. 194.
- 34 See *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, edited by Joaquim Heliodoro da Cunha Rivara. Nova Goa: Imprensa Nacional, 1857, fasc. 3, doc. 239, XIII, p. 672.
- 35 See *ibid.*, fasc. 3, doc. 206, XVI, p. 589.
- 36 The early known permit (*alvará*) on this subject is dated from 16 October. See *Regimentos das Fortalezas da Índia...*, p. 423.
- 37 See the letter of the King of Portugal to the Viceroy, 27 December 1598. *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, fasc. 3, doc. 368, I, p. 936.
- 38 See Sabine Choukroun, 'Damão. A fortaleza e o seu distrito'. In *Os Espaços de um Império. Estudos*. Porto: CNCDP, 1999, pp. 125-137.
- 39 See the missive of Goan Municipality to the King of Portugal, sent in the beginning of 1605. *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, fasc. 1, parte 2, doc. 13, XIV, p. 151.
- 40 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'O "Inimigo encuberto": A expansão mogol no Decão e o Estado da Índia, c. 1600', pp. 135-137.
- 41 See the letter of the portuguese King to the Viceroy, 1 March 1594. *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, fasc. 3, doc. 140, XXIX, pp. 429-430. Diogo do Couto mentions that on the occasion of the Mogul attack on Daman in 1582, the city's captain agreed with the King of the Sarcetas to move all its people and cradle into his lands. Such an agreement did actually caused a major conflict between the Portuguese and that King, which refused to return all their belongings to the people of Daman, once the war with the Moguls was over. See *Década X*, chapter XV, pp. 248-249.
- 42 See the letter of the Portuguese King to the Viceroy, 30 January 1597. *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, fasc. 3, doc. 239, XIII, p. 672.
- 43 Ibid., fasc. 3, doc. 304, II, pp. 800 e 801.
- 44 Ibid., fasc. 3, doc. 307, VI, pp. 814-815.
- 45 Ibid., fasc. 3, doc. 364, VIII, p. 915.

HISTORIOGRAFIA

TABLE 1: THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF DAMAN'S FORT (1564 -1607)

Fortress	Military Post	1564-1570 ¹		1574 ²		1581 ³		1588-1590 ⁴		1607 ⁵	
		no.	Pay	no.	Pay	no.	Pay	no.	Pay	no.	Pay
Daman (1559)	Captain	1	600,000	1	600,000	1	600,000	1	600,000	1	600,000
	Alcayde (major)	1	200,000	1	200,000	1	200,000	1	200,000	1	200,000
	Alcayde	1	18,000			1	18,000	1	18,000	1	
	Inspector of rounds (<i>sobrerrolada</i>)	1	18,000	1	18,000	1	18,000	1	18,000		
	Head of gunners	1	38,920	1	38,920	1	38,920	1	38,920	1	
	Gunners	12	14,400	12	14,400	12	14,400	12	14,400	12	
	Captain body of men	30		30	7,200	30		30		30	
	Relatives and dependents of the Captain	40		40		40		50		50	
	Trumpeters							4			
	Porter	1	15,600	1	15,600	1	15,600	1	15,600	1	15,600

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Alcayde of the harbour	1	20,000	1	20,000	1	20,000	1	20,000	?	
Sailors of the <i>galveta</i>	17		19		18		19			
Soldiers (Portuguese)	400		400		400		400		?	
Sentinels of the stockades			10	4 320			8			
Portuguese captain of the stockades	1	60,000	1	60,000	1	60,000	1	60,000	1	
<i>Naiques</i> and local soldiers of the stockades	104		104		104		12		4	
Local foot soldiers	51		51		51		53			
Servants	22		25		22		24			
Soldiers of the <i>prazeiros</i>	226									
Foot soldiers to be on guard of Daman land							500		?	
Others	7		17		15		31		27	
Total	900		714		700		1,151		?	

1 *Regimentos das Fortalezas da Índia*, edited by Panduronga Sacarama Sinai Pissurlencar. Bastorá-Goa: Tipografia Rangel, 1951.

2 António de Abreu, *Orçamento do Estado da Índia, 1574*, published by Jean Aubin, *Studia*, no. 4. Lisbon, 1959, pp. 169-289.

3 Simão do Rego Fialho, *Orçamento de 1581, de Simão do Rego Fialho e ordenado por D. Francisco de Mascarenhas Conde de Vila d'Orta, Vice-Rei da Índia*. In *O Estado da Índia nos Anos de 1581-1588. Estrutura Administrativa e Económica. Alguns Elementos para o seu Estudo*, edited by Artur Teodoro de Matos. Ponta Delgada: Universidade dos Açores, 1982.

4 *Orçamento do Estado da Índia, entre 1588 e 1590*, Bristish Library, Add. 28433, ff. 75-157.

5 Luiz de Figueiredo Falcão, *Livro em que se contém toda a Fazenda e Real patrimônio dos Reis de Portugal, Índia e Ilhas adjacentes e outras particularidades*, 1607, 2nd ed. Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1859, pp. 75-116; Biblioteca da Ajuda, 51-VI-54, ff. 271V-293, published by José-Gentil da Silva, 'Une image de l'Estado da Índia au début du XVII siècle et ses enseignements', *Arquivos do Centro Cultural Português*, vol. 2. Paris: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1977, pp. 242-287.

HISTORIOGRAFIA

TABLE 2: THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF DAMAN'S TANADARIAS (1564 -1607).

<i>Tanadarias</i>	Military Post	1564-1570 ¹		1574 ²		1581 ³		1588-1590 ⁴		1607 ⁶⁵	
		no.	Pay	no.	Pay	no.	Pay	no.	Pay	no.	Pay
Sangens	Captain and <i>Tanadar</i>	1	100,000	1	100,000	1	100,000	1	100,000		
	Portuguese soldiers	6		6		6		12			
	Foot soldiers	14		14		14		14			
	<i>Naiques</i>	1		1		1		1			
	Others	5		5		5		5			
	Total	27		27		27		33			553,500
Tarapur	Captain and <i>Tanadar</i>	1	100,000	1	100,000	1	100,000	1	100,000		
	Portuguese soldiers	6		6		6		6			
	Foot soldiers	14		14		14		14			
	<i>Naiques</i>	1		1		1		1			
	Others	5		5		5		5			
	Total	27		27		27		27			370,000
Quelme-Mahim	Captain and <i>Tanadar</i>	1	100,000	1	100,000	1	100,000	1			

HISTORIOGRAPHY

	Portuguese soldiers	6		6		6		6		
	Foot soldiers	14		14		14		14		
	<i>Naiques</i>	1		1		1		1		
	Others	5		5		5		5		
	Total	27		27		27		27		370,000
Danum	Captain and <i>Tanadar</i>			1	Leased	1	Leased	1	Leased	1 Leased
	Portuguese soldiers			6				10		4
	Foot soldiers			14						
	<i>Naiques</i>			1						
	Others	4		5						
	Total	4		27		1		11		
	Total <i>Tanadarias</i>	85		108		82		98		?
	Total of Daman	985		822		782		1,211		?

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- 3 Simão do Rego Fialho, *Orçamento de 1581, de Simão do Rego Fialho e ordenado por D. Francisco de Mascarenhas Conde de Vila d'Orta, Vice-Rei da Índia*. In *O Estado da Índia nos Anos de 1581-1588. Estrutura Administrativa e Económica. Alguns Elementos para o seu Estudo*, edited by Artur Teodoro de Matos. Ponta Delgada: Universidade dos Açores, 1982.
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